Cold War, 1980
|Date||1947 - 1991|
|Interest of||Simon Bracey-Lane, Melvin Goodman, George Kennan, Giles Scott-Smith|
|Description||The official narrative had 2 diametrically opposed systems locked in combat with one another since soon after WW2. Each of the "superpowers" and its team of allies needed to outdo each other by creating ever more and deadlier weapons, creating a kind of perpetual war for perpetual peace, with the warring parties engaging mainly in covert/proxy wars. Deep state interests blossomed in the climate of fear and paranoia.|
The Cold War was a polarising perspective that divided the world into two spheres of influence, each dominated by a "superpower" (the USA and the USSR). This was used in the 1950s and beyond to justify increased military expenditures in many countries, including those not at war.
The official narrative was of diametrically opposed systems locked in combat with one another since soon after WW2. In the blue corner, the US led NATO, in the red corner, the USSR led Warsaw Pact. Both of these so-called "superpowers" (and their allies) were locked in an arms race, needing to outdo each other by creating ever more and deadlier weapons of war and/or effective defenses against the other superpower's new weapons. National Security therefore meant that the welfare of citizens could not be the top priority.
The rapid fall of communist governments in the nations of Eastern Europe around 1989 and subsequent end of the USSR brought the cold war to a sharp and - for Western policy analysts at least, unexpectedly rapid end.
The cold war was undoubtedly real in the minds of many people, and the basic ideology behind it was more or less unquestioned by the commercially-controlled media. However, an examination of some of the less explored corners of history - for example, Operation Gladio and the activities of certain members of Le Cercle - would reveal that the notion of two ideologically opposed superpowers locked in opposition was a convenient yarn to spin for both the US and the USSR governments. Anthony Sutton has exposed that these 'enemies' did engage in more mutual assistance than was publicly admitted.
For a brief period after the end of the cold war, there was talk of a "peace dividend", i.e. a sharp decrease in military spending and a consequent increase in spending, worldwide, of benefit to humanity. This might logically have been presumed, if the military expenditures during the cold war were really a response to a communist threat. However, the exact opposite actually occurred - military spending increased, most notably after the "war on terror" was launched with the 9/11 attacks.
Echoing as it does the illusion that is 21st century party politics, the simplistic narrative of the Cold War polarised thought into an us/them, left/right perspective, narrowing thought and discourse about possible political systems. Many nation states, particularly in Africa chose not to align themselves with either "superpower". In the USA, the Soviet military threat was vastly exaggerated, so the need to maintain "parity" with the enemy was a fiction, albeit widely believed.
Mutually Assured Destruction
In his farewell speech as US President, the first commander of NATO, Dwight Eisenhower notably warned that "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex." This was not successfully guarded against, and the M.A.D. policy (Mutually Assured Destruction) presented no obstacle to the spiralling of military budgets (and hence profits) of the military contractors.
- Full article: “National Security”
- Full article: “National Security”
The ensuing climate of fear and paranoia provided a toxic environment in which the clandestine intelligence agencies thrived and the deep state using proxy wars to rapidly extend their power. Doctrines of "national security" were developed and refined to cloak wrongdoing and obscure the deep political significance of events.
Cold War II
- Full article: Cold War II
- Full article: Cold War II
Cold War II is a 21st century phenomenon. In Europe and the Americas this is manifested by Russophobic reporting of world events, and possible by the used of false flag attacks to try to assist in this process (e.g. the Skripal Affair.
|Document:Electronic Espionage - A Memoir||interview||August 1972||Perry Fellwock|
|Document:Psychological Warfare for the West: Interdoc and Youth Politics in the 1960s||book excerpt||2011||Giles Scott-Smith||A book chapter covering Interdoc's activities in the international student/youth field during the 1960s.|
|Document:Sins of Statecraft - The War on Terror Exposed||paper||29 July 2006||Brian Bogart|
|Document:The Spectacle of The False Flag||book||1 March 2015||Eric Wilson|
|File:Rogue Agents (3rd edition, 2011, full).pdf||book||2011||David Teacher||A book about the activities of the covert European groupings responsible for the realisation of the European Union between the end of World War II and the mid 1990's.|
|File:Rogue Agents (4th edition, 2015, full).pdf||book||2014||David Teacher||A book about the activities of the covert European groupings responsible for the realisation of the European Union between the end of World War II and the mid 1990's|
|File:Rogue Agents - the Cercle and the 6I in the Private Cold War 1951 - 1991 by David Teacher (5th edn, 2017).pdf||book||2017||David Teacher||A book about the activities of the covert European groupings responsible for the realisation of the European Union between the end of World War II and the mid 1990's.|
|Document:Psychological Warfare for the West: Interdoc and Youth Politics in the 1960s||“Psychological warfare has two sides: The build-up of moral strength within one's own side and the undermining of the morale of the opposing side.”||Cees van den Heuvel||1959|
|Document:Psychological Warfare for the West: Interdoc and Youth Politics in the 1960s||“We say to the leaders of the capitalist states: Let us try out in practice whose system is better, let us compete without war... The main thing is to keep to the positions of ideological struggle, without resorting to arms in order to prove that one is right... We believe that ultimately that system will be victorious on the globe which will offer the nations greater opportunities for improving their material and spiritual life.”||Nikita Khrushchev||1959|
|Strategy of tension||“Ultimately, Interdoc’s value comes from it being a remarkable example of the way European security services sought to engage with and manipulate the public sphere, initially out of serious concerns for the effects of peaceful coexistence on Western ideological solidity, and eventually as a means to secure a strategic advantage in the Cold War.”||Giles Scott-Smith||2011|