| Chris Quick |
(Scientist, military officer, deep state operative?)
|Residence||Washington D.C, United States.|
|Alma mater||Park University, Naval Postgraduate School, National Defense University|
|Member of||Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Netherlands|
|Interests|| • Cold War 2.0|
• Foreign Policy
• Cyber security
Global Engagement Center. Tech specialist for cyber-warfare
Christopher R. Quick is a social psychologist and "cyber security" expert located in Washington D.C. He is named as one of the 3 American members of the Dutch Cluster of the II, during the time he worked at the same employer as Jerry Sullivan and Hunter B. Treseder, the newly formed U.S Global Engagement Center. The GEC is summarised by Max Blumenthal and Mark Ames as a "de facto U.S. government propaganda operation". Quick joined the 101st Airborne Division for Iraq, and provided vital work in Baghdad during the Invasion of Iraq. After the II leaks, Quick left the GEC and joined a government services company named Perspecta that was formed out of multiple private defense contractors.
Quick is listed on LinkedIn to have specialities: Cross Function team integration, Information & Cyberspace Operations, Program & Project Management, Information Warfare, Media Analysis, Operational Security, Information Management, Logistics, Intelligence Analysis, Target Analysis, Operations Management, Leadership, Strategic Planning, Strategic Communications, Operations, Concept Development, Organizational Design and Information Technology Development/Exploitation.
After obtaining a bachelor degree in social psychology, Quick joined the 101st Airborne division as a lead strategic and logistical planner with "counterterrorism" operations in the dynamic operational environments of Baghdad. He planned, synchronized, coordinated for the Human Terrain Team and was responsible for Civil Affairs, psychological operations and the Iraqi Assessment teams. He also has a master in computer science.
Quick joined the U.S Army Cyber Command where he "coordinated matters relating to Cyberspace with other Service staff elements, Joint Staff, Office of Secretariat Defense, and Army Component Commands, while managing Cyberspace fiscal programs". As director of strategic communications and initiatives he provided "Deep analytic and project work as part of an ideas-generating team working on some of Army Cyber Commands most challenging issues" for the Obama administration in Virginia. He worked on all forms of communication for the U.S Government, including newsletters, fact sheets, Web sites, and brochures for information campaigns and events, planning and executing special events, meetings, and workshops. He continued this work at the U.S Department of state.
After joining the Global Engagement Center he worked as the Deputy Chief Technology Officer being the primary data, analytics, and targeting lead for campaigns and social media data, while managing the team that oversees data and analytics for all other departments at the GEC including Direct Marketing and Digital. In 2018 he was promoted to Director of Content and worked on "terrorist" organizations, "counter-recruitment" and radicalization to violence, being primarily focused on ISIS’. In regards to "terrorist organisations" Quick oversaw all content initiatives, both internal and external, across multiple platforms, including social media, satellite television, radio, film, and print and in various languages including Arabic, Urdu, Somali, and French.
Quick has a few publications. His first named "Creating a Total Army Cyber Force" from 2014 described the needs and the ways to set up the US Cyber Command. Quick detailed a 5 year plan where the soldiers in the divisions would be ready in 5 years to be able the use offensive attacks in a wide variety of targets. Another piece called "Engaging two domain warfare" gave the conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008, Stuxnet and InfraGards (a web security division of the FBI hacked by the same group according to Quick that revealed the Integrity Initiative) as examples promoting offensive use of a Army Cyber Division citing its effective use to cause "physical damage".
Quick is listed as member of the Dutch Cluster along with Jerry Sullivan and Hunter B. Treseder. Interesting to note is that they all worked in positions focused on information warfare or propaganda focused on "enemies" of the U.S, whether ISIS or Russia. It certainly raises questions what the actual goal of the Institute for Statecraft was aimed at rather than just the regular notion given at Dutch lectures at Dutch universities that we needed state-operated "fact-checking" to tackle "fake news".
During Quick's time at the GEC, Quick and other colleagues had an interesting discussion about the United States Information Command set-up by Dwight D. Eisenhower with a current Lieutenant Colonel for the Psychological Warfare division;
Robert Dexter - Lieutenant Colonel - Psychological Operations Officer, US Army: Question for Discussion: Should the United States take an active posture in countering adversary messaging, or should our policy be to allow our instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) drive our narrative?
Chris Quick: Rob. The challenge with the reconstitution of a USIS entity is that it would need to be free to operate in the current info environment, pulling pieces back out of the DOS and giving it the authority to deliver the message across the interagency. Having work at the GEC it is a hard sell even though it is probably the right one .