| AIVD |
|Headquarters||Zoetermeer, The Hague, Netherlands|
The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), is the Intelligence and Security agency of the Netherlands, tasked with Domestic, Foreign and Signals intelligence and protecting national security. From 1945 to 2002, it was known as the Domestic Security Service (Dutch: Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD).
During the Cold War, the relationship between the BVD and the CIA went much further than the simple exchange of information. In the 50s and 60s, Americans had almost unlimited financial resources in comparison with a service such as the BVD, and generously doled out the cash. By 1958, for example, the CIA paid the salaries of approximately 51 of the 691 employees of the Dutch service.
The CIA also provided the Dutch with technical equipment that could be used for eavesdropping on buildings and for telephone taps. This involved operations in which the interests of the two services largely coincided, mainly to the interception of communist embassies and domestic Dutch leftists.
For example, in the summer of 1958 the BVD succeeded in placing eavesdropping equipment supplied by the CIA in the building of the Chinese representation (at that time no embassy) in The Hague. For more than five years, the operation provided the BVD with a wealth of information about China at a time when the country was almost inpenetrable for Western services. The information from this operation was shared by the BVD with the Americans.
Possibly in connection with this false front group, the BVD also provided agents provocateurs to Norwegian intelligence services, in order to artificially create a case against Norwegian leftist.
The same was true for Operation Mongolian. That project with the somewhat unfortunate codename was a false pro-Chinese group, largely set up by the BVD, which maintained extensive contacts with official Chinese authorities in the Netherlands and Beijing for some 15 years in the 1960s and 1970s. This provided the BVD with a lot of information about political developments in China, in particular in the field of foreign policy. With a view to the glorious 'opening to China' of US President Richard Nixon and his minister Henry Kissinger in the mid-1970s, the CIA was very interested in this type of information.
Declaration of Independence from the CIA
In 1955, the management of the BVD made a Declaration of Independence, according to which the CIA in the Netherlands should not be operationally active and should not approach people without the BVD's knowledge. Whether the Americans kept this agreement is unclear. The fact is that during the Cold War four times the Chief of Station of the CIA in The Hague was asked to leave the country and possibly even declared persona non grata. It is obvious that these Chiefs of Station had been a little too energetic in their operational activities in the Netherlands.(On the other hand, this story might just be smoke and mirrors, to increase the credentials of the Dutch services).
The exchange of information by Dutch services such as the Domestic Security Service (BVD) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (IDB) with other Western services during the Cold War was very intensive. Two Dutch authors formulated it this way in 1997: "There was and is a constant intelligence sharing between the Dutch intelligence and security services and their American, British, German and Israeli counterparts."
During the Cold War the BVD had a reputation for interviewing potential employers of persons they deemed suspicious for any reason, thereby making sure corporations and government agencies did not hire them. Reasons for being suspect included leftist ideals, membership of the Dutch Communist Party, or a spotty military record (such as being a conscientious objector with regard to conscription).
On January 25, 2018 Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant and TV program Nieuwsuur reported that in 2014 the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) successfully infiltrated the computers of Cozy Bear and observed the hacking of the head office of the Democratic National Committee and subsequently The White House and were the first to alert the National Security Agency (NSA) about the alleged cyber-intrusion. Since this hacking is a false narrative, as proven by Craig Murray, Wikileaks, William Binney etc, it means the AIVD conducted a psy-op to support their American counterparts.
Through its central geographical location, Dutch intelligence services are active in several ongoing psychological operations. Bellingcat is heavily supported by the Dutch government; the OPCW, that twisted the investigation of the alleged Douma gas attack, has its headquarters in the Netherlands;The MH-17 investigation is run by the Dutch government.
- Dutch businessman Frans van Anraat was convicted of complicity in war crimes for selling raw materials for the production of chemical weapons to Iraq during the reign of Saddam Hussein. Soon after his arrest, the Dutch corporate media reported that van Anraat had been an informer of the Dutch secret service AIVD and enjoyed AIVD's protection.
- The group let Abdul Qadeer Khan go, although he shared Dutch nuclear knowledge to help Pakistan to produce its nuclear bomb. Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Ruud Lubbers claimed in 2005 that this on the instructions of the CIA.
- Delivering hand grenades to members of the Islamist terrorist gorup Hofstadgroep through alleged informer Saleh Bouali
|Nieuwsuur||“The AIVD and MIVD are subordinates of the Americans. The Dutch work for the Americans. They do what we tell them to do. They aren't valued because of their capacity, but just because they give us a free passage, that's what the NSA uses them for. (...) Look what France is doing and even they couldn't stop all those terror attacks”||Edward Snowden|
- https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/amerikaanse-nsa-bespioneert-europese-bondgenoten-waaronder-nederland~bdbcdfe4/ Volkskrant, 15 November 2020.
- Constant Hijzen en Cees Wiebes, ‘“Wederzijdse waardering en vriendschap.” De Amerikaans-Nederlandse intelligence liaison in de jaren zestig en zeventig.’ In: Duco Hellema en Giles Scott-Smith, De Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag. Een blik achter de schermen van de Amerikaans-Nederlandse betrekkingen. Amsterdam: Boom (2016), pp. 88-102, qouted in https://spectator.clingendael.org/nl/publicatie/staan-inlichtingendiensten-samen-sterker
- John Pike: CIA asked us to let nuclear spy go, Ruud Lubbers claims / accessdate=2012-02-14 / http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050809-khan-cia.htm