The secret war against Sweden

 The secret war against Sweden (Psyop,  false flag,  regime change,  mid-level deep event)

Dramatic image of helicopter using explosive charges during a submarine hunt in 1987 - but never against spots with actual submarines
Date	October 27, 1981 - 1994
Location	Sweden,  Stockholm,  Baltic Sea,  Karlskrona,  Hårsfjärden
Perpetrators	NATO, William Casey, Ronald Reagan, Bror Stefenson, Ace Lyons, National Underwater Reconnaissance Office
Exposed by	Ola Tunander
Interest of	Lars Borgnäs
Interests	US/Sponsored Regime-change efforts since 1945
Description	A large number of "Soviet" submarine intrusions in Swedish waters in the 1980s, in reality committed by NATO under false flag. The intrusions were about deception and PSYOPs, to change the mindset of the Swedes, to make them adapt to US interests.

Between 1981 and 1994, 4700 individual sightings of "submarine-related objects of various types were spotted in Swedish territorial waters. While the Soviet Union was blamed, the seemingly endless series of highly visible submarines was in reality part of a NATO black operation in collaboration with a cabal of Swedish military high officers, with the purpose to subvert public opinion in Sweden and embarrass and topple the government under Olof Palme, which was never informed.

Professor Ola Tunander, who has researched this in depth and sat on the third submarine commission in 2001, concludes that the majority of these incursions to be of NATO origin:

Following the stranding of a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine in 1981 on the Swedish archipelago, a series of very visible submarine intrusions took place within Swedish waters. However, the evidence for these appears to have been manipulated or simply invented. Classified documents and interviews point to covert Western, rather than Soviet activity. This is backed up by former US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who stated that Western "testing" operations were carried out regularly in Swedish waters with Swedish cooperation. Royal Navy submarine captains have also admitted to top-secret operations.

Part 2 (from min. 20:58) of the documentary The Reagan Method describes the use of submarines under false flag to topple the Swedish government. (Odysee backup).

Later, former US Secretary of Navy John Lehman told Ola Tunander that the decision about the Swedish operations that Weinberger had spoken about had been taken by a Deception Committee chaired by Director of Central Intelligence William Casey. The US did not just try to increase the defensive capabilities and the awareness of the Swedes. The intrusions were also about deception and PSYOPs, to change the mindset of the Swedes, to make them adapt to U.S. interests.

Official narrative

Map over Swedish territorial waters

Full article: Swedish Submarine Protection Commission

In 1982, a commission was established by the Social Democratic government led by Prime Minister Olof Palme. However, the commission were dominated deep state actors who were involved in the black operation and had an strong interest in hiding the true cause of events. They used the commission as part of the propaganda offensive to force the government's hand. At the very least Vice Admiral Bror Stefenson knew the true perpetrators and chain of events all along. Sven Andersson and Carl Bildt were also commission members.

12 remarkable facts

Ola Tunander summed up 12 remarkable facts about the operation (abridged in Wikispooks):

• A first remarkable fact is that the Soviets do not seem to have had the capabilities for these very ambitious operations that were conducted deep into Swedish archipelagoes, harbors, and naval bases. During the Cold War, nobody outside the intelligence community knew what kind of vessels the Soviets had. Scholars could imagine that they had secret classes of midget submarines. Several decades later, we have found no indication of these Soviet capabilities. The Soviets did not receive an offensive midget until the end of the Cold War in 1989 – the Pyranja (28 meters) – which was able to carry two wet Sirena (9 meters). This design, however, was not successful.

• A second remarkable fact is that the intruding submarines in the 1980s turned out to have shown sails and periscopes inside Swedish archipelagoes, sometimes even inside harbors and naval bases in total conflict with Soviet interests. A submarine operating in enemy waters is supposed to raise its periscope just centimeters above the surface and not for more than a few seconds to avoid detection. A submarine sail should never be made visible. From early 1980s, however, there were observations of submarines and smaller submersibles on the surface inside Swedish archipelagoes on a regular basis. The 1995 Submarine Commission writes: in 1981-1990 there were 2,144 observations of "objects", suspected submarines incl. sails and periscopes. There were 352 observations later identified as "certain" or "probable" (almost certain) submarine and 1421 observations identified as "possible submarine", which includes supposed "submarines" seen by naval officers. In addition, there were close to a hundred reports about divers, some using Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs). Several hundred observations of midget- or mini-submarines were made at a distance of less than 100 meters. Observers even described details of the hull.

• A third remarkable fact is the disappearance of definitive evidence. We know about evidence that would have made it possible for us to prove the nationality of the submarines, but this evidence has disappeared. Perfectly sharp photos of "Type 1" (10 meters) and "Type 2" submarines (20-30 meters), which would have made it possible to identify the single submarines, just disappeared. The 2001 Inquiry found that oil samples as well as samples and photos of a green Visual Distress Signal (VDS) had disappeared from the archives. This material would have made it possible to identify the nationality of the intruder. Most important pages from the Defense Staff War Diary had disappeared from the archive, both in the hand-written and the printed-out version. Objects found on the sea floor that would reveal the nationality just disappeared. Another Navy officer argued that the transponder actually was hydrophone no. 5.

Some of the participants; The Captain of the destroyer Halland Göran Wallén; Hans von Hofsten (middle) and Bror Stefenson

• A fourth remarkable fact is how far some Swedish Navy officers were willing to go in order to cover up real physical evidence. Military Expert to the Submarine Inquiry, Rear Admiral Göran Wallén, claimed that the transponder could have been an "artillery shell". During the TV interview, Swedish journalist Lars Borgnäs showed him a drawing of the transponder sitting on a concrete plate, and asked him: "does this look like an artillery shell?" Admiral Wallén responded: "There are many kinds of artillery shells. This could be one they have made an experiment with". After the sonar operator at Mälsten had tape-recorded a "certain submarine" at 18:00 on 12 October 1982, Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Bror Stefenson went home to Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Per Rudberg, and at 21:00 he walked over to the apartment of Chief of Defense General Ljung. They both went to the Defense Staff. A recording of a submarine was important, and it could also make it possible to identify the intruder, which would be "extremely sensitive politically". General Ljung returned home at 23:00, while Stefenson stayed at the Defense Staff to handle the situation. The 20-minutes' long tape-recording at 18:00 was, however, exchanged with a 3.47-minute tape-recording of a propeller sound from a surface vessel at around 14:30. As a Civilian Expert to the 2001 Submarine Inquiry, I found that this latter recording was not the recording of a "certain submarine" at 18:00. It had been made hours earlier on the same tape and the sonar operator did not recognize it. The recording of a "certain submarine" at 18:00 pointed to a submarine with very silent propellers, which rather would indicate a Western submarine. The 1995 Commission also showed that other sounds described as evidence for Soviet submarines in late 1980s and early 1990s turned out to have biological origin (mink and herring). No recording of submarine sounds pointed to the Soviet Union.

Also, evidence for a tape-recording of a certain submarine was covered up. It was exchanged with a tape-recording of a civilian surface ship and claimed to be "evidence for a Soviet submarine".

• A fifth remarkable fact is that the Swedish documents declassified in 2001 showed that Swedish Military Intelligence had nothing pointing to the Soviet Union. The Swedish top-secret report from the Naval Analysis Group signed by the Chief of Defense (18 December 1987) described details of different intruding submarines, their length, shape, color, escape hatches and periscopes and other masts, but in the following report to Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, former Chief of Military Intelligence Major General Bengt Wallroth (with Ambassador Jan Eliasson and Hans Dahlgren from Prime Minister's Office) wrote that these "Type 1 and Type 2 submarines" were not consistent with any known Soviet midget submarine. Swedish intelligence had nothing pointing to the Soviets, he said. This was also the conclusion of the 1995 Submarine Commission, where Wallroth was its Secretary General.

The Conservative Svenska Dagbladet on 27 April 1983 (the day after the Submarine Defense Commission press conference). Headline: "Midget submarine in Stockholm". Text: "Six Soviet submarines including three midget submarines, operated in the Stockholm Archipelago in late September and early October last year." Around 1 October 1982, two midget submarines entered the narrow Hårsfjärden at Naval Base East at Muskö. The artist is showing a tracked midget and its mother submarine or MOSUB. The drawing of Stockholm southern archipelago shows the believed positions for the MOSUBs and where the midgets entered Hårsfjärden at the Naval Base.(Tunander)

• A sixth remarkable fact is the timing. From a Soviet point of view, the planning of the operations appears to have been extremely counterproductive. We all knew in-beforehand that the press conference of the Submarine Defense Commission was announced for the 26 April 1983 and that hundreds of journalists and the global media would turn up. It was a most significant event for Sweden that year. Why would then the Soviets operate a small vessel deep into Stockholm harbor the same morning? This does not make sense. The next days, "four submarines" turned up at Sundsvall 300 km north of Stockholm and then there was a submarine on the Swedish west coast. The Stockholm press conference was accompanied by the sound of depth charges and anti-submarine rockets, as if these events had been orchestrated.

• A seventh equally remarkable fact is that the U.S. did not believe in any significant Soviet activity. Soviet penetrations deep into Swedish archipelagoes were not taken seriously by US Naval Intelligence. Swedish Defense Minister Thage G. Peterson had a similar experience. He was also asked to look to the West (see below). He wrote in 1999:

[I]t concerns the American total lack of interest for the Swedish submarine problems. [...] The Baltic Sea area has for decades been and still is of great strategic significance for the USA and NATO. If such serious matter occurs as submarine intrusions into the waters of the neutral Sweden in this very sensitive area, and Soviet Union/Russia is believed to be responsible for these intrusions, shouldn't the Americans in that case be interested in what has happened or still is happening. In practical terms, this would be a forwarding of the positions of the other military bloc. But the U.S. has never been concerned about the submarine issue. Isn't that strange? Particularly since the U.S. and NATO have been covering and still cover the Baltic Sea area with satellites, aircraft, and other advanced reconnaissance systems? And have an extensive intelligence activity? But they leave us with our submarine problems. Isn't that strange?

The U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) gave annual briefings about Soviet naval activities to the House Armed Services Committee of the US Congress. During these briefings, they never mentioned any Soviet operations in Swedish waters. Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral John Butts spoke about a new Soviet destroyer in the Baltic Sea 1982 but not about operations in Swedish waters. The same goes for the DNI's annual reviews for all 1980s. There was absolutely nothing, and the Americans would have known whether there were any Soviet submarines, because they received the Swedish information, and the U.S. hydrophone system would have picked up any Soviet activity in the Western Baltic. Furthermore, the U.S. Naval Intelligence had no reason to hide Soviet activity for the Armed Services Committee.

• An eighth remarkable fact is the number of indications pointing to an exercise in collaboration with the "intruder". On 29 September 1982, the Naval Base War Diary writes that an upcoming anti-submarine operation, Notvarp, with start the following day, actually is an "exercise". On 1 October, military personnel on a transport boat observed a periscope (flat top) and a mast for a minute or more at close range at a speed of five knots, as if the submarine wanted to be detected deep inside the restricted area of Hårsfjärden, at Sweden's Naval Base East (Muskö).... Chief of Defense Staff Admiral Stefenson ordered Navy Press Officer, Commander Sven Carlsson, to prepare for a press center for up to 500 journalists. In Sweden, this implied a global event with U.S. and UK TV-channels. Soon ABC, NBC, CBS, The New York Times, Washington Post, Times, and Stern turned up. Already after the first observation of a periscope, Admiral Stefenson prepared for head-line news all over the world. How could he know that this first observation would turn into the most dramatic submarine hunt in post-War Europe with the global TV-channels having a ringside seat? On the evening on October 4, Stefenson calls Carlsson from the reception with the foreign attachés (certainly with the U.S. and the British attachés) telling him to start the press center at midnight, as if everything had been coordinated with the "intruder".

Prime Minister Olof Palme

• A ninth remarkable fact is the number of strange orders indicating Swedish high-level collaboration with the "intruder". At lunch on the 7 October, 1982, in Hårsfjärden, Chief of Defense General Lennart Ljung ordered Brigadier General Lars Hansson to use the most lethal weapon, the 600-kilo mines, against the escaping submarine. Ljung received support from Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin and from Olof Palme (to become Prime Minister the following day). The first mines were detonated after lunch. This made a senior naval officer call von Hofsten's office to reach Admiral Stefenson. When Stefenson answered the telephone, he was upset: "We had an agreement not to use the mines", he said, but von Hofsten did not want to reveal the other senior officer's name.

In the evening the same day, a patrol boat Väktaren followed a mini-submarine out from Hårsfjärden. Väktaren received perfect contact with the vessel and demanded to use depth charges. At that moment, she was ordered "ceasefire" at the request of Admiral Stefenson. On 11 October, the mine troops were ordered "ceasefire" for the mines at the request of Stefenson. On 13 October, Stefenson denied Hansson and the local commander Sven-Olov Kviman the right to use the mines against an approaching submarine. Two hours after the passage, they were allowed to use the mines again.

• A tenth remarkable fact is the lack of Soviet activity in the Baltic during this major anti-submarine operation in October 1982. Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff Intelligence Björn Eklind, told me that he was confused. There was no worry or particular readiness on the Soviet side of the Baltic Sea. If the Swedish Navy was dropping depth charges and detonated heavy mines against "Soviet submarines", there would have been a certain activity on the side of the Soviets, he argued. There was nothing.

In October 1981, when the Whiskey submarine S-363 [U-137] was sitting on a rock outside Swedish Naval Base South in Karlskrona, there had been two Soviet destroyers and ten other Soviet naval vessels just outside Swedish territorial waters waiting to rescue the submarine, but now, in October 1982, during the much more dramatic events at Muskö, there was nothing.

• The eleventh most remarkable fact is the Soviet arguments: the Soviets asked the Swedes to sink every submarine that enter Swedish waters. Soviet leader Yuri Andropov told Finnish President Mauno Koivisto already in June 1983 in connection with Koivisto's first trip as a president to Moscow that he should tell the Swedes that they "should sink every submarine that enters their waters", so that the Swedes could see for themselves who is responsible. It is not our submarines, Andropov said. The Swedish admirals gave their forces the right to use depth charges that had to hit exactly on target to be lethal. They did not allow the use of real lethal weapons like torpedoes, and they tried to stop the Coastal Defense forces from using the bottom-mounted mines. The Soviet ambassador to Stockholm (1982-90), later Foreign Minister Boris Pankin said: "if you think there are [submarines], just bomb them". Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov told Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson in 1988: It is not our submarines. Just "destroy" them. But all these Soviet calls for sinking the intruder were not consistent with Soviet intrusions.

• A twelfth remarkable fact was that US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (1981–87) and British Navy Minister Keith Speed stated on Swedish TV (2000) that the West had operated submarines "frequently" and "regularly" in Swedish waters to "test" Swedish defenses after US–Swedish and British-Swedish "Navy-to-Navy consultations". The "intrusions" were conducted after consultations with the Swedish Navy, Weinberger and Speed said. Weinberger said:

“[I]t was very much to Sweden's advantage and very much to NATO's advantage that this was done. [The "Whiskey on the Rocks" showed that] submarines can get in where they are not wanted and that is exactly why we made this defensive testing and these defensive maneuvers to assure that they [the Soviets] would not be able to do that. […] Besides that one intrusion of the Whiskey-class submarine, there were no violations, no capabilities of the Soviets.”
Caspar Weinberger (2000) 

Former British Navy Minister Sir Keith Speed confirmed Weinberger's statement. The testing was conducted in Sweden, he said:

[We used our Porpoise and Oberon-class submarines …] We would not necessarily say [precisely where, because] it wouldn't have been very sensible neither from your point of view nor from ours. There might well be penetration [type] exercises. Can submarines actually get in and almost surface in the Stockholm harbor? Not quite, but that sort of thing. How far could we get without you being aware of it?

 

Related Quotations

Page	Quote	Author	Date
James Schlesinger	“[Former United States Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] said 'The [Swedish] Military was planning for us to come as soon as possible'. He obviously did not speak about all Swedish politicians or all Swedish military officers, but rather about a fundamental divide between a few relevant political leaders with the ambition of keeping Swedish neutrality, and some senior military officers that were directly linked up to the U.S. agencies, officers that identified themselves with the United States and with U.S. military priorities: They planned for the U.S. military forces to come to Sweden 'as soon as possible'”	Ola Tunander James Schlesinger	1993
John Vessey	“When it comes to Sweden, there was only one rule: Nothing on paper.”	John Vessey John W Vessey Jr.	1989

 

The Official Culprit

Name
Soviet Russia

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