Swedish Submarine Protection Commission
|Date||October 21, 1982 - April 1983|
|Participants||Sven Andersson, Carl Bildt, Lars Eliasson, Maj-Lis Lööw, Olle Svensson, Sven Hellman, Bror Stefenson, Sahlin|
|Description||Swedish Commission controlled by the deep state, used for propaganda effort in The secret war against Sweden and against the Swedish government.|
The Submarine Protection Commission (Swedish:Ubåtsskyddskommissionen) was a 1983 Swedish parliamentary inquiry.
During the Reagan administration, the United States started a covert operation to force the Swedish government to change foreign policy. Led by a secretive top-level Deception Committee tasked with conducting psy-ops, US submarines from the National Underwater Reconnaissance Office conducted a large number of false flag operations in Swedish waters over the period of almost a decade.
US an NATO submarines entered Swedish coastal waters, for then to on purpose make themselves clearly visible. The following spottings and numerous submarine chases would then be covered in corporate media as against presumed Soviet penetrations. The operations were conducted with the knowledge of senior Swedish naval officers, but crucially, not by the government led by Olof Palme, which was put in a difficult situation.
The members, dominated by deep state actors who were involved in and had an strong interest in hiding the true cause of events, used the commission as part of the propaganda offensive to force the government's hand; at the very least Vice Admiral Bror Stefenson knew the true perpetrators and chain of events all along.
The commission was established by the Social Democratic government led by Prime Minister Olof Palme, which had taken office in the middle of the Hårsfjärden incident at the beginning of October 1982 where the Swedish navy chased a suspected foreign submarine, and a large number of similar sightings presumed to be Soviet submarines.
The Commission was set with the task of investigating what was behind the suspected submarine violations of Sweden that had taken place and what measures were required to counteract such.
The commission submitted its report at the end of April 1983, "Meeting the submarine threat. The submarine violations and Swedish security policy". The commission's conclusion that it was Soviet submarines that were behind it led to the Swedish government submitting a formal protest against this to the Soviet Union.
The designation of the Soviet Union as the power responsible became political dynamite that contributed to upsetting the Swedish foreign policy of neutrality.
In a protest note on 26 April to the Soviet Union, prepared by Defense Minister Anders Thunborg and Cabinet Secretary Sverker Åström, the Commission's assessment that the submarines had been Soviet was touched upon and the government explained for its part that it had no information that contradicted the Commission's conclusions. The government had therefore concluded that it was a question of Soviet submarines. They therefore presented in the note a sharp protest against the gross violations of Swedish territory committed by the Soviet navy. It was further argued that the violations constituted a serious violation of international law and could be interpreted as part of deliberate and illegal attempts to explore Swedish maritime territory. The government declared that this activity must be strongly condemned.
Deep state actors
Of notice is that several of the members were deep state actors who had every interest in a stitch-up conclusion; at least Vice Admiral Bror Stefenson was probably one of the participants in the psychological operation, which went behind the back of the government. He would later order submarine destroyers not to shoot at identified targets, to allow them to escape.
The former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Sven Andersson was appointed chairman. He was strongly connected to the military-intelligence apparatus, and a key player in the IB affair, an extensive and illegal surveillance operation, which was exposed in the 1970s.
The other four commissioners were members of parliament, Carl Bildt from Moderatarna, Lars Eliasson, the Center Party, and the Social Democrats' Maj-Lis Lööw and Olle Svensson. The experts were Sven Hellman, the Ministry of Defense and the head of the Defense Staff Vice Admiral Bror Stefenson. Ministry Secretary Michael Sahlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed secretary of the commission.
The Commission was one of Carl Bildt's first major roles. Bildt was later exposed as a confidential informant for the US embassy. When he became Prime Minister 1991-1994, he played a central role in the cover-up of the sinking of MS Estonia. Since then, he has made a career of sitting on deep state connected committees and attending spooky conferences.
The Commission's reasoning began with the observation that, despite extensive investigations with various technical aids, no concrete evidence in the form of objects or photographs was found that could support or verify optical observations. However, through sketches and careful interviews as a follow-up to optical observations, the commission considered itself to have received information about the type of submarine in question. The commission also relied on the post-analysis of recorded hydrophone sounds that would provide indications that provided information about pact or nation affiliation. Then the Commission stated: "Similarly, it is possible to obtain, via signals intelligence, evidence for assessments of the submarines' nationality."
A later Commission into possible submarine violations by Sweden, the 2001 "Perspective on the submarine issue" (SOU 2001:85) considered that the designation of the Soviet Union was uncertainly based, the chain of evidence did not appear strong, and nothing had subsequently come to light to lend further support to the Commission's conclusion.
This further commission found that the members of the Submarine Security Commission, and then in particular its chairman Sven Andersson, decided sometime in early March 1983 that a designation of the Soviet Union was a necessity, and that regardless of the evidence. In the Commander-in-Chief's diary on March 8, it is said that Sven Andersson then believed that so much was known or could be assumed to be known regarding a Warsaw Pact operation that if a clear assessment of nationality was not made, there would be a debate with claims that the Swedes deliberately did not go into the issue of nationality, which could be considered " as if we were trying to politically get away cheaply".
SOU 2001:85 states that Prime Minister Palme was visibly upset when he was briefed on April 12 by Sven Andersson and formally on April 15, only about ten days before publication, by Defense Minister Thunborg about the content of the report. Palme said that he was faced with a fait accompli and that Andersson had not warned him or consulted about the content of the report and in particular the designation of the Soviet Union. During the preparation within the government on how to react to the report, it appeared that at least two ministers, Foreign Minister Lennart Bodström and Minister of Justice Ove Rainer, questioned whether the government, on the basis of weak evidence, could accept the Submarine Protection Commission's nationality determination. However, Olof Palme believed that there was no alternative for the government but to accept the commission's report. The domestic political situation would have become untenable if the government ignored the assessment of the respected Sven Andersson and a unanimous political inquiry for reasons that are difficult to explain.
2 of the 8 known participants already have pages here:
|Sven Andersson||Swedish Social Democrat politician and deep state operative|
|Carl Bildt||Swedish deep politician and serial Bilderberger|
- ↑ a b In October 1982, General Lars Hansson had permission from PM Palme to use heavy mines against an intruder. Bror Stefenson was visibly upset and told another naval officer "we had agreed not to explode any mines". But neither operation commander General Ljung, General Lieutenant Lehander nor commander of the Stockholm coastal artillery Lars Hansson were aware of such an agreement. The same evening, Stefenson gave order to hold fire against a perfectly identified target. The pages in the official war diary on this incident is missing. Stefenson also intervened similarly in other incidents. Ola Tunander Det svenska ubåtskriget, page 74
- ↑ a b c d e http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108/a/3738M
- ↑ https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/siteassets/5-information-och-fakta/historia/ubatsjakternas-80-tal/perspektiv-pa-ubatsfragan-2
- ↑ https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2001/11/sou-200185/