Arnold Horelick

Arnold Horelick   (spook, deep state operative)
Born	1928
Nationality	US
Alma mater	Harvard University, Rutgers University
Member of	Council on Foreign Relations/Historical Members, International Institute for Strategic Studies
Interests	USSR
Spooky RAND analyst. In 1986 he wrote a paper Soviet Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev, which was also a theme of the 1986 Bilderberg meeting he attended.  Senior Corporate Fellow In office 1959 - 1997 Employer RAND Corporation Probably wrote a paper on Soviet Foreign Policy for Bilderberg/1986

Arnold Lawrence Horelick was a spooky Soviet Union expert at RAND and the Carnegie Endowment. In 1986 he wrote a paper Soviet Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev, which was also a theme of the 1986 Bilderberg meeting he attended.

Education

Horelick received an M.A. from Harvard University and a B.A. from Rutgers University.

Activities

Horelick was a resident consultant at RAND and professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles. Having connection to RAND from 1959, from 1984 to 1994 Horelick was a RAND senior corporate fellow, and holder of RAND’s first corporate chair. From 1983 to 1989, he was the founding director of the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies.

Arnold Horelick was a specialist on Russian foreign policy and international security and co-directed the Carnegie Endowment’s Project on Rethinking U.S.-Russian Relations. He previously was vice president of the Russian and Eurasian Program.

Horelick was a visiting professor of political science at Columbia University, the City University of New York, the California Institute of Technology, and Cornell University. From 1977 to 1980, he served as national intelligence officer for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Horelick was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and the Pacific Council on International Policy.

Soviet Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev

This paper considers Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev. Gorbachev's first priority in foreign policy is to consolidate weak or threatened positions. He will be selective about making new commitments and sensitive to the economic and political costs of making bad choices. He has initiated the most thorough and far-reaching reorganization of the Soviet foreign policymaking structure since World War II, and has blurred the division of labor between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party's International Department. This restructuring indicates a downgrading in the priority of the Third World in Soviet foreign policy. The United States remains at the center of Gorbachev's foreign policy, and arms control at the center of his American policy. Failure by the United States and by the Western alliance to agree on a common strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union in the Gorbachev era could mean losing the opportunity either to pressure the Soviet Union effectively or to deal with it profitably.

His RAND paper analyzed:

How should we in the West respond to Gorbachev's evident desire for peredyshka?

While these questions are seldom if ever posed so explicitly, the issues surrounding them have become key to a debate between two alternative approaches for dealing generally with the Soviet Union during Reagan's final term, and particularly with respect to arms control. Both approaches proceed from the common premise that a shift in favor of the West is occurring in what the Soviets call the global correlation of forces. Different policy conclusions are drawn from this assessment, however. One view supports a policy of 'squeezing' the Soviets, seeking deliberately to maximize competitive pressures on the Soviet Union during a period of its relative weakness. This approach would attempt to press favorable trends still further in the hope of securing an even more substantial shift in the correlation of forces, eventually compelling Soviet retreats on a global scale, or, if the Soviets exhausted themselves economically in an effort to avoid concessions or retreat, inducing an internal Soviet crisis that would gravely weaken the USSR or even compel system-altering transformations with revolutionary long-term benefits for the West.

With regard to arms control, the 'squeeze' approach would call for the United States to take an essentially uncompromising position on the whole range of issues at Geneva, making at most only marginal, essentially cosmetic adjustments designed not to enhance the negotiability of US positions but rather to help manage domestic and alliance political concerns. Protecting the SDI from arms control constraints in the central preoccupation of the 'squeeze' position. Some 'squeezers' believe that SDI's strategic potential for the United States is so great that it must not be hampered by arms control constraints; others believe that withholding SDI from the negotiations is likely to preclude a compromise arms control agreement that would at best produce marginal benefits while squandering hard-won US gains and momentum.Some 'squeezers' would prefer to renounce the existing constraints of the ABM Treaty, in both its'restrictive' and 'broad' interpretations; others would 'novate' the ABM Treaty in lieu of abandoning it. SDI in the 'squeezer's' view should be used as leverage on Soviet force structure, not indirectly through enhanced arms control bargaining strength but directly, by compelling the Soviets to restructure their forces to compete in areas of comparative US advantage.

A second view supports an alternative policy of 'dealing'. It holds that the United States should take some initiatives in exploring ways to break the arms control deadlock. Partisans of this view generally believe that a sustained state of high tension between the United States and the Soviet Union is potentially dangerous and surely corrosive to the Western alliance if the United States is believed to be at fault. A credible attempt at arms control negotiations is held necessary to sustain public and congressional support for the administration's long-term armaments program.

Advocates of this view tend also to believe (like those who favor squeezing) that the correlation of forces is shifting against the Soviet Union. They prefer, however, to negotiate from that improved position now rather than gamble on the outcome of a totally unregulated arms competition of enormous and possibly unsustainable cost, incalculable risk and indefinite duration. Soviet anxiety about an intensified new round of strategic arms competition is held to provide an opportunity for inducing the USSR to accept basic tradeoffs in strategic weapons negotiations - tradeoffs that would involve deep cuts in Soviet offensive forces of greatest US concern in return for an easing of US competitive pressures in areas of greatest concern to the Soviets.

 

Event Participated in

Event	Start	End	Location(s)	Description
Bilderberg/1986	25 April 1986	27 April 1986	Scotland Gleneagles Hotel	The 34th Bilderberg, 109 participants

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