|Type||Private intelligence contractor|
|Membership||• Jean-Louis Georgelin|
• Eric Besson
• Ardavan Amir-Aslani
• Gérard Askinazi
• Patrick Calvar
• Patrice Fonlladosa
• Jesús Jiménez
• Paul Hatch
• Christian Bechon
• Lynton Crosby
• Joe Trippi
• Isao Iijima
• Matthieu Creux
• Arnaud Dassier
• Samuel Dralet
• Eric Bovim
• Jacques Lafitte
• Jérôme Yomtov
• Antoine Violet-Surcouf
• François-Charles Timmerman
• Olga Popova
Avisa Partners is a French private intelligence company, particular notable for its suggested work methods in the Integrity Initiative Document:Combatting Russian Disinformation. A more official, but still revealing, presentation is Document:Avisa Partners Presentation Its field of operations cover several dozen countries, where it has worked for big multinationals and governments.
According to the Integrity Initiative leak, the company had 75 staff of 16 different nationalities directly working for it. Later it has increased to over a hundred. These consultants oversee a vast network of several hundred writers specialized in numerous sectors (business, economics, foreign affairs, public policy, etc.), publishing on several hundred online media sites in each of their main operative languages (English, French, Spanish and Chinese).
Lexfo is a cybersecurity subsidiary of Avisa Partners, "specializing in offensive cybersecurity".
In October 2019, Avisa Partners expanded to the US, establishing an office in Washington and naming Eric Bovim, a former foreign correspondent for Reuters in Madrid and an international strategic communications consultant, chief executive of its US operations.
The US market accounts for 15% to 25% of the company's revenue.
The group brings together under one roof an ecosystem of professionals in the fields of competitive intelligence, public affairs, international relations, cybersecurity and digital communications. Avisa Partners is a flagship European firm on the issues of online influence, the fight against misinformation, and the fight against counterfeiting.
In 2019, Avisa aquired the PR-companies Gabara Strategies in London and IDA Group in Brussels and Berlin.. Stefan Borst, one of the founders of IDA Group confirmed that “by joining Avisa Partners, IDA will be part of the first truly European champion in the sphere of risk management consultancies. We are excited about the new possibilities for our international clients”.
Matthieu Creux, President of Avisa Holding Group stated: “Avisa Partners, already a leader in competitive intelligence in Europe, will now enjoy an strengthened presence on both sides of the Channel and the Atlantic. Our multinational group is an ideal partner for leaders who want to take advantage of the opportunities they see abroad - all while mitigating the risks"
Like often is the case with shady entities, it does not have its own Wikipedia page and no Wikipedia presence.
All the methods listed were offered in Document:Combatting Russian Disinformation
- Brainwashing the public by drumbeat repetition: "We recommend amplifying the existing but irregular coverage about the Russians’ use of disinformation across most mainstream Western media sites in order to create a drumbeat effect (communication as repetition) across hundreds of independent media sites – not only concentrated on a handful of sites like Polygraph.info."
- Spreading untraceable propaganda in multiple languages across several hundred existing and credible news media sites:
We operate as an international newsroom. Last month alone, we published more than 1,000 articles, briefs, or opinion pieces online. Since 2011, we have built a wide network of hundreds of third-party experts, and the capacity to publish on several hundred high-quality, independent news, opinion, and analysis websites, lending us the unique ability to make our clients’ voice heard in English, French, and Spanish. We have the know-how to open new languages and countries, with the ability to operate at full speed within several months depending on the market. Most critically, our ability to publish articles across hundreds of credible media outlets means that any campaign we undertake will have far more sway than the content published only on state-sponsored outlets RT and Sputnik, and their local few allies.
- Creating false websites. "where we lack platforms to publish our content (notably in certain local languages), we will create news media sites serving our objectives, inside a broader editorial spectrum. These media sites will be ostensibly independent to assure their credibility. They will be registered on Google news in order to improve significantly their visibility, credibility and reach."
- False social media campaigns. "To amplify our actions, we will also launch social media campaigns on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and other local platforms to push our content"
- Supporting people who already do what you want (a very frequently used intelligence method): "We would search for online influencers and encourage them become natural allies to engage in the conversation online by combatting false narratives and fostering constructive discourse"
- Controlling Wikipedia (through fake/paid moderators). "creating new pages, such as lists of known Russiabacked propaganda sites" ..."as well as expanding and updating pages related to fake news and other relevant subjects"
- "Undertake operations intended to intimidate those relaying fake news. "Raising the 'price to pay' for the influencers and media relaying Russian propaganda and fake news"
- Legal/financial harassment. "Engage legal actions against the media site, whenever possible, to remove controversial contents.."
- Limit the visibility of alternative news. "systematically alert search engines and social networks against every fake news publication, in order to encourage them to take stronger actions against the media and influencer responsible"
- Reduce the revenues of the media and influencers that are targeted by encouraging advertising agencies not to work with them
- Cyber attacks. "conduct ethical “hack back” operations."
Area of Operations
"In 2016, 70% of our revenue was drawn from operations primarily focused outside the European Union."
Documents by Avisa Partners
|Title||Document type||Publication date||Subject(s)||Description|
|Document:Avisa Partners Presentation||company presentation||June 2016||Propaganda|
|This is very revealing but more official presentation of the company's influence work. Compare with the dirty tricks in Document:Combatting Russian Disinformation|
|Document:Combatting Russian Disinformation||report||June 2016||Wikipedia|
|A truly astonishing II document, with a lot of dirty methods. It is written by an established covert French propaganda network, spreading more than a 1000 stories a month, offering to work for II. "our ability to publish articles across hundreds of credible media outlets means that any campaign we undertake will have far more sway than the content published only on state-sponsored outlets RT and Sputnik, and their local few allies."|