Difference between revisions of "Document:Bid for MoD Funding 2017-2018"
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draft for budget needs by Integrity Initiative dated 14 03 2017
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/3
Security Classification: Private
Source: 'Anonymous'
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|source_name='Anonymous' | |source_name='Anonymous' | ||
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|subject=Integrity Initiative, clusters, propaganda, | |subject=Integrity Initiative, clusters, propaganda, | ||
|source=https://fdik.org/Integrity_Initiative/bid-for-mod-funding-140317.pdf | |source=https://fdik.org/Integrity_Initiative/bid-for-mod-funding-140317.pdf | ||
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|description= "Creation of a Europe-wide network of groups who understand the danger of Russian active measures and who can pass the message on to their own decision-makers and public, often using material which we initiate" | |description= "Creation of a Europe-wide network of groups who understand the danger of Russian active measures and who can pass the message on to their own decision-makers and public, often using material which we initiate" | ||
}} | }} | ||
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Private – Draft Only | Private – Draft Only | ||
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Introduction: | Introduction: | ||
| − | The [[Integrity Initiative]] was set up in 2016 by The [[Institute for Statecraft]] in cooperation with the [[Free University of Brussels]] (VUB) to bring to the attention of policy-makers, military leaders and the general public the threat posed to democratic institutions in the United Kingdom and across Europe by Russia. The specific focus of the Initiative concerns disinformation, the deliberate spreading of false information aimed at destabilising Western societies, and sowing confusion and mistrust in our institutions; but the programme goes further, looking at all manner of threats under the banner of hybrid warfare and extending to the threat of military action against the West. | + | The [[Integrity Initiative]] was set up in 2016 by The [[Institute for Statecraft]] in cooperation with the [[Free University of Brussels]] (VUB) to bring to the attention of policy-makers, military leaders and the general public the threat posed to democratic institutions in the [[United Kingdom]] and across [[Europe]] by [[Russia]]. The specific focus of the Initiative concerns disinformation, the deliberate spreading of false information aimed at destabilising Western societies, and sowing confusion and mistrust in our institutions; but the programme goes further, looking at all manner of threats under the banner of hybrid warfare and extending to the threat of military action against the West. |
1. Success so far | 1. Success so far | ||
| − | * Organised visit to the UK by the Lithuanian StratComms team; as a result of their briefing [[77 Brigade]] adopted the Lithuanian approach | + | * Organised visit to the UK by the [[Lithuanian]] StratComms team; as a result of their briefing [[77 Brigade]] adopted the Lithuanian approach |
* Organised visit to the UK by a Ukrainian Special Forces team; in a series of meetings with their UK counterparts they passed on invaluable information about how they are dealing with Russian military operations in Eastern Ukraine | * Organised visit to the UK by a Ukrainian Special Forces team; in a series of meetings with their UK counterparts they passed on invaluable information about how they are dealing with Russian military operations in Eastern Ukraine | ||
| Line 29: | Line 29: | ||
* Meetings with senior politicians and military commanders (both in London and at NATO), and [[Full Spectrum Effects Coordination Cell]] (FSECC), to explain the threat of Russian active measures | * Meetings with senior politicians and military commanders (both in London and at NATO), and [[Full Spectrum Effects Coordination Cell]] (FSECC), to explain the threat of Russian active measures | ||
| − | * Briefing of journalists has led to stories in newspapers and online, including the lead front-page story in The Times on 17 Dec 2016 | + | * Briefing of journalists has led to stories in [[newspapers]] and online, including the lead front-page story in ''[[The Times]]'' on 17 Dec [[2016]] |
| − | * Discussions with NATO allies have led to formation of groups looking into active measures in France, Spain, Greece | + | * Discussions with [[NATO]] allies have led to formation of groups looking into active measures in France, Spain, Greece |
* Extensive amount of published material on the threat (see Appendix A) | * Extensive amount of published material on the threat (see Appendix A) | ||
| Line 39: | Line 39: | ||
3. Audiences | 3. Audiences | ||
| − | * UK Government, Parliament and Political Parties | + | * UK Government, Parliament and [[Political Parties]] |
* Armed Forces | * Armed Forces | ||
| Line 45: | Line 45: | ||
* Journalists | * Journalists | ||
| − | * Educational Institutions: universities, colleges, schools | + | * Educational Institutions: [[universities]], [[colleges]], [[schools]] |
* General Public | * General Public | ||
| Line 57: | Line 57: | ||
* Well-researched articles, published on our own and partner websites (ongoing) | * Well-researched articles, published on our own and partner websites (ongoing) | ||
| − | * Active Twitter feed to growing number of followers (183 as at 22/03/17, up from 29 in mid-Feb) (ongoing) | + | * Active [[Twitter]] feed to growing number of followers (183 as at 22/03/17, up from 29 in mid-Feb) (ongoing) |
| − | * Creation of a Europe-wide network of groups who understand the danger of Russian active measures and who can pass the message on to their own decision-makers and public, often using material which we initiate; conference planned for June 2017 in The Netherlands (expanding what we are currently doing) | + | * Creation of a Europe-wide [[Integrity Initiative/Cluster|network of groups]] who understand the danger of Russian active measures and who can pass the message on to their own decision-makers and public, often using material which we initiate; conference planned for June 2017 in [[The Netherlands]] (expanding what we are currently doing) |
| − | * Bringing together active groups from across Europe, such as the StratComms team at the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry with counterparts in the UK and elsewhere (ongoing) | + | * Bringing together active groups from across Europe, such as the StratComms team at the [[Lithuanian Foreign Ministry]] with counterparts in the UK and elsewhere (ongoing) |
5. Performance indicators: | 5. Performance indicators: | ||
Revision as of 11:01, 5 December 2019
| "Creation of a Europe-wide network of groups who understand the danger of Russian active measures and who can pass the message on to their own decision-makers and public, often using material which we initiate" |
draft for budget needs by Integrity Initiative dated 14 03 2017Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/3
Security Classification: Private
Source: 'Anonymous'
★ Start a Discussion about this document
Bid for MoD Funding 2017-2018
Private – Draft Only
THE INTEGRITY INITIATIVE: BID FOR MoD FUNDING 2017-2018
Introduction:
The Integrity Initiative was set up in 2016 by The Institute for Statecraft in cooperation with the Free University of Brussels (VUB) to bring to the attention of policy-makers, military leaders and the general public the threat posed to democratic institutions in the United Kingdom and across Europe by Russia. The specific focus of the Initiative concerns disinformation, the deliberate spreading of false information aimed at destabilising Western societies, and sowing confusion and mistrust in our institutions; but the programme goes further, looking at all manner of threats under the banner of hybrid warfare and extending to the threat of military action against the West.
1. Success so far
- Organised visit to the UK by the Lithuanian StratComms team; as a result of their briefing 77 Brigade adopted the Lithuanian approach
- Organised visit to the UK by a Ukrainian Special Forces team; in a series of meetings with their UK counterparts they passed on invaluable information about how they are dealing with Russian military operations in Eastern Ukraine
- Meetings with senior politicians and military commanders (both in London and at NATO), and Full Spectrum Effects Coordination Cell (FSECC), to explain the threat of Russian active measures
- Briefing of journalists has led to stories in newspapers and online, including the lead front-page story in The Times on 17 Dec 2016
- Discussions with NATO allies have led to formation of groups looking into active measures in France, Spain, Greece
- Extensive amount of published material on the threat (see Appendix A)
2. Budget- How much money are you asking for this project? (Different amounts for different levels of project is fine, but we need specifics on how much for what. Is there funding from other sources? What about long-term)
3. Audiences
- UK Government, Parliament and Political Parties
- Armed Forces
- Journalists
- Educational Institutions: universities, colleges, schools
- General Public
4. Activities
- Illustrating to the UK military that disinformation and Russian active measures are just one element of what Russia regards already as a wartime situation (this is clear from studying their own writings); showing that there is not simply one obvious military approach from the Russian side (ongoing)
- One-on-one briefings for politicians, senior military, journalists (ongoing)
- Well-researched articles, published on our own and partner websites (ongoing)
- Active Twitter feed to growing number of followers (183 as at 22/03/17, up from 29 in mid-Feb) (ongoing)
- Creation of a Europe-wide network of groups who understand the danger of Russian active measures and who can pass the message on to their own decision-makers and public, often using material which we initiate; conference planned for June 2017 in The Netherlands (expanding what we are currently doing)
- Bringing together active groups from across Europe, such as the StratComms team at the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry with counterparts in the UK and elsewhere (ongoing)
5. Performance indicators:
- Tougher stance in government policy towards Russia
- Better understanding of the military threat to the UK
- More information published in the media on the threat of Russian active measures
- Growth of network across Europe
- Increase in number of followers on Twitter
- Increased education of young generation on disinformation and threats posed by social media
- Greater awareness in all areas of society of the threat posed by Russian active measures to UK’s democratic institutions
