Difference between revisions of "Document:Integrity Initiative Budget for the 12 months ending 31 March 2019"
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{{Document | {{Document | ||
|title=Progress report on establishing national clusters | |title=Progress report on establishing national clusters | ||
− | |type= | + | |type=Budget and activity plan |
− | |authors= | + | |authors=Integrity Initiative |
|leaked=Yes | |leaked=Yes | ||
|publication_date=2 Nov 2018 | |publication_date=2 Nov 2018 | ||
Line 8: | Line 8: | ||
|source_URL=https://fdik.org/Integrity_Initiative/392195593-Integrity-2018-Activity-Budget-v3.pdf | |source_URL=https://fdik.org/Integrity_Initiative/392195593-Integrity-2018-Activity-Budget-v3.pdf | ||
|constitutes=Integrity Initiative/Leak/1 | |constitutes=Integrity Initiative/Leak/1 | ||
− | |subjects= | + | |subjects=Integrity Initiative, Clusters, propaganda, influence operation, political warfare |
− | |description= | + | |description=Budget outlining how Integrity Initiative is going to control the information space, and influence policy-makers, specialists and media. |
+ | |note=It was changed from horizontal spreadsheet to vertical list when transferred. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Line 20: | Line 21: | ||
Project IfS: Integrity Initiative: Phase II 1 | Project IfS: Integrity Initiative: Phase II 1 | ||
− | + | =Admin Costs= | |
− | |||
− | |||
+ | <b>Q1 1st Apr-30 Jun</b> | ||
Director £18'150.00 | Director £18'150.00 | ||
Line 76: | Line 76: | ||
− | + | =Activity Costs= | |
− | Expanding our cluster network of specialists, journalists, academics and political actors across Europe, empowering them to educate their publics and policy elites Current clusters: Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, Serbia, Italy (9) Next clusters: Moldova, Georgia, Sweden, Montenegro, Malta, USA, Canada, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland, Latvia (16) Research Clusters in Ukraine & Jordan (2) | + | ==Expanding our cluster network of specialists, journalists, academics and political actors across Europe, empowering them to educate their publics and policy elites Current clusters: Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, Serbia, Italy (9) Next clusters: Moldova, Georgia, Sweden, Montenegro, Malta, USA, Canada, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland, Latvia (16) Research Clusters in Ukraine & Jordan (2)== |
===ACTIVITY:Initial cluster foundation workshop=== | ===ACTIVITY:Initial cluster foundation workshop=== | ||
Line 94: | Line 94: | ||
Initial group of at least 8 members between core hub and network. Members agree team roles and start putting structures in place. Start exchanges of information with other clusters. Begin work on research and dissemination activities | Initial group of at least 8 members between core hub and network. Members agree team roles and start putting structures in place. Start exchanges of information with other clusters. Begin work on research and dissemination activities | ||
− | COST | + | COST £80'000.00 |
− | |||
− | £80'000.00 | ||
===ACTIVITY:Inaugural event=== | ===ACTIVITY:Inaugural event=== | ||
Line 113: | Line 111: | ||
Civil society, media, academia and policy makers increasingly call on members for commentary/advice/research. Enhanced cooperation measured through joint events, shared publications, greater public awareness and resistance to RU disinformation assessed through national polling data. Identify any patterns emerging. | Civil society, media, academia and policy makers increasingly call on members for commentary/advice/research. Enhanced cooperation measured through joint events, shared publications, greater public awareness and resistance to RU disinformation assessed through national polling data. Identify any patterns emerging. | ||
− | COST | + | COST £106'664.00 |
− | |||
− | £106'664.00 | ||
===ACTIVITY:Country fundamental report=== | ===ACTIVITY:Country fundamental report=== | ||
Line 131: | Line 127: | ||
Match trends identified with wider International network. Deliver to [[FCO]], [[MOD]], [[British Bankers Assoc]]., [[Assoc. of British Insurers]]. Regular content production and dissemination leading to increasing engagement | Match trends identified with wider International network. Deliver to [[FCO]], [[MOD]], [[British Bankers Assoc]]., [[Assoc. of British Insurers]]. Regular content production and dissemination leading to increasing engagement | ||
− | COST | + | COST £53'332.00 |
− | |||
− | £53'332.00 | ||
===ACTIVITY:Educational event (twice yearly)=== | ===ACTIVITY:Educational event (twice yearly)=== | ||
Line 147: | Line 141: | ||
KEY INDICATOR | KEY INDICATOR | ||
− | Unprompted interactions between sub cluster members. Delivered to FCO, MOD, British Bankers Assoc., Assoc. of British Insurers + academic programmes e.g. [[Manchester University]] 'Reframing Russia'. Increased engagement with social media accounts generally and content published on them | + | Unprompted interactions between sub cluster members. Delivered to FCO, MOD, British Bankers Assoc., Assoc. of British Insurers + academic programmes e.g. [[Manchester University]] '[[Reframing Russia]]'. Increased engagement with social media accounts generally and content published on them |
+ | |||
+ | COST £63'998.40 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Follow up workshop=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Review of cluster organisation and early work. Assistance with any issues /concerns and modifications following feedback. Planning for the future. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Questionnaire measuring more people / organisations being more aware. Cluster performance improves. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Cluster has increasingly public profile, members frequently called on for commentary/advice/research. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £39'999.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Professional comprehensive country report=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Printed and digital published report to analyse and illustrate a comprehensive picture of country network activities (civil society, NGO's, journalists, academics, Govt. agencies) to identify and counter RU disinformation | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Systematic picture of country efforts enabling the cluster to improve the effectiveness of the fight against RU disinformation. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | (Inter)National media coverage. Verifiable information and data that can be cross-referenced against other regions assessing acceptance of key RU messaging, trust in media sources, and the degree of coordinated strategic defence. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £71'998.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Sending cluster members to educational sessions abroad ([[IREX]], [[Detector Media]], [[StopFake]], [[EUvsDisinfo]], LT MOD [[Stratcom]])=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Improve the technical competence of the cluster to deal with disinformation. Strengthen bonds between clusters in the system. Reinforce by preparing a strategy paper on cross-network partnerships. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Cluster seen as definitive national source on counter-disinformation / influence education.Stronger defence and shared resources to bolster our cluster network. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | National media coverage. Cluster produce RU and local language material, including material adapted for use within RU speaking minority. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £39'999.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Core team and cluster experts briefing tour, in North America, with a regional focus, to spread understanding beyond capitals=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Briefings to regional audiences. Also identify like-minded partners and help bridge and diffuse partisan divide by sharing EU experience of countering RU disinformation | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Increased awareness of the RU disinformation threat and improved resilience, shared best practice, harnessing of national media/tech resources to tackle these threats on a global scale | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Increased cooperation measured through cross-party initiatives, media literacy improvement through polling data on cross-checking, articles written and shared to highlight (the US) experience, increased cluster membership and wider following through social media channels | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £39'999.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Application of [[Nationbuilder]] tool (cluster-wide out-facing public engagement platform)=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Enhance comms between project and general population. Provide greater autonomy and structure for clusters to engage with local populations. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Nuanced message targeting. Outward facing engagement campaigns. Specific email campaign. Each cluster able to have their own website connected to the hub. Material accessible to more people on an Int'l scale. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Volume of material distributed and number of individuals signed up | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £2'666.60 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Research and assessment: Sponsoring- including via the [[Free University of Brussels]] (VUB IES) - (thereby enhancing academic respectability of the topic)- advanced research, publications, workshops, educational courses, mentoring, lectures== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Regular educational seminars in London (30 per annum)=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Expert speakers addressing key issues to educate core team and clusters. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Exposes cluster leaders and UK and foreign opinion formers to new ideas on RU and on hybrid/information warfare; explores new and different issues; stimulates interest in and research into new aspects of our main topic. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Increasing demand from target audiences; new topics identified as research subjects; dissemination of new thinking to clusters and into the public domain. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £59'998.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:VUB IES: Commission research and educational project=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | 9 x Research paths: From Disinformation to Political Warfare (see attachment for details) | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Establishing the academic credibility of the topic internationally; influences EU member states via material sent directly to the EEAS and [[EU Stratcom]] Taskforce; provides the academic basis for the whole [[Integrity Initiative]] programme and makes the programme attractive to journalists and politicians by demonstrating its accuracy and reliability. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | The VUB team will be called upon to advise and educate influential people interested in this scheme more rapidly. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £79'998.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:VUB IES: Outreach with Policy-makers, Academics and the General Public=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Political warfare working meetings with EU Officials, Political warfare workshops, Information Literacy Course, Political Warfare Network, 'Information Warfare and Security' Modules | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | The [[Russian Propaganda|RU disinformation]] and influence issue will no longer be ignored or belittled. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | National think tanks (e.g. [[German Institute for International and Security Affairs|SWB]] Berlin, [[IFRI]] France, [[Clingendael]] NL) launch their own programmes on disinformation and malign influence | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £79'998.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Journalist skill-sharing seminars=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Journalists will be invited from regions where threats are more heightened to share their tips for how to operate safely in a hostile environment | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Cluster operations in hostile environments will become safer and more effective. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATORS | ||
+ | |||
+ | Cluster members in hostile environments feel more secure, are able to operate with less risk and can produce better analysis. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £33'000.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Launch a series of educational films=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | 5 educational films illustrating disinformation and outlining the threats. For school and university audiences. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Better, more comprehensive understanding of disinfomation trends amongst educated young people | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | The message reaches a wider demographic audience, especially younger people, [[schools]] - leading to conversations on [[discernment education]] | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £133'330.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Elves Academy=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | 4 day workshop in [[Lithuania]]. 40 participants from 8 EU countries, 10 lecturers for practical sessions and training, 10 lecturers for review sessions. Follow up visits, by Elves instructors, to ensure the organisation develops effectively. Instructional materials to be produced. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Taught goals 1) theoretical understanding of Kremlin propaganda and its trolls 2) practical sessions the 'elves' provide necessary knowledge for the development and implementation of an effective civic response. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATORS | ||
+ | |||
+ | Civic activists and volunteers actively engaged in cyber resistance and digital resilience. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £93'331.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: VUB structured series of workshops with key national institutes to help them develop their own programmes addressing disinformation and malign influence=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | 1 workshop per quarter, in [[Brussels]] | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Raising the profile of countering disinformation in key European countries | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | National governments sponsor and fund the establishment of programmes | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £26'666.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Topics to be researched (see attachment)=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Papers, seminars and presentations, on each of the topics, to core staff, clusters and external target audiences | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Rapidly raise target audience understanding of the RU strategic approach with the concerted use of all weapons of hybrid warfare | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Recognition by target audiences of the RU strategic approach evinced by their statements, publications and policies | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £35'999.10 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Bulletins on Russian online shill activity, using mass data surveys=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Weekly bulletins & monthly data surveys | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Better, more comprehensive understanding of online disinformation trends within all clusters | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Uptake of bulletin & production of graphics (turning data into more digestible information) available to journalistic audiences and other influences | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £19'999.50 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Use of data surveys to begin mapping out the details of Russian shill net=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Detailed, data and hard evidence backed understanding of Shill net | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Greater ability to combat the shill net using operations based on our improved understanding. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Clusters and Elves successfully using the product to improve their performance countering disinformation. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £124'796.88 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Implementing discernment and media literacy training programme (using e.g. [[Skripal]] as a case-study)=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | A modular training programme (based on [[IREX]]/[[StopFake]] material) that adapts media source examples as needed to be most relevant and accessible across our [[cluster]] network | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Train wider audiences in the nature and extent of the RU threat and develop media literacy/critical thinking resilience that will help protect our wider societies | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Pilot project running in Junior [[School]], Secondary School and [[University]]. Programme participation numbers, survey data on learning outcomes (cross-checking, verification, awareness). Reaching people in typically neglected areas and regions outside the country capitals. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £119'997.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Expanding the impact of the Integrity Initiative website, dissemination and [[Twitter]]/social media accounts, and increasing the reporting of the issue in the mainstream and specialist press== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Translation of cluster publications and material (local language, English and RU)=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Steady stream of content highlighting disinformation in the relevant country. Publication on social media and website. Dissemination by clusters. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Improved access to RU speaking minorities, RU diasporas and audiences within Russia. Increased awareness (and combating) of country-specific issues and RU malign influence in other countries. Sharing and engagement. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | (Inter)National media coverage. More identifying and combating of disinformation amongst the public, politicians and academics. Social media and website engagement. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST 79'998.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Experimental social media (calendar) pin pointing=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Targeted effort to pre-empt and combat specific malign influence attempts and control the information space | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | The information space will become dominated by accurate reporting instead of being carpet-bombed with [[Kremlin]] and fringe groups' disinfo | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Media spaces will clearly be dominated by real, factual narrative and not [[conspiracy theories]] and [[Kremlin propaganda]] | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £6'665.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Media interviews=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Core and cluster experts presenting their knowledge on TV, radio and in newspapers, as well as influential websites | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Our experts will increasingly be invited as as a matter of course, as the go-to specialists to discuss RU and other propaganda and disinformation as well as media literacy. Reactive and proactive assessment of RU methods. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATORS | ||
+ | |||
+ | Successful interviews and articles relating to high profile events e.g. the anniversary of the murder of the Tsar, The [[Katyn Massacre]]. A steady increase in the number of appearances. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £0.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Expanding content areas on website, including a series of podcasts=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | A series of podcasts available on our Integrity Initiative website. Two long, two short articles per month providing more details of disinformation and other tools of influence, improving media literacy. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | More attention turned onto RU influence activities in non EU/NATO nations. Disinformation cases and their special characteristics. Handy tools and examples for people to use in various situations - educational, research and others | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Measured increase in the use of the website. The evolution of the website in reaction to users comments, increased use of the website by NGO's and embassies. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £26'666.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Targeted op-ed pieces to highlight cross-over experience across the cluster network=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Articles in main stream media. New, varied, translated content for the website. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Enhanced reputation for expertise in this field, shared best practice | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Google analytics showing wider coverage, increased traffic and readership of articles, longer 'dwelling' time on site, greater audience diversity | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £53'332.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Website maintenance and IT / Comms security=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Active monitoring of core and cluster websites and supervised implementation of IT security procedures. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Improved security of the programme of network and of clusters | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | Security breaches minimised. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £33'320.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Ongoing production of infographics and other visual materials=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | A steady stream of relevant visual materials | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Fast and high impact response to disinfo events, preempting of propaganda campaigns, education of the digitally aware | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Engagement with and references to the content | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £33'332.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Social media training=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Training to clusters on setting up and effectively using social media relevant to their country / region | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Increased visibility and engagement of the topic in the clusters | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Referencing and quoting of efforts | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £6'666.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Branded materials=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Business cards, infographics postcards, branded reports and articles | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Increased visibility of the programme | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Increased referencing of the programme in public for a | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £13'333.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Best practice sharing=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Regular best practice newsletter and sharing sessions | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Clusters learn from each other and industry best practice to increase engagement | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Visible improvements in media performance by cluster members | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £0.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Media performance reporting==== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Regular report of social media performance and traditional media appearances | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Increased profile, reputation and demand for II expertise | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Measurement of being increased in demand | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £3'999.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Increase links between our website and like-minded, trusted 3rd parties=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Specific articles and shared events that bolster google rankings for relevant searches | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Greater reach and increased sphere of influence | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Increased website traffic, measurable month-on-month diverse audience, focused increase in targeted areas and by defined search terms | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £0.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Engaging national political and military establishments and societal organisations, improving their ability to counter Russian disinformation and other weapons of hybrid warfare strategy== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Engage national military authorities to increase their interest in joining the information warfare battle and in collaborating with clusters and other national assets=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Military personnel invited to core and cluster events, leading to joint events in each country | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Education of national military organisations: increasing human resources available to contribute in national programmes and the Integrity Initiative | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | National military hold an independent or joint information exercise. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £0.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Coordinate and host conference in Kyiv, Ukraine for representatives of British Army's [[77th Brigade]], [[UCMC]], [[NATO]], cluster representatives=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Share best practice and critical first hand experience of Russian [[infowar]] and hybrid war tactics in Eastern Ukraine | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Improved understanding of the links and common doctrine between different weapons of RU hybrid war, including use of hard military operations. Strengthen ties and more robust defence to a common threat | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Establishment of working level contact and generation of national military activity. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £5'333.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Education and training on how to use social media (where appropriate for the organisation)=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Training course and materials | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | More effective dissemination of message and engagement with audiences | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Audiences generate social media activity. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £6'666.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Develop and launch training seminar for journalists in 'Visual story-telling: real stories to counter disinformation'=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | A modular training programme that can be used to bolster independent, creative and provocative journalism across our network | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Understanding and practical resources to respond to disinformation through creating and sharing real stories that matter. Sensitivity to work in conflict situations, and an awareness of how to respond in divisive challenging environments | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Measured improvement of quality journalistic content across our network | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £4'666.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:With the help of the UK financial sector - British Bankers Association & Association of British Insurers, London Stock Exchange - establish relations with European counterparts and European for liaison with European bourses=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Guest lecture programme to alert these institutions to the threats of disinformation and malign influence | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | European financial institutions recognise the steps of disinformation and malign influence | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | European financial institutions issue statements acknowleding the threat, and identifying responses | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £2'433.33 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Through links with UK law enforcement and revenue organisations, anti corruption and development NGO's and journalistic organisations, gain access to their European counterparts=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Provide a series of briefings to European agencies on the interface between RU state and criminal organisations. Two reports per quarter on RU linked corruption | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Institutions will improve collaborations and improve their ability to identify links and their information value. Agreement for Europol to be lead agency. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Risk mitigation intranet, Fusion centre of suspicious incidents. Input to EC Disinfo Initiative NATO and [[Europol]]. RU culpability referred to in % age of all their annual and specific reports. Indicators of RU indifference or obstruction - arms trading. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £12'033.33 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Increasing the impact of effective organisations currently analysing Russian activities, making their expertise more widely available across Europe and North America== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Publications and reports on common and different experiences in commenting on hybrid warfare, propaganda and reports on such and criminal and geopolitical activities: 'your view, our comments' and vice versa: e.g. [[Clingendaal]], [[Egmont]], [[Konrad Adenauer Inst]]. and Swedish equivalent and Poland, Balkan/Baltic states etc=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | At least one dual report or two reciprocal reports on common and different approaches with cooperating organisations. Co posting on websites of each in cooperating magazines or other on line publications | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Quantitative and qualitative increases in circulation of commentaries rebutting past RU activities and action. Identification of both generic and country or region specific subjects and methods of delivery. | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Numbers of reports and range of both countries and regions covered. Publication of case studies / case histories / proactive warning alerts in countries beyond those which are the subjects of these reports i.e. dissemination | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £13'333.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Reinforcing the will and ability of international organisations to address this issue, despite the reticence of some member nations. Organisations include: ATA, YATA, [[NATO Parliamentary Assembly]], [[Atlantic Treaty Association]], [[Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers]], [[Baltic Defence College]], HQ NATO Public Diplomacy, EU [[East Stratcom]] Team== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Obtain the agreement of these international organisations to disseminate our programme material: link to national clusters where appropriate. Produce report based on press releases of Europol and Interpol on RU speaker criminality and produce proposals for identifying possible links with state bodies=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | List of indicators such as geographic or career links of individuals and groups with [[FSB]], [[SVR]], [[GRU]] and military. List of indicators linking RU with [[narcotics]], [[forced labour]], [[human trafficking]] for sexual purposes, [[wildlife trafficking]], conflict minerals, illegal forestry ([[private military companies]], illegal fishing | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Recognition of high prevalance of RU and RU linked groups and failure of the RU state to prosecute, disrupt or regulate these illegal activities and legal facilitating factors | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Inclusion of factual recognition of RU involvement leading to the readiness of countries to raise this with the RU government. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £5'333.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Setting up UK chapters of [[ATA]] and [[YATA]]]=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Participation in ATA and YATA events to engage national chapters and persuade them to transmit our messages | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | National ATA and YATA chapters engage with national clusters in the distribution of information and influencing target audiences | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Participation of clusters and programme staff in ATA and YATA activities. Participation of ATA and YATA personnel in programme cluster activities. Preparation of joint reports. Organisation of joint events. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £33'332.50 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Research papers in publications of the institutions=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Educate the wider range of audiences open to these international organisations about RU disinformation and malign influence | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Organisations/countries better equipped to counter RU disinfo and malign influence | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Organisations/countries more willing to take public stance and act against RU malign influence. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £0.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY: Lectures and seminars at events organised by these international organisations=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Educate policy-makers, specialists and media about RU disinfo and malign influence. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Organisations/countries better equipped to counter RU disinfo and malign influence | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Organisations/countries more willing to take public stance and act against RU malign influence. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £3'999.90 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Engaging Russian and Russian - speaking audiences to challenge Moscow's narratives== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:[[Andrei Sakharov Centre]] - [[Kaunus University Programme]]=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Bi-monthly Workshops to engage Russians and establish how to impact on attitudes in Russia | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Better understanding to inform our [[Stratcom]] targetting Russians | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Sanity checks on our Stratcom initiatives to identify and impact on Russian audiences | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £66'665.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Expand Russian citizen focus group programme in minority communities and diasporas=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Continuation meetings and in-depth engagement in minority communities and diasporas | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Improvement of core and cluster understanding of the attitudes within RU minority communities and RU diaspora communities. Programme learning of how best to impact on attitudes in these communities; what works and what does not | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Implementation of experimental projects to impact on attitudes in RU speaking minorities and diaspora communities, monitoring effects and feedback | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £2'666.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Make presentation at Donbas Media Forum July 2018, Krematorsk, Ukraine=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Engagement through training material - spoken and visual | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Increased resilience of independent journalists in Ukraine. Strengthened network for IfS in Ukraine through partnership with key civil society leaders and NGOs | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Conference participation, feedback, registration for IfS updates, increased social media coverage measured | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £1'000.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Provide guest articles from Ifs and our clusters for [[StopFake]]'s printed material published and distributed along the contact line in Eastern Ukraine=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Quality articles, short, relevant that will appeal to those at the frontline of Russian occupation | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Introduction of quality information at a critical front in the war on disinformation, support for those resisting the Russian frontal attack in Donbas | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Polling data that helps measure resilience and resistance towards targeted Russian disinformation in front line regions. Compare data over time and share results with European partners engaged in similar work to boost effectiveness. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £11,999.70 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Produce questionnaires for RU speaking audiences, inviting them to rebut Western analyses of key media stories (e.g. [[MH17]], [[Litvinenko]], [[Skripal]], doping) and invite reasons for supporting RU counter narratives=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Carefully analyse results. Distribute to clusters and national agencies to study and react. Publish responses with permission and publish non responses | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Identification of how these groups rebut Western narratives and by default identify failure to do so. Similar identification of successful or unsuccessful justifications or RU narratives and multiple narratives and which ones are favoured | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Evidence of impact on public responses from RU speaking audiences. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £399.99 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Adapting our approach as Russia responds to our successful counter moves== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Continued curation and preparation of the 'Armoury' (database of articles and key items of information) to improve the programme's ability to respond quickly in new RU disinformation initiatives=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Constantly updated archive of articles, analysis and other material of real value to clusters for rapid response and longer term education to improve the fight against disinformation | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Reinforces the cluster's ability to reach effectiveness quickly by providing a ready resource of examples, information and analysis | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Make an improvement of cluster response speed and use of cluster material by policy makers and journalists | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £16'250.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:All publications and proposals to produce lists of a) likely and b) potential responses=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Lists of such with proactive listing of counter rebuttals | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Earlier identification of RU responses and how they can be discredited. Identify and publish established patterns of RU disinformation and misinformation (strengths and weaknesses) | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Report listing nature of responses and to generic or specific issues and to wide or narrow ranges of countries and/or regions. Compare RU responses in different European countries and differentiation in RU tactics attacking those countries. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £0.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Monitoring of Russian and pro-Russian information=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Sharing of insights and analysis | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Adaptive response to Russian disinformation | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Impact on broader audiences outside the expert community | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £0.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Applying lessons of the programme more widely e.g. short report on best practice, twice a year, which could be shared with other FCO depts (Daesh, China for e.g)== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Bi-annual written report in English and local language, on output and media performance - successes and failures=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Dissemination | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Best practice sharing | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | All involved show improved performance | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £6'800.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Presentations to partner organisations=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Educate policy-makers, specialists and media about State / non State disinfo and malign influence. | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | Organisations/countries better equipped to counter State / non State disinfo and malign influence | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | Organisations/countries more willing to take public stance and act against State / non State malign activity. | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £2'798.77 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===ACTIVITY:Manual and Lexicon=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTPUT | ||
+ | |||
+ | Complete these products, issue them, gather feedback and edit | ||
+ | |||
+ | OUTCOME | ||
+ | |||
+ | This will provide standard basis of understanding on how best to respond to disinformation | ||
+ | |||
+ | KEY INDICATOR | ||
+ | |||
+ | The use of the manual and lexicon by clusters, national organisations and partners | ||
+ | |||
+ | COST £5'710.00 | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Quarterly budget== | ||
+ | |||
+ | Q1 1st Apr-30 Jun | ||
+ | Admin Costs | ||
+ | £49'125.00 | ||
+ | Activity Costs | ||
+ | £605'495.20 | ||
+ | Quarter Total | ||
+ | £640'000.00 | ||
+ | Estimated monthly invoice / spend: | ||
+ | A= £210k / M = £215k / J = £215k | ||
+ | |||
+ | Q2 1st Jul-30 Sep | ||
+ | Admin Costs | ||
+ | £49'125.00 | ||
+ | Activity Costs | ||
+ | £276'373.80 | ||
+ | Quarter Total | ||
+ | £276'373.80 | ||
+ | Estimated monthly invoice / spend | ||
+ | J = £115 / A = £105k / S = £105k | ||
+ | |||
+ | Q3 1st Oct-31st Dec | ||
+ | Admin Costs | ||
+ | £49'125.00 | ||
+ | Activity Costs | ||
+ | £440'934.50 | ||
+ | Quarter Total | ||
+ | £505'000.00 | ||
+ | Estimated monthly invoice / spend | ||
+ | O = £145k / N = £145k / D = £215k | ||
+ | |||
+ | Q4 1st Jan-31st Mar | ||
+ | Admin Costs | ||
+ | £49'125.00 | ||
+ | Activity Costs | ||
+ | £440'934.50 | ||
+ | Quarter Total | ||
+ | £491'000.00 | ||
+ | Estimated monthly invoice / spend | ||
+ | J = £165 / F = £163k / M = £163k | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | £196'500.00 ADMIN COSTS TOTAL | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | £1'764'500.00 ACTIVITY COSTS TOTAL | ||
+ | |||
− | + | £1'961'000.00 ADMIN + ACTIVITY COSTS TOTAL | |
− | + | £1'961'000.00 GRAND TOTAL |
Latest revision as of 13:45, 25 February 2020
Budget outlining how Integrity Initiative is going to control the information space, and influence policy-makers, specialists and media. |
![Disclaimer (#3)](/w/images/thumb/6/69/I.png/25px-I.png)
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Subjects: Integrity Initiative, Clusters, propaganda, influence operation, political warfare
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/1
Source: 'Anonymous' (Link)
It was changed from horizontal spreadsheet to vertical list when transferred.
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Progress report on establishing national clusters
Integrity 2018/19 Quarterly budget
Statecraft
For the 12 months ending 31 March 2019
Project IfS: Integrity Initiative: Phase II 1
Contents
- 1 Admin Costs
- 2 Activity Costs
- 2.1 Expanding our cluster network of specialists, journalists, academics and political actors across Europe, empowering them to educate their publics and policy elites Current clusters: Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, Serbia, Italy (9) Next clusters: Moldova, Georgia, Sweden, Montenegro, Malta, USA, Canada, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland, Latvia (16) Research Clusters in Ukraine & Jordan (2)
- 2.1.1 ACTIVITY:Initial cluster foundation workshop
- 2.1.2 ACTIVITY:Inaugural event
- 2.1.3 ACTIVITY:Country fundamental report
- 2.1.4 ACTIVITY:Educational event (twice yearly)
- 2.1.5 ACTIVITY:Follow up workshop
- 2.1.6 ACTIVITY:Professional comprehensive country report
- 2.1.7 ACTIVITY:Sending cluster members to educational sessions abroad (IREX, Detector Media, StopFake, EUvsDisinfo, LT MOD Stratcom)
- 2.1.8 ACTIVITY:Core team and cluster experts briefing tour, in North America, with a regional focus, to spread understanding beyond capitals
- 2.1.9 ACTIVITY:Application of Nationbuilder tool (cluster-wide out-facing public engagement platform)
- 2.2 Research and assessment: Sponsoring- including via the Free University of Brussels (VUB IES) - (thereby enhancing academic respectability of the topic)- advanced research, publications, workshops, educational courses, mentoring, lectures
- 2.2.1 ACTIVITY:Regular educational seminars in London (30 per annum)
- 2.2.2 ACTIVITY:VUB IES: Commission research and educational project
- 2.2.3 ACTIVITY:VUB IES: Outreach with Policy-makers, Academics and the General Public
- 2.2.4 ACTIVITY:Journalist skill-sharing seminars
- 2.2.5 ACTIVITY:Launch a series of educational films
- 2.2.6 ACTIVITY:Elves Academy
- 2.2.7 ACTIVITY: VUB structured series of workshops with key national institutes to help them develop their own programmes addressing disinformation and malign influence
- 2.2.8 ACTIVITY:Topics to be researched (see attachment)
- 2.2.9 ACTIVITY:Bulletins on Russian online shill activity, using mass data surveys
- 2.2.10 ACTIVITY:Use of data surveys to begin mapping out the details of Russian shill net
- 2.2.11 ACTIVITY:Implementing discernment and media literacy training programme (using e.g. Skripal as a case-study)
- 2.3 Expanding the impact of the Integrity Initiative website, dissemination and Twitter/social media accounts, and increasing the reporting of the issue in the mainstream and specialist press
- 2.3.1 ACTIVITY:Translation of cluster publications and material (local language, English and RU)
- 2.3.2 ACTIVITY:Experimental social media (calendar) pin pointing
- 2.3.3 ACTIVITY:Media interviews
- 2.3.4 ACTIVITY:Expanding content areas on website, including a series of podcasts
- 2.3.5 ACTIVITY:Targeted op-ed pieces to highlight cross-over experience across the cluster network
- 2.3.6 ACTIVITY:Website maintenance and IT / Comms security
- 2.3.7 ACTIVITY:Ongoing production of infographics and other visual materials
- 2.3.8 ACTIVITY:Social media training
- 2.3.9 ACTIVITY: Branded materials
- 2.3.10 ACTIVITY:Best practice sharing
- 2.3.11 ACTIVITY:Media performance reporting=
- 2.3.12 ACTIVITY: Increase links between our website and like-minded, trusted 3rd parties
- 2.4 Engaging national political and military establishments and societal organisations, improving their ability to counter Russian disinformation and other weapons of hybrid warfare strategy
- 2.4.1 ACTIVITY: Engage national military authorities to increase their interest in joining the information warfare battle and in collaborating with clusters and other national assets
- 2.4.2 ACTIVITY: Coordinate and host conference in Kyiv, Ukraine for representatives of British Army's 77th Brigade, UCMC, NATO, cluster representatives
- 2.4.3 ACTIVITY: Education and training on how to use social media (where appropriate for the organisation)
- 2.4.4 ACTIVITY: Develop and launch training seminar for journalists in 'Visual story-telling: real stories to counter disinformation'
- 2.4.5 ACTIVITY:With the help of the UK financial sector - British Bankers Association & Association of British Insurers, London Stock Exchange - establish relations with European counterparts and European for liaison with European bourses
- 2.4.6 ACTIVITY: Through links with UK law enforcement and revenue organisations, anti corruption and development NGO's and journalistic organisations, gain access to their European counterparts
- 2.5 Increasing the impact of effective organisations currently analysing Russian activities, making their expertise more widely available across Europe and North America
- 2.6 Reinforcing the will and ability of international organisations to address this issue, despite the reticence of some member nations. Organisations include: ATA, YATA, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Atlantic Treaty Association, Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, Baltic Defence College, HQ NATO Public Diplomacy, EU East Stratcom Team
- 2.6.1 ACTIVITY: Obtain the agreement of these international organisations to disseminate our programme material: link to national clusters where appropriate. Produce report based on press releases of Europol and Interpol on RU speaker criminality and produce proposals for identifying possible links with state bodies
- 2.6.2 ACTIVITY:Setting up UK chapters of ATA and YATA]
- 2.6.3 ACTIVITY:Research papers in publications of the institutions
- 2.6.4 ACTIVITY: Lectures and seminars at events organised by these international organisations
- 2.7 Engaging Russian and Russian - speaking audiences to challenge Moscow's narratives
- 2.7.1 ACTIVITY:Andrei Sakharov Centre - Kaunus University Programme
- 2.7.2 ACTIVITY:Expand Russian citizen focus group programme in minority communities and diasporas
- 2.7.3 ACTIVITY:Make presentation at Donbas Media Forum July 2018, Krematorsk, Ukraine
- 2.7.4 ACTIVITY:Provide guest articles from Ifs and our clusters for StopFake's printed material published and distributed along the contact line in Eastern Ukraine
- 2.7.5 ACTIVITY:Produce questionnaires for RU speaking audiences, inviting them to rebut Western analyses of key media stories (e.g. MH17, Litvinenko, Skripal, doping) and invite reasons for supporting RU counter narratives
- 2.8 Adapting our approach as Russia responds to our successful counter moves
- 2.8.1 ACTIVITY:Continued curation and preparation of the 'Armoury' (database of articles and key items of information) to improve the programme's ability to respond quickly in new RU disinformation initiatives
- 2.8.2 ACTIVITY:All publications and proposals to produce lists of a) likely and b) potential responses
- 2.8.3 ACTIVITY:Monitoring of Russian and pro-Russian information
- 2.9 Applying lessons of the programme more widely e.g. short report on best practice, twice a year, which could be shared with other FCO depts (Daesh, China for e.g)
- 2.10 Quarterly budget
- 2.1 Expanding our cluster network of specialists, journalists, academics and political actors across Europe, empowering them to educate their publics and policy elites Current clusters: Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, Serbia, Italy (9) Next clusters: Moldova, Georgia, Sweden, Montenegro, Malta, USA, Canada, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland, Latvia (16) Research Clusters in Ukraine & Jordan (2)
Admin Costs
Q1 1st Apr-30 Jun Director £18'150.00
Programme Manager £14'175.00
Team Secretary £8'400.00
Distribution Manager £8'400.00
Q2 1st Jul-30 Sep
Director £18'150.00
Programme Manager £14'175.00
Team Secretary £8'400.00
Distribution Manager £8'400.00
Q3 1st Oct-31st Dec
Director £18'150.00
Programme Manager £14'175.00
Team Secretary £8'400.00
Distribution Manager £8'400.00
Q4 1st Jan-31st Mar
Director £18'150.00
Programme Manager £14'175.00
Team Secretary £8'400.00
Distribution Manager £8'400.00
COST £
Director £72'600.00
Programme Manager £56'700.00
Team Secretary £33'600.00
Distribution Manager £33'600.00
ADMIN COSTS TOTAL £196'500.00
Activity Costs
Expanding our cluster network of specialists, journalists, academics and political actors across Europe, empowering them to educate their publics and policy elites Current clusters: Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, Serbia, Italy (9) Next clusters: Moldova, Georgia, Sweden, Montenegro, Malta, USA, Canada, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland, Latvia (16) Research Clusters in Ukraine & Jordan (2)
ACTIVITY:Initial cluster foundation workshop
OUTPUT
Connect cluster members, create internal national network, formally introduce them to the II aims, practices and methodologies, establish target programme for research, dissemination and events
OUTCOME
New cluster able to self-organise. Increased coordination and shared best practice from cluster individuals and organisations working at the forefront of efforts countering RU disinfo, increased resource material for an Int'l audience.
KEY INDICATOR
Initial group of at least 8 members between core hub and network. Members agree team roles and start putting structures in place. Start exchanges of information with other clusters. Begin work on research and dissemination activities
COST £80'000.00
ACTIVITY:Inaugural event
OUTPUT
Establishes the cluster nationally. Sets cluster 'modus operandi'. Representatives of other clusters participate to establish international networking, share expertise, boost morale and media coverage. Regional discussions to ascertain principle disinfo narratives and other malign influence threats which exist within their sphere of influence. Publish event report.
OUTCOME
Cluster strengthens its national public profile as a reliable provider of factual analysis and assessment. Build bonds with regional players. Strengthens the programme's expertise base and ability to hold unique, nuanced conversations. Agree social media and editorial output strategy.
KEY INDICATOR
Civil society, media, academia and policy makers increasingly call on members for commentary/advice/research. Enhanced cooperation measured through joint events, shared publications, greater public awareness and resistance to RU disinformation assessed through national polling data. Identify any patterns emerging.
COST £106'664.00
ACTIVITY:Country fundamental report
OUTPUT
Creation of a regional report on specific realities of malign interference to establish a base of common understanding on which to develop the national programme and share information more coherently and consistently with the Int'l audience. Crime/political and strategic nexus with RU + include details of media & social media environments and establish which platforms are popular.
OUTCOME
Disseminate information on the situation and trends existing within a specific region. Compare domestic and international findings. Earlier and better identificiation of the threat. Production and dissemination of content that educates key national communities and the public.
KEY INDICATOR
Match trends identified with wider International network. Deliver to FCO, MOD, British Bankers Assoc., Assoc. of British Insurers. Regular content production and dissemination leading to increasing engagement
COST £53'332.00
ACTIVITY:Educational event (twice yearly)
OUTPUT
Assemble all contacts and sub-cluster members at one meeting, with key national audience of influencers, to discuss national trends. Pro-reactive editorial and social media output by the cluster. Emerging and expected propaganda drives.
OUTCOME
National cohesion. Creation of defensive and offensive counter narratives. More engagement with specialists and the public.
KEY INDICATOR
Unprompted interactions between sub cluster members. Delivered to FCO, MOD, British Bankers Assoc., Assoc. of British Insurers + academic programmes e.g. Manchester University 'Reframing Russia'. Increased engagement with social media accounts generally and content published on them
COST £63'998.40
ACTIVITY:Follow up workshop
OUTPUT
Review of cluster organisation and early work. Assistance with any issues /concerns and modifications following feedback. Planning for the future.
OUTCOME
Questionnaire measuring more people / organisations being more aware. Cluster performance improves.
KEY INDICATOR
Cluster has increasingly public profile, members frequently called on for commentary/advice/research.
COST £39'999.00
ACTIVITY:Professional comprehensive country report
OUTPUT
Printed and digital published report to analyse and illustrate a comprehensive picture of country network activities (civil society, NGO's, journalists, academics, Govt. agencies) to identify and counter RU disinformation
OUTCOME
Systematic picture of country efforts enabling the cluster to improve the effectiveness of the fight against RU disinformation.
KEY INDICATOR
(Inter)National media coverage. Verifiable information and data that can be cross-referenced against other regions assessing acceptance of key RU messaging, trust in media sources, and the degree of coordinated strategic defence.
COST £71'998.00
ACTIVITY:Sending cluster members to educational sessions abroad (IREX, Detector Media, StopFake, EUvsDisinfo, LT MOD Stratcom)
OUTPUT
Improve the technical competence of the cluster to deal with disinformation. Strengthen bonds between clusters in the system. Reinforce by preparing a strategy paper on cross-network partnerships.
OUTCOME
Cluster seen as definitive national source on counter-disinformation / influence education.Stronger defence and shared resources to bolster our cluster network.
KEY INDICATOR
National media coverage. Cluster produce RU and local language material, including material adapted for use within RU speaking minority.
COST £39'999.00
ACTIVITY:Core team and cluster experts briefing tour, in North America, with a regional focus, to spread understanding beyond capitals
OUTPUT
Briefings to regional audiences. Also identify like-minded partners and help bridge and diffuse partisan divide by sharing EU experience of countering RU disinformation
OUTCOME
Increased awareness of the RU disinformation threat and improved resilience, shared best practice, harnessing of national media/tech resources to tackle these threats on a global scale
KEY INDICATOR
Increased cooperation measured through cross-party initiatives, media literacy improvement through polling data on cross-checking, articles written and shared to highlight (the US) experience, increased cluster membership and wider following through social media channels
COST £39'999.00
ACTIVITY:Application of Nationbuilder tool (cluster-wide out-facing public engagement platform)
OUTPUT
Enhance comms between project and general population. Provide greater autonomy and structure for clusters to engage with local populations.
OUTCOME
Nuanced message targeting. Outward facing engagement campaigns. Specific email campaign. Each cluster able to have their own website connected to the hub. Material accessible to more people on an Int'l scale.
KEY INDICATOR
Volume of material distributed and number of individuals signed up
COST £2'666.60
Research and assessment: Sponsoring- including via the Free University of Brussels (VUB IES) - (thereby enhancing academic respectability of the topic)- advanced research, publications, workshops, educational courses, mentoring, lectures
ACTIVITY:Regular educational seminars in London (30 per annum)
OUTPUT
Expert speakers addressing key issues to educate core team and clusters.
OUTCOME
Exposes cluster leaders and UK and foreign opinion formers to new ideas on RU and on hybrid/information warfare; explores new and different issues; stimulates interest in and research into new aspects of our main topic.
KEY INDICATOR
Increasing demand from target audiences; new topics identified as research subjects; dissemination of new thinking to clusters and into the public domain.
COST £59'998.00
ACTIVITY:VUB IES: Commission research and educational project
OUTPUT
9 x Research paths: From Disinformation to Political Warfare (see attachment for details)
OUTCOME
Establishing the academic credibility of the topic internationally; influences EU member states via material sent directly to the EEAS and EU Stratcom Taskforce; provides the academic basis for the whole Integrity Initiative programme and makes the programme attractive to journalists and politicians by demonstrating its accuracy and reliability.
KEY INDICATOR
The VUB team will be called upon to advise and educate influential people interested in this scheme more rapidly.
COST £79'998.00
ACTIVITY:VUB IES: Outreach with Policy-makers, Academics and the General Public
OUTPUT
Political warfare working meetings with EU Officials, Political warfare workshops, Information Literacy Course, Political Warfare Network, 'Information Warfare and Security' Modules
OUTCOME
The RU disinformation and influence issue will no longer be ignored or belittled.
KEY INDICATOR
National think tanks (e.g. SWB Berlin, IFRI France, Clingendael NL) launch their own programmes on disinformation and malign influence
COST £79'998.00
ACTIVITY:Journalist skill-sharing seminars
OUTPUT
Journalists will be invited from regions where threats are more heightened to share their tips for how to operate safely in a hostile environment
OUTCOME
Cluster operations in hostile environments will become safer and more effective.
KEY INDICATORS
Cluster members in hostile environments feel more secure, are able to operate with less risk and can produce better analysis.
COST £33'000.00
ACTIVITY:Launch a series of educational films
OUTPUT
5 educational films illustrating disinformation and outlining the threats. For school and university audiences.
OUTCOME
Better, more comprehensive understanding of disinfomation trends amongst educated young people
KEY INDICATOR
The message reaches a wider demographic audience, especially younger people, schools - leading to conversations on discernment education
COST £133'330.00
ACTIVITY:Elves Academy
OUTPUT
4 day workshop in Lithuania. 40 participants from 8 EU countries, 10 lecturers for practical sessions and training, 10 lecturers for review sessions. Follow up visits, by Elves instructors, to ensure the organisation develops effectively. Instructional materials to be produced.
OUTCOME
Taught goals 1) theoretical understanding of Kremlin propaganda and its trolls 2) practical sessions the 'elves' provide necessary knowledge for the development and implementation of an effective civic response.
KEY INDICATORS
Civic activists and volunteers actively engaged in cyber resistance and digital resilience.
COST £93'331.00
ACTIVITY: VUB structured series of workshops with key national institutes to help them develop their own programmes addressing disinformation and malign influence
OUTPUT
1 workshop per quarter, in Brussels
OUTCOME
Raising the profile of countering disinformation in key European countries
KEY INDICATOR
National governments sponsor and fund the establishment of programmes
COST £26'666.00
ACTIVITY:Topics to be researched (see attachment)
OUTPUT
Papers, seminars and presentations, on each of the topics, to core staff, clusters and external target audiences
OUTCOME
Rapidly raise target audience understanding of the RU strategic approach with the concerted use of all weapons of hybrid warfare
KEY INDICATOR
Recognition by target audiences of the RU strategic approach evinced by their statements, publications and policies
COST £35'999.10
ACTIVITY:Bulletins on Russian online shill activity, using mass data surveys
OUTPUT
Weekly bulletins & monthly data surveys
OUTCOME
Better, more comprehensive understanding of online disinformation trends within all clusters
KEY INDICATOR
Uptake of bulletin & production of graphics (turning data into more digestible information) available to journalistic audiences and other influences
COST £19'999.50
ACTIVITY:Use of data surveys to begin mapping out the details of Russian shill net
OUTPUT
Detailed, data and hard evidence backed understanding of Shill net
OUTCOME
Greater ability to combat the shill net using operations based on our improved understanding.
KEY INDICATOR
Clusters and Elves successfully using the product to improve their performance countering disinformation.
COST £124'796.88
ACTIVITY:Implementing discernment and media literacy training programme (using e.g. Skripal as a case-study)
OUTPUT
A modular training programme (based on IREX/StopFake material) that adapts media source examples as needed to be most relevant and accessible across our cluster network
OUTCOME
Train wider audiences in the nature and extent of the RU threat and develop media literacy/critical thinking resilience that will help protect our wider societies
KEY INDICATOR
Pilot project running in Junior School, Secondary School and University. Programme participation numbers, survey data on learning outcomes (cross-checking, verification, awareness). Reaching people in typically neglected areas and regions outside the country capitals.
COST £119'997.00
Expanding the impact of the Integrity Initiative website, dissemination and Twitter/social media accounts, and increasing the reporting of the issue in the mainstream and specialist press
ACTIVITY:Translation of cluster publications and material (local language, English and RU)
OUTPUT
Steady stream of content highlighting disinformation in the relevant country. Publication on social media and website. Dissemination by clusters.
OUTCOME
Improved access to RU speaking minorities, RU diasporas and audiences within Russia. Increased awareness (and combating) of country-specific issues and RU malign influence in other countries. Sharing and engagement.
KEY INDICATOR
(Inter)National media coverage. More identifying and combating of disinformation amongst the public, politicians and academics. Social media and website engagement.
COST 79'998.00
ACTIVITY:Experimental social media (calendar) pin pointing
OUTPUT
Targeted effort to pre-empt and combat specific malign influence attempts and control the information space
OUTCOME
The information space will become dominated by accurate reporting instead of being carpet-bombed with Kremlin and fringe groups' disinfo
KEY INDICATOR
Media spaces will clearly be dominated by real, factual narrative and not conspiracy theories and Kremlin propaganda
COST £6'665.00
ACTIVITY:Media interviews
OUTPUT
Core and cluster experts presenting their knowledge on TV, radio and in newspapers, as well as influential websites
OUTCOME
Our experts will increasingly be invited as as a matter of course, as the go-to specialists to discuss RU and other propaganda and disinformation as well as media literacy. Reactive and proactive assessment of RU methods.
KEY INDICATORS
Successful interviews and articles relating to high profile events e.g. the anniversary of the murder of the Tsar, The Katyn Massacre. A steady increase in the number of appearances.
COST £0.00
ACTIVITY:Expanding content areas on website, including a series of podcasts
OUTPUT
A series of podcasts available on our Integrity Initiative website. Two long, two short articles per month providing more details of disinformation and other tools of influence, improving media literacy.
OUTCOME
More attention turned onto RU influence activities in non EU/NATO nations. Disinformation cases and their special characteristics. Handy tools and examples for people to use in various situations - educational, research and others
KEY INDICATOR
Measured increase in the use of the website. The evolution of the website in reaction to users comments, increased use of the website by NGO's and embassies.
COST £26'666.00
ACTIVITY:Targeted op-ed pieces to highlight cross-over experience across the cluster network
OUTPUT
Articles in main stream media. New, varied, translated content for the website.
OUTCOME
Enhanced reputation for expertise in this field, shared best practice
KEY INDICATOR
Google analytics showing wider coverage, increased traffic and readership of articles, longer 'dwelling' time on site, greater audience diversity
COST £53'332.00
ACTIVITY:Website maintenance and IT / Comms security
OUTPUT
Active monitoring of core and cluster websites and supervised implementation of IT security procedures.
OUTCOME
Improved security of the programme of network and of clusters
KEY INDICATOR Security breaches minimised.
COST £33'320.00
ACTIVITY:Ongoing production of infographics and other visual materials
OUTPUT
A steady stream of relevant visual materials
OUTCOME
Fast and high impact response to disinfo events, preempting of propaganda campaigns, education of the digitally aware
KEY INDICATOR
Engagement with and references to the content
COST £33'332.00
ACTIVITY:Social media training
OUTPUT
Training to clusters on setting up and effectively using social media relevant to their country / region
OUTCOME
Increased visibility and engagement of the topic in the clusters
KEY INDICATOR
Referencing and quoting of efforts
COST £6'666.00
ACTIVITY: Branded materials
OUTPUT
Business cards, infographics postcards, branded reports and articles
OUTCOME
Increased visibility of the programme
KEY INDICATOR
Increased referencing of the programme in public for a
COST £13'333.00
ACTIVITY:Best practice sharing
OUTPUT
Regular best practice newsletter and sharing sessions
OUTCOME
Clusters learn from each other and industry best practice to increase engagement
KEY INDICATOR
Visible improvements in media performance by cluster members
COST £0.00
ACTIVITY:Media performance reporting=
OUTPUT
Regular report of social media performance and traditional media appearances
OUTCOME
Increased profile, reputation and demand for II expertise
KEY INDICATOR
Measurement of being increased in demand
COST £3'999.00
ACTIVITY: Increase links between our website and like-minded, trusted 3rd parties
OUTUT
Specific articles and shared events that bolster google rankings for relevant searches
OUTCOME
Greater reach and increased sphere of influence
KEY INDICATOR
Increased website traffic, measurable month-on-month diverse audience, focused increase in targeted areas and by defined search terms
COST £0.00
Engaging national political and military establishments and societal organisations, improving their ability to counter Russian disinformation and other weapons of hybrid warfare strategy
ACTIVITY: Engage national military authorities to increase their interest in joining the information warfare battle and in collaborating with clusters and other national assets
OUTPUT
Military personnel invited to core and cluster events, leading to joint events in each country
OUTCOME
Education of national military organisations: increasing human resources available to contribute in national programmes and the Integrity Initiative
KEY INDICATOR
National military hold an independent or joint information exercise.
COST £0.00
ACTIVITY: Coordinate and host conference in Kyiv, Ukraine for representatives of British Army's 77th Brigade, UCMC, NATO, cluster representatives
OUTPUT
Share best practice and critical first hand experience of Russian infowar and hybrid war tactics in Eastern Ukraine
OUTCOME
Improved understanding of the links and common doctrine between different weapons of RU hybrid war, including use of hard military operations. Strengthen ties and more robust defence to a common threat
KEY INDICATOR
Establishment of working level contact and generation of national military activity.
COST £5'333.00
ACTIVITY: Education and training on how to use social media (where appropriate for the organisation)
OUTPUT
Training course and materials
OUTCOME
More effective dissemination of message and engagement with audiences
KEY INDICATOR
Audiences generate social media activity.
COST £6'666.00
ACTIVITY: Develop and launch training seminar for journalists in 'Visual story-telling: real stories to counter disinformation'
OUTPUT
A modular training programme that can be used to bolster independent, creative and provocative journalism across our network
OUTCOME
Understanding and practical resources to respond to disinformation through creating and sharing real stories that matter. Sensitivity to work in conflict situations, and an awareness of how to respond in divisive challenging environments
KEY INDICATOR
Measured improvement of quality journalistic content across our network
COST £4'666.00
ACTIVITY:With the help of the UK financial sector - British Bankers Association & Association of British Insurers, London Stock Exchange - establish relations with European counterparts and European for liaison with European bourses
OUTPUT
Guest lecture programme to alert these institutions to the threats of disinformation and malign influence
OUTCOME
European financial institutions recognise the steps of disinformation and malign influence
KEY INDICATOR
European financial institutions issue statements acknowleding the threat, and identifying responses
COST £2'433.33
ACTIVITY: Through links with UK law enforcement and revenue organisations, anti corruption and development NGO's and journalistic organisations, gain access to their European counterparts
OUTPUT
Provide a series of briefings to European agencies on the interface between RU state and criminal organisations. Two reports per quarter on RU linked corruption
OUTCOME
Institutions will improve collaborations and improve their ability to identify links and their information value. Agreement for Europol to be lead agency.
KEY INDICATOR
Risk mitigation intranet, Fusion centre of suspicious incidents. Input to EC Disinfo Initiative NATO and Europol. RU culpability referred to in % age of all their annual and specific reports. Indicators of RU indifference or obstruction - arms trading.
COST £12'033.33
Increasing the impact of effective organisations currently analysing Russian activities, making their expertise more widely available across Europe and North America
ACTIVITY: Publications and reports on common and different experiences in commenting on hybrid warfare, propaganda and reports on such and criminal and geopolitical activities: 'your view, our comments' and vice versa: e.g. Clingendaal, Egmont, Konrad Adenauer Inst. and Swedish equivalent and Poland, Balkan/Baltic states etc
OUTPUT
At least one dual report or two reciprocal reports on common and different approaches with cooperating organisations. Co posting on websites of each in cooperating magazines or other on line publications
OUTCOME
Quantitative and qualitative increases in circulation of commentaries rebutting past RU activities and action. Identification of both generic and country or region specific subjects and methods of delivery.
KEY INDICATOR
Numbers of reports and range of both countries and regions covered. Publication of case studies / case histories / proactive warning alerts in countries beyond those which are the subjects of these reports i.e. dissemination
COST £13'333.00
Reinforcing the will and ability of international organisations to address this issue, despite the reticence of some member nations. Organisations include: ATA, YATA, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Atlantic Treaty Association, Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, Baltic Defence College, HQ NATO Public Diplomacy, EU East Stratcom Team
ACTIVITY: Obtain the agreement of these international organisations to disseminate our programme material: link to national clusters where appropriate. Produce report based on press releases of Europol and Interpol on RU speaker criminality and produce proposals for identifying possible links with state bodies
OUTPUT
List of indicators such as geographic or career links of individuals and groups with FSB, SVR, GRU and military. List of indicators linking RU with narcotics, forced labour, human trafficking for sexual purposes, wildlife trafficking, conflict minerals, illegal forestry (private military companies, illegal fishing
OUTCOME
Recognition of high prevalance of RU and RU linked groups and failure of the RU state to prosecute, disrupt or regulate these illegal activities and legal facilitating factors
KEY INDICATOR
Inclusion of factual recognition of RU involvement leading to the readiness of countries to raise this with the RU government.
COST £5'333.00
ACTIVITY:Setting up UK chapters of ATA and YATA]
OUTPUT
Participation in ATA and YATA events to engage national chapters and persuade them to transmit our messages
OUTCOME
National ATA and YATA chapters engage with national clusters in the distribution of information and influencing target audiences
KEY INDICATOR
Participation of clusters and programme staff in ATA and YATA activities. Participation of ATA and YATA personnel in programme cluster activities. Preparation of joint reports. Organisation of joint events.
COST £33'332.50
ACTIVITY:Research papers in publications of the institutions
OUTPUT
Educate the wider range of audiences open to these international organisations about RU disinformation and malign influence
OUTCOME
Organisations/countries better equipped to counter RU disinfo and malign influence
KEY INDICATOR
Organisations/countries more willing to take public stance and act against RU malign influence.
COST £0.00
ACTIVITY: Lectures and seminars at events organised by these international organisations
OUTPUT
Educate policy-makers, specialists and media about RU disinfo and malign influence.
OUTCOME
Organisations/countries better equipped to counter RU disinfo and malign influence
KEY INDICATOR
Organisations/countries more willing to take public stance and act against RU malign influence.
COST £3'999.90
Engaging Russian and Russian - speaking audiences to challenge Moscow's narratives
ACTIVITY:Andrei Sakharov Centre - Kaunus University Programme
OUTPUT
Bi-monthly Workshops to engage Russians and establish how to impact on attitudes in Russia
OUTCOME
Better understanding to inform our Stratcom targetting Russians
KEY INDICATOR
Sanity checks on our Stratcom initiatives to identify and impact on Russian audiences
COST £66'665.00
ACTIVITY:Expand Russian citizen focus group programme in minority communities and diasporas
OUTPUT
Continuation meetings and in-depth engagement in minority communities and diasporas
OUTCOME
Improvement of core and cluster understanding of the attitudes within RU minority communities and RU diaspora communities. Programme learning of how best to impact on attitudes in these communities; what works and what does not
KEY INDICATOR
Implementation of experimental projects to impact on attitudes in RU speaking minorities and diaspora communities, monitoring effects and feedback
COST £2'666.00
ACTIVITY:Make presentation at Donbas Media Forum July 2018, Krematorsk, Ukraine
OUTPUT
Engagement through training material - spoken and visual
OUTCOME
Increased resilience of independent journalists in Ukraine. Strengthened network for IfS in Ukraine through partnership with key civil society leaders and NGOs
KEY INDICATOR
Conference participation, feedback, registration for IfS updates, increased social media coverage measured
COST £1'000.00
ACTIVITY:Provide guest articles from Ifs and our clusters for StopFake's printed material published and distributed along the contact line in Eastern Ukraine
OUTPUT
Quality articles, short, relevant that will appeal to those at the frontline of Russian occupation
OUTCOME
Introduction of quality information at a critical front in the war on disinformation, support for those resisting the Russian frontal attack in Donbas
KEY INDICATOR
Polling data that helps measure resilience and resistance towards targeted Russian disinformation in front line regions. Compare data over time and share results with European partners engaged in similar work to boost effectiveness.
COST £11,999.70
ACTIVITY:Produce questionnaires for RU speaking audiences, inviting them to rebut Western analyses of key media stories (e.g. MH17, Litvinenko, Skripal, doping) and invite reasons for supporting RU counter narratives
OUTPUT
Carefully analyse results. Distribute to clusters and national agencies to study and react. Publish responses with permission and publish non responses
OUTCOME
Identification of how these groups rebut Western narratives and by default identify failure to do so. Similar identification of successful or unsuccessful justifications or RU narratives and multiple narratives and which ones are favoured
KEY INDICATOR
Evidence of impact on public responses from RU speaking audiences.
COST £399.99
Adapting our approach as Russia responds to our successful counter moves
ACTIVITY:Continued curation and preparation of the 'Armoury' (database of articles and key items of information) to improve the programme's ability to respond quickly in new RU disinformation initiatives
OUTPUT
Constantly updated archive of articles, analysis and other material of real value to clusters for rapid response and longer term education to improve the fight against disinformation
OUTCOME
Reinforces the cluster's ability to reach effectiveness quickly by providing a ready resource of examples, information and analysis
KEY INDICATOR
Make an improvement of cluster response speed and use of cluster material by policy makers and journalists
COST £16'250.00
ACTIVITY:All publications and proposals to produce lists of a) likely and b) potential responses
OUTPUT
Lists of such with proactive listing of counter rebuttals
OUTCOME
Earlier identification of RU responses and how they can be discredited. Identify and publish established patterns of RU disinformation and misinformation (strengths and weaknesses)
KEY INDICATOR
Report listing nature of responses and to generic or specific issues and to wide or narrow ranges of countries and/or regions. Compare RU responses in different European countries and differentiation in RU tactics attacking those countries.
COST £0.00
ACTIVITY:Monitoring of Russian and pro-Russian information
OUTPUT
Sharing of insights and analysis
OUTCOME
Adaptive response to Russian disinformation
KEY INDICATOR
Impact on broader audiences outside the expert community
COST £0.00
ACTIVITY:Bi-annual written report in English and local language, on output and media performance - successes and failures
OUTPUT
Dissemination
OUTCOME
Best practice sharing
KEY INDICATOR
All involved show improved performance
COST £6'800.00
ACTIVITY:Presentations to partner organisations
OUTPUT
Educate policy-makers, specialists and media about State / non State disinfo and malign influence.
OUTCOME
Organisations/countries better equipped to counter State / non State disinfo and malign influence
KEY INDICATOR
Organisations/countries more willing to take public stance and act against State / non State malign activity.
COST £2'798.77
ACTIVITY:Manual and Lexicon
OUTPUT
Complete these products, issue them, gather feedback and edit
OUTCOME
This will provide standard basis of understanding on how best to respond to disinformation
KEY INDICATOR
The use of the manual and lexicon by clusters, national organisations and partners
COST £5'710.00
Quarterly budget
Q1 1st Apr-30 Jun Admin Costs £49'125.00 Activity Costs £605'495.20 Quarter Total £640'000.00 Estimated monthly invoice / spend: A= £210k / M = £215k / J = £215k
Q2 1st Jul-30 Sep Admin Costs £49'125.00 Activity Costs £276'373.80 Quarter Total £276'373.80 Estimated monthly invoice / spend J = £115 / A = £105k / S = £105k
Q3 1st Oct-31st Dec Admin Costs £49'125.00 Activity Costs £440'934.50 Quarter Total £505'000.00 Estimated monthly invoice / spend O = £145k / N = £145k / D = £215k
Q4 1st Jan-31st Mar Admin Costs £49'125.00 Activity Costs £440'934.50 Quarter Total £491'000.00 Estimated monthly invoice / spend J = £165 / F = £163k / M = £163k
£196'500.00 ADMIN COSTS TOTAL
£1'764'500.00 ACTIVITY COSTS TOTAL
£1'961'000.00 ADMIN + ACTIVITY COSTS TOTAL
£1'961'000.00 GRAND TOTAL