Document:Project Title INTEGRITY INITIATIVE Phase II

 budget application and plan  by Chris Donnelly dated 27 April 2017

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Subjects: Clusters, Integrity Initiative
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/1
Source: 'Anonymous' (Link)

The document is originally a form. The formatting has been slightly edited by Wikispooks for clarity when transferring to here. The questions in Part B, at the end of the form, has not been filled in by the original responder.

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FCO application form 2017-18

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PROJECT PROPOSAL FORM For projects over £80k To be completed by the Post

Project Title INTEGRITY INITIATIVE Phase II

Which Programme is the funding being sought from

Russian Language Strategic Communication Programme

Project Code. To be added once the Project has been approved and the code is provided by the Programme Team

TBC

Is the Project ODA eligible * Yes/No

Part A: To be completed by the Project Implementer

Project Title

INTEGRITY INITIATIVE Phase II

Purpose. This must be NO MORE than one sentence, clearly setting out the “change” to be delivered

To counter Russian disinformation and malign influence, and associated weapons of “Hybrid warfare”, in Europe and North America by: expanding the knowledge base; harnessing existing expertise, and; establishing a network of networks of experts, opinion formers and policy makers, to educate national audiences in the threat and to help build national capacities to counter it.

Context and Need for the Project. In no more than 200 words, provide the background to the issue this project will change, what the expected final Outcome will be, and (where applicable) why the UK should fund this project

Russian leaders say that Russia is at war with the West. The existence of democracy poses a threat to their dictatorial system. Undermining and ultimately destroying Western democratic institutions is Russia’s way of neutralising this “threat”. To this end, Russia is currently ramping up its use of all forms of power, led by malign influence and disinformation. Russia’s diplomats, media, Information Troops, hackers and troll armies attack individuals, subvert institutions and create mistrust of democratic processes.

The past year has seen significant publicity given to this issue in the West. But the intent and extent of Russia’s increasingly aggressive campaign is still denied in many capitals; its scale and nature is understood only by a small expert international community; western responses frequently lack strategic coherence. In some countries, Russian influence and disinformation has a free hand. To change this situation our project will continue its successful building of a network of networks across Europe, organising local teams to counter Russian influence and disinformation in their own societies, including within Russian-speaking communities, and changing attitudes in Russia itself. Our programme to date has helped the UK to lead this process. Expanding this success will cement UK’s influence in N America and in Europe post-Brexit.

Short Project Summary

In no more than 200 words explain what the project plans to achieve and how (setting out how the Outputs will deliver the Purpose/Objective, and how the activities will deliver each relevant Output), and what difference will it make on the ground over the next few years?

To expand our long-term programme so that European and N American countries can better understand and counter Russia’s policy of malign influence and disinformation.

To be achieved by:

• Expanding our network of specialists, journalists, academics and political actors across Europe, empowering them to educate their publics and policy elites

• Sponsoring, including via the Free University of Brussels (thereby enhancing academic respectability of the topic), advanced research, publications, workshops, educational courses, mentoring, lectures

• Expanding the impact of the Integrity Initiative website, dissemination and Twitter/social media accounts, and increasing the reporting of the issue in mainstream and specialist press

• Engaging national political and military establishments and societal organisations, improving their ability to counter Russian disinformation and other weapons of hybrid warfare strategy

• Increasing the impact of effective organisations currently analysing Russian activities, making their expertise more widely available across Europe and North America.

• Reinforcing the will and ability of international organisations to address this issue, despite the reticence of some member nations. Organisations include: NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Atlantic Treaty Association; Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers; Baltic Defence College; HQ NATO Public Diplomacy; EU East Stratcom team

• Engaging Russian and Russian-speaking audiences to challenge Moscow’s narratives

• Adapting our approach as Russia responds to our successful counter moves

• Applying lessons of the programme more widely, e.g. to expose and counter Daesh influence in Muslim communities, and increasing Chinese influence in our countries

Phase 1 of this programme is now completed; FCO funding is requested for phase two.

Co-Funding

Has funding for this project been sought from other donors (EU, DfID, other countries), Private institutions or the host government? If Yes, please provide details including source and amount. If No, why not, and were options for doing so explored?

Funding from HQ NATO Public Diplomacy, £12,000 for each inaugural workshop = £168,000

Funding from partner institutions £5,000 for each inaugural workshop = £70,000

Funding from NATO HQ for educational video films – free provision of camera team

Funding from Lithuanian MOD to provide free all costs for their stratcom team for a monthly trip to support a new hub/cluster creation and to educate cluster leaders and key people in Vilnius in infowar techniques = £20,000

Funding from US State Dept, £250,000 for research and dissemination activities (excluding any activity in USA)

Funding from Smith Richardson Foundation, £45,000 for cluster activities in Europe and USA

Funding from Facebook, £100,000 for research and education activities

Funding from German business community, £25,000 for research and dissemination in EU countries

Timing

Planned start date:

01 04 2018

Planned completion date:

31 03 2019

Will the Implementing Partner be sub-contracting any other agencies to carry out elements of the project activities? If Yes, please provide details

No

Implementing Agency. Name; Address; Telephone Numbers; Email; Website

The Institute for Statecraft

2 Temple Place

London WC2R 3BD

07974 019 212

www.statecraft.org.uk

Country or countries covered

Southern and Western European countries, Greece, Balkans and Baltic States, USA, Canada

Have you bid for funding from the FCO in the past three years?

Please provide details of any bids made and/or projects implemented

2014 Ukraine capacity building. Unsuccessful bid

2015 El Salvador Human Rights and reduction of gang violence. Successful bid.

2016 El Salvador Rule of Law and prison reform. Successful bid.

2017 Integrity Initiative Phase 1 Successful bid

2018 TOR study for Expose network Unsuccessful bid

Project Plan

Based on the information provided in the Summary, use the table below to set out the Purpose, Outputs and Activities to be delivered. Give the Indicator(s) for the Purpose and each Output, along with the Baseline information, what the target to be reached is, and when it will be delivered by, along with milestones (checkpoints) at which progress will be measured.This will allow you to monitor and measure progress throughout the Project, and provide clear evidence of the Project’s success.

Indicator = what will be measured (eg the number of people who will be trained; the increase in positive perceptions of an issue)

Baseline = the current status (eg no training exists; current perceptions are x% positive)

Sources = where will the information on the baseline data and targets come from (eg data from research carried out by the implementer; open source data)

Milestones = the key points at which progress will be tracked (can be specific dates/events or the regular quarterly reports – but provide indicative dates for the latter)

Target = what the project will deliver (eg 100 people trained; 50% increase in positive perceptions)

Date = the date by which it will be delivered

Purpose: To counter Russian disinformation and malign influence, and associated weapons of “Hybrid warfare”, in Europe and North America by: expanding the knowledge base; harnessing existing expertise, and; establishing a network of networks of experts, opinion formers and policy makers, to educate national audiences in the threat and to help build national capacities to counter it. Indicator(s) Baseline Sources

Indicator(s)

Complete the development of the 9 national clusters (Hub + network) created during Phase 1 (Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, Serbia, Italy; set up the latent clusters ready to go in Moldova, Georgia, Sweden, Montenegro, Malta. Establish clusters in USA, Canada, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland. Explore the need for the networks to extend to the Middle East/N Africa and other concerned countries. Achieve increased awareness and understanding of the threat posed by Russian influence, disinformation and other hybrid warfare weapons. Strengthen the capability of the country to recognise and respond to that threat

Baseline

Despite the recent extensive publicity given to this topic, in countries where there is no cluster or competent NGO fulfilling this function, understanding is limited to experts and expert communities are isolated, passive, and even under siege. There is little spin off from the expert international community’s understanding to impact on national political leaderships.

In countries where we have established clusters during Phase 1, awareness is rising within government and society, and response is being stimulated. NB in Spain, the widespread press coverage (e.g. El Pais) of Russian meddling in the Catalan referendum, the strong statements by the Defence Minister, and the recent appointment of Sra. Julia Olmo y Romero as Ambassador at large for Hybrid Threats and Cybersecurity.

Sources

A solid academic information base has been established at the Free University of Brussels (VUB) and on the Integrity Initiative website and on other websites we have supported with our research work in Phase 1. New clusters as they build their competence are improving their local information bases. In most countries with no cluster or relevant NGO, experts still work in stovepipes and do not achieve critical mass

Milestones

Experience in Phase 1 has shown that, once a cluster has been established, measurable impact can be expected within 3 months and the cluster is fully effective within 6 – 9 months.

Target & Date Phase 1 has shown that the establishment of new national clusters is dependent on finding competent, committed and well-connected individuals, ideally with a suitable institute affiliation. The growth of the network in Phase 1 exceeded expectations because news of the Integrity Initiative spread and attracted the attention of like-minded individuals. The ability to provide some modest financial support to help set up the local network and to fund its early activity was also crucial. The experience of the Spanish and Lithuanian clusters particularly offers hope that a successful cluster can generate its own local income after a few months.

In some countries where Russian influence is pronounced (Italy, Serbia, Greece) cluster development must proceed with great caution to protect the cluster members from harassment. This notwithstanding, it should be possible to set up functioning clusters in all countries named in column 1 during the coming year Apl18-Apl19.

===9 Output 1: Creating or improving the structural mechanisms for tracking, analysing, exposing and responding to Russian malign influence and disinformation===

Indicators(s) 1. Setting up a cluster (Hub plus network of experts, journalists, political players) in each country in staged phases. Phase 1 has achieved this in 9 countries with preparatory work done in a further 4, with funding from FCO and HQ NATO; in Phase 2 the 9 existing clusters and the 4 latent clusters will all be brought to fully functioning status; clusters will be set up in 10 more countries as listed above. Details of the process for setting up the national clusters are given in item 1 in Attachment A to this form

Baseline In Phase 1, the organisation and staff was established to set up and run the international network of clusters named above. The work of this core staff made it clear that, to understand fully disinformation and malign influence, it was essential to address other weapons of hybrid warfare used by Russia which interacted with the disinformation and operationalised the influence. These areas include: organised crime and corruption; money laundering; oligarchical influence; financing of extreme left and right wing political parties; military sports and sports clubs, the Russian Orthodox Church; classical active measures (dirty tricks – Russ “Mokriye dyela”). To this end, some 40 specialist associates were identified and engaged with a view to exploiting their expertise as the programme expanded in Phase 2.

In Phase 2, the next group of 14 clusters will be set up; the work of the existing clusters will be expanded as they reach full operating capability. All clusters will extend their portfolios to embrace the issues listed above (noting that in some countries this will have to be done with caution because of tense or hostile local conditions. To enhancing impact and outreach, a publication and translation process in English, the local language and Russian will be established, building on research work done in Phase 1.

Sources

All data researched by the Institute for Statecraft and national clusters Social media will be used to gather and distribute information on the topic as well as to help reinforce a sense of community and to engage more people outside the expert community

Milestones

Progress will be reported on a monthly basis and the programme amended according to developing circumstances, driven by the pace of international events

Each cluster mastering the use of social media, website and online platforms to engage with each other and take material for internal use and public distribution

Target & Date

Each Cluster generally consists of a small admin hub (1-3 pers), plus a network of 10-20 active members serving to disseminate material to 100+ key individuals and institutions.

The exact circumstances of each cluster established so far reflect the conditions in the country. It has proved essential to adjust the cluster mechanism to suit local conditions.

Spain: Cluster established Feb 2017 as proof of concept. Netherlands and France, clusters established June 2017. Greece, Serbia, Lithuania, Norway, clusters established in Nov 2017. Germany and Italy, clusters established in Jan 2018 In the US, a subsidiary company has been established and is currently going through the process of registration for “not-for-profit” status, to enable the programme to benefit from US funding.

In Phase 2, as the further 14 clusters are established across Europe and N America during 2018-9, the speed of consolidation of the clusters and their attaining full effective functioning will increase as they interact and learn from each other in a formalised learning process.

Indicators(s)

2. Setting up a Brussels-based research network to encourage all major European countries, US and Canada to establish in a major national think tank a process or programme for studying infowar

The basis of this network is the academic research programme of the Institute for European Studies at the Free University of Brussels (VUB-IES).

This programme was established with funding from the Institute’s initial iteration of the Integrity Initiative. Continuation of this programme is dependent on further funding in Phase 2.

Details of the programme’s achievements are at Attachment B to this form.

Baseline

During Phase 1, Think tanks from 12 European countries were engaged; meetings were held in April and June 2017. Meetings in US in Sept 2017 established good contacts with institutes in Washington DC and California.

During Phase 2, this network of national think tanks will be engaged by the VUB IES in a discrete network, reinforcing their willingness to introduce this topic into their national mainstream programme. In some countries, this will be a very sensitive issue and will require extreme care.

The process will be supported by setting up an Advanced research programme and post graduate teaching modules at the VUB IES, which will provide academic rigour and respectability. The EU EEAS East Stratcom Task Force will be engaged to strengthen the Community link, and educational work by the Lithuanian MOD, Saper Vedere and ACUS will provide technical expertise.

Sources

Data researched principally by the VUB IES

Milestones

Progress reported on a monthly basis

Target & Date

12 European Institutes agreed to participate in the process, as did 2 in DC and 1 in California.

A further 10 institutes across Europe and N America will be engaged in Phase 2

Indicators(s) 3. In Phase 1, national MFAs, MODs were engaged, to encourage them to set up centres for the study of disinformation etc. This will be expanded in Phase 2, building on the successful models from Phase 1

Baseline National clusters will operate separately from these national institutes, but will collaborate with and support them.

This has been successfully accomplished 5 countries so far: France (MFA CAPS), Netherlands (MOD), Spain (MOD, MFA & PM’s Office), Norway (MOD), Lithuania (MFA).

In Phase 2 we will step up the formal engagement of relevant Govt Depts, tailoring our approach to suit each country’s particular circumstances.

Sources

All data researched by the Institute and National clusters

Milestones

Progress will be reported on a monthly basis and the programme amended according to developing circumstances, driven by the pace of international events.

Target & Date

Progress will be tied to the establishment of national clusters. The more active the cluster, the greater likelihood of success. At the beginning of Phase 1 we estimated that we would achieve this in 5-6 countries by March 2018. We have in fact reached this target. But it was not possible to predict which those countries would be, nor is it possible to do that for Phase 2, where we hope to engage a further 7-8 Govt Depts. This is because success is by being alert to exploit opportunities as they arise rather than targeting countries specifically.

Indicators(s) In Phase 1 we engaged the Lithuanian Armed Forces Stratcom (Infowar) team with UK 77 Bde , the Netherlands, Spanish and Norwegian MODs to establish units within their own ranks or to support our clusters and other NGOs to track, analyse and respond to Russian influence and disinformation.

This process will be expanded in Phase 2, to engage the MOD/Armed Forces of all countries which have a flourishing cluster. It will also continue the educational process, and link in ACUS and Saper Vedere to ensure a completely joined up approach between western institutions studying this problem and developing different forensic models.

Baseline

The Lithuanian AF Stratcom team successfully engaged with and educated the Spanish cluster formation in Jan/Feb 2017. Engagement with NL military agreed at 22 June in the Hague.

We also arranged for the Lithuanian team to provide training on a regular basis for all our cluster leaders in the methodology of tracking and exposing Russian malign influence and disinformation, and linked them directly to the Ukrainian Stopfake leadership and to the UK LSE team (whom we took to Vilnius) to exchange practical experience.

The Lithuanian CHOD has committed his Stratcom team to supporting the development of our programme in Phase 2 by providing educational instruction either in Vilnius or in other countries as we request. We will continue to organise regular visits and support the transfer of knowledge and methodologies.

Sources

All data researched by the Institute, Lithuanian cluster and 77Bde/SGMI

Using off-the-shelf tools and platforms as well as developing our own software tools to track, analyse and display disinformation activities.

Working with experts to apply AI to spot and analyse disinformation efforts

Milestones

Progress will be reported on a monthly basis and the programme amended according to developing circumstances, driven by the pace of international events.

Studies and papers have been and will continue to be prepared on the basis of the data produced; the new Integrity Initiative website has a disinformation dashboard that displays information on current disinformation themes, or events for which we are expecting and combating disinformation.

Target & Date Progress in Phase 2 will be tied to the establishment of new national clusters and the evolution of existing clusters.

Indicators(s) 5. In Phase 1 we engaged with several governmental and quasi-governmental organisations (e.g. NATO HQ, the Atlantic Treaty Association [ATA] and the Youth ATA [YATA]), getting their agreement to exploit their influence networks. We also established links with several non-governmental institutions also working to track, expose and counter Russian malign influence and disinformation.

In Phase 2 we will engage more closely with these institutions, exploiting what they have to offer, linking them into our network so that their valuable research and innovative methodologies inform and enhance the work of our national clusters. In turn, our clusters will offer these institutions the opportunity to exploit our networks of national contacts.

Details of the process for engaging these institutions are given in item 2 of Attachment A to this form

Baseline

In Phase 1 the Institute became the official UK representative organisation within both ATA (in Dec 2017) and YATA (Mar 2018). NATO PDD support to our programme was evinced by the grant of matching funding to our events with clusters. Phase 2 will see the expansion of our exploitation of ATA and YATA using their chapters in various countries. This has already started in Serbia and Montenegro.

NATO PDD has agreed to support relevant events by clusters in partnership with our programme

Sources

All data researched by the Institute, national clusters, YATA and ATA.

Milestones

Progress will be reported on a monthly basis and the programme amended according to developing circumstances, driven by the pace of international events.

Target & Date

Phase 2 will allow this activity to be scaled up considerably by our providing material for distribution, delivering presentations, organising events in collaboration with local ATA & YATA chapters

Output 2: In-depth research and analyses of the aims, tools and modus operandi of Russian malign influence and disinformation; tracking, analysing and exposing Russian interference in specific countries and significant events; researching western vulnerabilities and effective responses

Indicator(s) 1.Continuation of conducting in-depth studies of Russian influence and disinformation within a specific country: vulnerabilities; issues specific to the country in question; trends.

In Phase 2 we will establish a procedure for identifying key Russian disinformation message lines/ narratives and for tracking how they have found their way into the national political or media mainstream.

Baseline

In Phase 1, Germany study was completed and updated. Study of Germany’s vulnerabilities also completed and published by NDC Rome. French study completed and updated. Swedish study satisfactorily undertaken by third party outside this programme. Partial Netherlands study completed. Norwegian, Serbian and Italian studies commissioned and underway. Greek study to be completed by end March. Spanish study of Catalan referendum interference completed.

Sources All data researched by the Institute and local clusters

Milestones Completion of each study report

Target & Date

Written report for widespread dissemination; date determined by the programme of each cluster. In Phase 2, each new cluster will be commissioned to produce a study, which will be translated into English, local language and Russian, disseminated across the network and published as appropriate (e.g. as an II report, or fed anonymously into local media outlets)

Indicators(s) 2. Evaluation study comparing the differences in the way Russia approaches each country (variations in Russian tactics) and why; implications for the responses. Baseline

This study was partially completed in phase 1 and will be finalised in Phase 2

Sources All data researched by the Institute, VUB IES, and local clusters

Milestones Completion of the study report

Target & Date Written report for widespread dissemination; July 2018

Translated into English, local language and Russian, disseminated across the network and published as appropriate

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