Difference between revisions of "Mark Lowenthal"
(unstub) |
m (Text replacement - " -- " to " — ") |
||
| Line 36: | Line 36: | ||
==Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction== | ==Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction== | ||
As the ADCIAP, Lowenthal was one of the key coordinators and evaluators of the [[National Intelligence Estimate]] on [[Iraq]] leading up to [[Operation Iraqi Freedom]], the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In a 2009 Op-Ed in ''[[The Washington Post]]'', Lowenthal vehemently defends the protection he and his office extended to the product from the forces of politicization: | As the ADCIAP, Lowenthal was one of the key coordinators and evaluators of the [[National Intelligence Estimate]] on [[Iraq]] leading up to [[Operation Iraqi Freedom]], the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In a 2009 Op-Ed in ''[[The Washington Post]]'', Lowenthal vehemently defends the protection he and his office extended to the product from the forces of politicization: | ||
| − | :The 2002 estimate claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction had little influence on anyone's decision about going to war. Only six senators actually read the [[National Intelligence Estimate|NIE]], but 77 voted to authorize the use of force. As analytically flawed as that estimate might have been, the one intelligence "sin" the council did not commit was "politicization" | + | :The 2002 estimate claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction had little influence on anyone's decision about going to war. Only six senators actually read the [[National Intelligence Estimate|NIE]], but 77 voted to authorize the use of force. As analytically flawed as that estimate might have been, the one intelligence "sin" the council did not commit was "politicization" — that is, writing what the policymaker wants to hear. Even the Senate intelligence committee's investigation of the Iraq NIE agreed; it wasn't politicized to support invasion."<ref name="washingtonpost1"/> |
Lowenthal contends that given the information available at the time, it would not have been possible to determine the absence of [[weapons of mass destruction]] in Iraq.<ref name="charlierose1">https://web.archive.org/web/20121001194302/http://www.charlierose.com/view/clip/9950</ref> | Lowenthal contends that given the information available at the time, it would not have been possible to determine the absence of [[weapons of mass destruction]] in Iraq.<ref name="charlierose1">https://web.archive.org/web/20121001194302/http://www.charlierose.com/view/clip/9950</ref> | ||
Revision as of 18:35, 1 February 2022
 Mark Lowenthal    (spook) | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | ||||||||
| Nationality | United States | |||||||
| Alma mater | Brooklyn College, Harvard University | |||||||
One of the key coordinators of the WMD phony intelligence before Iraq invasion in 2003
| ||||||||
Mark M. Lowenthal is an author and Adjunct Professor at the Krieger School of Arts and Sciences at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.[1] His book Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy has become a standard undergraduate and graduate text.
Lowenthal was one of the key coordinators and evaluators of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which was central in the creation of a pretext for invading Iraq in 2003, with claims of alleged weapons of mass destruction. In a January 2009 interview, he discussed several topics related to national security and intelligence. In that interview, Dr. Lowenthal expressed his opinion that "the overall community was appropriately sized," an extraordinary statement, given the actual gargantuan size of the US intelligence services.
He is the former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production and former Vice Chairman for Evaluation on the National Intelligence Council. He has also served in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), as both an office director and as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.
Contents
Personal background
Lowenthal is married to Cynthia Lowenthal. Together, they have two children, Sarah and Adam.[2] The family resides in Reston, Virginia, outside of Washington D.C.
United States intelligence
In 1995, Lowenthal served as the staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In this capacity, he directed the committee's study on the future of the Intelligence Community, "IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century". Lowenthal was the Senior Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
In 2002, Lowenthal began serving as the CIA's Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production (ADCIAP).[3] He also served as the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 2002–2005.[4] After the creation of the Director of National Intelligence, his position was realigned to meet the recommendations of the 9/11 and WMD Commissions. The functions of his position were divided and incorporated into several roles in the new ODNI structure.
As the Assistant Director, Lowenthal was instrumental in having the Intelligence Community adopt the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). The framework provides guidance on the priorities of the President for intelligence collection requirements. It is the basis upon which all analysis and production decisions are made and ultimately impacts all members of the Intelligence Community. Reportedly, Lowenthal also started a process to evaluate the Community's performance against the NIPF.[5] This function was later adopted by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to report on and to senior policymakers on the progress the Intelligence Community was making against its directed areas for exploration.
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction
As the ADCIAP, Lowenthal was one of the key coordinators and evaluators of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In a 2009 Op-Ed in The Washington Post, Lowenthal vehemently defends the protection he and his office extended to the product from the forces of politicization:
- The 2002 estimate claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction had little influence on anyone's decision about going to war. Only six senators actually read the NIE, but 77 voted to authorize the use of force. As analytically flawed as that estimate might have been, the one intelligence "sin" the council did not commit was "politicization" — that is, writing what the policymaker wants to hear. Even the Senate intelligence committee's investigation of the Iraq NIE agreed; it wasn't politicized to support invasion."[4]
Lowenthal contends that given the information available at the time, it would not have been possible to determine the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.[6]
Intelligence community reforms
Lowenthal has been one of several voices in opposition to the initiatives to change the way the Intelligence Community produces analysis. He serves the intelligence community as the President and CEO of the Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC,[3] which is a national security education, training, and consulting organization.[7]
In 2007, Lowenthal attended the ODNI's Analytic Transformation conference held in Chicago. At that event, he took the microphone questioning the ultimate objective and endstate of analytic transformation. He called into question the ability of technological solutions like Intellipedia and A-Space to resolve some of the most pressing reforms in the community.[8]
Lowenthal was quoted as saying, "I think, unfortunately, a lot of this is pandering to a bunch of commissions that have no understanding of what we do for a living, or the nature of our work, and to a workforce. And I don't think that's a sufficient ground for a transformation. And so I'm left here wondering, what's the end state? For what reason?"[8]
In January 2009, Lowenthal was interviewed by Charlie Rose on the American television interview show Charlie Rose. He discussed several topics related to national security and intelligence. In that interview, Dr. Lowenthal expressed his opinion that the overall community was appropriately sized, but that the experience levels of the community were extraordinarily low. He went on to indicate that the staff of the ODNI was too large and should be evaluated for downsizing.[6]
Jeopardy
Lowenthal is a notable contestant on the American game show Jeopardy!, appearing four times, including winning the "Tournament of Champions" in 1988.[9] In 1992, he co-wrote Secrets of the Jeopardy Champions, which was marketed as an instruction manual for prospective contestants of the trivia game show.[10]
References
- ↑ http://advanced.jhu.edu/about-us/faculty/mark-lowenthal-phd%7Ctitle=Mark Lowenthal, Adjunct Faculty - Advanced Academic Programs - Johns Hopkins University|publisher=Johns Hopkins University
- ↑ https://web.archive.org/web/20150409000715/https://fas.org/irp/congress/2005_cr/h032005.html
- ↑ a b https://web.archive.org/web/20111214004726/http://intellacademy.com/about/faculty-bios/
- ↑ a b https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/13/AR2009031302096.html
- ↑ https://web.archive.org/web/20150409000715/https://fas.org/irp/congress/2005_cr/h032005.html
- ↑ a b https://web.archive.org/web/20121001194302/http://www.charlierose.com/view/clip/9950
- ↑ https://web.archive.org/web/20120320070840/http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/directory/mml28-fac.html
- ↑ a b http://shaneharris.com/magazinestories/liberator
- ↑ http://www.j-archive.com/showplayer.php?player_id=418
- ↑ Forrest, Chuck; and Lowenthal, Mark. Secrets of the Jeopardy Champions, Grand Central Publishing, 1992; ISBN 978-0-446-39352-2.
