|An official narrative crafted to deceive the ignorant, which highlights the roles of Al Qaeda and the 19 hijackers.|
| 9-11/Commission/Report |
|Publication date||July 22, 2004|
|Interest of||9/11 CitizensWatch|
- 1 Official narrative
- 2 Flaws
- 3 Reception
- 4 References
On July 22, 2004, the "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States", also known as the 9/11 Commission, published its final report, "The 9/11 Commission Report", which purported to be a detailed inquiry into the events of the September 11th, 2001. The commission reported that "We have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization."
As David Ray Griffin points out in his book, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, the report systematically excludes almost all the evidence which contradicts the official story, such as eyewitness reports of bombs in WTC and forensic evidence of evidence of explosive use. Reminiscent of the Warren Commission's cover-up afer the JFK assassination, the report stated in 63 places that there was "no evidence", including several where such evidence manifestly does exist, and some where the evidence was provably known to the commissioners. In 2016, WhoWhatWhy reported that "the official 9/11 narrative is unraveling now at considerable speed".
Torture as source of false evidence
Over 1/4 of the reports footnotes refer to evidence obtained by torture.The main witness Khalid Sheikh Mohammed cited by the report was tortured in a secret CIA facility in Szymany, Poland, by sleep deprivation, inflicting pain and waterboarding at least 183 times in one month.
Historian Daniele Ganser writes: "I then took a closer look at the Report: how did they prove who did it? Actually, they didn't prove anything. There are a lot of footnotes referring to secret services. The secret services in turn refer to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed - who was tortured. [...] It's unbelievable: our official narrative is based on a document which a) mentions only two out of three buildings and b) uses torture... That's garbage!" 
The commission's original report failed to even mention WTC7. When asked whether this omission was deliberate, and if so, why, the chairman said he "couldn't remember". The commission wrote that "the U.S. government has not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately the question is of little practical significance."
The report also fails to mention:
- The prediction of this collapse by firefighters, BBC and FOX News
- Eyewitness accounts and recordings of explosions
- Rudy Giuliani's statement that "We were operating out of there when we were told that the World Trade Center was gonna collapse, and it did collapse before we could get out of the building."
The commission's final reported stated that there were no witnesses to explosions in WTC7, directly contradicting the testimony of Barry Jennings, who had (reportedly) died in highly suspicious circumstances just 2 days earlier.
The funding of 9-11 and the money transfers that must have taken place make up a very small part of the 911 Commission Report.
p. 172 of the 911 Commission Report: ... the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack.
Nobody has been prosecuted for helping to fund the attack.
Hawala money transfer
From a footnote referring to p.171 of the 911 Commission Report:
# 124. A hawala, at least in the "pure" form, transfers value without the use of a negotiable instrument or other commonly recognized method for the exchange of money. For example, a U.S. resident who wanted to send money to a person in another country, such as Pakistan,would give her money, in dollars, to a U.S.-based hawaladar. The U.S. hawaladar would then contact his counterpart in Pakistan, giving the Pakistani hawaladar the particulars of the transaction, such as the amount of money, the code, and perhaps the identity of the recipient. The ultimate recipient in Pakistan would then go to the Pakistani hawaladar and receive his money, in rupees, from whatever money the Pakistani hawaladar has on hand. As far as the sender and ultimate recipient are concerned, the transaction is then complete. The two hawaladars would have a variety of mechanisms to settle their debt, either through offsetting transactions (e.g., someone in Pakistan sending money to the United States using the same two hawaladars), a periodic settling wire transfer from the U.S. hawaladar’s bank to the Pakistani hawaladar’s bank, or a commercial transaction, such as the U.S. hawaladar paying a debt or an invoice, in dollars, that the Pakistani hawaladar owes in the United States. Hawalas typically do not have a large central control office for settling transactions, maintaining instead a loose association with other hawaladars to transfer value, generally without any formal or legally binding agreements. See Treasury report,"A Report to Congress in Accordance with Section 359 of the [USA PATRIOT Act]"Nov. 2002;Treasury report,"Hawala:The Hawala Alternate Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering," undated (prepared by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in cooperation with INTERPOL, probably in 1996).
Report says that al Qaeda used hawala
p.171 of the 911 Commission Report: It does not appear that any government other than the Taliban financially supported al Qaeda before 9/11, although some governments may have contained al Qaeda sympathizers who turned a blind eye to al Qaeda’s fundraising activities.121 Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization. (This conclusion does not exclude the likelihood that charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship diverted funds to al Qaeda.)122
Still, al Qaeda found fertile fund-raising ground in Saudi Arabia, where extreme religious views are common and charitable giving was both essential to the culture and subject to very limited oversight.123 Al Qaeda also sought money from wealthy donors in other Gulf states.
Al Qaeda frequently moved the money it raised by hawala, an informal and ancient trust-based system for transferring funds.124 In some ways, al Qaeda had no choice after its move to Afghanistan in 1996: first, the banking system there was antiquated and undependable; and second, formal banking was risky due to the scrutiny that al Qaeda received after the August 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, including UN resolutions against it and the Taliban.125 Bin Ladin relied on the established hawala networks operating in Pakistan, in Dubai, and throughout the Middle East to transfer funds efficiently. Hawaladars associated with al Qaeda may have used banks to move and store money, as did various al Qaeda fund-raisers and operatives outside of Afghanistan, but there is little evidence that Bin Ladin or core al Qaeda members used banks while in Afghanistan.126
Note # 126 is on p.498: CIA analytic report, "Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target," CTC 01-40003HCS, Apr. 12, 2001; CIA analytic report, "Couriers, Hawaladars Key to Moving Al-Qa’ida Money," CTC 2003-40063CH, May 16, 2003.
Report says that al Qaeda did not use hawala
p. 172 of the 911 Commission Report: ... the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly,we have seen no evidence that any foreign government - or foreign government official - supplied any funding.131
Note # 131 is on p.499. The hijackers spent more than $270,000 in the United States, and the costs associated with Moussaoui were at least $50,000. The additional expenses included travel to obtain passports and visas, travel to the United States, expenses incurred by the plot leaders and facilitators, and the expenses incurred by the people selected to be hijackers who ultimately did not participate. For many of these expenses, we have only fragmentary evidence and/or unconfirmed detainee reports, and can make only a rough estimate of costs. The $400,000 to $500,000 estimate does not include the cost of running training camps in Afghanistan, where the hijackers were recruited and trained, or the marginal cost of the training itself. Finally, the architect of the plot,KSM, put the total cost at approximately $400,000, apparently excluding Moussaoui’s expenses. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 3, 2003;Apr. 5, 2004. Our investigation has uncovered no evidence that the 9/11 conspirators employed hawala as a means to move the money that funded the operation. Indeed, the surviving plot participants have either not mentioned hawala or have explicitly denied using it to send money to the United States. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, April 5, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 2, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Apr. 7, 2004. On domestic U.S. and foreign government funding, see, e.g., Adam Drucker interviews (Jan. 12, 2004; May 19, 2004); Dennis Lormel interview (Jan. 16, 2004); FBI response to Commission question for the record, July 13, 2004. As discussed in chapter 7, we have examined three transactions involving individuals in San Diego. Based on all of the evidence, we have concluded that none of these transactions involved a net transfer of funds to the hijackers.
Report says Ossama Bin Laden in Afghanistan had hardly any money
Perhaps the 911 Commission Report contains valuable information that has simply been ignored:
p.61 of the 911 Commission Report. ... Bin Ladin found it necessary both to cut back his spending and to control his outlays more closely. He appointed a new financial manager, whom his followers saw as miserly.59
Money problems proved costly to Bin Ladin in other ways. Jamal Ahmed al Fadl, a Sudanese-born Arab, ... skimmed about $110,000 ... Fadl resented receiving a salary of only $500 a month while some of the Egyptians in al Qaeda were given $1,200 a month. He defected and became a star informant for the United States. Also testifying about al Qaeda in a U.S. court was L’Houssaine Kherchtou, who told of breaking with Bin Ladin because of Bin Ladin’s professed inability to provide him with money when his wife needed a caesarian section.60... In any case, on May 19, 1996, Bin Ladin left Sudan - significantly weakened, despite his ambitions and organizational skills. He returned to Afghanistan.61
Ray McGovern, 27-year CIA veteran who chaired National Intelligence Estimates and personally delivered intelligence briefings to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, their Vice Presidents, Secretaries of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior government officials, said "I think at simplest terms, there’s a cover-up. The 9/11 Report is a joke."
- Folter in Masuren. In: Der Spiegel. Nr. 18, 2009, p. 106, online(German)
- http://ccrjustice.org/files/05-30-2005_bradbury_40pg_OLC%20torture%20memos.pdf page 37 of pdf. The report also admits that the CIA "could not always distinguish detainees who had information but were successfully resisting interrogation from those who did not actually have the information"(p.31)
- Video interviewby Ken Jepsen 37:30 ff (German)
- http://www.serendipity.li/wot/571-page-lie.htm The 9/11 Commission Report: A 571-Page Lie
|Constitutes||Propaganda +, Cover-up + and Report +|
|Description||An official narrative crafted to deceive the ignorant, which highlights the roles of Al Qaeda and the 19 hijackers. +|
|Display date||22 July 2004 +|
|Display docType||report +|
|Display image||File:911report cover HIGHRES.png +|
|Has author||9-11/Commission +|
|Has documentType||report +|
|Has fullPageName||9-11/Commission/Report +|
|Has fullPageNamee||9-11/Commission/Report +|
|Has image2||File:911report cover HIGHRES.png +|
|Has noRatings||0 +|
|Has objectClass||Publication +|
|Has objectClass2||Publication +|
|Has parentFullPageName||9-11/Commission +|
|Has publicationDate||22 July 2004 +|
|Has revisionSize||13,385 +|
|Has revisionUser||Robin +|
|Has wikipediaPage||https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11_Commission_Report +|
|Has wikipediaPage2||https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11_Commission_Report +|
|Is not stub||true +|