Vela Incident

 Vela Incident

The Vela Incident, also known as the South Atlantic Flash, was a "double flash" of light detected by an American Vela satellite on 22 September 1979 near the Prince Edward Islands off Antarctica, which many believe was of nuclear origin.

Developed as the Vela Hotel element of Project Vela by the United States to monitor compliance with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty by the Soviet Union, Vela means "she watches over" in Spanish.

The most widespread theory among those who believe the flash was of nuclear origin is that it resulted from a joint South African-Israeli nuclear test.

Avner Cohen, author of Israel and the Bomb and The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb, said:

"Nothing in the documents suggests there was an actual offer by Israel to sell nuclear weapons to the regime in Pretoria."

Responsibility

If a nuclear explosion did occur, it occurred within the three-thousand-mile-wide circle covering the Indian Ocean, South Atlantic, southern tip of Africa, and a small part of Antarctica.

South Africa did have a nuclear weapons programme at the time, and it falls within that geographic location. Nevertheless, since the fall of apartheid, South Africa has disclosed most of the information on its nuclear weapons programme, and according to the subsequent International Atomic Energy Agency report, South Africa could not have constructed such a device until November 1979, two months after the incident. Furthermore the IAEA reported that all South African nuclear devices had been accounted for. However, a report dated 21 January 1980 prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency claimed allegedly unprecedented security measures at South African naval facilities the week before the event, suggested that a test could have been staged from one or more of them. Paragraph 18 of the report, which was based largely on circumstantial evidence and also on the assumption that there had been a nuclear explosion, said that several reliable sources had informed the then US defence attache in South Africa that harbour defence exercises at Simonstown naval base (publicly declared off-limits for the period 17-23 September 1979) had taken place there during this period. The CIA report acknowledged that these exercises could have simply been routine security measures. But, although there was no connection with evidence for or against a nuclear test, paragraph 19 of the report went on to say:

Prime Minister Botha has avoided public comment on the issue since the US disclosure [on 25 October 1979] of the Vela indications. However, on 25 September 1979—three days after the nuclear event—he told a provincial congress of the ruling National Party that "South Africa's enemies might find out we have military weapons they do not know about". Botha's enigmatic remark prompted speculation in the South African press that he had undeclared weapons in mind.

Israel had nuclear weapons in 1979, but it is questioned whether they had the capability to mount a covert test thousands of kilometres away. If it had been an Israeli test, it was almost certainly done with South African cooperation.

US analysts also considered the possibility that it could have been a covert test by a known nuclear state. They concluded that there would be little motivation for the USSR or China in particular to test a nuclear weapon in such a way, unless they were attempting to make it look like South Africa or Israel were covertly testing weapons. As the flash could have occurred in the vicinity of the Kerguelen Islands, it is possible that France was testing a neutron bomb.

India had carried out a nuclear test in 1974 (see Smiling Buddha). The possibility that India would test a weapon was considered, since it would be normal for Indian Navy ships to be in those waters, but dismissed as impracticable and unnecessary. India was not considered as a potential partner of South Africa's nuclear programme as it was one of the most vocal critics of apartheid and had no diplomatic or military relationship with South Africa.

It is unlikely any other declared nuclear powers would have conducted such a test. They had little reason to conduct an atmospheric test, and the small size of the blast might reflect a less advanced weapon – though there are many "advanced" reasons for small tests as well, including tactical nuclear weapons (such as neutron bombs) and testing the primary devices for thermonuclear weapons.

Sometimes also mentioned as another potential partner for South Africa in such a test is Taiwan.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 of November 4, 1977 introduced a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, also requiring all States to refrain from "any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons". This prohibition could explain why other countries are so reluctant to admit involvement with South Africa's nuclear weapons programme.

Subsequent developments

Since 1980 some new evidence has emerged. However, most questions remain unanswered:

• In October 1984, a National Intelligence Estimate on the South African nuclear programme noted:

"There is still considerable disagreement within the Intelligence Community as to whether the flash in the South Atlantic detected by a US [...] satellite in September 1979 was a nuclear test, and if so, by South Africa. If the latter, the need for South Africa to test a device during the time frame of this Estimate is significantly diminished."

A shorter form of this wording was used in a subsequent National Intelligence Council memorandum of September 1985.

• In February 1994 Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, a convicted Soviet spy and commander of South Africa's Simonstown naval base at the time, talked about the incident upon his release from prison. He said:

"Although I was not directly involved in planning or carrying out the operation, I learned unofficially that the flash was produced by an Israeli-South African test, code-named Operation Phenix. The explosion was clean and was not supposed to be detected. But they were not as smart as they thought, and the weather changed – so the Americans were able to pick it up."

He subsequently admitted that no South African naval vessels had been involved, and that he had no first hand knowledge of a test.

• On 20 April 1997, the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz, quoted South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad as confirming that the flash over the Indian Ocean was indeed from a South African nuclear test. Soon afterwards Pahad reported that he had been misquoted and that he was merely repeating the rumours that had been circulating for years.

• Aviation Week & Space Technology/July 21, 1997 page 33 "Admission of 1979 Nuclear Test Finally Validates Vela Data" by William B. Scott/Colorodo Springs

• In October 1999, a white paper published by the US Senate Republican Policy Committee in opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty said:

"There remains uncertainty about whether the South Atlantic flash in September 1979 recorded by optical sensors on the US Vela satellite was a nuclear detonation and, if so, to whom it belonged."

• In his 2006 book On the Brink, retired CIA clandestine service officer Tyler Drumheller wrote of his 1983-1988 tour in South Africa:

"We had operational successes, most importantly regarding Pretoria's nuclear capability. My sources collectively provided incontrovertible evidence that the apartheid government had in fact tested a nuclear bomb in the south Atlantic in 1979, and that they had developed a delivery system with assistance from the Israelis."

== Some related US information has recently been declassified in the form of heavily redacted reports and memoranda following applications made under Freedom of Information Act. On 5 May 2006, many of these declassified documents were made available through the National Security Archive.

In 2010, The Guardian released South African government documents that it alleged confirmed the existence of Israel's nuclear arsenal, and were associated with an Israeli offer to sell South Africa nuclear weapons in 1975. Israel categorically denied these allegations and said that the documents do not indicate any offer for a sale of nuclear weapons. Israeli President Shimon Peres said that The Guardian article was based on "selective interpretation... and not on concrete facts."

Avner Cohen, author of Israel and the Bomb and The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb, said:

"Nothing in the documents suggests there was an actual offer by Israel to sell nuclear weapons to the regime in Pretoria."

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