Difference between revisions of "Charles Duelfer"
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{{QB|A new organisation was created, the [[CIA]]-led Iraq survey group (ISG), led by David Kay. His job was not to find [[WMD]] but to spin the data for the political benefit of the White House. He hinted at dramatic findings, only to suddenly reverse course once [[Saddam Hussein]] was captured. Kay told us that everyone had got it wrong on WMD, that it was no one's fault. He was replaced by Charles Duelfer, whose task was to extend the WMD cover-up for as long as possible. Duelfer was very adept at this, having done similar work while serving as the deputy executive chairman of the UN weapons inspection effort. | {{QB|A new organisation was created, the [[CIA]]-led Iraq survey group (ISG), led by David Kay. His job was not to find [[WMD]] but to spin the data for the political benefit of the White House. He hinted at dramatic findings, only to suddenly reverse course once [[Saddam Hussein]] was captured. Kay told us that everyone had got it wrong on WMD, that it was no one's fault. He was replaced by Charles Duelfer, whose task was to extend the WMD cover-up for as long as possible. Duelfer was very adept at this, having done similar work while serving as the deputy executive chairman of the UN weapons inspection effort. | ||
:I witnessed him manipulate reports to the security council, rejecting all that didn't sustain his (and the US government's) foregone conclusion that [[Iraq]] had WMD. | :I witnessed him manipulate reports to the security council, rejecting all that didn't sustain his (and the US government's) foregone conclusion that [[Iraq]] had WMD. | ||
| − | :As the head of the ISG, he was called upon to again manipulate the data. As it was virtually impossible to conjure up WMD stockpiles where none existed, he did the next best thing - he re-certified [[Colin Powell]]'s pre-war assertion that Saddam Hussein had the "intent" to re-acquire WMD. Duelfer provided no evidence to support this supposition. In fact, the available data seems to reject the notion of "intent". But once again, politicians, the | + | :As the head of the ISG, he was called upon to again manipulate the data. As it was virtually impossible to conjure up WMD stockpiles where none existed, he did the next best thing - he re-certified [[Colin Powell]]'s pre-war assertion that Saddam Hussein had the "intent" to re-acquire WMD. Duelfer provided no evidence to support this supposition. In fact, the available data seems to reject the notion of "intent". But once again, politicians, the corporate media and the public at large failed to let facts get in the way of assertions. The ISG had accomplished its mission - not the search for WMD, but the establishment of a viable alibi. Its job done, the ISG slipped quietly away, its passing barely noticed by politicians, media and a public all too willing to pretend that no crime has been committed.<br>— Scott Ritter, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1399228,00.html Criminals the lot of us], ''The Guardian'', January 27, 2005.}} |
==Education== | ==Education== | ||
Latest revision as of 18:34, 14 December 2023
 Charles Duelfer      (spook) | |
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| Alma mater | University of Connecticut, Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
US spook who led post-war whitewash of lie of "Iraqi WMDs". | |
Charles A. Duelfer is a US spook who was special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for "Iraqi WMDs". Duelfer was Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commision on Iraq (UNSCOM) from 1993-2000. He replaced David Kay in the Iraq Survey Group in March 2004, which conducted the "investigation" of Iraq's WMD programs.
This is what Scott Ritter had to say about the ISG and Duelfer:
A new organisation was created, the CIA-led Iraq survey group (ISG), led by David Kay. His job was not to find WMD but to spin the data for the political benefit of the White House. He hinted at dramatic findings, only to suddenly reverse course once Saddam Hussein was captured. Kay told us that everyone had got it wrong on WMD, that it was no one's fault. He was replaced by Charles Duelfer, whose task was to extend the WMD cover-up for as long as possible. Duelfer was very adept at this, having done similar work while serving as the deputy executive chairman of the UN weapons inspection effort.
- I witnessed him manipulate reports to the security council, rejecting all that didn't sustain his (and the US government's) foregone conclusion that Iraq had WMD.
- As the head of the ISG, he was called upon to again manipulate the data. As it was virtually impossible to conjure up WMD stockpiles where none existed, he did the next best thing - he re-certified Colin Powell's pre-war assertion that Saddam Hussein had the "intent" to re-acquire WMD. Duelfer provided no evidence to support this supposition. In fact, the available data seems to reject the notion of "intent". But once again, politicians, the corporate media and the public at large failed to let facts get in the way of assertions. The ISG had accomplished its mission - not the search for WMD, but the establishment of a viable alibi. Its job done, the ISG slipped quietly away, its passing barely noticed by politicians, media and a public all too willing to pretend that no crime has been committed.
— Scott Ritter, Criminals the lot of us, The Guardian, January 27, 2005.
Contents
Education
Duelfer holds a BA from the University of Connecticut and a MSc from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Career
Duelfer's 25 years of government work involved policy and intelligence in the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and Asia, and in the areas of nuclear weapons and space programs. Duelfer joined the Politico-Military Bureau of the State Department in 1983 and was responsible for special regional activities including conflicts in Chad, Libya, and Grenada as well as ongoing strategic verification, space, and strategic defense issues.
Before joining the Department of State, Duelfer worked at the White House Office of Management and Budget (1977-1983), where he was responsible for Department of Defense strategic nuclear forces and space programs.
In 1984, he became Deputy Director of the Office of International Security Policy and was responsible for European, Africa, and Latin America regions. He became Director, with responsibility for regional security issues worldwide, in 1985. During this period, Duelfer also worked with the special coordinator for counterterrorism to develop, implement, and exercise the State Department's terrorism response system.
Before joining UNSCOM, Duelfer was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for arms control and multilateral defense matters. From 1990 to 1992, he was in charge of defense trade matters as the director of the Center for Defense Trade and Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for politico-military affairs. In this capacity, he had responsibility for arms transfers, munitions licensing, and conventional arms control. From January to March 1991, he directed the State Department's Task Force in support of Operation Desert Storm.[1]
Duelfer was the Deputy Executive Chairman and then Acting Chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from 1993 until its termination in 2000.[2] The Commission was established following the Gulf War by the UN Security Council to monitor and eliminate Iraq's WMD, but was used as a pretext to keep sanctions.
Duelfer was the former Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. He led the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) that conducted the investigation of the scope of Iraq's WMD.[3] The ISG was an intelligence organization of over 1700 military and civilian staff that investigated Iraq WMD programs. The ISG's definitive work, known as the Duelfer Report, a whitewash of the WMD lie, was presented to the President and Congress in October 2004.
After his, he moved over to the private sector of the MIC. From 2005-2008, Duelfer was CEO of Transformational Space, a small space launch vehicle company that worked under NASA and DARPA contracts to develop a new vapor-pressurized liquid fuel engine. After that, he became Chairman of Omnis, Inc., a consulting firm in aerospace, defense, intelligence, training, and finance.[4]
Think Tank Affiliations
- 2003-04 - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Public Policy Scholar
- ?? - Center for Strategic and International Studies, Visiting Resident Scholar, Middle East Studies
Publications
- "The Inevitable Failure of Inspections in Iraq", Arms Control Today, September 2002
- "Arms Reduction: The Role of International Organizations, The UNSCOM Experience", Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2000), Vol. 5 No. 1, fee access
External Resources
- Excerpts of CNN interview with Charles Duelfer, "Inside UNSCOM: The Inspector", CNN, February 13 1998
- Scott Ritter, The source Duelfer didn't quote, The Guardian, October 9, 2004
- Scott Ritter, Criminals the lot of us, The Guardian, January 27, 2005
- US Senate Armed Services Committee, "Testimony of Charles Duelfer" - (PDF file), October 6, 2005
- Statement of Charles A. Duelfer to the House Committee on International Relations, 17 November 2004
- Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, "U.S. 'Almost All Wrong' on Weapons - Report on Iraq Contradicts Bush Administration Claims", Washington Post, October 7, 2004.
