Difference between revisions of "Australia/Universal surveillance"
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| − | '''Universal surveillance of Australians''' is one of the most advanced in the world, after aggressive rolling back of [[civil liberties]]. | + | '''Universal surveillance of Australians''' is one of the most advanced in the world, after aggressive rolling back of [[civil liberties]]. The trend has has gone in overdrive after the start of the [[COVID-19]] deep event in March 2020. |
==History== | ==History== | ||
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===2015 bill=== | ===2015 bill=== | ||
After a 2015 bill claimed that the government had rights to carry out very broad warrantless [[mass surveillance]] of electronic media, including banning [[warrant canaries]]. The powers claimed were so broad that they have been called "nearly unlimited",<ref>http://boingboing.net/2015/03/26/australia-outlaws-warrant-cana.html</ref> but efforts continue to expand their scope and use more resources to track and monitor citizens. | After a 2015 bill claimed that the government had rights to carry out very broad warrantless [[mass surveillance]] of electronic media, including banning [[warrant canaries]]. The powers claimed were so broad that they have been called "nearly unlimited",<ref>http://boingboing.net/2015/03/26/australia-outlaws-warrant-cana.html</ref> but efforts continue to expand their scope and use more resources to track and monitor citizens. | ||
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| + | ===2021 Identify and Disrupt Bill=== | ||
| + | In August [[2021]], Parliament passed the <i>Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020</i><ref>https://melbactivistlegal.org.au/2021/08/26/identify-and-disrupt-bill/ This link gives a longer explanation of the law</ref>, giving the [[Australian Federal Police]] (AFP), the [[Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission]] (ACIC) — and by extension, the [[Australian Signals Directorate]] the power to spy domestically.<ref>Dark web crime: how Australia’s powerful new warrants would work, the Guardian, 3 December 2020.</ref> The bill creates three new warrants, with the purported purpose of targeting “serious and organised crime” that utilise “anonymising technologies” online. The announcement of these warrants follows a $90 million injection of funding in the government’s already-existing and extensive surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities.<ref>https://www.itnews.com.au/news/australian-govt-makes-play-for-sweeping-online-account-takeover-powers-558546</ref> The new powers will be particularly useful in the disruption of resistance to forced [[COVID-19/vaccine|COVID-19 vaccine injections]], [[lockdowns]] and related measures. | ||
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| + | The Bill provides three new warrants: | ||
| + | |||
| + | *Data Disruption Warrants, which allow the AFP and the ACIC (or another person on the law enforcement officer’s behalf) the ability to “add, copy, delete or alter” files on a [[computer]] or device, so as to “frustrate the commission of crime”<ref>https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r6623_ems_e2ab793d-9b5f-47db-aa3e-0498cb581918/upload_pdf/JC003346_Revised%20Explanatory%20Memorandum.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf</ref> where a law enforcement officer “reasonably suspects” that one or more “relevant offences” are “being, are about to be, or are likely to be” committed.<ref>https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6623</ref> | ||
| + | *Network Activity Warrants, which “allow agencies to collect intelligence on serious criminal activity being conducted by criminal networks” by intercepting communications and using surveillance devices on computer networks. The AFP and the ACIC are permitted to do “any thing reasonably necessary to conceal” their access and modification to computers, allowing the warrant to be conducted secretly. This is available where there is a “reasonable suspicion” that monitoring the network activity of a “criminal network of individuals” is “relevant to the prevention, detection or frustration of one or more kinds of ‘relevant offences.’” | ||
| + | *Account Takeover Warrants, which provide agencies with the ability to take control of a person’s online account “through the modification of data” for the purposes of “gathering evidence to further a criminal investigation.” This is available where there is a “reasonable suspicion” that one or more “relevant offences” are “being, are about to be, or are likely to be” committed; an investigation is either imminent or in progress, and taking control of the “target accounts” is “necessary for enabling evidence to be obtained.” | ||
==CCTV== | ==CCTV== | ||
Revision as of 05:36, 29 August 2021
 Australia/Universal surveillance  (Universal surveillance)   | |
|---|---|
| Interest of | Annika Smethurst |
Universal surveillance of Australians is one of the most advanced in the world, after aggressive rolling back of civil liberties. The trend has has gone in overdrive after the start of the COVID-19 deep event in March 2020.
Contents
History
In the 1970s, Prime Minister of Australia] Gough Whitlam attempted to close Pine Gap, a CIA run universal surveillance in Australia. He was removed from power in US Deep state-run bloodless coup in 1975.[1]
Laws
Under the 2012 Defence Trade Controls Act law, “supplies of technology” come under a censorship regime involving criminal penalties of up to ten years imprisonment. One commentator has suggested that it has potential to "[catch] open source privacy software, information security research and education, and the entire computer security industry in its snare."[2]
2015 bill
After a 2015 bill claimed that the government had rights to carry out very broad warrantless mass surveillance of electronic media, including banning warrant canaries. The powers claimed were so broad that they have been called "nearly unlimited",[3] but efforts continue to expand their scope and use more resources to track and monitor citizens.
2021 Identify and Disrupt Bill
In August 2021, Parliament passed the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020[4], giving the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) — and by extension, the Australian Signals Directorate the power to spy domestically.[5] The bill creates three new warrants, with the purported purpose of targeting “serious and organised crime” that utilise “anonymising technologies” online. The announcement of these warrants follows a $90 million injection of funding in the government’s already-existing and extensive surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities.[6] The new powers will be particularly useful in the disruption of resistance to forced COVID-19 vaccine injections, lockdowns and related measures.
The Bill provides three new warrants:
- Data Disruption Warrants, which allow the AFP and the ACIC (or another person on the law enforcement officer’s behalf) the ability to “add, copy, delete or alter” files on a computer or device, so as to “frustrate the commission of crime”[7] where a law enforcement officer “reasonably suspects” that one or more “relevant offences” are “being, are about to be, or are likely to be” committed.[8]
- Network Activity Warrants, which “allow agencies to collect intelligence on serious criminal activity being conducted by criminal networks” by intercepting communications and using surveillance devices on computer networks. The AFP and the ACIC are permitted to do “any thing reasonably necessary to conceal” their access and modification to computers, allowing the warrant to be conducted secretly. This is available where there is a “reasonable suspicion” that monitoring the network activity of a “criminal network of individuals” is “relevant to the prevention, detection or frustration of one or more kinds of ‘relevant offences.’”
- Account Takeover Warrants, which provide agencies with the ability to take control of a person’s online account “through the modification of data” for the purposes of “gathering evidence to further a criminal investigation.” This is available where there is a “reasonable suspicion” that one or more “relevant offences” are “being, are about to be, or are likely to be” committed; an investigation is either imminent or in progress, and taking control of the “target accounts” is “necessary for enabling evidence to be obtained.”
CCTV
- Full article:
CCTV
- Full article:
As of 2017, Australia was continuing to expand mass surveillance, spending $18.5M on iOmniscient, a system which "works by analysing images recorded by existing CCTV cameras.”[9]
Data retention
The Australian Department of Home Affairs said in December 2018 that it would take "considerable time and resources" for it to determine how many agencies across Australia's three tiers of government have accessed metadata held under the nation's data retention laws.[10]
Related Quotation
| Page | Quote | Author | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| H. V. Evatt | “We must be aware of setting up a security organization which has political views, and which regards the left-wing man who goes too far to the left, as being a criminal. We must prevent any attempt to set up an espionage system for spying on our own people. The security service was never intended to be a secret police organization. Now it wants to run the police of Canberra and everything else, and it is only kept from doing so by public opinion.” | H. V. Evatt | 19 October 1955 |
References
- ↑ http://one-just-world.blogspot.com/2016_02_01_archive.html
- ↑ http://www.gizmodo.com.au/2015/12/in-australia-even-learning-about-encryption-will-be-illegal-soon/
- ↑ http://boingboing.net/2015/03/26/australia-outlaws-warrant-cana.html
- ↑ https://melbactivistlegal.org.au/2021/08/26/identify-and-disrupt-bill/ This link gives a longer explanation of the law
- ↑ Dark web crime: how Australia’s powerful new warrants would work, the Guardian, 3 December 2020.
- ↑ https://www.itnews.com.au/news/australian-govt-makes-play-for-sweeping-online-account-takeover-powers-558546
- ↑ https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r6623_ems_e2ab793d-9b5f-47db-aa3e-0498cb581918/upload_pdf/JC003346_Revised%20Explanatory%20Memorandum.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf
- ↑ https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6623
- ↑ http://anonhq.com/australian-govt-ramps-18-5m-citizen-surveillance-capability-iomniscient-technology/
- ↑ http://corpau.blogspot.com/2018/12/home-affairs-cannot-be-bothered-listing.html
