Swedish Submarine Protection Commission
| Date | October 21, 1982 - April 1983 |
|---|---|
| Participants | Sven Andersson, Carl Bildt, Lars Eliasson, Maj-Lis Lööw, Olle Svensson, Sven Hellman, Bror Stefenson, Sahlin |
| Interests | Olof Palme. |
| Description | Swedish Commission used as part of propaganda effort in The secret war against Sweden. |
The Submarine Protection Commission (Swedish:Ubåtsskyddskommissionen) was a Swedish parliamentary inquiry.
During the Reagan administration, the United States started a covert operation to force the Swedish government to change foreign policy. Led by a secretive Deception Committee, US submarines from the National Underwater Reconnaissance Office conducted a large number of false flag operations.
US an NATO submarines entered Swedish coastal waters, for then to on purpose make themselves clearly visible. The following spottings and numerous submarine chases would then be covered in corporate media as against presumed Soviet penetrations. The operations were conducted with the knowledge of senior Swedish naval officers, but crucially, not by the government, which was put in a difficult situation.
The Commission, dominated by deep state actors who were involved and had an interest in hiding the true cause of events, used the commission as part of the propaganda offensive to force the government's hand. Vice Admiral Bror Stefenson knew the true perpetrators all along.
Contents
Background
The commission was established by the Social Democratic government led by Prime Minister Olof Palme, which had taken office in the middle of the Hårsfjärden incident at the beginning of October 1982 where the Swedish navy chased a suspected foreign submarine, and a large number of similar sightings, presumed to be Soviet submarines. The
Official narrative
The Commission was set with the task of investigating what was behind the suspected submarine violations of Sweden that had taken place and what measures were required to counteract such. Of notice is that several of the members were deep state actors who had every interest in a stitch-up conclusion; Vice Admiral Bror Stefenson was also probably one of the knowing participants in the psychological operation, which went behind the back of the government.
The commission submitted its report at the end of April 1983, "Meeting the submarine threat. The submarine violations and Swedish security policy". The commission's conclusion that it was Soviet submarines that were behind it led to the Swedish government submitting a formal protest against this to the Soviet Union.
Deep state actors
The former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Sven Andersson was appointed chairman. He was strongly connected to the military-intelligence apparatus, and a key player in the IB affair, which was exposed in the 1970s.
The other four commissioners were members of parliament, Carl Bildt from Moderatarna, Lars Eliasson, the Center Party, and the Social Democrats' Maj-Lis Lööw and Olle Svensson. The experts were Sven Hellman, the Ministry of Defense and the head of the Defense Staff Vice Admiral Bror Stefenson. Ministry Secretary Michael Sahlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed secretary of the commission.
It was one of Carl Bildt's first major roles. Bildt was later exposed as a confidential informant for the US embassy. When he became Prime Minister 1991-1994, he played a central role in the cover-up of the Sinking of MS Estonia. Since then, he has made a career of sitting on deep state connected committees and attending spooky conferences.
Vice Admiral Bror Stefenson was one of the few senior naval command who knew the true perpetrators, and would later order submarine hunters not to shoot at identified targets.[citation needed]
Conclusions
The Commission's reasoning began with the observation that, despite extensive investigations with various technical aids, no concrete evidence in the form of objects or photographs was found that could support or verify optical observations. However, through sketches and careful interviews as a follow-up to optical observations, the commission considered itself to have received information about the type of submarine in question. The commission also relied on the post-analysis of recorded hydrophone sounds that would provide indications that provided information about pact or nation affiliation. Then the Commission stated: "Similarly, it is possible to obtain, via signals intelligence, evidence for assessments of the submarines' nationality."
The Submarine Protection Commission's designation of the Soviet Union as the power responsible for the violations took on an extensive political dimension that contributed to upsetting some of the beliefs and conditions for Swedish foreign policy. The commission itself underlined the seriousness of the new situation that it had signed: that the stepped-up submarine violations constituted a threat and a challenge to the credibility of Sweden's security and neutrality policy. The extent, nature and direction of the violations showed that they must be regarded as a threat to Swedish security and Sweden's ability to deter war.
Further Commissions
A later investigation into possible submarine violations by Sweden, "Perspective on the submarine issue" (SOU 2001:85) considered that the designation of the Soviet Union was uncertainly based, the chain of evidence did not appear strong, and nothing had subsequently come to light to lend further support to the Commission's conclusion. This investigation meant that the members of the Submarine Security Commission, and then in particular its chairman Sven Andersson, decided sometime in early March 1983 that a designation of the Soviet Union was a necessity, and that regardless of the evidence. In the Commander-in-Chief's diary on March 8, it is said that Sven Andersson then believed that so much was known or could be assumed to be known regarding a Warsaw Pact operation that if a clear assessment of nationality was not made, there would be a debate with claims that the Swedes deliberately did not go into the issue of nationality, which could be considered " as if we were trying to politically get away cheaply". From the same diary entry, it appears that, for the government, Defense Minister Anders Thunborg was concerned about such a development in the commission's thinking on the question of nationality determination, and highlighted the many uncertainties that still applied.
SOU 2001:85 states that Prime Minister Palme was visibly upset when he was briefed on April 12 by Sven Andersson and formally on April 15, only about ten days before publication, by Defense Minister Thunborg about the content of the report. Palme said that he was faced with a fait accompli and that Andersson had not warned him or consulted about the content of the report and in particular the designation of the Soviet Union. During the preparation within the government on how to react to the report, it appeared that at least two ministers, Foreign Minister Lennart Bodström and Minister of Justice Ove Rainer, questioned whether the government, on the basis of weak evidence, could accept the Submarine Protection Commission's nationality determination. However, Olof Palme believed that there was no alternative for the government but to accept the commission's report. The domestic political situation would have become untenable if the government ignored the assessment of the respected Sven Andersson and a unanimous political inquiry for reasons that are difficult to explain.
In a protest note on 26 April to the Soviet Union, prepared by Thunborg and Åström, the Submarine Protection Commission's assessment that the submarines had been Soviet was touched upon and the government explained for its part that it had no information that contradicted the Commission's conclusions. The government had therefore concluded that it was a question of Soviet submarines. They therefore presented in the note a sharp protest against the gross violations of Swedish territory committed by the Soviet navy. It was further argued that the violations constituted a serious violation of international law and could be interpreted as part of deliberate and illegal attempts to explore Swedish maritime territory. The government declared that this activity must be strongly condemned.
Known Participants
4 of the 8 of the participants already have pages here:
| Participant | Description |
|---|---|
| Sven Andersson | Swedish Social Democrat politician and deep state actor |
| Carl Bildt | Swedish deep politician, serial Bilderberger and visitor to the MSC. Sitting on an impressive number of deep state related commissions. |
| Michael Sahlin | Swedish diplomat on the Swedish Submarine Protection Commission |
| Bror Stefenson |
