Document:Integrity 2018 Moldova Cluster (1)

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Disclaimer (#3)Document.png strategy document  by Integrity Initiative dated 26 December 2018
Subjects: Integrity Initiative/Clusters/Moldova, plans, strategy, media
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/4
Source: Anonymous (Link)

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Integrity Initiative Activity Budget April 2018 - March 2019



This is an easy to read (and easier to copy and paste from if required) version of the important document Integrity_2018_Moldova_Cluster_(1).pdf ‎(which is the name given it by Anonymous. It is a general budget strategy plan, not dealing with Moldova in particular.)


Contents

Integrity Initiative Activity Budget April 2018 - March 2019

A. Expanding our cluster network

Activity Costs: Expanding our cluster network of specialists, journalists, academics and political actors across Europe, empowering them to educate their publics and policy elites Current clusters: Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, Serbia, Italy (9) Next clusters: Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, Sweden, Montenegro, Malta, USA, Canada, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland, Latvia (16) Research Clusters in Ukraine & Jordan (2)

Activity A01: Initial cluster foundation workshop

OUTPUT

Connect cluster members, create internal national network, formally introduce them to the II aims, practices and methodologies, establish target programme for research, dissemination and events

OUTCOME

New cluster able to self-organise. Increased coordination and shared best practice from cluster individuals and organisations working at the forefront of efforts countering RU disinfo, increased resource material for an Int'l audience.

KEY INDICATOR

Initial group of at least 8 members between core hub and network. Members agree team roles and start putting structures in place. Start exchanges of information with other clusters. Begin work

Activity A02: Inaugural event

OUTPUT

Establishes the cluster nationally. Sets cluster 'modus operandi'. Representatives of other clusters participate to establish international networking, share expertise, boost morale and media coverage. Regional discussions to ascertain principle disinfo narratives and other malign influence threats which exist within their sphere of influence. Publish event report.

OUTCOME

Cluster strengthens its national public profile as a reliable provider of factual analysis and assessment. Build bonds with regional players. Strengthens the programme's expertise base and ability to hold unique, nuanced conversations. Agree social media and editorial output strategy.

KEY INDICATOR

Civil society, media, academia and policy makers increasingly call on members for commentary/advice/research. Enhanced cooperation measured through joint events, shared publications, greater public awareness and resistance to RU disinformation assessed through national polling data. Identify any patterns emerging.

Activity A03: Country fundamental report

OUTPUT

Creation of a regional report on specific realities of malign interference to establish a base of common understanding on which to develop the national programme and share information more coherently and consistently with the Int'l audience. Crime/political and strategic nexus with RU + include details of media & social media environments and establish which platforms are popular.

OUTCOME

Disseminate information on the situation and trends existing within a specific region. Compare domestic and international findings. Earlier and better identificiation of the threat. Production and dissemination of content that educates key national communities and the public.

KEY INDICATOR

Match trends identified with wider International network. Deliver to FCO, MOD, British Bankers Assoc., Assoc. of British Insurers. Regular content production and dissemination leading to increasing engagement

Activity A04: Educational event (twice yearly)

OUTPUT

Assemble all contacts and sub-cluster members at one meeting, with key national audience of influencers, to discuss national trends. Pro-reactive editorial and social media output by the cluster. Emerging and expected propaganda drives.

OUTCOME

National cohesion. Creation of defensive and offensive counter narratives. More engagement with specialists and the public.

KEY INDICATOR

Unprompted interactions between sub cluster members. Delivered to FCO, MOD, British Bankers Assoc., Assoc. of British Insurers + academic programmes e.g. Manchester University 'Reframing Russia'. Increased engagement with social media accounts generally and content published on them

Activity A05: Follow up workshop

OUTPUT

Review of cluster organisation and early work. Assistance with any issues /concerns and modifications following feedback. Planning for the future.

OUTCOME

Questionnaire measuring more people / organisations being more aware. Cluster performance improves.

KEY INDICATOR

Cluster has increasingly public profile, members frequently called on for commentary/advice/research.

Activity A06: Professional comprehensive country report

OUTPUT

Printed and digital published report to analyse and illustrate a comprehensive picture of country network activities (civil society, NGO's, journalists, academics, Govt. agencies) to identify and counter RU disinformation

OUTCOME

Systematic picture of country efforts enabling the cluster to improve the effectiveness of the fight against RU disinformation.

KEY INDICATOR

(Inter)National media coverage. Verifiable information and data that can be cross-referenced against other regions assessing acceptance of key RU messaging, trust in media sources, and the degree of coordinated strategic defence.

Activity A07: Sending cluster members to educational sessions abroad (IREX, Detector Media, StopFake, EUvsDisinfo, LT MOD Stratcom)

OUTPUT

Improve the technical competence of the cluster to deal with disinformation. Strengthen bonds between clusters in the system. Reinforce by preparing a strategy paper on cross-network partnerships.

OUTCOME

Cluster seen as definitive national source on counterdisinformation / influence education.Stronger defence and shared resources to bolster our cluster network.

KEY INDICATOR

National media coverage. Cluster produce RU and local language material, including material adapted for use within RU speaking minority.

Activity A08: Core team and cluster experts briefing tour, in North America, with a regional focus, to spread understanding beyond capitals.

OUTPUT

Briefings to regional audiences. Also identify likeminded partners and help bridge and diffuse partisan divide by sharing EU experience of countering RU disinformation

OUTCOME

Increased awareness of the RU disinformation threat and improved resilience, shared best practice, harnessing of national media/tech resources to tackle these threats on a global scale

KEY INDICATOR

Increased cooperation measured through cross-party initiatives, media literacy improvement through polling data on cross-checking, articles written and shared to highlight (the US) experience, increased cluster membership and wider following through social media channels

Activity A09: Application of Nationbuilder tool (cluster-wide outfacing public engagement platform)

OUTPUT

Enhance comms between project and general population. Provide greater autonomy and structure for clusters to engage with local populations.

OUTCOME

Nuanced message targeting. Outward facing engagement campaigns. Specific email campaign. Each cluster able to have their own website connected to the hub. Material accessible to more people on an Int'l scale.

KEY INDICATOR

Volume of material distributed and number of individuals signed up

B. Research and assessment

Activity Cost: Research and assessment: Sponsoring including via the Free University of Brussels (VUB IES) - (thereby enhancing academic respectability of the topic)- advanced research, publications, workshops, educational courses, mentoring, lectures==

Activity B01: Regular educational seminars in London (30 per annum)

OUTPUT

Expert speakers addressing key issues to educate core team and clusters.

OUTCOME

Exposes cluster leaders and UK and foreign opinion formers to new ideas on RU and on hybrid/information warfare; explores new and different issues; stimulates interest in and research into new aspects of our main topic.

KEY INDICATORS

Increasing demand from target audiences; new topics identified as research subjects; dissemination of new thinking to clusters and into the public domain.

Activity B02:VUB IES: Commission research and educational project

OUTPUT

9 x Research paths: From Disinformation to Political Warfare (see attachment for details)

OUTCOME

Establishing the academic credibility of the topic internationally; influences EU member states via material sent directly to the EEAS and EU Stratcom Taskforce; provides the academic basis for the whole Integrity Initiative programme and makes the programme attractive to journalists and politicians by demonstrating its accuracy and reliability.

KEY INDICATORS

The VUB team will be called upon to advise and educate influential people interested in this scheme more rapidly.

Activity B03: VUB IES: Outreach with Policy-makers, Academics and the General Public

OUTPUT

Political warfare working meetings with EU Officials, Political warfare workshops, Information Literacy Course, Political Warfare Network, 'Information Warfare and Security' Modules

OUTCOME

The RU disinformation and influence issue will no longer be ignored or belittled.

KEY INDICATORS

National think tanks (e.g. SWB Berlin, IFRI France, Clingendael NL) launch their own programmes on disinformation and malign influence

Activity B04:Journalist skill-sharing seminars

OUTPUT

Journalists will be invited from regions where threats are more heightened to share their tips for how to operate safely in a hostile environment

OUTCOME

Cluster operations in hostile environments will become safer and more effective.

KEY INDICATORS

Cluster members in hostile environments feel more secure, are able to operate with less risk and can produce better analysis.

Activity B05:Launch a series of educational films

OUTPUT

5 educational films illustrating disinformation and outlining the threats. For school and university audiences.

OUTCOME

Better, more comprehensive understanding of disinfomation trends amongst educated young people

KEY INDICATORS

The message reaches a wider demographic audience, especially younger people, schools - leading to conversations on discernment education

Activity B06:Elves Academy

OUTPUT

4 day workshop in Lithuania. 40 participants from 8 EU countries, 10 lecturers for practical sessions and training, 10 lecturers for review sessions. Follow up visits, by Elves instructors, to ensure the organisation develops effectively. Instructional materials to be produced.

OUTCOME

Taught goals 1) theoretical understanding of Kremlin propaganda and its trolls 2) practical sessions the 'elves' provide necessary knowledge for the development and implementation of an effective civic response.

KEY INDICATORS

Civic activists and volunteers actively engaged in cyber resistance and digital resilience.

Activity B07:VUB structured series of workshops with key national institutes to help them develop their own programmes addressing disinformation and malign influence

OUTPUT

1 workshop per quarter, in Brussels

OUTCOME

Raising the profile of countering disinformation in key European countries

KEY INDICATORS

National governments sponsor and fund the establishment of programmes

Activity B08:Topics to be researched (see attachment)

OUTPUT

Papers, seminars and presentations, on each of the topics, to core staff, clusters and external target audiences

OUTCOME

Rapidly raise target audience understanding of the RU strategic approach with the concerted use of all weapons of hybrid warfare

KEY INDICATORS

Recognition by target audiences of the RU strategic approach evinced by their statements, publications and policies

Activity B09:Bulletins on Russian online shill activity, using mass data surveys

OUTPUT

Weekly bulletins & monthly data surveys

OUTCOME

Better, more comprehensive understanding of online disinformation trends within all clusters

KEY INDICATORS

Uptake of bulletin & production of graphics (turning data into more digestible information) available to journalistic audiences and other influences

Activity B10:Use of data surveys to begin mapping out the details of Russian shill net

OUTPUT

Detailed, data and hard evidence backed understanding of Shill net

OUTCOME

Greater ability to combat the shill net using operations based on our improved understanding.

KEY INDICATORS

Clusters and Elves successfully using the product to improve their performance countering disinformation.

Activity B11:Implementing discernment and media literacy training programme (using e.g. Skripal as a case-study)

OUTPUT

A modular training programme (based on IREX/StopFake material) that adapts media source examples as needed to be most relevant and accessible across our cluster network

OUTCOME

Train wider audiences in the nature and extent of the RU threat and develop media literacy/critical thinking resilience that will help protect our wider societies

KEY INDICATORS

Pilot project running in Junior School, Secondary School and University. Programme participation numbers, survey data on learning outcomes (crosschecking, verification, awareness). Reaching people in typically neglected areas and regions outside the country capitals.


C. Expanding the impact

Activity Cost: Expanding the impact of the Integrity Initiative website, dissemination and Twitter/social media accounts, and increasing the reporting of the issue in the mainstream and specialist press

Activity C01:Translation of cluster publications and material (local language, English and RU)

OUTPUT

Steady stream of content highlighting disinformation in the relevant country. Publication on social media and website. Dissemination by clusters.

OUTCOME

Improved access to RU speaking minorities, RU diasporas and audiences within Russia. Increased awareness (and combating) of country-specific issues and RU malign influence in other countries. Sharing and engagement.

KEY INDICATORS

(Inter)National media coverage. More identifying and combating of disinformation amongst the public, politicians and academics. Social media and website engagement.

Activity C02: Experimental social media (calendar) pin pointing

OUTPUT

Targeted effort to pre-empt and combat specific malign influence attempts and control the information space

OUTCOME

The information space will become dominated by accurate reporting instead of being carpet-bombed with Kremlin and fringe groups' disinfo

KEY INDICATORS

Media spaces will clearly be dominated by real, factual narrative and not conspiracy theories and Kremlin propaganda

Activity C03:Media interviews

OUTPUT

Core and cluster experts presenting their knowledge on TV, radio and in newspapers, as well as influential websites

OUTCOME

Our experts will increasingly be invited as as a matter of course, as the go-to specialists to discuss RU and other propaganda and disinformation as well as media literacy. Reactive and proactive assessment of RU methods.

KEY INDICATORS

Successful interviews and articles relating to high profile events e.g. the anniversary of the murder of the Tsar, The Katyn Massacre. A steady increase in the number of appearances.

Activity C04: Expanding content areas on website, including a series of podcasts

OUTPUT

A series of podcasts available on our Integrity Initiative website. Two long, two short articles per month providing more details of disinformation and other tools of influence, improving media literacy.

OUTCOME

More attention turned onto RU influence activities in non EU/NATO nations. Disinformation cases and their special characteristics. Handy tools and examples for people to use in various situations - educational, research and others

KEY INDICATORS

Measured increase in the use of the website. The evolution of the website in reaction to users comments, increased use of the website by NGO's and embassies.

Activity C05:Targeted op-ed pieces to highlight cross-over experience across the cluster network

OUTPUT

Articles in main stream media. New, varied, translated content for the website.

OUTCOME

Enhanced reputation for expertise in this field, shared best practice

KEY INDICATORS

Google analytics showing wider coverage, increased traffic and readership of articles, longer 'dwelling' time on site, greater audience diversity

Activity C06:Website maintenance and IT / Comms security

OUTPUT

Active monitoring of core and cluster websites and supervised implementation of IT security procedures.

OUTCOME

Improved security of the programme of network and of clusters

KEY INDICATORS

Security breaches minimised.

Activity C07: Ongoing production of infographics and other visual materials

OUTPUT

A steady stream of relevant visual materials

OUTCOME

Fast and high impact response to disinfo events, preempting of propaganda campaigns, education of the digitally aware

KEY INDICATORS

Engagement with and references to the content

Activity C08:Social media training

OUTPUT

Training to clusters on setting up and effectively using social media relevant to their country / region

OUTCOME

Increased visibility and engagement of the topic in the clusters

KEY INDICATORS

Referencing and quoting of efforts

Activity C09: Branded materials

OUTPUT

Business cards, infographics postcards, branded reports and articles

OUTCOME

Increased visibility of the programme

KEY INDICATORS

Increased referencing of the programme in public for a

Activity C10:Best practice sharing

OUTPUT

Regular best practice newsletter and sharing sessions

OUTCOME

Clusters learn from each other and industry best practice to increase engagement

KEY INDICATORS

Visible improvements in media performance by cluster members

Activity C11: Media performance reporting

OUTPUT

Regular report of social media performance and traditional media appearances

OUTCOME

Increased profile, reputation and demand for II expertise

KEY INDICATORS

Measurement of being increased in demand

Activity C12: Increase links between our website and like-minded, trusted 3rd parties

OUTPUT

Specific articles and shared events that bolster google rankings for relevant searches

OUTCOME

Greater reach and increased sphere of influence

KEY INDICATORS

Increased website traffic, measurable month-on month diverse audience, focused increase in targeted areas and by defined search terms


D.Engaging national political and military establishments and societal organisations

Activity Costs: Engaging national political and military establishments and societal organisations, improving their ability to counter Russian disinformation and other weapons of hybrid warfare strategy

Activity D01: Engage national military authorities to increase their interest in joining the information warfare battle and in collaborating with clusters and other national assets.

OUTPUT

Military personnel invited to core and cluster events, leading to joint events in each country

OUTCOME

Education of national military organisations: increasing human resources available to contribute in national programmes and the Integrity Initiative

KEY INDICATORS

National military hold an independent or joint information exercise.


Activity D02: Coordinate and host conference in Kyiv, Ukraine for representatives of British Army's 77th Brigade, UCMC, NATO, cluster representatives

OUTPUT

Share best practice and critical first hand experience of Russian infowar and hybrid war tactics in Eastern Ukraine

OUTCOME

Improved understanding of the links and common doctrine between different weapons of RU hybrid war, including use of hard military operations. Strengthen ties and more robust defence to a common threat

KEY INDICATORS

Establishment of working level contact and generation of national military activity.

===Activity D03:Education and training on how to use social media (where appropriate for the organisation)===

OUTPUT

Training course and materials

OUTCOME

More effective dissemination of message and engagement with audiences

KEY INDICATORS

Audiences generate social media activity.

Activity D04:Develop and launch training seminar for journalists in 'Visual story-telling: real stories to counter disinformation'

OUTPUT

A modular training programme that can be used to bolster independent, creative and provocative journalism across our network

OUTCOME

Understanding and practical resources to respond to disinformation through creating and sharing real stories that matter. Sensitivity to work in conflict situations, and an awareness of how to respond in divisive challenging environments

KEY INDICATORS

Measured improvement of quality journalistic content across our network

Activity D05:With the help of the UK financial sector - British Bankers Association & Association of British Insurers, London Stock Exchange - establish relations with European counterparts and European for liaison with European bourses

OUTPUT

Guest lecture programme to alert these institutions to the threats of disinformation and malign influence

OUTCOME

European financial institutions recognise the steps of disinformation and malign influence

KEY INDICATORS

European financial institutions issue statements acknowleding the threat, and identifying responses

Activity D06:Through links with UK law enforcement and revenue organisations, anti corruption and development NGO's and journalistic organisations, gain access to their European counterparts

OUTPUT

Provide a series of briefings to European agencies on the interface between RU state and criminal organisations. Two reports per quarter on RU linked corruption

OUTCOME

Institutions will improve collaborations and improve their ability to identify links and their information value. Agreement for Europol to be lead agency.

KEY INDICATORS

Risk mitigation intranet, Fusion centre of suspicious incidents. Input to EC Disinfo Initiative NATO and Europol. RU culpability referred to in % age of all their annual and specific reports. Indicators of RU indifference or obstruction - arms trading.


E: Increasing the impact of effective organisations

Activity Costs: Increasing the impact of effective organisations currently analysing Russian activities, making their expertise more widely available across Europe and North America

Activity E01:Publications and reports on common and different experiences in commenting on hybrid warfare,propaganda and reports on such and criminal and geopolitical activities: 'your view, our comments' and vice versa: e.g. Clingendaal, Egmont, Konrad Adenauer Inst. and Swedish equivalent and Poland, Balkan/Baltic states etc

OUTPUT

At least one dual report or two reciprocal reports on common and different approaches with cooperating organisations. Co posting on websites of each in cooperating magazines or other on line publications

OUTCOME

Quantitative and qualitative increases in circulation of commentaries rebutting past RU activities and action. Identification of both generic and country or region specific subjects and methods of delivery.

KEY INDICATORS

Numbers of reports and range of both countries and regions covered. Publication of case studies / case histories / proactive warning alerts in countries beyond those which are the subjects of these reports i.e. dissemination

F:Reinforcing the will and ability of international organisations to address this issue

Activity Costs: Reinforcing the will and ability of international organisations to address this issue, despite the reticence of some member nations. Organisations include: ATA, YATA, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Atlantic Treaty Association, Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, Baltic Defence College, HQ NATO Public Diplomacy, EU East Stratcom Team

Activity F01:Obtain the agreement of these international organisations to disseminate our programme material: link to national clusters where appropriate. Produce report based on press releases of Europol and Interpol on RU speaker criminality and produce proposals for identifying possible links with state bodies

OUTPUT

List of indicators such as geographic or career links of individuals and groups with FSB, SVR, GRU and military. List of indicators linking RU with narcotics forced labour, human trafficking for sexual purposes, wildlife trafficking, conflict minerals, illegal forestry (private military companies, illegal fishing

OUTCOME

Recognition of high prevalance of RU and RU linked groups and failure of the RU state to prosecute, disrupt or regulate these illegal activities and legal facilitating factors

KEY INDICATORS

Inclusion of factual recognition of RU involvement leading to the readiness of countries to raise this with the RU government.


Activity F02: Setting up UK chapters of ATA and YATA

OUTPUT

Participation in ATA and YATA events to engage national chapters and persuade them to transmit our messages

OUTCOME

National ATA and YATA chapters engage with national clusters in the distribution of information and influencing target audiences

KEY INDICATORS

Participation of clusters and programme staff in ATA and YATA activities. Participation of ATA and YATA personnel in programme cluster activities. Preparation of joint reports. Organisation of joint events.

Activity F03: Research papers in publications of the institutions

OUTPUT

Educate the wider range of audiences open to these international organisations about RU disinformation and malign influence

OUTCOME

Organisations/countries better equipped to counter RU disinfo and malign influence

KEY INDICATORS

Organisations/countries more willing to take public stance and act against RU malign influence.


Activity F04:Lectures and seminars at events organised by these international organisations

OUTPUT

Educate policy-makers, specialists and media about RU disinfo and malign influence

OUTCOME

Organisations/countries better equipped to counter RU disinfo and malign influence

KEY INDICATORS

Organisations/countries more willing to take public stance and act against RU malign influence.


G. Engaging Russian and Russian -speaking audiences to challenge Moscow's narratives

Activity Costs: Engaging Russian and Russian-speaking audiences to challenge Moscow's narratives

Activity G01:Andrei Sakharov Centre - Kaunus University Programme

OUTPUT

Bi-monthly Workshops to engage Russians and establish how to impact on attitudes in Russia


OUTCOME

Better understanding to inform our Stratcom targetting Russians

KEY INDICATORS

Sanity checks on our Stratcom initiatives to identify and impact on Russian audiences


Activity G02:Expand Russian citizen focus group programme in minority communities and diasporas

OUTPUT

Continuation meetings and in-depth engagement in minority communities and diasporas

OUTCOME

Improvement of core and cluster understanding of the attitudes within RU minority communities and RU diaspora communities. Programme learning of how best to impact on attitudes in these communities; what works and what does not

KEY INDICATORS

Implementation of experimental projects to impact on attitudes in RU speaking minorities and diaspora communities, monitoring effects and feedback

Activity G03: Make presentation at Donbas Media Forum July 2018, Krematorsk, Ukraine

OUTPUT

Engagement through training material - spoken and visual

OUTCOME

Increased resilience of independent journalists in Ukraine. Strengthened network for IfS in Ukraine through partnership with key civil society leaders and NGOs

KEY INDICATORS

Conference participation, feedback, registration for IfS updates, increased social media coverage measured

Activity G04:Provide guest articles from Ifs and our clusters for StopFake's printed material published and distributed along the contact line in Eastern Ukraine

OUTPUT

Quality articles, short, relevant that will appeal to those at the frontline of Russian occupation

OUTCOME

Introduction of quality information at a critical front in the war on disinformation, support for those resisting the Russian frontal attack in Donbas

KEY INDICATORS

Polling data that helps measure resilience and resistance towards targeted Russian disinformation in front line regions. Compare data over time and share results with European partners engaged in similar work to boost effectiveness.

===Activity G05:Produce questionnaires for RU speaking audiences, inviting them to rebut Western analyses of key media stories (e.g. MH17, Litvinenko, Skripal, doping) and invite reasons for supporting RU counter narratives.===

OUTPUT

Carefully analyse results. Distribute to clusters and national agencies to study and react. Publish responses with permission and publish non responses

OUTCOME

Identification of how these groups rebut Western narratives and by default identify failure to do so. Similar identification of successful or unsuccessful justifications or RU narratives and multiple narratives and which ones are favoured

KEY INDICATORS

Evidence of impact on public responses from RU speaking audiences.


H. Evidence of impact on public responses from RU speaking audiences.

Activity Costs: Evidence of impact on public responses from RU speaking audiences.

Activity H01:Continued curation and preparation of the 'Armoury' (database of articles and key items of information) to improve the programme's ability to respond quickly in new RU disinformation initiatives

OUTPUT

Constantly updated archive of articles, analysis and other material of real value to clusters for rapid response and longer term education to improve the fight against disinformation

OUTCOME

Reinforces the cluster's ability to reach effectiveness quickly by providing a ready resource of examples, information and analysis

KEY INDICATORS

Make an improvement of cluster response speed and use of cluster material by policy makers and journalists

Activity H02:All publications and proposals to produce lists of a) likely and b) potential responses

OUTPUT

Lists of such with proactive listing of counter rebuttals

OUTCOME

Earlier identification of RU responses and how they can be discredited. Identify and publish established patterns of RU disinformation and misinformation (strengths and weaknesses)

KEY INDICATORS

Report listing nature of responses and to generic or specific issues and to wide or narrow ranges of countries and/or regions. Compare RU responses in different European countries and differentiation in RU tactics attacking those countries.

Activity H03:Monitoring of Russian and pro-Russian information

OUTPUT

Sharing of insights and analysis

OUTCOME

Adaptive response to Russian disinformation

KEY INDICATORS

Impact on broader audiences outside the expert community

I. Applying lessons of the programme

Activity Costs: Applying lessons of the programme more widely e.g. short report on best practice, twice a year, which could be shared with other FCO depts (Daesh, China for e.g.)

Activity I01:Bi-annual written report in English and local language, on output and media performance - successes and failures

OUTPUT

Dissemination

OUTCOME

Best practice sharing

KEY INDICATORS

All involved show improved performance

Activity I02:Presentations to partner organisations

OUTPUT

Educate policy-makers, specialists and media about State / non State disinfo and malign influence.

OUTCOME

Organisations/countries better equipped to counter State / non State disinfo and malign influence

KEY INDICATORS

Organisations/countries more willing to take public stance and act against State / non State malign activity.

Activity I03:Manual and Lexicon

OUTPUT

Complete these products, issue them, gather feedback and edit

OUTCOME

This will provide standard basis of understanding on how best to respond to disinformation

KEY INDICATORS

The use of the manual and lexicon by clusters, national organisations and partners