Document:Project Title INTEGRITY INITIATIVE Phase II
budget application and plan by Chris Donnelly dated 27 April 2017Subjects: Clusters, Integrity Initiative
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/1
Source: 'Anonymous' (Link)
The document is originally a form. The formatting has been slightly edited by Wikispooks for clarity when transferring to here. The questions in Part B, at the end of the form, has not been filled in by the original responder.
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FCO application form 2017-18
PROJECT PROPOSAL FORM For projects over £80k To be completed by the Post
Project Title INTEGRITY INITIATIVE Phase II
Which Programme is the funding being sought from
Russian Language Strategic Communication Programme
Project Code. To be added once the Project has been approved and the code is provided by the Programme Team
TBC
Is the Project ODA eligible * Yes/No
Part A: To be completed by the Project Implementer
Project Title
INTEGRITY INITIATIVE Phase II
Purpose. This must be NO MORE than one sentence, clearly setting out the “change” to be delivered
To counter Russian disinformation and malign influence, and associated weapons of “Hybrid warfare”, in Europe and North America by: expanding the knowledge base; harnessing existing expertise, and; establishing a network of networks of experts, opinion formers and policy makers, to educate national audiences in the threat and to help build national capacities to counter it.
Context and Need for the Project. In no more than 200 words, provide the background to the issue this project will change, what the expected final Outcome will be, and (where applicable) why the UK should fund this project
Russian leaders say that Russia is at war with the West. The existence of democracy poses a threat to their dictatorial system. Undermining and ultimately destroying Western democratic institutions is Russia’s way of neutralising this “threat”. To this end, Russia is currently ramping up its use of all forms of power, led by malign influence and disinformation. Russia’s diplomats, media, Information Troops, hackers and troll armies attack individuals, subvert institutions and create mistrust of democratic processes.
The past year has seen significant publicity given to this issue in the West. But the intent and extent of Russia’s increasingly aggressive campaign is still denied in many capitals; its scale and nature is understood only by a small expert international community; western responses frequently lack strategic coherence. In some countries, Russian influence and disinformation has a free hand. To change this situation our project will continue its successful building of a network of networks across Europe, organising local teams to counter Russian influence and disinformation in their own societies, including within Russian-speaking communities, and changing attitudes in Russia itself. Our programme to date has helped the UK to lead this process. Expanding this success will cement UK’s influence in N America and in Europe post-Brexit.
Short Project Summary
In no more than 200 words explain what the project plans to achieve and how (setting out how the Outputs will deliver the Purpose/Objective, and how the activities will deliver each relevant Output), and what difference will it make on the ground over the next few years?
To expand our long-term programme so that European and N American countries can better understand and counter Russia’s policy of malign influence and disinformation.
To be achieved by:
- Expanding our network of specialists, journalists, academics and political actors across Europe, empowering them to educate their publics and policy elites
- Sponsoring, including via the Free University of Brussels (thereby enhancing academic respectability of the topic), advanced research, publications, workshops, educational courses, mentoring, lectures
- Expanding the impact of the Integrity Initiative website, dissemination and Twitter/social media accounts, and increasing the reporting of the issue in mainstream and specialist press
- Engaging national political and military establishments and societal organisations, improving their ability to counter Russian disinformation and other weapons of hybrid warfare strategy
- Increasing the impact of effective organisations currently analysing Russian activities, making their expertise more widely available across Europe and North America.
- Reinforcing the will and ability of international organisations to address this issue, despite the reticence of some member nations. Organisations include: NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Atlantic Treaty Association; Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers; Baltic Defence College; HQ NATO Public Diplomacy; EU East Stratcom team
- Engaging Russian and Russian-speaking audiences to challenge Moscow’s narratives
- Adapting our approach as Russia responds to our successful counter moves
- Applying lessons of the programme more widely, e.g. to expose and counter Daesh influence in Muslim communities, and increasing Chinese influence in our countries
Phase 1 of this programme is now completed; FCO funding is requested for phase two.
Co-Funding
Has funding for this project been sought from other donors (EU, DfID, other countries), Private institutions or the host government? If Yes, please provide details including source and amount. If No, why not, and were options for doing so explored?
Funding from HQ NATO Public Diplomacy, £12,000 for each inaugural workshop = £168,000
Funding from partner institutions £5,000 for each inaugural workshop = £70,000
Funding from NATO HQ for educational video films – free provision of camera team
Funding from Lithuanian MOD to provide free all costs for their stratcom team for a monthly trip to support a new hub/cluster creation and to educate cluster leaders and key people in Vilnius in infowar techniques = £20,000
Funding from US State Dept, £250,000 for research and dissemination activities (excluding any activity in USA)
Funding from Smith Richardson Foundation, £45,000 for cluster activities in Europe and USA
Funding from Facebook, £100,000 for research and education activities
Funding from German business community, £25,000 for research and dissemination in EU countries
Timing
Planned start date:
01 04 2018
Planned completion date:
31 03 2019
Will the Implementing Partner be sub-contracting any other agencies to carry out elements of the project activities? If Yes, please provide details
No
Implementing Agency. Name; Address; Telephone Numbers; Email; Website
The Institute for Statecraft
2 Temple Place
London WC2R 3BD
07974 019 212
www.statecraft.org.uk
Country or countries covered
Southern and Western European countries, Greece, Balkans and Baltic States, USA, Canada
Have you bid for funding from the FCO in the past three years?
Please provide details of any bids made and/or projects implemented
2014 Ukraine capacity building. Unsuccessful bid
2015 El Salvador Human Rights and reduction of gang violence. Successful bid.
2016 El Salvador Rule of Law and prison reform. Successful bid.
2017 Integrity Initiative Phase 1 Successful bid
2018 TOR study for Expose network Unsuccessful bid
Project Plan
Based on the information provided in the Summary, use the table below to set out the Purpose, Outputs and Activities to be delivered. Give the Indicator(s) for the Purpose and each Output, along with the Baseline information, what the target to be reached is, and when it will be delivered by, along with milestones (checkpoints) at which progress will be measured.This will allow you to monitor and measure progress throughout the Project, and provide clear evidence of the Project’s success.
Indicator = what will be measured (eg the number of people who will be trained; the increase in positive perceptions of an issue)
Baseline = the current status (eg no training exists; current perceptions are x% positive)
Sources = where will the information on the baseline data and targets come from (eg data from research carried out by the implementer; open source data)
Milestones = the key points at which progress will be tracked (can be specific dates/events or the regular quarterly reports – but provide indicative dates for the latter)
Target = what the project will deliver (eg 100 people trained; 50% increase in positive perceptions)
Date = the date by which it will be delivered
Purpose: To counter Russian disinformation and malign influence, and associated weapons of “Hybrid warfare”, in Europe and North America by: expanding the knowledge base; harnessing existing expertise, and; establishing a network of networks of experts, opinion formers and policy makers, to educate national audiences in the threat and to help build national capacities to counter it. Indicator(s) Baseline Sources
Indicator(s)
Complete the development of the 9 national clusters (Hub + network) created during Phase 1 (Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, Serbia, Italy; set up the latent clusters ready to go in Moldova, Georgia, Sweden, Montenegro, Malta. Establish clusters in USA, Canada, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland. Explore the need for the networks to extend to the Middle East/N Africa and other concerned countries. Achieve increased awareness and understanding of the threat posed by Russian influence, disinformation and other hybrid warfare weapons. Strengthen the capability of the country to recognise and respond to that threat
Baseline
Despite the recent extensive publicity given to this topic, in countries where there is no cluster or competent NGO fulfilling this function, understanding is limited to experts and expert communities are isolated, passive, and even under siege. There is little spin off from the expert international community’s understanding to impact on national political leaderships.
In countries where we have established clusters during Phase 1, awareness is rising within government and society, and response is being stimulated. NB in Spain, the widespread press coverage (e.g. El Pais) of Russian meddling in the Catalan referendum, the strong statements by the Defence Minister, and the recent appointment of Sra. Julia Olmo y Romero as Ambassador at large for Hybrid Threats and Cybersecurity.
Sources
A solid academic information base has been established at the Free University of Brussels (VUB) and on the Integrity Initiative website and on other websites we have supported with our research work in Phase 1. New clusters as they build their competence are improving their local information bases. In most countries with no cluster or relevant NGO, experts still work in stovepipes and do not achieve critical mass
Milestones
Experience in Phase 1 has shown that, once a cluster has been established, measurable impact can be expected within 3 months and the cluster is fully effective within 6 – 9 months.
Target & Date Phase 1 has shown that the establishment of new national clusters is dependent on finding competent, committed and well-connected individuals, ideally with a suitable institute affiliation. The growth of the network in Phase 1 exceeded expectations because news of the Integrity Initiative spread and attracted the attention of like-minded individuals. The ability to provide some modest financial support to help set up the local network and to fund its early activity was also crucial. The experience of the Spanish and Lithuanian clusters particularly offers hope that a successful cluster can generate its own local income after a few months.
In some countries where Russian influence is pronounced (Italy, Serbia, Greece) cluster development must proceed with great caution to protect the cluster members from harassment. This notwithstanding, it should be possible to set up functioning clusters in all countries named in column 1 during the coming year Apl18-Apl19.
===9 Output 1: Creating or improving the structural mechanisms for tracking, analysing, exposing and responding to Russian malign influence and disinformation===
Indicators(s)
1. Setting up a cluster (Hub plus network of experts, journalists, political players) in each country in staged phases.
Phase 1 has achieved this in 9 countries with preparatory work done in a further 4, with funding from FCO and HQ NATO; in Phase 2 the 9 existing clusters and the 4 latent clusters will all be brought to fully functioning status; clusters will be set up in 10 more countries as listed above.
Details of the process for setting up the national clusters are given in item 1 in Attachment A to this form
Baseline In Phase 1, the organisation and staff was established to set up and run the international network of clusters named above. The work of this core staff made it clear that, to understand fully disinformation and malign influence, it was essential to address other weapons of hybrid warfare used by Russia which interacted with the disinformation and operationalised the influence. These areas include: organised crime and corruption; money laundering; oligarchical influence; financing of extreme left and right wing political parties; military sports and sports clubs, the Russian Orthodox Church; classical active measures (dirty tricks – Russ “Mokriye dyela”). To this end, some 40 specialist associates were identified and engaged with a view to exploiting their expertise as the programme expanded in Phase 2.
In Phase 2, the next group of 14 clusters will be set up; the work of the existing clusters will be expanded as they reach full operating capability. All clusters will extend their portfolios to embrace the issues listed above (noting that in some countries this will have to be done with caution because of tense or hostile local conditions. To enhancing impact and outreach, a publication and translation process in English, the local language and Russian will be established, building on research work done in Phase 1.
Sources All data researched by the Institute for Statecraft and national clusters Social media will be used to gather and distribute information on the topic as well as to help reinforce a sense of community and to engage more people outside the expert community
Milestones
Progress will be reported on a monthly basis and the programme amended according to developing circumstances, driven by the pace of international events
Each cluster mastering the use of social media, website and online platforms to engage with each other and take material for internal use and public distribution
Target & Date
Each Cluster generally consists of a small admin hub (1-3 pers), plus a network of 10-20 active members serving to disseminate material to 100+ key individuals and institutions.
The exact circumstances of each cluster established so far reflect the conditions in the country. It has proved essential to adjust the cluster mechanism to suit local conditions.
Spain: Cluster established Feb 2017 as proof of concept. Netherlands and France, clusters established June 2017. Greece, Serbia, Lithuania, Norway, clusters established in Nov 2017. Germany and Italy, clusters established in Jan 2018 In the US, a subsidiary company has been established and is currently going through the process of registration for “not-for-profit” status, to enable the programme to benefit from US funding.
In Phase 2, as the further 14 clusters are established across Europe and N America during 2018-9, the speed of consolidation of the clusters and their attaining full effective functioning will increase as they interact and learn from each other in a formalised learning process.
Indicators(s)
2. Setting up a Brussels-based research network to encourage all major European countries, US and Canada to establish in a major national think tank a process or programme for studying infowar
The basis of this network is the academic research programme of the Institute for European Studies at the Free University of Brussels (VUB-IES).
This programme was established with funding from the Institute’s initial iteration of the Integrity Initiative. Continuation of this programme is dependent on further funding in Phase 2.
Details of the programme’s achievements are at Attachment B to this form.
Baseline
During Phase 1, Think tanks from 12 European countries were engaged; meetings were held in April and June 2017. Meetings in US in Sept 2017 established good contacts with institutes in Washington DC and California.
During Phase 2, this network of national think tanks will be engaged by the VUB IES in a discrete network, reinforcing their willingness to introduce this topic into their national mainstream programme. In some countries, this will be a very sensitive issue and will require extreme care.
The process will be supported by setting up an Advanced research programme and post graduate teaching modules at the VUB IES, which will provide academic rigour and respectability. The EU EEAS East Stratcom Task Force will be engaged to strengthen the Community link, and educational work by the Lithuanian MOD, Saper Vedere and ACUS will provide technical expertise.
Sources
Data researched principally by the VUB IES
Milestones
Progress reported on a monthly basis
Target & Date
12 European Institutes agreed to participate in the process, as did 2 in DC and 1 in California.
A further 10 institutes across Europe and N America will be engaged in Phase 2
Indicators(s)
Baseline
Sources
Milestones
Target & Date
Indicators(s)
Baseline
Sources
Milestones
Target & Date
