President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism

President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism

Pan American Flight 103 blew up over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988. 243 passengers, 16 crew members, and 11 people on the ground were killed by the explosion. It was the second most disastrous passenger airline explosion up to that time By the next day, experts found enough evidence to declare the explosion to be deliberate sabotage. Within days intelligence sources reported an anonymous telephone call to the United States Embassy in Helsinki, Finland, on December 5, 1988, warned of possible sabotage on the flight.

Newly-elected President George H W Bush met with victims’ families in April 1989. Relatives present asked for an independent investigation of airline security which, they claimed, should have prevented the disaster. Bush promised he would look into establishing just such a commission. Relatives also complained about the US State Department’s poor consular services for assisting victims’ family members. This news seemed to shock the President.

US Government personnel were belatedly reported to be deeply involved in the investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was working closely with its European counterparts The US Department of Justice was conducting a criminal investigation, and the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) was investigating its internal securities procedures.

US Congressional response to the disaster came when Senator Frank R Lautenberg (D-New Jersey) introduced Senate Resolution S. Res. 86, calling on the President to appoint a special commission "to investigate the events surrounding the destruction of Pan Am 103" That same day, (August 4, 1989), President Bush did so.

Official name

• President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (PCAST).

Enabling authorities

• President George H W Bush established the commission with Executive Order 12686 on August 4, 1989.

• President Bush extended the deadline for the commission to issue its final report by May 15, 1990, with Executive Order 12705 on March 3, 1990.

Termination

• PCAST presented its report to President Bush on May 15, 1990. In accordance with Section 4 of Executive Order 12686, the commission disbanded on June 15, 1990.

Purposes

• Study and evaluate existing US aviation policies and practices regarding terrorist threats.
• Investigate options of informing US aviation customers of possible terrorist threats
• Review US laws, policies, and practices dealing with the families of terrorists’ victims.
• Carry out these provisions with particular attention to the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, but without jeopardising on-going intelligence and criminal operations.

Membership

• Ann McLaughlin Korologos, (Chair) former Secretary of Labor (1987–1989)
• Edward Hidalgo, former Secretary of the Navy (1979–1981)
• Richards, General Thomas C, USAF (Ret.) former Deputy Commander-in-Chief, HQ, US Army European Command (1986–1989)

The enabling Executive Order required the President to appoint 4 Commission members from the US Congress: 1 Republican Representative, 1 Democratic Representative, 1 Republican Senator, and 1 Democratic Senator.

• Alfonse D'Amato, Senator (R-New York State)
• John Paul Hammerschmidt, (Representative-Arkansas)
• Frank Lautenberg, Senator (D-New Jersey)
• James Oberstar, (R-Minnesota)

Advisers

• Associate Deputy Director of the FBI, Buck Revell, advised PCAST on security matters.
• Frank Duggan was appointed as Liaison Officer to the Lockerbie victims' familes.

Public hearings

• November 17, 1989

Testimony from

-family members of Pan Am Flight 103 victims

-aviation community representatives (pilots, flight attendants, airlines, airport personnel)

-consumer groups

• December 18, 1989

Reports of findings from

-the General Accounting Office (GAO)

-the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on aviation security

Testimony from the State Department on dealings with victims’ families

• February 2, 1990

Testimony on counter-terrorist and aviation security technologies from

-scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Naval Research Laboratory, George Washington University, Los Alamos National Laboratory.

-the FAA

-airport security experts

-security technology manufacturers

• March 9, 1990

Testimony from

-The Hon. Dante B. Fascell Representative (D-Florida), Chair of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs on international aviation security.

-U.S. Embassy in Moscow personnel on the "Helsinki Warning".

-Pan Am representatives about their personnel’s responses to the "Helsinki Warning".

• April 4, 1990

-Testimony from executives of American Airlines, Pan American Airlines, United Air Lines, and Trans World Airlines.

-Testimony from FAA Director of Civil Aviation Security Raymond Salazer on aviation security policy issues.

Meeting with British relatives

Before submitting their report, the PCAST members met a group of British relatives of Lockerbie victims at the US embassy in London on 12 February 1990. Twelve years later, on 11 July 2002, Scottish MP Tam Dalyell reminded the House of Commons of a controversial statement made at that 1990 embassy meeting by a PCAST member to one of the British relatives, Martin Cadman:

"Your government and ours know exactly what happened. But they're never going to tell."

The statement first came to public attention in the 1994 documentary film "The Maltese Double Cross" and was published in both The Guardian of 29 July 1995, and a special report from Private Eye magazine entitled "Lockerbie, the flight from justice" May/June 2001. Dalyell asserted in Parliament that the statement had never been refuted.

Findings

• The sabotage of Pan Am Flight 103 quite possibly could have been averted if proper security safeguards had been in place.
• The FAA’s security system continues to target aviation hijackings instead of organised terrorists' bombs.
• Intelligence operations are fragmented among individual airlines and several agencies. Intelligence operations are low key in importance.
• Technology research and development of counterterrorism devices lag behind terrorists' activities.
• Neither the State Department nor the FAA have quick response programs to give aid and assistance to the victims and families of aviation terrorism.

Recommendations

The Executive Order enabling PCAST required its final report to be screened for classified information. Only an unclassified text would be released to the general public The Final Report contained 64 specific recommendations summarised below in categories used by the Commission.

International security

• The US State Department—not American aviation corporations—should be the aviation leader in international security matters
• The US State Department should create a Coordinator for International Aviation Security with the diplomatic rank of Ambassador.
• This ambassador should work closely with the United Nations International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in international security matters.
• The existing 1978 international policy on aviation terrorism is insufficient. The US should exhort its economic allies to create stronger multilateral and bilateral alliances to combat aviation terrorism.

Domestic security

• The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should continue to be the aviation leader in domestic security measures, but partner with the FBI in assessing all aviation threats.
• The FAA should plan and implement additional security measures into domestic aviation over time.
• Commercial air carriers must report all security threats to the FAA.
• Public safety authorities are responsible for when and how searches of aircraft, passengers, and facilities are carried out in response to security threats.

Mail and cargo

• Commercial air carriers have the first responsibility for screening air mail and air cargo.

The FAA

• The FAA should establish an office of security reporting directly to the FAA Administrator.
• The FAA should ensure adequate security staffing at all airports, international and domestic.
• The FAA should be responsible for training security staff.
• The FAA should develop technology for screening both passengers and checked baggage.

Research and development

The FAA should vigorously foster research and development of

• explosive detection systems;
• aircraft frames capable of withstanding small amounts of explosives; and,
• proactive security planning for future forms of terrorism and security threats.

Intelligence

• The FAA should work with the FBI in monitoring, analysing, and confronting possible aviation security threats in US airports.
• The new office of Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Security and Intelligence should work with the Central Intelligence Agency in monitoring, analysing, and confronting possible international aviation security threats.
• Memoranda of Understanding and written working agreements among the FAA, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement regarding aviation security measures should be regularly reviewed and updated when appropriate.

Threat notification

• The security bulletins of the Overseas Security Advisory Council and the State Department’s Overseas Security Electronic Bulleting Board should be routed to the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs. This Bureau should guarantee timely public access to the information.
• The State Department, The Justice Department, and the US Department of Transportation will cooperate in creating additional mechanisms to notify the traveling public of potential domestic and international aviation terrorism threats.

Treatment of terror victims' families

• The State Department should be responsible for the needs of victims of international terrorism as well as their families. Specific procedures and personnel must be assigned to deal with matters of notification, direct aid for survivors, injury, death, and bereavement.
• The US should create special funds to compensate US citizens and permanent residents for all economic and non-economic damages resulting from international aviation terrorism.

National will

• Terrorist attacks must not be allowed to disrupt US political and economic interests.
• State-sponsored terrorism and safe havens for terrorists must be identified and isolated through international cooperation.
• The US Government must actively punish state sponsors of terrorism and safe havens for terrorists.
• These punishments include preemptive or retaliatory actions carried out directly or covertly.
• "National will—and the moral courage to use it—is the ultimate means to defeat terrorism."

Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990

Rep. James Oberstar, a member of the Commission, introduced Bill 5732, "Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990" on September 27, 1990, in the second session of the 101st United States Congress. This Bill embodied nearly all of the recommendations of the Commission. It became Public Law 101-604 on November 16, 1990.

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Sources

• Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990) 182 pages.

• U.S. House. Foreign Affairs Committee. Report of the President’s Commission on International Aviation Security and Terrorism. Hearings 101st Cong, 2nd Sess. May 17, 1990. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 190 p.

• Donna Batten, et al. Encyclopedia of Governmental Advisory Organizations (Detroit, MI: Gale (publisher), 2009–2010).

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