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Latest revision as of 20:50, 7 February 2022
Background to and observation of two war Simulation Seminars |
Subjects: Center for the Study of New Generation Warfare
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/3
Source: 'Anonymous' (Link)
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Military measures
The Institute for Statecraft
Background to the Simulation Seminars
Over the past two years, a team of consultants to The Potomac Foundation in the US developed a computer assisted operational-strategic simulation for theatre war in northeastern Europe. Former members of this team have now established a new Center for the Study of New Generation Warfare (NGW Center) so as to be able to continue to refine their collective knowledge and provide a tool with which senior military and civilian leaderships can educate themselves, challenge their preconceptions, experiment with different concepts and refine their strategic thinking.
In cooperation with the Institute for Statecraft, the NGW Center will conduct two seminars on 27 & 28th February. These seminars will draw upon the lessons learned from running seven wargames in northeastern Europe, plus two development & testing games with NATO and European Union Defense Attachés in Washington. These operational-strategic scale simulations draw upon open source analysis of Russia’s post-Cold War Zapad Exercises, reflecting new thinking on warfare to create the operational threat against which Western players contend.
Russia’s New Generation Warfare theory places a premium on covert conflict through the employment of non-kinetic means. Ideally, the Russian armed forces would need to be employed only to prevent significant resistance after the “war” had already been lost - a “grab and threaten” strategy - “is it so important to you that you really want to fight with a nuclear-armed state over this?”. As a result, “overreach” is the Russian General Staff’s nightmare; consequently, it strives to prepare the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - should Russian President Vladimir Putin provoke an overt military conflict with NATO and its Partners - to terminate the resultant armed conflict rapidly, and on terms favourable to Russia.
Russia’s “escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine provides the geo-strategic context within which its New Generation Warfare is operationalised. Putin has prepared his country to fight in any circumstances so that, when the victims and their neighbors hesitate, the Kremlin can intimidate both the victims and potential supporters into submission. For a Moscow whose society and economy is in decline, this strategy can succeed only if it can previously undermine the societies and governmental structures of the countries Putin targets by successfully employing a wide range of instruments of power – political, economic, social, technological; disinformation, malign influence, corruption, cyber, dirty tricks and the like. These methods exploit our weaknesses, divide our populations by exaggerating cultural differences within societies, drive wedges between nations with shared values by exaggerating the risks of collective security and dismissing the costs associated with its failure.
As the team is fond of saying, the simulation does not provide answers, but it does assist operational-strategic leaders to ask the right questions.
Seminar 1: Observations on Air-Land Simulations
Tuesday, February 27th, 2018
11:00 - 11:15 Introduction
Chris Donnelly, Institute for Statecraft
Charles Long, Vice President for Technology, Center for New Generation Warfare
11:15 -11:45 Operational-Strategic Simulations from 2017
Edmund Bitinas, Vice President for Simulations, Center for New Generation Warfare
11:45 - 12:30 Buffet lunch
12:30 – 14:00 New Generation Warfare & the Threat Scenario Employed in the Simulations
Phillip A. Petersen, President, Center for New Generation Warfare
14:00 – 14:30 Observations & Lessons Learned from Seven Simulations
Greg Melcher, Chief Operating Officer, Center for New Generation Warfare
Seminar 2: Observations on Maritime Simulations
Wednesday, February 28th, 2018
11:00 - 11:15 Introduction
Chris Donnelly, Institute for Statecraft
Charles Long, Vice President for Technology, Center for New Generation Warfare
11:15 - 11:45 Operational-Strategic Maritime Simulations
Edmund Bitinas, Vice President for Simulations, Center for New Generation Warfare
11:45 - 12:30 Buffet lunch
12:30 - 14:00 New Generation Warfare & the Threat Scenario Employed in the Simulations
Phillip A. Petersen, President, Center for New Generation Warfare
14:00 - 14:30 Observations & Lessons Learned from Seven Simulations
Greg Melcher, Chief Operating Officer, Center for New Generation Warfare