Difference between revisions of "Document:My contribution"
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{{Document | {{Document | ||
|title= My contribution | |title= My contribution | ||
| − | |type= | + | |type=self-assessment |
| − | |authors= | + | |authors=Chris Hernon |
|leaked=Yes | |leaked=Yes | ||
|publication_date=26 December 2018 | |publication_date=26 December 2018 | ||
|source_name=Anonymous | |source_name=Anonymous | ||
|source_URL=https://www.cyberguerrilla.org/blog/operation-integrity-initiative-british-informational-war-against-all-part-4/ | |source_URL=https://www.cyberguerrilla.org/blog/operation-integrity-initiative-british-informational-war-against-all-part-4/ | ||
| − | | | + | |subjects=Chris Hernon, censorship, school indoctrination, |
|constitutes=Integrity Initiative/Leak/4 | |constitutes=Integrity Initiative/Leak/4 | ||
| − | |description= | + | |description=A self assessment by Chris Hernon of how he can help the the [[Integrity Initiative]] |
| + | |note=The document is unsigned, but from certain information in the text, it is fairly certainly written by team member [[Chris Hernon]], who has an Ukrainian wife | ||
}} | }} | ||
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*My expertise is: | *My expertise is: | ||
| − | o Over 25 years of observing Russian and FSU affairs, with fluent, active | + | o Over 25 years of observing [[Russian]] and FSU affairs, with fluent, active Russian and good, passive Ukrainian |
| − | Russian and good, passive Ukrainian | ||
| − | o Over 25 years of editorial experience, including editing and writing content, | + | o Over 25 years of editorial experience, including editing and writing content, shaping new and existing products, quality assurance and training |
| − | shaping new and existing products, quality assurance and training | ||
| − | o Knowledge of how to use and monitor social media | + | o Knowledge of how to use and monitor [[social media]] |
| − | o Leading innovation projects including in using technology to handle media | + | o Leading innovation projects including in using technology to handle media sources and information |
| − | sources and information | ||
| − | * Education, education, education! Teaching on this subject needs to start in school. | + | * Education, education, education! Teaching on this subject needs to start in [[school]]. People need to know how to examine information, on the web particularly, for its origin and accuracy. The public and government need to understand that we are |
| − | People need to know how to examine information, on the web particularly, for its | + | constantly and permanently under information attack, overtly and subtly. The public need to understand the difference between actual journalism by reporters who go to places and examine them and talk to people, probably with a particular political spin, |
| − | origin and accuracy. The public and government need to understand that we are | + | and, for example, partisan political websites that post [[conspiracy theories]] and articles cobbled together by cherry picking information to present a skewed point of view. I think the [[Integrity Initiative]] could create a dashboard on the web that shows the latest disinformation and propaganda surrounding the biggest stories of the moment, for example. Also, information “hacking” events where teams put together false information and others have to debunk it. |
| − | constantly and permanently under information attack, overtly and subtly. The public | ||
| − | need to understand the difference between actual journalism by reporters who go to | ||
| − | places and examine them and talk to people, probably with a particular political spin, | ||
| − | and, for example, partisan political websites that post conspiracy theories and | ||
| − | articles cobbled together by cherry picking information to present a skewed point of | ||
| − | view. I think the Integrity Initiative could create a dashboard on the web that shows | ||
| − | the latest disinformation and propaganda surrounding the biggest stories of the | ||
| − | moment, for example. Also, information “hacking” events where teams put together | ||
| − | false information and others have to debunk it. | ||
* My activities will be: | * My activities will be: | ||
| − | o Running our social media presence to increase our visibility and establish us | + | o Running our social media presence to increase our visibility and establish us as a resource for highlighting disinformation and debunking material, including content created by our clusters, as well as media literacy and media freedom information. This can be measured in followers and interactions with our output. |
| − | as a resource for highlighting disinformation and debunking material, | ||
| − | including content created by our clusters, as well as media literacy and media | ||
| − | freedom information. This can be measured in followers and interactions | ||
| − | with our output. | ||
| − | o Editorial quality and coherence: advising on what to produce, how to present | + | o Editorial quality and coherence: advising on what to produce, how to present or shape it, including visuals, editing material written by non-native speakers. The outcome will be high quality content that supports our narrative and is useful to anyone interested in disinformation. |
| − | or shape it, including visuals, editing material written by non-native speakers. | ||
| − | The outcome will be high quality content that supports our narrative and is | ||
| − | useful to anyone interested in disinformation. | ||
o Support and training on using social media effectively. | o Support and training on using social media effectively. | ||
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| − | |||
| − | o | + | o Monitoring and analysing social media use in disinformation. Alerts of significant issues and regular summaries of trends. |
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| − | o | + | o Helping build and maintain our networks. I’ve connected [[David Leask]] with the team and he is introducing me to Scottish political and academic figures who want to combat disinformation. I can also support other team members with their cluster liaison, particularly as a backup on Ukraine since my wife is Ukrainian. |
| − | |||
| − | o Social media posting of our own material and other people’s to create a | + | o Suggestions on how to use technology to monitor, analyse and present information. |
| − | stream of useful information. | + | |
| + | o Social media posting of our own material and other people’s to create a stream of useful information. | ||
* Risks: | * Risks: | ||
| − | o Too little of our own content may make it hard to differentiate us from other | + | o Too little of our own content may make it hard to differentiate us from other disinformation projects – need to ensure a regular flow of material |
| − | disinformation projects – need to ensure a regular flow of material | ||
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| − | + | o We may come under attack from Russian or other hostile actors – ensure password and anti-virus safety, ensure all content is accurate and verifiable, don’t ally ourselves to causes or interests, but maintain values and principles. | |
| − | + | o People may continue to fail to understand that we are under attack and that it is vital to know how to deal with it. | |
Latest revision as of 13:14, 17 October 2020
| A self assessment by Chris Hernon of how he can help the the Integrity Initiative |
self-assessment by Chris Hernon dated 26 December 2018Subjects: Chris Hernon, censorship, school indoctrination
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/4
Source: Anonymous (Link)
The document is unsigned, but from certain information in the text, it is fairly certainly written by team member Chris Hernon, who has an Ukrainian wife
★ Start a Discussion about this document
My contribution
- My expertise is:
o Over 25 years of observing Russian and FSU affairs, with fluent, active Russian and good, passive Ukrainian
o Over 25 years of editorial experience, including editing and writing content, shaping new and existing products, quality assurance and training
o Knowledge of how to use and monitor social media
o Leading innovation projects including in using technology to handle media sources and information
- Education, education, education! Teaching on this subject needs to start in school. People need to know how to examine information, on the web particularly, for its origin and accuracy. The public and government need to understand that we are
constantly and permanently under information attack, overtly and subtly. The public need to understand the difference between actual journalism by reporters who go to places and examine them and talk to people, probably with a particular political spin, and, for example, partisan political websites that post conspiracy theories and articles cobbled together by cherry picking information to present a skewed point of view. I think the Integrity Initiative could create a dashboard on the web that shows the latest disinformation and propaganda surrounding the biggest stories of the moment, for example. Also, information “hacking” events where teams put together false information and others have to debunk it.
- My activities will be:
o Running our social media presence to increase our visibility and establish us as a resource for highlighting disinformation and debunking material, including content created by our clusters, as well as media literacy and media freedom information. This can be measured in followers and interactions with our output.
o Editorial quality and coherence: advising on what to produce, how to present or shape it, including visuals, editing material written by non-native speakers. The outcome will be high quality content that supports our narrative and is useful to anyone interested in disinformation.
o Support and training on using social media effectively.
o Monitoring and analysing social media use in disinformation. Alerts of significant issues and regular summaries of trends.
o Helping build and maintain our networks. I’ve connected David Leask with the team and he is introducing me to Scottish political and academic figures who want to combat disinformation. I can also support other team members with their cluster liaison, particularly as a backup on Ukraine since my wife is Ukrainian.
o Suggestions on how to use technology to monitor, analyse and present information.
o Social media posting of our own material and other people’s to create a stream of useful information.
- Risks:
o Too little of our own content may make it hard to differentiate us from other disinformation projects – need to ensure a regular flow of material
o We may come under attack from Russian or other hostile actors – ensure password and anti-virus safety, ensure all content is accurate and verifiable, don’t ally ourselves to causes or interests, but maintain values and principles.
o People may continue to fail to understand that we are under attack and that it is vital to know how to deal with it.
