Difference between revisions of "Document:Downing Street Memo"
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|publication_date=2002 July | |publication_date=2002 July | ||
|type=memo | |type=memo | ||
| − | | | + | |authors=Matthew Rycroft |
|AuthorDetail=Downing Street foreign policy aide | |AuthorDetail=Downing Street foreign policy aide | ||
| − | | | + | |recipients=David Manning |
| − | | | + | |recipientsDetails=foreign policy advisor to [[Tony Blair]] who appointed him Ambassador to the US in 2003 |
| − | | | + | |subjects=Iraq War 2003 |
| + | |source_URL=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article387374.ece | ||
| + | |source_name=Sunday Times | ||
| + | |description=The now infamous memo about the 2003 Invasion of Iraq | ||
|note=Leaked by the Sunday Times on 1 May 2005<br/> | |note=Leaked by the Sunday Times on 1 May 2005<br/> | ||
==Cast of Characters mentioned in the memo== | ==Cast of Characters mentioned in the memo== | ||
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*Attorney-General - [[Lord Goldsmith]] | *Attorney-General - [[Lord Goldsmith]] | ||
*Cabinet Secretary - [[Sir Richard Wilson]] | *Cabinet Secretary - [[Sir Richard Wilson]] | ||
| − | *Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee - [[John Scarlett]] | + | *Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee - [[John Scarlett]] |
*Director of [[GCHQ]] - [[Francis Richards]], head of the UK's "signals intelligence establishment", an intelligence agency, which reports to the Foreign Secretary. | *Director of [[GCHQ]] - [[Francis Richards]], head of the UK's "signals intelligence establishment", an intelligence agency, which reports to the Foreign Secretary. | ||
*Director of [[SIS]] (aka MI6) - [[Sir Richard Dearlove]], identified as 'C' in the meeting minutes, heads the UK's foreign intelligence service | *Director of [[SIS]] (aka MI6) - [[Sir Richard Dearlove]], identified as 'C' in the meeting minutes, heads the UK's foreign intelligence service | ||
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MATTHEW RYCROFT | MATTHEW RYCROFT | ||
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Latest revision as of 00:38, 26 July 2015
| The now infamous memo about the 2003 Invasion of Iraq |
memo by Matthew Rycroft to David Manning dated 2002 JulySubjects: Iraq War 2003
Source: Sunday Times (Link)
Leaked by the Sunday Times on 1 May 2005
Contents
Cast of Characters mentioned in the memo
Below is a list of individuals mentioned in the memo - all of whom were present during the meeting with the Prime Minister.
- Foreign Policy Advisor - David Manning
- Aide to Manning - Matthew Rycroft (wrote up the minutes of the meeting)
- Defence Secretary - Geoff Hoon
- Foreign Secretary - Jack Straw
- Attorney-General - Lord Goldsmith
- Cabinet Secretary - Sir Richard Wilson
- Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee - John Scarlett
- Director of GCHQ - Francis Richards, head of the UK's "signals intelligence establishment", an intelligence agency, which reports to the Foreign Secretary.
- Director of SIS (aka MI6) - Sir Richard Dearlove, identified as 'C' in the meeting minutes, heads the UK's foreign intelligence service
- Chief of the Defence Staff - Admiral Sir Michael Boyce
- Chief of Staff - Jonathan Powell
- Head of Strategy - Alastair Campbell
- Director of Political & Govt Relations - Sally Morgan
Though it is sometimes difficult to equate a given official to his or her US counterpart, it's clear that this was a meeting at the highest level within the UK government.
Attendees included three members of the Cabinet (Prime Minister Blair, the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary), the nation's most senior bureaucrat (the Cabinet Secretary), three out of the four top people from the UK intelligence community (the JIC Chair and the heads of MI6 and GCHQ), the head of the armed forces and four of the innermost circle of the PM's political advisors.
The relatively junior level of the author bears no relevance to the contents, which describe the thinking and opinions of the principals.★ Start a Discussion about this document
The Downing Street Memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
- (a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
- (b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
- (i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
- (ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
- (iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
- (a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
- (b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
- (c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
- (d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
- He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
- (e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
- (f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
