Difference between revisions of "NIST"
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| + | The '''National Institute of Standards and Technology''' ('''NIST''') is a [[physical sciences]] laboratory and non-regulatory agency of the [[United States Department of Commerce]]. Its mission is to promote American innovation and industrial competitiveness. NIST's activities are organized into laboratory programs that include [[Nanotechnology|nanoscale science and technology]], engineering, [[information technology]], [[neutron]] research, material measurement, and physical measurement. | ||
| + | |||
==September 11th, 2001== | ==September 11th, 2001== | ||
| − | In 2002 the [[National Construction Safety Team Act]] mandated NIST to conduct an investigation into the [[collapse of the World Trade Center]] buildings 1 and 2 and the 47-storey [[9-11/WTC7|7 World Trade Center]]. The point man for the "World Trade Center Collapse Investigation" has been named as [[Stephen Cauffman]] and the lead investigator WAS [[Shyam Sunder]],<ref name="Lipton"> | + | In 2002 the [[National Construction Safety Team Act]] mandated NIST to conduct an investigation into the [[collapse of the World Trade Center]] buildings 1 and 2 and the 47-storey [[9-11/WTC7|7 World Trade Center]]. The point man for the "World Trade Center Collapse Investigation" has been named as [[Stephen Cauffman]] and the lead investigator WAS [[Shyam Sunder]],<ref name="Lipton">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/nyregion/22wtccnd.html</ref> covered three aspects, including a technical building and [[fire safety]] investigation to study the factors contributing to the probable cause of the collapses of the WTC Towers (WTC 1 and 2) and WTC 7. |
| + | |||
| + | NIST blocked release of various videos about 9/11. In response to [[FOIA]] requests they later released videos, including video about firefighters discussing explosives in the WTC.<ref>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IO1ps1mzU8o</ref> They also released video{{why}} in 2010 showing [[Michael Hess]] calling from the 8th floor of [[WTC7]]. | ||
| − | NIST | + | ===Models=== |
| + | NIST reportedly created models of the WTC, used to conclude that the buildings were destroyed by fire, not explosives. However, it refuses to release much information about them, citing "[[national security]]".<ref>http://cryptome.org/nist070709.pdf</ref> What little information they did release has been termed "perturbing and inexplicable".<ref>https://off-guardian.org/2016/09/17/why-did-nist-decide-wtc-steel-could-not-conduct-heat/</ref> | ||
==Compromised cryptography== | ==Compromised cryptography== | ||
| − | NIST is responsible for standardising cryptographic algorithms and standardised [[Dual_EC_DRBG]], which already by 2004 was understood by some researchers to have a possible kleptographic [[backdoor (computing)|backdoor]] in its design, with the unusual property that it was theoretically impossible for anyone but Dual_EC_DRBG's designers (NSA) to confirm the backdoor's existence. [[Bruce Schneier]] concluded shortly after standardization that the "rather obvious" backdoor (along with other deficiencies) would mean that nobody would use Dual_EC_DRBG.<ref name="wired-schneier"> | + | NIST is responsible for standardising cryptographic algorithms and standardised [[Dual_EC_DRBG]], which already by 2004 was understood by some researchers to have a possible kleptographic [[backdoor (computing)|backdoor]] in its design, with the unusual property that it was theoretically impossible for anyone but Dual_EC_DRBG's designers (NSA) to confirm the [[backdoor]]'s existence. [[Bruce Schneier]] concluded shortly after standardization that the "rather obvious" [[backdoor]] (along with other deficiencies) would mean that nobody would use Dual_EC_DRBG.<ref name="wired-schneier">https://web.archive.org/web/20140621062515/http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/11/securitymatters_1115 </ref> The [[backdoor]] would allow NSA to decrypt for example [[Transport Layer Security|SSL/TLS]] encryption which used Dual_EC_DRBG as a CSPRNG.<ref name="green_flaws">{http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html</ref> |
===Snowden's revelations=== | ===Snowden's revelations=== | ||
| − | In December 2013, a [[Reuters]] news article alleged that in 2004, before NIST had standardized Dual_EC_DRBG, NSA paid [[RSA Security]] $10 million in a secret deal to use Dual_EC_DRBG as the default in the [[RSA BSAFE]] cryptography library, which resulted in RSA Security becoming the most important distributor of the insecure algorithm.<ref name="NSApaid"> | + | In December 2013, a [[Reuters]] news article alleged that in 2004, before NIST had standardized Dual_EC_DRBG, NSA paid [[RSA Security]] $10 million in a secret deal to use Dual_EC_DRBG as the default in the [[RSA BSAFE]] cryptography library, which resulted in RSA Security becoming the most important distributor of the insecure algorithm.<ref name="NSApaid">http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220</ref> RSA denied ever knowingly colluded with the NSA to adopt an algorithm that was known to be flawed, saying "we have never kept [our] relationship [with the NSA] a secret".<ref name="RSA Company Statements">https://blogs.rsa.com/news-media-2/rsa-response/</ref> |
{{SMWDocs}} | {{SMWDocs}} | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{RefList}} | {{RefList}} | ||
Latest revision as of 11:42, 7 August 2021
 NIST     | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Headquarters | Gaithersburg, Maryland, U.S. |
| Leaders | • Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology • NIST/Director |
| Staff | 2,900 |
| Subpage | •NIST/Director |
| Now infamous for their attempt to cover-up the truth of the 9-11 controlled demolitions. | |
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a physical sciences laboratory and non-regulatory agency of the United States Department of Commerce. Its mission is to promote American innovation and industrial competitiveness. NIST's activities are organized into laboratory programs that include nanoscale science and technology, engineering, information technology, neutron research, material measurement, and physical measurement.
Contents
September 11th, 2001
In 2002 the National Construction Safety Team Act mandated NIST to conduct an investigation into the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings 1 and 2 and the 47-storey 7 World Trade Center. The point man for the "World Trade Center Collapse Investigation" has been named as Stephen Cauffman and the lead investigator WAS Shyam Sunder,[1] covered three aspects, including a technical building and fire safety investigation to study the factors contributing to the probable cause of the collapses of the WTC Towers (WTC 1 and 2) and WTC 7.
NIST blocked release of various videos about 9/11. In response to FOIA requests they later released videos, including video about firefighters discussing explosives in the WTC.[2] They also released video[Why?] in 2010 showing Michael Hess calling from the 8th floor of WTC7.
Models
NIST reportedly created models of the WTC, used to conclude that the buildings were destroyed by fire, not explosives. However, it refuses to release much information about them, citing "national security".[3] What little information they did release has been termed "perturbing and inexplicable".[4]
Compromised cryptography
NIST is responsible for standardising cryptographic algorithms and standardised Dual_EC_DRBG, which already by 2004 was understood by some researchers to have a possible kleptographic backdoor in its design, with the unusual property that it was theoretically impossible for anyone but Dual_EC_DRBG's designers (NSA) to confirm the backdoor's existence. Bruce Schneier concluded shortly after standardization that the "rather obvious" backdoor (along with other deficiencies) would mean that nobody would use Dual_EC_DRBG.[5] The backdoor would allow NSA to decrypt for example SSL/TLS encryption which used Dual_EC_DRBG as a CSPRNG.[6]
Snowden's revelations
In December 2013, a Reuters news article alleged that in 2004, before NIST had standardized Dual_EC_DRBG, NSA paid RSA Security $10 million in a secret deal to use Dual_EC_DRBG as the default in the RSA BSAFE cryptography library, which resulted in RSA Security becoming the most important distributor of the insecure algorithm.[7] RSA denied ever knowingly colluded with the NSA to adopt an algorithm that was known to be flawed, saying "we have never kept [our] relationship [with the NSA] a secret".[8]
Employee on Wikispooks
| Employee | Job | Appointed |
|---|---|---|
| John Gross | Research Structural Engineer | July 1983 |
Related Documents
| Title | Type | Publication date | Author(s) | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| File:NIST Analyses Brookman.pdf | paper | 26 March 2010 | Ronald Brookman | |
| File:Nanothermite Smoking Gun.pdf | article | 18 August 2009 | Michael Schmidt | An introduction to the nano-thermite issue and how the "investigators" chose to ignore this aspect. |
| File:The Top Ten Connections Between NIST and Nano-Thermites.pdf | paper | 2 July 2008 | Kevin Ryan | An examination of NIST's connections to the nano-thermite. |
References
- ↑ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/nyregion/22wtccnd.html
- ↑ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IO1ps1mzU8o
- ↑ http://cryptome.org/nist070709.pdf
- ↑ https://off-guardian.org/2016/09/17/why-did-nist-decide-wtc-steel-could-not-conduct-heat/
- ↑ https://web.archive.org/web/20140621062515/http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/11/securitymatters_1115
- ↑ {http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html
- ↑ http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
- ↑ https://blogs.rsa.com/news-media-2/rsa-response/
