Document:Col. Cassad comments on Igor Strelkov's 11 Sptember 2014 address
In theses form, one per point
1. Some, perhaps, were surprised by such obvious contrast made between Putin and angry boyars, but only those who didn't pay attention to what Strelkov said earlier. He took the same position before too and announced it publicly, pointing to the presence of the fifth column. Strelkov himself told in June that he considers Putin to be the author of the revolution "from above". I really don't understand where did the idea of Strelkov being an oppositionist came from. In this respect he is actually more of a consistent supporter of Putin's, which he once again confirmed for those who didn't pay attention earlier.
2. Again, Strelkov already in Slavyansk openly said that his media publicity and the fact that a cult is created out of him were a burden for him. Being a person who worked in the nation security system for a long time, this attitude towards sudden popularity is quite natural for him. And in this regard he once again confirmed what he said before.
3. And with respect to the question of the necessity of military aid for Donbass, he once again repeated the same thing he said before. That is, he said that without Russia's help there will be a bloody ulcer in there. In this respect, the whole press-conference consisted of consistently standing for the same position that he announced in May-July. However, this time it was voiced within the framework of a political manifesto.
4. Also, the fact of his forced exit right before the major offensive was confirmed. Actually, Strelkov was removed so that he wouldn't be able to bear the fruits of this offensive and, as it was easy to notice, he was disappointed by this. The method of pressure, about which Strelkov chose not to speak, became the humanitarian aid, with which he was in essence blackmailed, forcing him to resign. The fifth column blackmailed him, although Strelkov chose not to name the names, starting from the "great combinator" [note from the translator: this is a thinly veiled hint at Vladislav Surkov  and his servants.
5. Like most other militia commanders in Novorossia, he rejected the Minsk truce, pointing to the deadly nature of these negotiations for Novorossia and Russia. Simultaneously, he used his authority to cover Zakharchenko, in essence suggesting that it is the fifth column that is to blame for dumping Novorossia and not Zakharchenko and other Novorossian officials who signed the Minsk agreement. And in general, the positive assessment of the actions by the military leadership, impersonated by Zakharchenko and Kononov, reflects a long-standing line of Strelkov towards creating a cohesive military leadership of Novorossia. Even when he dissolved the conspiracy that was being prepared in Donetsk with the goal of surrendering the city to the junta, he decided not to finish off certain officials publicly in order to avoid provoking an armed conflict in Donetsk.
6. Overall, when the "wounding" version was conclusively refuted and the political underpinnings of Strelkov's resignation became obvious, the internal arguments within the Russian ruling elite became public. I don't think that the accusations towards the unnamed officials among the highest leadership in the country and Putin's inner circle are Strelkov's own initiative. Behind these accusations there are certain circles, which are not interested in the scenario of "cease-fire dump". And after some public figures and field commanders formed the public opinion, Strelkov is hitting the crucial nail on the head by turning a backstage conflict (which isn't obvious for many who are not familiar with details of Novorossian politics) into a public conflict. Thus, he finalized an open protest of significant figures in Novorossia against the "Minsk truce". In this respect, again, there's nothing surprising here. As I wrote after military intervention was rejected by the Russian security council, the decision fork for Russia is simple: either an active offensive policy in Ukraine or a dump of one kind or another, e.g., a dump under a "truce sauce" in an attempt to avoid a direct conflict with the USA.
It is precisely the uncertainty in this question that allows to answer the question of "Was Novorossia dumped or not?" with "No, not yet. The choice isn't made yet." Nevertheless, the answer to this question will be given already in the short term, because the conflict finally transitioned from the phase of covert struggle to the phase of a public conflict and the political underpinnings of harassing Strelkov in July-August 2014  now became even more obvious for the public.
In this respect, the incoming information about the high probability of the start of large-scale offensive by the junta already tomorrow, in addition to the next sanction package from the EU that touch the Russian oil and gas sector, is remarkable. At the same time, the military in the Far East are being put on full combat alert and a check of the military district and administrative structures in the situation of ongoing war is started. So to speak, they are making things a bit more dramatic.
- Vladislav Surkov - Wikipedia page
- On Political Underpinnings of Strelkov's Harassment
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