In the Dark

 In the Dark(“Terrorism/Preparation”,  Disaster/Preparation)

Date	28 September 2010 - 30 September 2010
Location	US Army War College
Perpetrators	Cynthia Ayers, Kenneth Chrosniak, Wendy LeBlanc
Website	https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/usacsl/publications/InTheDark.pdf

In the Dark was a workshop at the US Army War College with the subject "Military Planning for a Catastrophic Critical Infrastructure Event"

Topic

The three day workshop assembled "a body of subject matter experts, civic leaders, and electric industry providers to create awareness, discuss threat postures, and recommend actions to better prepare for the possibility of a critical infrastructure failure or collapse of the electrical grid and associated electronic devices due to either a solar storm, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), or a cyber attack." The workshop addressed the preparation, response, and recovery from a catastrophic event.

Speakers

There were a dozen experts speaking in the plenary session of the conference, including:

The event speaker Thomas Pappas, who outlined five significant vulnerabilities.

• The United States has an exposed technology base that potential enemies can readily adapt, and do so cheaply.
• The U.S. infrastructure (104 nuclear reactors, mines, roads, bridges, airports) is exposed and there are insufficient funds to protect all of them.
• Cultural fault lines are being drawn, and rather than being a melting pot nation, the United States is composed of religious and political groups, plus hundreds of hate groups.
• The expanding information enterprise can be a global network platform which can be used against our nation by anonymous enemies gaining asymmetric advantage.
• Retrenchment of the continental U.S. military and multiple deployments makes the United States vulnerable to attack.

The event speaker John Kappenman, from Storm Analysis Consultants, gave a presentation on the origin and impact of severe solar flares, nuclear EMP, and intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) on the electric grid infrastructure. He stated that the two probable areas of greatest impact are the nation’s Northwest and the area from the Midwest to the East coast (eastern third of the U.S.) where results can be catastrophic. Permanent damage to the grid can result and take years to repair or replace. If several regions are affected simultaneously, the difficulty of restoring the electric grid is greatly increased. Depending on damage, a full recovery could take 4-10 years, where all sorts of electronic devices, not directly impacted by the EMP, could be damaged or rendered useless due to the unavailability of electricity. Widespread failure of the electronic infrastructure will place millions of lives at risk.

The event speaker Ron Plesco,CEO of the National Cyber Forensics Training Alliance highlighted the depth and magnitude of the cyber threat.

Speaker Rich Haver, from the Defense Science Board: Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland (DSB), said the DSB presumed that an informed and educated enemy wants to bring the world to its knees, and knows U.S. vulnerabilities

Workshop Conclusions

After the plenary session, the attendees split into three break-out groups to discuss further. General conclusions were:

1. There is very little in the way of back-up capability to the electric grid.The net effect of the collapse of the electric grid is that communities would become localized and insular. They would be disconnected from the more regional conditions, the possibility of outside assistance such as food and medicine, and the chances of recovery to normal. One group even explored that there might be no return to normal as was previously known.

2.There is little in the way of preparation for the loss of the electric grid, in the form of individual preparation and rehearsal for such an event. This includes the stockpiling of food and survival kits to include radios in Faraday protection boxes with batteries and first aid supplies. Preparing for months without a commercial source of clean water (city water pressure is often dependent on electric pumping to storage towers) and stoppage of sewage treatment facilities will require new methods of survival particularly in populated areas.

3.Whereas the Department of Defense will provide support and assistance in the restoration of infrastructure failures to the greatest extent possible, it too has limitations in personnel and funding, and the possibility of regional and national grid failure could push the DOD beyond its ability to assist on a massive scale.

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