Document:Russian Federation (RF) Sanctions

shopping list of desired sanctions, maybe written by an Ukrainian

 wanted sanctions strategy  by Integrity Initiative dated 26 December 2018

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Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/4
Source: Anonymous (Link)

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Russian'Federation (RF) Sanctions

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13.01.2015

Russian Federation (RF) Sanctions

MAIN AIM(S)

Behaviour change? Peace with Ukraine (UKR)? Return Crimea? Regime change? Other?

POTENTIAL LEVERS

Civil society e.g.

• Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia

• Ukraine Crisis Media Center ; Project Mirotvorets ; Project Likbez

• Global Witness (e.g. V.F. Yanukovich & UKR corruption)

Commerce e.g.

• Suspend/expel RF from G8, WTO, ITO & similar organisations

• Expand existing sanctions regimes to anyone helping RF break them

• Ban RF delegates from attending commercial conferences abroad

• Suspend commercial delegation exchange visits

Culture e.g.

• Suspend operations of Pushkin House, Russkiy Mir & similar organisations

• Suspend British Council operations in RF

• Suspend visits by Bolshoi & Kirov Ballets, & similar groups

• Suspend cultural delegation exchange visits

• Repatriate dependents of “top 100” RF Government officials studying abroad

Diplomacy e.g.

• Visa bans for “top 100” RF Government officials & immediate families

Economics e.g.

• Expand existing sanctions regimes to anyone helping RF break them

Finance e.g.

• Freeze assets of “top 100” RF Government officials & immediate families

• Publicise location of illicit assets in their name where possible

• Ban RF delegates from attending financial conferences abroad

• Ban RF companies from launching IPOs in West

• Western divestment of RF related investments (e.g. Heath, Telegraph, 23.07.2014)

Individuals e.g.

• Visa bans for individuals & relatives helping RF break sanctions regimes

• Freeze assets of such individuals & immediate families

• Publicise location of illicit assets in their name where possible

Industry e.g.

• Suspend RF companies from international industrial associations

• Ban RF delegates from attending industrial conferences abroad

• Suspend industrial delegation exchange visits

Information e.g.

• Make ordinary Russians the direct focus of & audience for Western media

• Increase spending on BBC World Service, BBC Monitoring coverage of RF

• Fund removal of Kyiv Post, The Times, The New York Times, etc., paywalls

• Sanction RF media in West for not complying with regulators standards

• Fund citizen journalism in UKR & RF to expose RF information operations

Intelligence e.g.

• Simultaneously expel every RF intelligence officer and air/defence/naval attaché

from as many countries as possible (global Operation FOOT, 1971)

• Increase scrutiny of RF religious, academic, think[tank & business links in West

Military e.g.

• Suspend military/defence delegation visits/exchanges

• Suspend all defence[related sales to RF

• Suspend RF from international defence[ & security[related fora

• Expand sanctions on/to RF companies (in)directly profiting from UKR invasion

Politics e.g.

• Make ordinary Russians the direct focus of & audience for Western politicians

• Suspend RF & any other State helping it evade sanctions from international fora

Sports e.g.

• Expose RF corruption of bidding processes for international sports events

• Advocate view that RF unworthy of hosting such events

• Publicise RF labour violations when building venues for such events

• Publicise RF programmes that encourage athletes to engage in doping

Security e.g.

• Simultaneously expel every RF intelligence officer and air/defence/naval attaché

from as many countries as possible (global Operation FOOT, 1971)

• Arrest every known RF agent — not least “agents of influence”

• Publicise arrest of key RF “agents of influence”

• Increase funding & operational tempo of counter[intelligence operations against RF

• Revive Lists “N”, “U” & “X” fully

Technology e.g.

• Ban all sales of dual[use technology or that deemed strategic in nature to RF (e.g. CoCom during Cold War & now Wassenaar Arrangement)

• Revive Lists “N”, “U” & “X” fully

• Suspend RF companies from international technological associations

• Ban RF delegates from attending technology conferences abroad

• Suspend technology delegation exchange visits

Other?

POLICY"OPTIONS

Do nothing

Trivial

Halfway

Serious

Severe

Conflict

Other?

BROADER CONSIDERATIONS

Culture e.g.

• State interests vs individual “rights”

History e.g.

• Siege mentality because of Western “predators”

Informatione.g.

• RF is an intelligence State: intelligence officers running it like an intelligence service

• Heavy RF focus on intelligence gathering to infiltrate & keep up with West

• Need to acquire, control & manipulate information is the KEY RF weakness

• Reputation of State/Government institutions & traditions also important to RF

Psychology e.g.

• V.V. Putin (& his close circle): survived abysmal post-WW2 conditions

• These men eventually chose security, intelligence &/or military careers

• These men see themselves as survivors: they believe that nothing West can do is worse than what they have already endured in life

• To Putin & Co., UKR is another “fight” RF must survive

Religion e.g.

• Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) long coHopted by State

• From top down, ROC riddled with Soviet/RF intelligence officers & agents

• RF aggressively expanding role & use of ROC to promote State interests abroad

• ROC in most ways State Orthodoxy, propagating State views to every congregation

Other?

MOST FOR THE LEAST?

• Simultaneously expel every RF intelligence officer and air/defence/naval attaché

from as many countries as possible

• Arrest every known RF agent — not least “agents of influence”

• Ban visas for “top 100” RF Government officials & immediate families

• Freeze their assets where possible

• Publicise location of illicit assets in their names where possible

• Repatriate children of “top 100” RF Government officials studying abroad

FINAL THOUGHTS

• Russians are proud & intrinsically about “face”. They crave respect/admiration above almost all else. Absent that, being feared will do; they often confuse the two.

• RF is not a “normal” country in most senses of the word. Crucially, Russians see life & the world very differently from us. While economics is of course important to them, in the broadest sense Russians are not nearly as driven by economic & financial considerations.

• Despite contradictions with how they view both themselves & the world, Russians generally feel part of a Spiritual Mother Russia of infinite patience.

• A sense of destiny & uniqueness contributes to RF ability to absorb enormous hardship when necessary, both collectively & individually. History, climate, religion & tradition all contribute to Russians’ resilient mindset.

• For most Russians, daily life has long been a struggle (not least for survival). Not having Western goods & services will not necessarily be much of an issue in the medium to long term, though no doubt this will initially cause inconvenience.

• The 1998 financial crash & RF’s initial reactions to the 2008[09 banking crisis are helpful in assessing RF responses/strategies to cope with post[Crimea sanctions.

• However, it is important to remember that the RF Government is not the RF people. Generally, they are savvy & ever aware of their history (including the brutality of current & former rulers). Driving a wedge between Russians & Government is key.

• Putin has remained popular so far for two main reasons. One: after the chaos of ~1990[94 & 1998[2000, he has restored relative stability, prosperity & pride as far as many Russians are concerned (though primarily because of high energy prices). Second: this public perception has been largely shaped by Government’s increasing monopoly of the domestic information space since 2000.

• But too well, Russians know the “baggage” that Putin & his close circle — almost entirely Soviet[era security/intelligence officers — carry: bureaucratic mindsets of oppressing/repressing ordinary people, seen as expendable by the State.

• Fear of renewed uncertainty, chaos & ultimately the State is what still keeps most Russians in check — for now.

• In speeches & media pieces, Putin & Co. tend to tell us what they aim to do & why.

• Essentially, they aspire to all the benefits of Western prosperity but on Russian terms, & restore RF as a core player in world affairs, unconstrained in its right to assert its national interests.

• So long as these (unrealistic) criteria are not met, Putin’s RF will continue to act as a “spoiler state” for the West in international affairs.