File:Afghan-kill.pdf

Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan

Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer

A Monograph By Major Thomas P. Ehrhart United States Army - 2009

School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Abstract

Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. These operations occur in rugged terrain and in situations where traditional supporting fires are limited due to range or risk of collateral damage. With these limitations, the infantry in Afghanistan require a precise, lethal fire capability that exists only in a properly trained and equipped infantryman. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate.

Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain

There are several ways to extend the lethality of the infantry. A more effective 5.56-mm bullet can be designed which provides enhanced terminal performance out to 500 meters. A better option to increase incapacitation is to adopt a larger caliber cartridge, which will function using components of the M16/M4. The 2006 study by the Joint Service Wound Ballistics – Integrated Product Team discovered that the ideal caliber seems to be between 6.5 and 7-mm. This was also the general conclusion of all military ballistics studies since the end of World War I.

The reorganization of the infantry squad in 1960 eliminated the M1D sniper rifle and resulted in the loss of the precision mid-range capability of the infantry squad. The modern solution to this problem is the squad designated marksman. The concept of the squad designated marksman is that a soldier receives the training necessary to engage targets beyond the 300-meter range limitation of current marksmanship programs, but below the 600 meter capability of actual snipers. As of June 2009, the equipment and training of the squad designated marksman has yet to be standardized. In field manual 3-22.9 there are only fourteen pages dedicated to training the squad designated marksman.

Any weapon system designed to perform in various environments will invariably make compromises in order to perform all requirements. The modular nature of the M4/M16 series of weapons lends itself to the arms room concept. Under the arms room concept, each soldier would have multiple weapons and optics combinations available. Commanders would have the flexibility to adjust the capabilities of the infantry squad for the anticipated environment while maintaining commonality of the manual of arms.

Finally, the current qualification course does not accurately depict the enemy on the battlefield. It is based on the 1960’s and 70’s concept of active defense strategy. Targets come up and depending on their range, remain up for a period of five to ten seconds. The modern battlefield is never this static. Soldiers fire twenty rounds from a prone or foxhole-supported position, then ten rounds from a prone-unsupported position and finally ten rounds from the kneeling position. Soldiers are conditioned to expect that their targets will not move, will only require one shot to incapacitate, and that a hit anywhere will result in that incapacitation.

The Army now has the opportunity to rectify this degradation of marksmanship capability and take back the infantry half kilometer. The ability to engage targets out to 500 meters requires significant revisions to doctrine, training, and equipment. These revisions require emphasis from the highest levels of military leadership.