Iron law of oligarchy
Iron law of oligarchy (political idea, sociological concept, Oligarchy, political theory) | |
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The theory that all complex organizations, regardless of how democratic they are when started, eventually develop into oligarchies. |
The iron law of oligarchy is a political theory first developed by the German sociologist Robert Michels in his 1911 book, Political Parties.[1] It asserts that rule by an elite, or oligarchy, is inevitable as an "iron law" within any democratic organization as part of the "tactical and technical necessities" of organization.
Michels applied the Iron Law to Parties, States and Unions.[2]An example that Michels used in his book was Germany's Social Democratic Party.[3] Later research extended the scope to other organizations.
The law can be broken down into three hypotheses:
- Larger groups of people always form a bureaucratic organization for reasons of efficiency.
- Bureaucracy tend to form a power elite.
- The resulting oligarchization leads to the corruption of this power elite.
Michels's theory states that all complex organizations, regardless of how democratic they are when started, eventually develop into oligarchies. Michels observed that since no sufficiently large and complex organization can function purely as a direct democracy, power within an organization will always get delegated to individuals within that group, elected or otherwise.
Using anecdotes from political parties and trade unions struggling to operate democratically to build his argument in 1911, Michels addressed the application of this law to representative democracy, and stated: "Who says organization, says oligarchy." He went on to state that "Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy."
In 1911 Robert Michels argued that paradoxically the socialist parties of Europe, despite their democratic ideology and provisions for mass participation, seemed to be dominated by their leaders just like traditional conservative parties. Michels' conclusion was that the problem lay in the very nature of organizations. The more liberal and democratic modern era allowed the formation of organizations with innovative and revolutionary goals, but as such organizations become more complex, they became less and less democratic and revolutionary.
According to Michels, all organizations eventually come to be run by a "leadership class", who often function as paid administrators, executives, spokespersons or political strategists for the organization. Far from being "servants of the masses", Michels argues this "leadership class," rather than the organization's membership, will inevitably grow to dominate the organization's power structures. By controlling who has access to information, those in power can centralize their power successfully, often with little accountability, due to the apathy, indifference and non-participation most rank-and-file members have in relation to their organization's decision-making processes. Michels argues that democratic attempts to hold leadership positions accountable are prone to fail, since with power comes the ability to reward loyalty, the ability to control information about the organization, and the ability to control what procedures the organization follows when making decisions. All of these mechanisms can be used to strongly influence the outcome of any decisions made 'democratically' by members.[4]
Michels stated that the official goal of representative democracy of eliminating elite rule was impossible, that representative democracy is a façade legitimizing the rule of a particular elite, and that elite rule, which he refers to as oligarchy, is inevitable.
History
At the time Michels formulated his Law, he was an anarcho-syndicalist.[5] Michels later migrated to Italy and teaching economics at the University of Perugia. He became an important ideologue of Benito Mussolini's fascist regime in Italy, as he believed this was the next legitimate step of modern societies.[6][7]
Reasons
Michels stressed several factors that underlie the Iron Law of Oligarchy. Darcy K. Leach summarized them briefly as: "Bureaucracy happens. If bureaucracy happens, power rises. Power corrupts."[8] Any large organization, Michels pointed out, has to create a bureaucracy in order to maintain its efficiency as it becomes larger—many decisions have to be made daily that cannot be made by large numbers of disorganized people. For the organization to function effectively, centralization has to occur and power will end up in the hands of a few. Those few—the oligarchy—will use all means necessary to preserve and further increase their power.
According to Michels, this process is further compounded as delegation is necessary in any large organization, as thousands—sometimes hundreds of thousands—of members cannot make decisions via participatory democracy. This has to-date been dictated by the lack of technological means for large numbers of people to meet and debate, and also by matters related to crowd psychology, as Michels argued that people feel a need to be led. Delegation, however, leads to specialization—to the development of knowledge bases, skills and resources among a leadership—which further alienates the leadership from the rank and file and entrenches the leadership in office. Michels also argued that for leaders in organizations, "The desire to dominate . . . is universal. These are elementary psychological facts." Thus, they were prone to seek power and dominance.[9]
Bureaucratization and specialization are the driving processes behind the Iron Law. They result in the rise of a group of professional administrators in a hierarchical organization, which in turn leads to the rationalization and routinization of authority and decision-making, a process described first and perhaps best by Max Weber, later by John Kenneth Galbraith.
Bureaucracy by design leads to centralization of power by the leaders. Leaders also have control over sanctions and rewards. They tend to promote those who share their opinions, which inevitably leads to self-perpetuating oligarchy. People achieve leadership positions because they have above-average political skill (see charismatic authority). As they advance in their careers, their power and prestige increases. Leaders control the information that flows down the channels of communication, censoring what they do not want the rank-and-file to know. Leaders will also dedicate significant resources to persuade the rank-and-file of the rightness of their views. This is compatible with most societies: people are taught to obey those in positions of authority. Therefore, the rank and file show little initiative, and wait for the leaders to exercise their judgment and issue directives to follow.
References
- ↑ James L. Hyland. Democratic theory: the philosophical foundations. Manchester, England, UK; New York, New York, USA: Manchester University Press ND, 1995. p. 247.
- ↑ C. Fred Alford: The "Iron Law of Oligarchy" in the Athenian Polis … and Today. In: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique. 18, Nr. 2, 1985
- ↑ Darcy K. Leach, The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy Across Organizational Forms, Sociological Theory, Volume 23, Number 3, September 2005, pp. 312-337(26)
- ↑ Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, 1915, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001), 241, http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/michels/polipart.pdf
- ↑ Darcy K. Leach, The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy Across Organizational Forms, Sociological Theory, Volume 23, Number 3, September 2005, pp. 312-337(26
- ↑ Darcy K. Leach, The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy Across Organizational Forms, Sociological Theory, Volume 23, Number 3, September 2005, pp. 312-337(26
- ↑ Gerald Friedman (2007). Reigniting the labor movement: restoring means to ends in a democratic labor movement. Psychology Press. p. 53.
- ↑ Darcy K. Leach, The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy Across Organizational Forms, Sociological Theory, Volume 23, Number 3, September 2005, pp. 312-337
- ↑ Rohrschneider, Robert (February 1994). "How iron is the iron law of oligarchy?.: Robert Michels and national party delegates in eleven West European democracies". European Journal of Political Research. 25 (2): 207–238.