Malaysia Airlines Flight 17/Russia's questions to Ukraine

 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17/Russia's questions to Ukraine

Date	2014-07-18 - 2014-07-25
Perpetrators	Anatoly Antonov, Russia’s Air Transport Agency
Type	interrogation
Description	Questions addressed to the Ukraine authorities by the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Air Transport Agency .

24 hours after the MH17 crash and noting the cacophony of blame against Russia by the western Commercially-controlled media, Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov was quoted by the Russia media on his remarks and his list of 10 questions about the tragedy for the ukraine authorities. This was followed on 25 July by many more questions and suggested actions, issued by the Russian Air Transport Agency.

Anatoly Antonov's remarks and 10 questions

On 18 July 2014, the day after the crash, Russian Deputy Minister of Defense, Anatoly Antonov post 10 questions to the Ukrainian authorities

Initial remarks

“They try to show to the whole world that we are responsible for the crash. It is very strange that without any evidence my colleagues from western media would like to find somebody who is responsible for the crash,” Antonov said. “It seems to me that this is part of information warfare which has been started against the Russian Federation and armed forces. As for me, I don’t want to use this opportunity to blame anybody. I would just like to raise few questions for my colleagues from the armed forces of Ukraine. I hope they try to answer the questions, it will be a good opportunity for us to realize where we are, whether there is a possibility for us to restart cooperation and to find who is really responsible for the tragedy.”

10 questions for the Ukrainian authorities

1. Immediately after the tragedy, the Ukrainian authorities, naturally, blamed it on the self-defense forces. What are these accusations based on?
   
2. Can Kiev explain in detail how it uses Buk missile launchers in the conflict zone? And why were these systems deployed there in the first place, seeing as the self-defense forces don’t have any planes?
   
3. Why are the Ukrainian authorities not doing anything to set up an international commission? When will such a commission begin its work?
   
4. Would the Ukrainian Armed Forces be willing to let international investigators see the inventory of their air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, including those used in SAM launchers?
   
5. Will the international commission have access to tracking data from reliable sources regarding the movements of Ukrainian warplanes on the day of the tragedy?
   
6. Why did Ukrainian air traffic controllers allow the plane to deviate from the regular route to the north, towards “the anti-terrorist operation zone”?
   
7. Why was airspace over the warzone not closed for civilian flights, especially since the area was not entirely covered by radar navigation systems?
   
8. How can official Kiev comment on reports in the social media, allegedly by a Spanish air traffic controller who works in Ukraine, that there were two Ukrainian military planes flying alongside the Boeing 777 over Ukrainian territory?
   
9. Why did Ukraine’s Security Service start working with the recordings of communications between Ukrainian air traffic controllers and the Boeing crew and with the data storage systems from Ukrainian radars without waiting for international investigators?
   
10. What lessons has Ukraine learned from a similar incident in 2001, when a Russian Tu-154 crashed into the Black Sea? Back then, the Ukrainian authorities denied any involvement on the part of Ukraine’s Armed Forces until irrefutable evidence proved official Kiev to be guilty.

Questions and suggestions from Russian Air Transport Agency

Seeking to clarify the situation surrounding the crash, Russia’s Air Transport Agency prepared the following questions for Ukraine published on 25 July 2014. They were widely reported in the Russian and alternative media but largely ignored by the western Commercially-controlled media.

Data requests

1. Video and audio recording of the air traffic control center communications.
   
2. Tape recordings of radio exchanges between the air traffic controller and adjacent air traffic control centers inter alia covering the entry into the Ukrainian airspace.
   
3. Recordings of radio exchanges and phone calls between the air traffic controllers and the military air traffic control sector or Ukraine Air Defense.
   
4. Tape recordings of radio exchanges between the air traffic controllers and aircrews of SIA351 (Singapore Airlines) and AIC113 (Air India).
   
5. Data from ground-based radar facilities (including primary surveillance radar) on the aircraft track starting from the entry into Ukrainian airspace.
   
6. Information on the composition and performance of Ukrainian ground radar facilities, including the Russian-type radar stations, “Dome” radar stations etc.
   
7. Information from the Ukraine Armed Forces on the Air Defense control of airspace in this region (if such control has indeed occurred), including recordings of radio exchanges between Air Defense sites.
   
8. Description of the radar situation, including the complete information on military aircraft flights in the area of the military conflict and impact area of the aircraft debris.
   
9. Information on the specific detachment of Ukrainian Armed Forces which was tracking aircraft on July 17, 2014 and its location.
   
10. Tape recordings of radio exchanges between military pilots and the military air traffic control sector and the military pilots themselves in the area of the military conflict and the impact area of the aircraft debris.
    
11. Data from military aircraft data recorders present in this area.
    
12. Information on the specific instructions from the Ukraine Aviation Administration to the air traffic control units of Ukraine with relation to the imposed restrictions on the airspace utilization in the area of Donetsk and Lugansk (issuance of NOTAM) as well as the implemented procedures for coordination between the aircrews and Ukraine Air Defense units.
    
13. Parameters from the specialized onboard systems maintaining accurate data on aircraft track based on GPS signal.
    
14. Information on possible interference with GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) performance on the day of the accident (the Federal Air Transport Agency of Russia had been previously informed by Russian airlines flying over Ukraine).
    
15. Information on the aircrew pre-flight briefing (including the availability of information on the valid NOTAMs, enplaned flight levels and possible deviations from the filed flight plan).
    
16. A copy of the flight plan filed by the Malaysian airliner.
    
17. Statistics on previous MH17 flights on this air route.
    
18. Information about the missile launches planned for the date of the air accident including placement of the respective forces and means.
    
19. Daily plan and objective control data of the flight operations executed by the Ukrainian air forces on July 17, 2014.
    
20. Data about actual existence and consumptions of the anti-aircraft guided missiles, all anti-aircraft missiles systems, which are in the armament of the Ukrainian military forces.
    
21. Information about all the launches of the guided missiles by the Ukrainian military (including training exercise) during the period of July 10-17, 2014.
    
22. Information about the activation of the radar centers in the period close the time of the air accident.>

Immediate actions necessary

1. To execute a layout of the aircraft construction elements. To make the visual examination in regard to the existence of striking elements.
   
2. To make the detailed visual examination of the air accident scene, including the existence of striking elements.
   
3. Inquire aircraft crews present in the area on the day of the accident on the possible interference with on-board and ground-based navigation aids.
   
4. Decipher DFDR data (digital flight data recorder), paying special attention to the performance of the navigational equipment and trajectory parameters.
   
5. Receive all the data on the crashed aircraft including all previous possible failures and deficiencies, opened MEL items (failure or deficiency of a certain piece of equipment form the minimal equipment list), especially with regards to the navigational equipment.
   
6. Interrogate the crew if the flight SIA 351 Copenhagen – Singapore on the subject of possible observation of Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 crash.

The quoted text is as prepared by the Federal Air Transport Agency.

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