View source for Document:British govt funded plan for censorship of factual NATO criticism

{{Document
|title=British govt funded plan for censorship of factual NATO criticism
|type=Article
|publication_date=3 October 2023
|source_name=The Grayzone
|source_URL=
|authors=Jack Poulson
|subjects=Zinc Network, NATO, disinformation, Bellingcat, CACI, SBU, FBI
|image=Zinc_Network.jpg
|image_width=300px
|description=Leaked documents reveal British intel contractor [[Zinc Network]] singled out [[The Grayzone]]’s [[Max Blumenthal]] for online [[censorship]], and seeks to redefine factual criticism of [[NATO]] as [[disinformation]]
}}
A leaked 130-page report made public here for the first time documents an international censorship campaign funded by the British government and led by a public relations contractor for [[US Special Operations Forces]].<ref>''[https://techinquiry.org/docs/OIP-DisinfoUkraine.pdf "A coalition of 10 civil society organisations from across Eastern Europe monitored and analysed Kremlin-aligned disinformation in 12 countries from 20 February – 30 April 2023"]''</ref> The basic strategy is to redefine “[[disinformation]]” to include even factual criticism of the [[US military]] or the [[North Atlantic Treaty Organisation]] (NATO), and then to exert “coordinated action to pressure [[social media]] and digital market actors” to “moderate” such speech. The previously secret report also recommends “intensifying cooperation among the [[intelligence agencies]] within the EU [[European Union]]”, which in the past has included [[Ukrainian]] intelligence conducting what it described as a “multi-level special operation” in [[Spain]] to arrest a critical journalist for treason over his ''[[YouTube]]'' broadcasts.<ref>''[https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-arrests-ukrainian-blogger-accused-by-kyiv-of-high-treason/ "Spain arrests Ukrainian blogger accused of ‘high treason’ by Kyiv"]''</ref>

The international effort is coordinated by the [[UK]]-based government public relations contractor [[Zinc Network]],<ref>''[https://thegrayzone.com/2021/02/20/reuters-bbc-uk-foreign-office-russian-media/ "Reuters, BBC, and Bellingcat participated in covert UK Foreign Office-funded programs to “weaken Russia,” leaked docs reveal"]''</ref> which rose to prominence more than two years ago as the subject of the first piece of investigative journalism to be forceably labelled by ''[[Twitter]]'' as potentially obtained through hacking.<ref>''[https://mashable.com/article/twitter-hacked-materials-warning-label "Twitter is now adding a controversial 'hacked materials' warning label to tweets"]''</ref> Despite being based upon documents implicitly confirmed as authentic, the reporting was arguably panned by major [[US]] outlets because of the embarrassing ties it revealed between Western [[intelligence agencies]] and prominent [[investigative journalism]].

Based upon a fresh leak of a report internally released by the [[Ukraine War Disinfo Working Group]] of [[Zinc Network|Zinc]]’s [[Open Information Partnership]] (OIP) earlier this month, the author is independently concluding that the [[UK government]]-funded network of [[think tank]]s and [[investigative journalist]]s has recommended a coordinated campaign to pressure [[social media]] companies and “digital market actors” into suppressing even factual criticism of [[NATO]]-aligned governments.

We are further revealing from public procurement records that [[Zinc Network]] received more than $500,000 from a direct contract with [[US Special Operations]] Command in [[Kenya]] and more than $3 million from a subcontract with [[US Army]] [[Europe]] and [[Africa]] under the controversial US intelligence contractor [[CACI]]. (Last month a federal judge again refused to dismiss a lawsuit against [[CACI]] regarding its alleged support for [[US military]] torture in the [[Abu Ghraib]] prison.)

Much of the [[polarisation]] surrounding [[The Grayzone]]’s reporting centered on [[OIP]]’s previous partnership with the influential investigatory nonprofit [[Bellingcat]], whom [[Zinc Network|Zinc]] funded with more than 65,000 euros between 2019 and 2021. Grayzone’s 2021 publication noted that one of the potential [[Bellingcat]] trainers named in [[Zinc Network|Zinc]]’s documents was [[Christiaan Triebert]], who subsequently moved to the Visual Investigations team of the ''[[New York Times]]''. [[Bellingcat]]’s former director of training and research, [[Aric Toler]], recently joined the same team.

[[Zinc Network]] and [[Bellingcat]] did not respond to detailed requests for comment sent two days before publication. Additional emails to the two official public accounts associated with [[OIP]] bounced due to the author’s email address not being on a pre-approved list, but both [[Zinc Network|Zinc]] and its [[OIP]] team confirmed receipt directly before the requested response deadline. This article will be updated if any of the organisations provide a post-publication comment.

The former head of the [[US Department of Homeland Security]]’s short-lived [[Disinformation Governance Board]], [[Nina Jankowicz]], has also prominently advertised their role as a member of [[OIP]]’s advisory board. Much of the concern surrounding such a content moderation board within [[DHS]] stemmed from fears that it could become a tool for suppressing even factual critiques of the [[US Government]] — an overt aim of the newly public [[OIP]] report.

The [[Ukraine War Disinfo Working Group]]’s study was largely outsourced by [[Zinc Network|Zinc]] to eleven separate organisations: the [[Ukrainian]] narrative surveillance firm [[LetsData]] led the [[social media]] data collection and network analysis, while each of the ten Eastern European regions of study was handled by a separate think tank. For example, analysis of [[Ukraine]] was assigned to [[Detector Media]], whose 2020 annual report listed the US Embassy in [[Ukraine]], the [[US Agency for International Development]], [[OIP]], and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of [[Denmark]] as funders.

The number one target of [[Detector Media|Detector]]’s campaign in [[Ukraine]], journalist and politician [[Anatoliy Shariy]], has been twice charged with treason by the [[Security Service of Ukraine]] ([[SBU]]). The first charge, for posting a map of [[Ukraine]] to his ''[[YouTube]]'' channel which excluded [[Crimea]] and the [[Donbas]], resulted in his brief arrest in [[Spain]] as a result of what the [[SBU]] itself described as a “multi-level special operation”. The second charge was announced in July through the [[SBU]]’s ''[[Telegram]]'' channel, based on an accusation that Shariy provided filming advice to [[Russian intelligence]].

Leaked emails from the ''[[Twitter]]'' Files revealed that the US [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] ([[FBI]]) forwarded requests from the [[SBU]] to ''[[Twitter]]'' which included a demand to censor both Shariy and Canadian journalist [[Aaron Maté]]. Maté is perhaps the second most prominent contributor to [[The Grayzone]] behind founding editor [[Max Blumenthal]], whom [[OIP]] names alongside Columbia professor [[Jeffrey Sachs]] as an influential American figure in “pro-Russian” narratives in [[Belarus]]. The [[SBU]]’s request for ''[[Twitter]]'' to censor Shariy and Maté came one year after [[The Grayzone]]’s exposé of [[Zinc]]’s [[Open Information Partnership]].

The [[OIP]] working group’s recent recommendation of “coordinated action to pressure social media and digital market actors” to censor even factual journalism is laid out in the leaked final report. The first page of its introduction defines [[disinformation]] to include even verifiable criticisms of [[NATO]], with two such explicit categories including “Content based on verifiable information which…uses emotive or inflammatory language” and “Not-attributable…information which fits with existing pro-Kremlin narratives, aims or activities”. Under a non-partisan extension of this system, the [[US Congress]]man-endorsed online troll army known as the [[North Atlantic Fella Organization]] (NAFO) would have its communications labelled as [[disinformation]], regardless of the veracity of its individual arguments. But [[OIP]]’s targets are instead influential journalists who report critically on [[NATO]].

The basic methodology of the report was to collect 50 postings each week using keyword searches on individually selected “pro-Russian” information sources in each of the ten studied regions, typically taking 35 of the 50 posts from social media such as ''[[Telegram]]'' and ''[[Facebook]]'' and 15 from online media outlets. [[US Army]] Cyber Command has similarly been purchasing bulk copies of the public content of [[social media]] platforms such as ''[[Facebook]]'' and ''[[Twitter]]'' as part of its mission to protect the “[[NATO]] brand”, as was revealed by the author in April.

(Twelve pages of the [[Ukraine War Disinfo Working Group]]’s final report were made public six days ago on [[LinkedIn]] by the [[Lithuania]]n non-profit [[Civic Resilience Initiative]] (CIR), which handled the Baltics region for the group. Several weekly reports from [[OIP]]’s study were also published by [[Political Capital]], the [[Hungarian]] [[think tank]] tasked with monitoring narratives in its own country. While of a similar format, the weekly reports do not contain, for example, the final report’s noteworthy recommendation of a coordinated pressure campaign against [[social media]] companies and “digital market actors”. [[CIR]]’s twelve pages similarly are focused on the Baltics and do not contain the full report’s more controversial definitions or recommendations.)

The leaked [[UK government]]-funded report explicitly warns against usage of the phrase “[[the West]]”, arguing that “This may fuel the narrative that the so-called ‘collective West’ exerts undue control over [[Ukraine]].” On the other hand, the final pages of the report argue that “[[intelligence agencies]] across [[Europe]] can and should do more and they require a more unified approach [emphasis theirs]”. The group further recommends “Improving and intensifying cooperation among the [[intelligence agencies]] within the [[EU]] with the focus on malign foreign information influence.”

==References==
<references/>