Gaza War (2008–09)

White phosphorous shells explode over Gaza City. January 2009

Operation 'Cast Lead' - The name assigned by the Israeli military to its 22 day offensive against the Gaza Strip that began on 27 December 2008.

Background

Immediate

On 19th June 2008 an Egyptian-brokered truce came into effect between Gaza and Israel, though with no mutually agreed text. Israel killed another Palestinian (allegedly preparing to fire a rocket) minutes before the cease-fire came into effect. Israel warned that even a single rocket firing would be considered a violation and they would hold Hamas responsible. There must also be movement towards the release of Gilad Shalit before the Rafah crossing could be opened.

Gazans understood that, after two weeks of success, Israel would open the crossings and allow normal transfer of goods. Hamas agreed that for its part it would stop rocket attacks from its own armed groups and from others based in Gaza, including Islamic Jihad and Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades.

Hamas imposed its will and imprisoned some of those firing rockets/mortars for short periods. While there is minor disagreement about the figures (eg of 38 fired in 4.5 months, only 30 reached Israel), all observers agree that the number of firings plummeted from an average of around 380/month in early 2008 to single figures in September & October, a success rate of some 99%.

Goods shipments increased by 25% or so but remained at less than 1/5th of what Gazans considered normal.

On 4 November 2008 Israel entered Gaza and killed 6 Palestinians and there was retaliatory firing of 190 rockets in that month. However, on the expiry of the formal cease-fire on 19th Dec 2008, despite Israel having previously warned that only total peace would be acceptable, most published sources expected that the cease-fire would probably be renewed.

Rocket/mortars on Israel 2008.
Average 380/month drops to 3 per month as ceasefire holds.

Published position of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs) On December 27, 2008, after enduring an 8-year-long barrage of 12,000 rockets and having exhausted all other options, Israel launched a military operation against Hamas in Gaza. 'Operation Cast Lead' was limited to two objectives:

1. To stop the bombardment of Israeli civilians by destroying Hamas' mortar and rocket launching apparatus and infrastructure.

2. To reduce the ability of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza to perpetrate future attacks against the civilian population in Israel.

The "Hasbara Manual" from The Israel Project (TIP) re-issued in 2009: "Israel should not be bombing Gaza. I will repeat that. Israel should not be forced into a situation where they have to bomb Gaza. Likewise, Hamas should not be deliberately firing rockets into civilian areas of Israel. If the rockets stop, we can achieve that peace where Palestinian and Israeli children live in safety. p.47

Since 2005

In 2006 an election held in both parts of Palestine (ie Gaza and the West Bank) was won by Hamas, the electoral wing of an Islamist party once noted for suicide bombings (though these had ceased in 2005 and the tactic eventually repudiated). With Israeli supplied arms (including armoured cars) a putsch was attempted against this new government by Arafat's old party, Fatah. All elected and many other members of Hamas were rounded up in the West Bank but Hamas members fought off the coup in Gaza and remained in a form of control. Hamas was declared a terrorist organisation by most of the Western world.

Gaza, from which all settlers had been withdrawn in 2005, became a hub of militancy from which considerable numbers of home-made rockets were launched into Israel causing occasional casualties. Sporadic control was sometimes exerted by the new (but largely unfunded) government of Hamas while at other times launches were made in its name.

Operation Cast Lead

Opening attacks

With no news on the renewal status of the expired ceasefire, Israel's air-attack on 27 December came as a complete surprise and first targetted four police facilities (including a passing out parade of newly qualified policemen) resulting in the death of 99 policemen and nine members of the public. Further attacks concentrated on degrading the security provisions of the population and some 250 or 255 policemen were killed in total.

The circumstances of the attacks and Israeli governments report of July 2009 report confirm that the policemen were deliberately targeted and killed on the ground that, in the eyes of Israel, the police were part of the Palestinian military forces in Gaza.

Further attacks were made against buildings and persons of the Gaza authorities on the grounds that political and administrative institutions in Gaza are part of the "Hamas terrorist infrastructure".

Ground Invasion

The Israeli ground invasion began after 7 days on January 3, 2009 and encountered almost no formal resistance.

No attempt is known to have been made to find and rescue Gilad Shalit though some Israeli reports suggested that he, along with Hamas leaders, were hidden under the main hospital.

Completion and withdrawal

On 18 January Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire and completed its withdrawal on January 21.

Outcome

The invasion left at least 1,417 (PCHR) Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead (4 by 'friendly fire'). Tens of thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed as were 15 of Gaza’s 27 hospitals and 43 of its 110 primary health care facilities, 800 water wells, 186 greenhouses, and 10,000 family farms. About half a million people were left without running water and one million without electricity.

Israel paid $10.5 million to the UN for the damage it had caused to seven UN buildings. UN officials said they believed this was the first time Israel had paid them for damage done by their military.

Norman Finkelstein on a visit to Gaza in June 2009."... Two years ago it was Operation Summer Rains. Succeeded a few months later by Operation Autumn Clouds. It’s just nonstop destruction and death, and these names they dream up, if they had any honesty they would call it Operation Attila the Hun, followed by Operation Genghis Kahn, followed by Operation Murder, Incorporated."

UN Reports

Observers report, "Goldstone"

In September 2009, a UN special mission, headed by Justice Richard Goldstone, produced a report accusing both Palestinian militants and Israeli Defense Forces of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, and recommended bringing those responsible to justice. Israel rejected the report out of hand. The UN Human Rights Council endorsed the report with heavy criticism of Israel. The US Congress overwhelmingly rejected the report.

Membership of Mission

On 3 April 2009, the UN Human Rights Council established a Mission with the mandate “to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.” (The mandate had to be modified when it was pointed out that it made no reference to possible violations committed by parties other than Israel).

The President of the UNHRC appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were: Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun (2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations. Objections were raised to some members of this Commission.

Goldstone on Police deaths

The Goldstone Mission report (para 34) analysed the institutional development of the Gaza police since Hamas took complete control of Gaza in July 2007 and merged the Gaza police with the "Executive Force" it had created after its election victory. The Mission found that, while a great number of the Gaza policemen were recruited among Hamas supporters or members of Palestinian armed groups, the Gaza police were a civilian law-enforcement agency. The Mission concluded that the policemen killed on 27 December 2008 cannot be said to have been taking a direct part in hostilities and thus did not lose their civilian immunity from direct attack as civilians on this basis. The Mission accepts that there may be individual members of the Gaza police that were at the same time members of Palestinian armed groups and thus combatants. It concludes, however, that the attacks against the police facilities on the first day of the armed operations failed to strike an acceptable balance between the direct military advantage anticipated (i.e. the killing of those policemen who may have been members of Palestinian armed groups) and the loss of civilian life (i.e. the other policemen killed and members of the public who would inevitably have been present or in the vicinity), and therefore violated international humanitarian law. Further attacks on the police killed around 255 of them.

Goldstone on the strikes against infrastructure

The Mission examined (para 32) the strikes on the Palestinian Legislative Council building and the Gaza main prison (chap. VII), both of which were destroyed. The Mission rejected the stated position of the Israeli Government and armed forces representatives that justified the attacks on the basis that political and administrative institutions in Gaza are part of the "Hamas terrorist infrastructure". The Mission finds that there is no evidence that the Legislative Council building and the Gaza main prison made an effective contribution to military action. On the information available to it, the Mission finds that the attacks on these buildings constituted deliberate attacks on civilian objects in violation of the rule of customary international humanitarian law whereby attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives.

Goldstone "retraction"

Seven months after the publication of the "Goldstone Report", the chairman of the Mission, Judge Richard Goldstone (under intense personal pressure) wrote an article hailed by supporters of Israel as a retraction of the report to which he'd put his name. This change of view was repudiated by the other members of the committee.

In detail, Goldstone was changing one important allegation in the report, the view that Israel, as policy, had deliberately targetted civilians. The nearest thing that amounted to a retraction of anything said were the words "if I [Goldstone] had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document". There were no changes to the other specific allegations in the report - in particular the six broad findings of war-crimes viz (1) Siege on Gaza (2) Attack on political institutions and buildings of Gaza (3) taking insufficient measures to protect civilians (4) "indiscriminate" attacks (as distinct from "deliberate" attacks) (5) illegal weapons, such as white phosphorous and flechette missiles and (6) deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure.

Another part of the revised views of Richard Goldstone were that, despite the length (15 months) of Israel’s military investigations, which was "frustrating", nevertheless Israel had "appropriate processes" in place to produce a credible investigation on the charges. Goldstone's three colleagues disagreed, citing the same final UN report on the Gaza war (ie the one led by Judge Mary McGowan Davies, see below) published a month earlier (March 2010) which criticised Israel for the slow pace with which it conducted its investigations and for its refusal to address, or even answer questions on, some of the most serious allegations.

Assessment of investigations, 2nd/final UN report

In March 2011 the UN published a second report to "assess investigations for compliance with international standards of independence, impartiality, effectiveness, thoroughness and promptness." Led by Judge Mary McGowan Davies, this committee was refused any cooperation by Israel and refused access to Gaza - though it was able to hold video-teleconferences with victims.

Palestinians recounted their first-hand experience with Israeli criminal investigations and detailed their frustration with the Israeli investigating authorities. They gave "articulate voice" to their perception that Israeli justice mechanisms were completely ineffective and non-existent. The Committee criticised Israel for the slow pace with which it conducted its investigations and for its refusal to address some of the most serious allegations about its conduct.

Earlier, in September 2010, the Committee had reported that the investigation carried out by the Palestinian Independent Investigation Commission (PIIC) conformed to international standards and could be considered credible and genuine. However, the PIIC had been unable to complete either its investigation of rocket and mortar attacks against Israel or human rights violations in the Gaza Strip, having not received positive responses to requests for access from either Israel or the de facto authorities in Gaza.

With access to Gaza refused by Israel, the McGowan Committee understood that two investigations had been launched there, one into allegations directed at Israel and the other "on measures to redress alleged violations". Although even this information could not be substantiated, the Committee acknowledged that the de facto authorities (ie Hamas) had made efforts to collect information on alleged human rights violations committed by security forces. (They add "the Committee is aware of the fact that it is not uncommon for such cases to be resolved to the satisfaction of the families through out-of-court settlements"). The defacto authorities (Hamas) had not conducted any investigations into the launching of rocket and mortar attacks. The Committee considered that Hamas should make serious efforts to conduct criminal inquiries into all the allegations of grave violations of international law implicated by these attacks.

White phosphorous/HRW Report

Late in the conflict, 7 white phosphorous (and 3 HE) shells struck the UNRWA depot.
600+ civilians survived as attack failed to ignite fuel tankers the IDF had been repeatedly warned about.

In March 2009, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report on the extensive use of white phosphorous munitions by the Israeli forces entitled 'Rain of Fire - Israel's unlawful use of white phosphorous in Gaza.

Late in the operation, several obviously humanitarian facilities were hit by White Phosphorus munitions including (from the Summary, p.3): "... on January 15 ... white phosphorus shells struck the al-Quds Hospital and its administration building run by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society ... Also on January 15, at least three white phosphorus shells struck the main UNRWA compound in the Rimal neighborhood of central Gaza City ... At another well-marked UN facility – a school in Beit Lahiya sheltering roughly 1,600 displaced persons – the IDF air-burst at least three white phosphorus shells on January 17".

UNRWA’s Gaza director John Ging adamantly denied the IDF claim, made by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon that any Palestinian fighters had entered the compound, let alone fired from it at IDF soldiers.

UN officials said they made dozens of increasingly frantic phone calls with IDF officers as the shells got closer, asking them to stop, and the IDF did not warn UNRWA about Hamas activity in or near the compound. “They should tell us if there are militants operating in our compound or in our area,” Ging said. “The fact that they don’t, we take that as indicative of the fact that there wasn’t.”

The UNRWA shortly issued a statement saying that “Attacks Against the UN in Gaza Must Be Investigated”.

Amnesty International Report

In February 2009, Amnesty International published a report entitled "Fueling Conflict: Foreign arms supplies to Israel/Gaza . This report (like the later Goldstone Report) criticises both sides but also details the disparities in quantity, quality, technical sophistication and destructive power of the two parties.

The Hasbara Manual

In 2009 "The Information Project" (TIP) published the 116 page "2009 GLOBAL LANGUAGE DICTIONARY" on how best to defend Israel. Particularly emphasis is laid on "WORDS THAT WORK" and "WORDS THAT DONT WORK", as identified from the "Luntz National Survey, January 2009". The contents of this document were soon leaked and widely published. However, perhaps for reason of copyright, it is no longer available anywhere on the web and can only be accessed at the "Wayback Machine".

This substantial overhaul of a Manual first released in 2002 was released soon after "Operation Cast Lead" (or the "Gaza War" as Wikipedia calls it). Operation Cast Lead is mentioned in Appendix III p.108 with a "conflict by the numbers" demonstrating the humanity and generosity of the Israeli people to the suffering Palestinians.

However, most of the contents consists of essential tips for winning the battle for American hearts and minds:

"Clearly differentiate between the Palestinian people and Hamas. ... Hamas is a terrorist organization - Americans get that already. But if it sounds like you are attacking the Palestinian people (even though they elected Hamas) rather than their leadership, you will lose public support. Right now, many Americans sympathize with the plight of the Palestinians, and that sympathy will increase if you fail to differentiate the people from their leaders." p.5

"To [all Americans and many Europeans] Hamas is evil and hostile. But the Palestinian people are poor, unrepresented, and therefore without hope of peace. For now, your rhetorical quarrel needs to be with Hamas, not the people of Palestine. We have dedicated a whole chapter to language regarding the Palestinian people specifically. This chapter is about how to talk about Iran-backed Hamas, but we must stress again that they are two very different sides of the same Gaza coin to the public - so you need to keep both language approaches in mind, and know when to use each." p.33

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