Gaza War (2008–09)

White phosphorous shells explode over Gaza City. January 2009

Operation Cast Lead is the Israeli name for what Palestinians know as the Gaza Massacre but which is also known as the Gaza War.

The operation began with surprise air-strikes on the police and other security assets on 27 December 2008, followed by destruction of government buildings and other targets in the densely populated cities of Gaza, Khan Younis and Rafah.

Israel's stated aim in breaking the ceasefire was to stop the mortar and rocket fire that had occured previously. Israel was also concerned about arms import into the Gaza strip.

On January 3, 2009 Israeli ground forces invaded but met little formal resistance. On 18 January Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire and completed its withdrawal on January 21 2009. Over 1400 Gazan Palestinians and 13 Israelis had been killed and a great deal of damage done to Palestinian and UN property.

Background

2008 ceasefire

On 19th June 2008 an Egyptian-brokered truce came into effect between Gaza and Israel, though with no mutually agreed text. Israel warned that even a single rocket firing would be considered a violation and they would hold Hamas responsible. There must also be movement towards the release of Gilad Shalit before the Rafah crossing could be opened. Another Palestinian was killed by Israel (allegedly preparing to fire a rocket) just minutes before the cease-fire came into effect.

Gazans understood that, after two weeks of success, Israel would open the crossings and allow normal transfer of goods. Hamas agreed that for its part it would stop rocket attacks from its own armed groups and from others based in Gaza, including Islamic Jihad and Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades.

Hamas imposed its will and imprisoned some of those firing rockets/mortars for short periods. While there is minor disagreement about the figures (eg of 38 fired in 4.5 months, only 30 reached Israel), all observers agree that the number of firings plummeted from an average of around 380/month in early 2008 to single figures in September & October, a success rate of some 99%.

Goods shipments increased by 25% or so but remained at less than 1/5th of what Gazans considered normal.

On 4 November 2008 Israel entered Gaza and killed 6 Palestinians and there was retaliatory firing of 190 rockets in that month. However, on the expiry of the formal cease-fire on 19th Dec 2008, despite Israel having previously warned that only total peace would be acceptable, most published sources expected that the cease-fire would probably be renewed.

Rocket/mortars on Israel 2008.
Average 380/month drops to 3 per month as ceasefire holds.

Published position of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs) On December 27, 2008, after enduring an 8-year-long barrage of 12,000 rockets and having exhausted all other options, Israel launched a military operation against Hamas in Gaza. 'Operation Cast Lead' was limited to two objectives:

1. To stop the bombardment of Israeli civilians by destroying Hamas' mortar and rocket launching apparatus and infrastructure.

2. To reduce the ability of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza to perpetrate future attacks against the civilian population in Israel.

The "Hasbara Manual" from The Israel Project (TIP) re-issued in 2009: "Israel should not be bombing Gaza. I will repeat that. Israel should not be forced into a situation where they have to bomb Gaza. Likewise, Hamas should not be deliberately firing rockets into civilian areas of Israel. If the rockets stop, we can achieve that peace where Palestinian and Israeli children live in safety. p.47 in a section "WORDS THAT WORK".

2005 to 2008, Hamas control of Gaza

In 2006 an election held in both parts of Palestine (ie Gaza and the West Bank) was won by Hamas, the electoral wing of an Islamist party once noted for suicide bombings (though these had ceased in 2005 and the tactic eventually repudiated). With Israeli supplied arms (including armoured cars) a putsch was attempted against this new government by Arafat's old party, Fatah. All elected and many other members of Hamas were rounded up in the West Bank but Hamas members fought off the coup in Gaza and remained in a form of control. Hamas was declared a terrorist organisation by most of the Western world.

Gaza, from which all settlers had been withdrawn in 2005, became a hub of militancy from which considerable numbers of home-made rockets were launched into Israel causing occasional casualties. Sporadic control was sometimes exerted by the new (but largely unfunded) government of Hamas while at other times launches were made in its name.

Operation Cast Lead

Opening attacks

With no news on the renewal status of the expired ceasefire, Israel's air-attack on 27 December came as a complete surprise and first targetted four police facilities (including a passing out parade of newly qualified policemen) resulting in the death of 99 policemen and nine members of the public. Further attacks concentrated on degrading the security provisions of the population and some 250 or 255 policemen were killed in total.

The circumstances of the attacks and Israeli governments report of July 2009 report confirm that the policemen were deliberately targeted and killed on the ground that, in the eyes of Israel, the police were part of the Palestinian military forces in Gaza.

Further attacks were made against buildings and persons of the Gaza authorities on the grounds that political and administrative institutions in Gaza are part of the "Hamas terrorist infrastructure".

Ground Invasion

The Israeli ground invasion began after 7 days on January 3, 2009 and encountered almost no formal resistance.

No attempt is known to have been made to find and rescue Gilad Shalit though some Israeli reports suggested that he, along with Hamas leaders, were hidden under the main hospital.

Completion and withdrawal

On 18 January Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire and completed its withdrawal on January 21.

Outcome/casualties

The invasion left at least 1,417 (PCHR) Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead (4 by 'friendly fire'). Tens of thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed as were 15 of Gaza’s 27 hospitals and 43 of its 110 primary health care facilities, 800 water wells, 186 greenhouses, and 10,000 family farms. About half a million people were left without running water and one million without electricity.

Israel paid $10.5 million to the UN for the damage it had caused to seven UN buildings. UN officials said they believed this was the first time Israel had paid them for damage done by their military.

Norman Finkelstein on a visit to Gaza in June 2009."... Two years ago it was Operation Summer Rains. Succeeded a few months later by Operation Autumn Clouds. It’s just nonstop destruction and death, and these names they dream up, if they had any honesty they would call it Operation Attila the Hun, followed by Operation Genghis Kahn, followed by Operation Murder, Incorporated."

UN Reports

Observers report, "Goldstone"

In September 2009, a UN special mission, headed by Justice Richard Goldstone, produced a report accusing both Palestinian militants and Israeli Defense Forces of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, and recommended bringing those responsible to justice. Israel rejected the report out of hand. The UN Human Rights Council endorsed the report with heavy criticism of Israel. The US Congress overwhelmingly rejected the report.

Membership of Mission

On 3 April 2009, the UN Human Rights Council established a Mission with the mandate “to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.” (The mandate had to be modified when it was pointed out that it made no reference to possible violations committed by parties other than Israel).

The President of the UNHRC appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were: Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun (2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations. Objections were raised to some members of this Commission.

Goldstone on Police deaths

The Goldstone Mission report (para 34) found that, while a great number of the Gaza policemen were recruited among Hamas supporters or members of Palestinian armed groups, the Gaza police were a civilian law-enforcement agency. The Mission concluded that the policemen killed on 27 December 2008 cannot be said to have been taking a direct part in hostilities and had not lost their civilian immunity from direct attack.

The Mission accepted that there may be individual members of the Gaza police that were at the same time members of Palestinian armed groups and thus combatants. It concludes, however, that the attacks against the police facilities on the first day of the armed operations failed to strike an acceptable balance between the direct military advantage anticipated (i.e. the killing of those policemen who may have been members of Palestinian armed groups) and the loss of civilian life (i.e. the other policemen killed and members of the public who would inevitably have been present or in the vicinity), and therefore violated international humanitarian law. Further attacks on the police killed around 255 of them.

Goldstone on the strikes against infrastructure

The Mission examined (para 32) the strikes on the Palestinian Legislative Council building and the Gaza main prison (chap. VII), both of which were destroyed. The Mission rejected the stated position of the Israeli Government and armed forces representatives that justified the attacks on the basis that political and administrative institutions in Gaza are part of the "Hamas terrorist infrastructure". The Mission finds that there is no evidence that the Legislative Council building and the Gaza main prison made an effective contribution to military action. On the information available to it, the Mission finds that the attacks on these buildings constituted deliberate attacks on civilian objects in violation of the rule of customary international humanitarian law whereby attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives.

Goldstone "retraction"

Seven months after the publication of the "Goldstone Report", the chairman of the Mission, Judge Richard Goldstone (under intense personal pressure) wrote an article hailed by supporters of Israel as a retraction of the report to which he'd put his name. This change of view was repudiated by the other members of the committee.

In detail, Goldstone was changing one important allegation in the report, the view that Israel, as policy, had deliberately targetted civilians. Left without comment were all other allegations in the report - in particular the six broad findings of war-crimes viz (1) Siege on Gaza (2) Attack on political institutions and buildings of Gaza (3) taking insufficient measures to protect civilians (4) "indiscriminate" attacks (as distinct from "deliberate" attacks) (5) illegal weapons, such as white phosphorous and flechette missiles and (6) deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure. Goldstone stated "if I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document".

Another part of the revised views of Richard Goldstone were that, despite the length (15 months) of Israel’s military investigations, which was "frustrating", nevertheless Israel had "appropriate processes" in place to produce a credible investigation on the charges. Goldstone's three colleagues disagreed, citing the same final UN report on the Gaza war (ie the one led by Judge Mary McGowan Davies, see below) published a month earlier (March 2010) which criticised Israel for the slow pace with which it conducted its investigations and for its refusal to address, or even answer questions on, some of the most serious allegations.

2nd UN report, assessment of investigations

In March 2011 the UN published a second report to "assess investigations for compliance with international standards of independence, impartiality, effectiveness, thoroughness and promptness." Led by Judge Mary McGowan Davies the Committee was refused access to Israel and refused access to Gaza by Israel.

Victims testify

On the 9th and 14th of March 2011 the Committee was able to hold video-teleconferences with Israeli victims and witnesses, who provided information on the human and material damage suffered as a direct consequence of rocket attacks launched from the Gaza Strip. They described their injuries and the continuing physical and psychological effects of living near the border and noted their complete inability to gain redress for these crimes. On the 25th March held a conference with the father of Gilad Shalit who expressed concern about the psychological and physical well-being of his son after five years in detention and appealed for his immediate release.

On 15 March 2011, the Committee held video-teleconferences with Palestinians who recounted their first-hand experience with Israeli criminal investigations and detailed their frustration with the Israeli investigating authorities. They gave "articulate voice" to their perception that Israeli justice mechanisms were completely ineffective and non-existent. These victims and witnesses had suffered serious injuries during Operation Cast Lead and had cooperated fully with investigators, but after two years have heard absolutely nothing with respect to the status of their cases - apart from one family who had had learned from an official report that the criminal investigation into the death of their young children had been closed.

Conclusions - Israel

The Committee criticised Israel for the slow pace with which it conducted its investigations and for its refusal to address some of the most serious allegations about its conduct, and noted that it did not seem to have reviewed its rules of engagement after Cast Lead. Their earlier report (Sept 2010) had expressed strong reservations as to whether Israel’s investigations into allegations of misconduct were sufficiently prompt, with concerns that such investigations may have resulted in evidence being lost or compromised. There was no indication that Israel opened investigations into the actions of those who designed, planned, ordered and oversaw Operation Cast Lead.

Conclusions - Palestinian Authority in West Bank, Fatah

The Committee had earlier reported (Sept 2010) that the investigation carried out by the Palestinian Independent Investigation Commission (PIIC) conformed to international standards and could be considered credible and genuine. However, the PIIC had not been granted access either to Israel or, via Israel, to Gaza.

Conclusions - de facto authority in Gaza, Hamas

With access to Gaza refused by Israel, the McGowan Committee understood that two investigations had been launched there by the "de facto authority" (ie Hamas) one into allegations directed at Israel and the other "on measures to redress alleged violations". Although even this information could not be substantiated, the Committee acknowledged that the de facto authorities (Hamas) had made efforts to collect information on alleged human rights violations committed by their own security forces. The defacto authorities (Hamas) had not conducted any investigations into the launching of rocket and mortar attacks. The Committee considered that Hamas should make serious efforts to conduct criminal inquiries into all the allegations of grave violations of international law implicated by these attacks.

White phosphorous

Human Rights Watch Report: Rain of Fire

7 white phosphorous and 3 HE shells struck the UNRWA depot, miraculously failing to ignite fuel tankers the IDF had been repeatedly warned about

Late in the operation, several obviously humanitarian facilities were hit by White Phosphorus munitions including: "... on January 15 ... white phosphorus shells struck the al-Quds Hospital and its administration building run by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society ... Also on January 15, at least three white phosphorus shells struck the main UNRWA compound in the Rimal neighborhood of central Gaza City ... At another well-marked UN facility – a school in Beit Lahiya sheltering roughly 1,600 displaced persons – the IDF air-burst at least three white phosphorus shells on January 17". (From the Summary of the Human Rights Watch report, p.3, entitled Rain of Fire - Israel's unlawful use of white phosphorous in Gaza).

UN protests over use of White Phosphorus

UNRWA’s Gaza director John Ging adamantly denied the IDF claim, made by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon that Palestinian fighters had entered the compound, let alone fired from it at IDF soldiers.

UN officials said they made dozens of increasingly frantic phone calls to IDF officers as the shells got closer, asking them to stop, and the IDF did not warn UNRWA about Hamas activity in or near the compound. "They should tell us if there are militants operating in our compound or in our area" Ging said. "The fact that they don’t, we take that as indicative of the fact that there wasn’t."

The UNRWA issued a statement on the 24th Jan 2009 saying that "Attacks Against the UN in Gaza Must Be Investigated".

In May 2009, the UN called the way that White Phosphorus and high-explosive had been used on its headquarters "grossly negligent":

The Board found that any precautions that were taken by the IDF were clearly inadequate ... concluded that, given all the circumstances, the firing by the IDF of artillery with high explosives and projectiles containing white phosphorous into, over or in such close proximity to UNRWA headquarters as to cause injuries to persons and very substantial damage to property was grossly negligent and amounted to recklessness.

More details of the White Phosphorus attack on the UNRWA headquarters are in the Goldstone Report p.133.

Other reports criticising the use of White Phosphorus

The Amnesty report "Foreign arms supplies to Israel/Gaza" concerns weapons generally. Amnesty believes that rockets, artillery (including White Phosphorus) are all indiscriminate and illegal. Of White Phosphorus it says that "characteristics of a phosphorus wound are: chemical burns accompanied by extreme pain, damage to tissue ... the phosphorus may seep into the body and damage internal organs. In the long run, kidney failure and the spread of infection are characteristic ... In conclusion: a wound by an ordnance containing explosive phosphorus is inherently dangerous and has the potential to cause serious damage to tissue."

Amnesty International Report

In February 2009, Amnesty International visited Gaza and published a report that calls for the UN (ie the Security Council) to impose an immediate, comprehensive arms embargo on all parties to the conflict until there is "no longer a substantial risk that such arms could be used to commit serious violations of international law"..

The report details the arming of both sides but notes the disparity betweeen the quantity, quality, technical sophistication and destructive power of the weapons available to the two parties. It notes that a delivery of arms from North Carolina to Ashdod was made just before the operation and amounted to the equivalent of 989 standard (20ft) shipping containers of cargo, requiring a ship to carry at least 5.8 million lbs (around 2600 metric tons) of 'net explosive weight' that was required to have up to 12 US armed forces personnel on board. 4 days after the start of Israel's attacks on targets in Gaza, a second request was issued two shipments of 157 and 168 standard shipping containers of ammunition with a net explosive weight of nearly 1 million lbs. The 'Hazard Codes' of the cargo indicated that it included white phosphorus.

Amnesty takes the view that the use of indiscriminate weapons is itself a war-crime, though it classes both artillery and rocket fire as indiscriminate. Noting that there is a ban on incendiary weapons "deemed to be excessively Injurious or to have indiscriminate effects", they say that the repeated use of white phosphorus munitions in densely-populated civilian areas constitute a form of indiscriminate attack, and amount to a war crime.

Amnesty describe the use of flechettes (while not being prohibited weapons) in densely-populated civilian areas in Gaza as amounting to unlawful killing, while DIME and cube weapons are also mentioned.

Amnesty considers that the remit of the Goldstone Report was inadequate and calls for an independent investigation into all allegations of war-crimes.

Unexploded Ordnance

As a result of Operation Cast Lead considerable quantities of bomb-making material were left in Gaza. The United Nations Mine Action Service and the Mines Advisory Group (the Nobel Peace Prize winner from the UK) were able to enter Gaza and began collecting the UXOs (unexploded ordnance) that Israel's operation had left behind.

However, it took 14 months before Israel allowed the UN bomb experts and their equipment into Gaza to neutralize the stockpile, by which time the Hamas police (badly depleted by the attacks on them) had been unable to stop Palestinian militant groups arming themselves with the raw materials for IED (improvised explosive devices, a technology developed in Iraq and Afghanistan) and protect children from endangerment.

Initially, the bomb experts were able to make safe some white phosphorus shells by submerging them in water and covering them with sand. However, none of the UXO could be destroyed while Israel blocked the UN from bringing in equipment.

So the UXOs remained stockpiled, a danger to the nearby densely populated areas, and a temptation to militant groups. The munitions were guarded - by the same Gazan police force that Israel had targeted and tried to kill during the first days of Cast Lead, claiming that they were not a civilian force, but Hamas’ police.

In February 2009 the first ordnance is known to have got into the hands of Israel’s adversaries when Hamas publically displayed weapons it had collected, including unexploded one-ton bombs, half-ton bombs, 250 kilogram bombs, 30 mm bombs, several types of anti-tank missiles, illumination rounds, and the mines that Israel uses to blow up houses. Israel continued to block the UN from destroying these stockpiled UXOs.

In mid-February 2009, Israel issued a statement in response to the relief workers’ increasingly urgent protests:

"The conclusion that the IDF is not permitting the [UXO disposal] force’s entry lacks all factual basis, since no response has been issued. The issue is being considered with a favorable eye and the IDF’s answer will be given within a few days."

Haaretz reported on 17th Feb 2009 that the UN team’s "work is being held up because Israel has not approved the entry of its equipment nor an area for storing and neutralizing ordnance." On the same day, 17th Feb 2009, the BBC said that "the UN staff had been waiting for the Israeli army to allow them to bring specialist equipment and were also waiting for permission from the Israeli military to use two safe areas to dispose of the munitions." The New York Times on 18th Feb 2009 reported that the ordnance had been "awaiting safe disposal by a team working with the United Nations" but with no explanation of what had happened. Before "a few days" were up, five tons of Cast Lead UXOs had disappeared from the stockpile the UN was waiting to destroy. Israel blamed Hamas and announced that the incident was a blow to its security.

Despite five tons of stockpiled bombs having ended up in the hands of its sworn enemies, Israel still refused to allow the UN to deactivate the remaining UXOs. In late May 2009 - three months after the IDF’s "no response has been issued" statement, and under continuing pressure from the UN - Israel consented (but only "in principle") to stop blocking the UN.

By mid-September 2010 Israel realised that some of the white phosphorous shells it had left behind were being fired into southern Israel from Gaza but without acknowledging the fact they'd left the munitions available to the militants.

A UN Mine Action Service expert who was involved with the situation in the Gaza Strip at the time told Philip Weiss (respected blogger of Mondoweiss) with "an air of bewilderment", that Israel continually presented its obstruction of their work as "bureaucratic ... needing permission from senior rank etc." The "chances of getting a reply" the officer told him, "are about as likely as the election of Khaled Meshal as Israeli prime minister" - precisely zero.

Ten further months passed until on March 10 2010 Israel (technically not meant to have legal jurisdiction in Gaza, and claiming not to be occupying Gaza) finally allowed the bomb experts to bring their equipment into the Gaza Strip and begin the destruction of the remaining Cast Lead ordnance.

The Hasbara Manual explains "Cast Lead"

In 2009 "The Information Project" (TIP) published a 116 page "2009 GLOBAL LANGUAGE DICTIONARY" on how best to defend Israel. Particularly emphasis is laid on "WORDS THAT WORK" and "WORDS THAT DONT WORK", as identified from the "Luntz National Survey, January 2009". The contents of this document were soon leaked and widely published. However, perhaps for reason of copyright, it is no longer available anywhere on the web and can only be accessed at the "Wayback Machine".

This substantial overhaul of a Manual first released in 2002 came out soon after "Operation Cast Lead" (or the "Gaza War" as Wikipedia calls it). Operation Cast Lead is mentioned in Appendix III p.108 with a "conflict by the numbers" demonstrating both the humanity and generosity of the Israeli people to the suffering Palestinians and the very serious threats facing Israel.

The Manual is more than the means to win arguments, it explains in detail how to do Public Relations for Israel and win the hearts and minds of Americans and Europeans. Some sections are written with particular reference to Gaza:

"Clearly differentiate between the Palestinian people and Hamas. ... Hamas is a terrorist organization - Americans get that already. But if it sounds like you are attacking the Palestinian people (even though they elected Hamas) rather than their leadership, you will lose public support. Right now, many Americans sympathize with the plight of the Palestinians, and that sympathy will increase if you fail to differentiate the people from their leaders." p.5

"To [all Americans and many Europeans] Hamas is evil and hostile. But the Palestinian people are poor, unrepresented, and therefore without hope of peace. For now, your rhetorical quarrel needs to be with Hamas, not the people of Palestine. We have dedicated a whole chapter to language regarding the Palestinian people specifically. This chapter is about how to talk about Iran-backed Hamas, but we must stress again that they are two very different sides of the same Gaza coin to the public - so you need to keep both language approaches in mind, and know when to use each." p.33

Wikipedia article on this topic

This article will read very differently from the Wikipedia version. That's because the Wikispooks article is predominantly written around information published by semi-independent observers (such as the UN and human rights organisations). Only limited notice has been taken of the claims made by the protagonists, in line with the intended practice of Wikipedia articles, see their guidelines at Wikipedia:Reliable Sources.

The Wikipedia article is entitled the "Gaza War" and has an enormous number of references (435 at Oct 2011). However, examining the writing of the Wikipedia article could make it appear that, perhaps even more than usual in articles on the Israel/Palestine topic, only incompetent editors have had any input. It has had a huge amount of work done to it (well over 10,000 changes) but is tagged "neutrality disputed" (since June 2011) for reasons the editors don't seem to understand.

References used in the Wikipedia article shows a strong bias towards sources that are either pro-Israel or, in some cases, are actual mouth-pieces of the government that carried out this operation. Easy to check is the balance or imbalance of the references cited. For instance, the "Goldstone Mission" report has the most material and is amongst the most credible (at least as regards actual observations, even if the reader chooses to reject the relatively few opinions expressed). At Wikipedia, the Goldstone Report is barely referenced. "Challenges" to the Goldstone report (and Judge Richard Goldstone's supposed "retraction") get 12 mentions, while "Goldstone" (but under 3 different titles) is cited just 6 times. For comparison, "New Tactics Yield Solid Victory in Gaza" gets 7 citations, "Hamas seeks new doctrine after Gaza War failures" gets 9, and "Military Dimensions: The Israeli Arsenal Deployed against Gaza" gets 13 citations.

Past experience suggests that this Wikipedia article will continue to be so heavily biased towards an Israeli narrative that it will never even reflect what the Western media reported about the event.

Omissions from Wikipedia article

There are at least three major omissions from the Wikipedia article, all startling in different ways.

The 2nd UN report (above ) which looked at the "investigations" carried out by different parties is not mentioned. The committee, led by Judge Mary McGowan Davies reported in March 2011 and was controversially refered to in Goldstone's widely reported "retraction".

Secondly, Wikipedia fails to mention the affair of the unexploded ordnance left behind in Gaza.

The third (partial) omission is a discussion of the 6 month ceasefire. It is described throughout as a "lull" (or "Egyptian-mediated truce") with the details in a separate article. There are numerous references to "ceasefire", but all refer to events of the war, brief humanitarian breaks or the messy end of the operation, not the 6-month (and almost completely successful) period beforehand.

Remember to save this page

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Note that the 2009 "Hasbara Manual" is not easy to find, other than at the "Wayback Machine" here. The Wayback machine does not allow you to search the document online.