File:War-gaming the Baltics.pdf

 report  by David Shlapak, Michael Johnson

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Subjects: NATO, Russia, The Baltics, War games
Example of: War game
Source: Rand Corporation (Link)

Citation: Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. - Shlapak, David A. and Michael Johnson.

Wikispooks Comment

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This document is typically representative of the Rand Corporation's Orwellian inversion of who is the real aggressor in early 21st century Nato-Russian relations in that its executive summary begins as follows:

Russia’s recent aggression against Ukraine has disrupted nearly a generation of relative peace and stability between Moscow and its Western neighbors and raised concerns about its larger intentions.

It nonethless makes sobering reading in that, short of stationing another 7 combat-ready brigades, including three of heavy armour with full air-support and 'other enablers' in the Baltics - at an annual cost of $2.7 billion - They can not be defended against a determined Russian attack.

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Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank

Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics

Key Findings

As Presently Postured, NATO Cannot Successfully Defend the Territory of its Most Exposed Members

• Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga is 60 hours.
• Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad.

It Is Possible to Avoid Such Consequences

• Having a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades—adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities—might prevent such an outcome.
• While not sufficient for a sustained defense of the region or to restore NATO members’ territorial integrity, such a posture would fundamentally change the strategic picture from Moscow.

The Expense Needs to Be Balanced Against the Consequences of Not Rethinking the Current Posture

• While this deterrent posture would not be inexpensive in absolute terms, it is not unaffordable, especially in comparison with the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies.