Document:Second Front - The conflicts of interest in the anti-Hitler coalition
| The Soviet diplomat and historian Valentin Falin discusses the 1943 OSS secret plans to preempt the Soviet Union, including allying with Germany, with or without Hitler (pages 367-74 and 377-78, images added). To achieve this preemption now become the main content of the various contacts with the German opposition, which was intended to play the role of a "fifth column". |
Book by Valentin Falin, Office of Strategic Services dated 1995Subjects: 20 July plot, D-Day, Operation Unthinkable, Operation Rankin, World War 2
Source: Unknown
Rating
★ Start a Discussion about this document
Instead of unconditional surrender, Italy was granted an easily digestible truce at London's instigation. This turn of events was a source of inspiration for the high-ranking opposition in Germany. The anti-fascist revolution in Italy Churchill reduced to the elimination of Mussolini. The state structure of the regime remained untouched so that the "order" could be maintained and "spontaneous excesses" could be prevented.
In addition to Hitler, one demanded a little more of the German opposition, the removal of all his cabinet colleagues from power. One might even have kept insisting on that. For the beginning, however, the removal of the "Führer" was also sufficient in order not to spoil the general disposition by "exaggerated claims". Hitler's fall was to be the signal for declaring the war goals achieved and for reorienting the fronts to new tasks. It is no coincidence that a distinction was made between German and Prussian militarism. While no special interest was shown for the Italian Armed Forces in connection with some specific projects of the West, things were quite different with the Wehrmacht.
In the summer of 1943, the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) investigated whether it was expedient to "turn the whole might of the still strong Germany against them [the Soviet Union]". Donovan's Memorandum of August 20, 1943 and the accompanying document "Strategy and Policy: Can America and Russia work together?" has so far not received the attention from researchers that the President and the Prime Minister, together with their chiefs of staff, paid to them at that time.
This collective work of the OSS reflected the conceptual peculiarities of the US position on this war, the development of its strategy and policy. It allows us to better understand where lies the internal driving forces for the zigzag course of the United States up to 1945 and for the subsequent break with the legacy of the anti-Hitler coalition.
In the summer of 1943, the OSS assessed the state of relations between the Western powers and the USSR as a "crisis", which "urgently demands a review and definition of the strategy and policy that will determine the post-war order". "The future of Europe would be profoundly, perhaps decisively, influenced by the strength and geographical positioning of the armed forces in the cessation of official hostilities against Germany."
The "security of the United States" was cited as the most important American goal in Europe, and the primary requirement for this security was to "repel Germany's attempt to unite, subjugate and lead the forces of Europe". The second demand was that "after a defeat of Germany, no power alone and no group of powers in which we [the USA] have no strong influence may lead the forces of Europe".
If the US achieved neither one nor the other, "one can assume that we [the Americans] have lost the war". The ultimate goal of the United States was to "contribute to the creation of some other conditions in Europe that ensure peace, freedom and prosperity - for the benefit not only of Europe, but also for our own good". However, this can only be achieved through the "establishment of a (corresponding) power system".
However, the USA was not in a position to alone achieve its objectives in Europe. Therefore, they had the choice either to back down or to create effective alliances. Joint efforts of the USA and Great Britain were not enough for this. If possible, they should be supplemented by "the construction of all possible auxiliary forces (Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, Czech, Polish, Yugoslav, Greek and, in particular, French origin) before and after the expected landing of Allied troops in Western Europe".
The OSS considered the following war goals as a priority for the Soviet Union:
1. Main task: the security of the USSR.
2. The first indispensable condition of Russia's security: the defeat of Germany. And further, a thesis that was constantly present in the American analysis: "A strong and aggressive Germany undoubtedly poses a greater danger for the Russians than for the United States."
3. "The Soviet government is likely to insist on at least the following conditions for a settlement:
a) Restoration of the Soviet borders to approximately the level of June 1941;
b) the establishment of friendly or at least non-hostile governments of the USSR, which are not under the influence of other great powers, in all neighboring states (including Germany);
c) guarantees that no non-Soviet power or a grouping of powers in which the Soviet Union does not have a strong influence exercises overall domination over Europe."
4. Under certain conditions, the minimum goals can be extended to a maximum - "a significant expansion of the revolutionary Soviet system to the West along with the formation of new Soviet governments under the rule of Moscow". The establishment of such a regime in Germany "ensured Russia's domination over Europe".
"Given the discrepancy between our goals and opportunities, three alternatives are proposed for the direction of strategy and policy towards Germany and Russia:
1. To make an immediate attempt to settle our differences with the Soviet Union and to concentrate on the common interests that we have with this power.
2. America and Great Britain continue to pursue for a while a strategy and policy that are largely independent of the strategy and policy of the Soviet Union - in the hope that in this way they will achieve both the defeat of Germany and a strengthening of our positions in negotiations on a settlement that does not particularly favor Russia.
3. To try to turn the whole power of an unconquered Germany, which is still ruled by the Nazis or the generals, against Russia."
The authors of this document envisioned as optimal a course aimed at weakening Germany and the Soviet Union with "maximum concentration of (Anglo-American) forces in the crucial region of Western Europe". In view of the current and foreseeable dangers and imponderables inherent in every conceivable course in Europe, "whether in the hostilities or in negotiations with Germany or Russia, this seems to be our only good hope".
According to the assessment of the OSS, the Soviet Union was able to "maintain the current volume of military operations until the spring thaw of 1944, possibly even a little longer". However, by the summer at the latest, "the lack of food and fresh forces will lead to a significant decline in Russia's military capabilities".
At the same time, they also expected a "significant decline in Germany's military capabilities at the same time". To conclude a separate peace "with a strong and aggressive Germany" is "not in the interests of the Soviet Union", because this would fulfill for the Americans and the British the "only condition" (emphasis by the authors of the document), in which "for the United States and Great Britain the conclusion of an analogous peace [with the Germans] would be politically and morally feasible".
This is a very significant moment, which may shed light on another aspect of the maneuvers of the Western powers. In 1943, they challenged the USSR to take actions that would have provided the democracies with an external opportunity to do business with the Reich.
In the document, all the pros and cons of the "American alternatives" are weighed in detail. Under point A, it is planned to "turn Nazi or junker Germany against Russia". "There seems to be only one way to defeat the Soviet Union by strength alone: the entire might of a still powerful Germany (i.e. a Germany ruled by the Nazis or the generals). In order to prevent the subsequent domination of the whole of Europe by a Germany that conquered the USSR, the United States and Great Britain are obliged to "once again and without the help of Russia to go to the difficult, perhaps also unrealizable task of defeating Germany". The main difficulty was seen in how the public of Western countries could be adjusted to this idea and mobilized to implement this monstrous plan.
Under B, the authors of the document proposed "to pursue an independent strategy in the hope of a cheap victory over Germany and a better starting position for negotiations with Russia". The authors warned that "in the absence of well-balanced, energetic and successful efforts to change the emerging course of events, Anglo-American and Soviet strategy and policy will apparently pass from the current phase of relative independence and incipient competition to a new phase of sharp rivalry in the course of the following six or eight months". For this case, a forecast was made until the end of the upcoming winter:
a) The military actions of the USA and Great Britain on the mainland are likely to continue at about the current level. If one extended them to the Balkans without consultations with the USSR, then the "frictions with the Russians will intensify". On the whole, an "operation in the Balkans" was considered not very promising, because it did not promise to strengthen the American position in relation to the USSR and at the same time withdrew Allied troops from Western Europe. That is why the OSS advocated an attempt to use political means and air strikes to persuade Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to withdraw from the war against Russia. "Military-political activity [towards the Reich] may in part result in an attempt to separate the non-Nazis in Germany from the Nazis and other persons responsible for the war and to offer them conciliatory conditions if the Nazis and the generals are removed from power". b) The Soviet Union can continue its operations against Germany at about the present level and with significant success. "The Soviet government can then hope to defeat Germany first of all with its own forces and then to play the leading role in the reorganization of Germany and Europe. c) The German troops are likely to be transferred more and more from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. The following factors will contribute to this change: the absence of strong Allied pressure in the West, strong Russian pressure in the East and the widespread fear of the Germans about Russia and communism."
If the Russians are heading for a victory in the East and the German armed forces in the West are significantly weakened, a rapid development of the crisis may occur in the spring and summer of 1944. a) "The US and the UK could then launch an offensive with limited forces in the West. b) The Germans, who prefer an Anglo-American occupation to a Russian one, will hopefully offer relatively weak resistance in the West, but will try to keep their positions in the East. c) In this situation, power can pass from the Nazis to the German generals. d) The generals (who had reached the leadership) could ask the Western Allies for a ceasefire.
If this request is rejected, it is assumed that "the generals could hand over power to a centrist-socialist government" that would be acceptable to the USA and Great Britain. The Russian side should recognize this fait accompli as the basis for the cessation of hostilities on the Eastern Front and a subsequent agreement on the post-war settlement.
For the spring and summer of 1944, a rebellion of an energetic minority of German Communists and their sympathizers was also predicted, an unhindered advance of the Russians to the west with forces significantly exceeding those of Great Britain and the USA, an unfavorable negotiating position of the Western powers and, not excluded, a de facto conflict with the stronger armed forces of the USSR.
Under C, a "concentration of maximum forces in Western Europe and an immediate agreement with Russia" is proposed. The OSS was of the opinion that the minimum goals of the USA and the USSR were compatible. Although it is becoming clear that Germany will be defeated even without the direct participation of Anglo-American ground forces, the Soviet side has not lost interest in cooperation with the Western powers. An expensive landing on the continent, the authors of the document stressed, "would be the only action that would be suitable to guarantee the Western powers from the outset a promising position for the enforcement of a compromise settlement with Russia and the basis for the United States, Great Britain and Russia to occupy Germany together and jointly guarantee compliance with the agreements".
The implementation of this variant depended to a decisive extent on "the scope, timing and a previous agreement with Russia". A delayed landing could lead to the Soviet Union turning away from the Allies and setting up an "extremist government. The early intervention of the Allied forces, while the USSR still felt the need for a coordinated approach, would pave the way for an understanding of a wide range of issues in which all three powers were extremely interested.
A list of twelve such issues includes: "the recognition by the Soviet Union of American and British claims to a number of newly acquired strategic bases", basically in exchange for the recognition by the West of "Soviet claims to a significant part of the territories annexed by Russia in 1939/40".
If an attempt to reach an agreement with the USSR should fail, "the continued open rivalry would not be sharper than without this attempt to come to an agreement". The OSS emphasized the idea that the opening of a second front was "an indispensable element of any compromise policy towards the Soviet Union". Moreover, it was noted that even in the case of a separate strategy and policy towards Germany, it would not work out without "large-scale operations of the Allies in Western Europe
Looking ahead, we note that the practical course of the USA to Quebec, where these considerations from Donovan's office were discussed, represented a combination of the various alternatives. At the same time, as the facts clearly show, the president was more inclined to Variant C, while his environment, the apparatus of the State Department, the War Department and the generals warmed up more for the ideas of variant B (and to some extent also variant A).
From item 9 of the Protocol "Military Considerations in relations with Russia", which was adopted at the meeting of the Joint Anglo-American Staff on May 20. We learn that Admirals William Leahy and Ernest King, Generals George Marshall and Henry Arnold (USA), as well as General Alan Brooke, Admiral Dudley Pound and the Chief Marshal of the Air Force Charles Portal (Great Britain) discussed the question of whether the Germans "would not help" with the invasion of Anglo-American troops in Germany "to repulse the Russians" This consultation was held at the Quadrant conference in Quebec from August 19 to 24 held in 1943.
What did they agree on?
Regardless of which decision was ultimately reached, the fact speaks for itself that the question of the method and timing of the betrayal of the ally and the cause of the anti-Hitler coalition was put up for discussion at all. At a time when the Soviet Union was engaged in the most serious battles to break up Hitler's Zitadelle offensive, the Western powers weighed how they could complicate the life of the USSR and impose additional burdens beyond measure in the fight against the aggressors. What Leahy, Brooke and others had previously dealt with individually and even secretly, they were now discussing without any shyness in a fairly large circle, without fearing that they might be called to order.
At the latest since that time, American and British diplomacy, as well as the intelligence services, saw an extremely important field of their activity in creating the conditions for the unhindered entry of the troops of the USA and Great Britain into Germany and the countries occupied by it. To achieve this goal now become the main content of the various contacts with the German opposition, which was intended to play the role of a "fifth column". The ideal variant was a landing, during which the commanders of the few Wehrmacht units stationed in the west handed over the keys of the cities and fortresses without a fight. The Nazi military themselves were to be kept in reserve - in the event that there were complications with the USSR.
[pages 374-377 omitted]
At the Quebec conference, in parallel with "Overlord", the successor to "Sledgehammer" was also discussed - the renewed plan for a special landing of the Allies on the continent in three modifications, now called "Rankin":
Case A: Comprehensive weakening of the spirit and combat power of the German troops, which makes it possible to invade the existing Anglo-American troops before the date set for Operation Overlord. Case B: Withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories. Case C: Unconditional surrender of Germany and cessation of organized resistance in northwestern Europe." In Appendix 1 to the main document (43) 41 it is stated: "It is within the realm of possibility that the danger of a complete defeat on the Russian front can persuade them [the Germans] to abandon the occupation of Western- and possibly also to completely abandon southern Europe in order to throw all available forces against the Russian threat, thus delaying the final defeat and achieving that Germany is occupied by Anglo-American rather than Russian troops."According to "Case C", it was planned to occupy the territories in the shortest possible time, which should make it possible to control "compliance with the stipulations of unconditional surrender". The geographical determination of these areas was carried out generously. For the American troops, France, Belgium and Germany were planned, from the Swiss border to Düsseldorf. The British were to occupy the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and northern Germany from the Ruhr to Lübeck. According to the "Rankin" plan, it was planned to establish a joint Anglo-American civil administration for Germany and all the countries to be liberated.
In this version, the plan was sanctioned by Roosevelt and Churchill in Quebec. However, the planners had not yet fired their powder with this.
The variant of November 8, 1943 was based on troops of the USA and Great Britain having to occupy the following points immediately: in northwest Germany - Bremen, Lübeck and Hamburg, in west Germany - the Ruhr area and Cologne, in central Germany - Berlin and Dresden, in southern Germany - the area around Stuttgart and Munich, in Italy - the cities of Turin, Milan, Rome, Naples and Trieste with their surroundings, in southeast Europe, finally Budapest, Bucharest and Sofia.
"Symbolic forces" were to be sent to The Hague, Brussels, Lyon, Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade and Zagreb. In a third stage, they wanted to take control of Denmark, the Kiel area, in Greece, Thessaloniki and the island of Rhodes. The leitmotif was above all: "to preempt the Russians". Not a coordinated approach with the USSR, but countermeasures. Unconditional surrender of Germany not to the anti-Hitler coalition, which also included the Soviet Union, but to the USA and Great Britain.
Rating
