Document:Russian Federation (RF) Sanctions
| shopping list of desired sanctions, maybe written by an Ukrainian |
wanted sanctions strategy by Integrity Initiative dated 26 December 2018Subjects: shopping list of desired sanctions
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/4
Source: Anonymous (Link)
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Russian'Federation (RF) Sanctions
13.01.2015
Russian Federation (RF) Sanctions
Contents
MAIN AIM(S)
Behaviour change? Peace with Ukraine (UKR)? Return Crimea? Regime change? Other?
POTENTIAL LEVERS
Civil society e.g.
• Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia
• Ukraine Crisis Media Center ; Project Mirotvorets ; Project Likbez
• Global Witness (e.g. V.F. Yanukovich & UKR corruption)
Commerce e.g.
• Suspend/expel RF from G8, WTO, ITO & similar organisations
• Expand existing sanctions regimes to anyone helping RF break them
• Ban RF delegates from attending commercial conferences abroad
• Suspend commercial delegation exchange visits
Culture e.g.
• Suspend operations of Pushkin House, Russkiy Mir & similar organisations
• Suspend British Council operations in RF
• Suspend visits by Bolshoi & Kirov Ballets, & similar groups
• Suspend cultural delegation exchange visits
• Repatriate dependents of “top 100” RF Government officials studying abroad
Diplomacy e.g.
• Visa bans for “top 100” RF Government officials & immediate families
Economics e.g.
• Expand existing sanctions regimes to anyone helping RF break them
Finance e.g.
• Freeze assets of “top 100” RF Government officials & immediate families
• Publicise location of illicit assets in their name where possible
• Ban RF delegates from attending financial conferences abroad
• Ban RF companies from launching IPOs in West
• Western divestment of RF related investments (e.g. Heath, Telegraph, 23.07.2014)
Individuals e.g.
• Visa bans for individuals & relatives helping RF break sanctions regimes
• Freeze assets of such individuals & immediate families
• Publicise location of illicit assets in their name where possible
Industry e.g.
• Suspend RF companies from international industrial associations
• Ban RF delegates from attending industrial conferences abroad
• Suspend industrial delegation exchange visits
Information e.g.
• Make ordinary Russians the direct focus of & audience for Western media
• Increase spending on BBC World Service, BBC Monitoring coverage of RF
• Fund removal of Kyiv Post, The Times, The New York Times, etc., paywalls
• Sanction RF media in West for not complying with regulators standards
• Fund citizen journalism in UKR & RF to expose RF information operations
Intelligence e.g.
• Simultaneously expel every RF intelligence officer and air/defence/naval attaché
from as many countries as possible (global Operation FOOT, 1971)
• Increase scrutiny of RF religious, academic, think[tank & business links in West
Military e.g.
• Suspend military/defence delegation visits/exchanges
• Suspend all defence[related sales to RF
• Suspend RF from international defence[ & security[related fora
• Expand sanctions on/to RF companies (in)directly profiting from UKR invasion
Politics e.g.
• Make ordinary Russians the direct focus of & audience for Western politicians
• Suspend RF & any other State helping it evade sanctions from international fora
Sports e.g.
• Expose RF corruption of bidding processes for international sports events
• Advocate view that RF unworthy of hosting such events
• Publicise RF labour violations when building venues for such events
• Publicise RF programmes that encourage athletes to engage in doping
Security e.g.
• Simultaneously expel every RF intelligence officer and air/defence/naval attaché
from as many countries as possible (global Operation FOOT, 1971)
• Arrest every known RF agent — not least “agents of influence”
• Publicise arrest of key RF “agents of influence”
• Increase funding & operational tempo of counter[intelligence operations against RF
• Revive Lists “N”, “U” & “X” fully
Technology e.g.
• Ban all sales of dual[use technology or that deemed strategic in nature to RF (e.g. CoCom during Cold War & now Wassenaar Arrangement)
• Revive Lists “N”, “U” & “X” fully
• Suspend RF companies from international technological associations
• Ban RF delegates from attending technology conferences abroad
• Suspend technology delegation exchange visits
Other?
POLICY"OPTIONS
Do nothing
Trivial
Halfway
Serious
Severe
Conflict
Other?
BROADER CONSIDERATIONS
Culture e.g.
• State interests vs individual “rights”
History e.g.
• Siege mentality because of Western “predators”
Informatione.g.
• RF is an intelligence State: intelligence officers running it like an intelligence service
• Heavy RF focus on intelligence gathering to infiltrate & keep up with West
• Need to acquire, control & manipulate information is the KEY RF weakness
• Reputation of State/Government institutions & traditions also important to RF
Psychology e.g.
• V.V. Putin (& his close circle): survived abysmal post-WW2 conditions
• These men eventually chose security, intelligence &/or military careers
• These men see themselves as survivors: they believe that nothing West can do is worse than what they have already endured in life
• To Putin & Co., UKR is another “fight” RF must survive
Religion e.g.
• Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) long coHopted by State
• From top down, ROC riddled with Soviet/RF intelligence officers & agents
• RF aggressively expanding role & use of ROC to promote State interests abroad
• ROC in most ways State Orthodoxy, propagating State views to every congregation
Other?
MOST FOR THE LEAST?
• Simultaneously expel every RF intelligence officer and air/defence/naval attaché
from as many countries as possible
• Arrest every known RF agent — not least “agents of influence”
• Ban visas for “top 100” RF Government officials & immediate families
• Freeze their assets where possible
• Publicise location of illicit assets in their names where possible
• Repatriate children of “top 100” RF Government officials studying abroad
FINAL THOUGHTS
• Russians are proud & intrinsically about “face”. They crave respect/admiration above almost all else. Absent that, being feared will do; they often confuse the two.
• RF is not a “normal” country in most senses of the word. Crucially, Russians see life & the world very differently from us. While economics is of course important to them, in the broadest sense Russians are not nearly as driven by economic & financial considerations.
• Despite contradictions with how they view both themselves & the world, Russians generally feel part of a Spiritual Mother Russia of infinite patience.
• A sense of destiny & uniqueness contributes to RF ability to absorb enormous hardship when necessary, both collectively & individually. History, climate, religion & tradition all contribute to Russians’ resilient mindset.
• For most Russians, daily life has long been a struggle (not least for survival). Not having Western goods & services will not necessarily be much of an issue in the medium to long term, though no doubt this will initially cause inconvenience.
• The 1998 financial crash & RF’s initial reactions to the 2008[09 banking crisis are helpful in assessing RF responses/strategies to cope with post[Crimea sanctions.
• However, it is important to remember that the RF Government is not the RF people. Generally, they are savvy & ever aware of their history (including the brutality of current & former rulers). Driving a wedge between Russians & Government is key.
• Putin has remained popular so far for two main reasons. One: after the chaos of ~1990[94 & 1998[2000, he has restored relative stability, prosperity & pride as far as many Russians are concerned (though primarily because of high energy prices). Second: this public perception has been largely shaped by Government’s increasing monopoly of the domestic information space since 2000.
• But too well, Russians know the “baggage” that Putin & his close circle — almost entirely Soviet[era security/intelligence officers — carry: bureaucratic mindsets of oppressing/repressing ordinary people, seen as expendable by the State.
• Fear of renewed uncertainty, chaos & ultimately the State is what still keeps most Russians in check — for now.
• In speeches & media pieces, Putin & Co. tend to tell us what they aim to do & why.
• Essentially, they aspire to all the benefits of Western prosperity but on Russian terms, & restore RF as a core player in world affairs, unconstrained in its right to assert its national interests.
• So long as these (unrealistic) criteria are not met, Putin’s RF will continue to act as a “spoiler state” for the West in international affairs.
