View source for Document:Moldova- suggested priorities for consideration by clusters and UK staff in light of recent and ongoing developments

{{Document
|title=Moldova- suggested priorities for consideration by clusters and UK staff in light of recent and ongoing developments
|type=Strategy Document
|authors=Integrity Initiative
|leaked=Yes
|publication_date=26 December 2018
|source_name=Anonymous
|source_URL=https://www.cyberguerrilla.org/blog/operation-integrity-initiative-british-informational-war-against-all-part-4/
|subjects= Moldova,clusters, making and spreading of outputs
|constitutes=Integrity Initiative/Leak/4
}}

=Moldova- suggested priorities for consideration by clusters and UK staff in light of recent and ongoing developments=


The following proposals are not given in order of priority. They draw
especially on the regular inputs of Artur Gherman, and are based on
the assumption and hope that he would be a full contributor to
several suggested outputs and keeping high readiness for delivery of
those outputs with timely, accurate and well analysed and
forwarding looking assessments.

See below - <b>Initial topics for central and cluster distributions</b> – for
suggested subjects suitable for grabbing early attention.

==Proposed format and nature of outputs==

Bullet points, in depth summaries or full scale articles on how
Moldova’s internal situation is exploited for the purpose of building
Russian and Russian speaking influence in EU, EU applicant and
Eastern Partnership countries, and in undermining NATO.
Similar podcasts or offers of interviews on TV and radio on these
issues, especially to coincide with NATO / EU diplomatic summits,
Russian or NATO Black sea exercises, Russian – Turkish cooperation
events, especially in light of sensitive 100 years and 75 years
anniversaries in Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and the northern shore
of the Black sea.

Produce a report on Europol initiatives and publicity documents on
Moldova centred or linked criminal activities which are potentially
linked with military or political influence buildings issues in the EU,
especially the greater Mediterranean and the Maghreb.
Cascade all of these above through relevant clusters, especially
Spain, Portugal, France and Italy, but also Belgium ( Brussels based
EU Disinformation Unit, and NATO) and Netherlands ( Europol).
Update this report at regular intervals ( at least quarterly- not an
onerous task). Such a report to be capable of informing short notice
and long-term approaches to insert material in radio and tv
documentaries or entertainment programmes where Moldovan /
Romanian / Greater Odessa (i.e. Ukrainian AND Russian linked )
issues could firm a basis for productions, or be inserted into them,
or to be used for complementary comments about the facts behind
the fiction. Recent “ Moldovan linked” plotlines have included the
Hollywood film “ The Whistleblower” ad the French TV series
“Spiral”. The soon to go into production series of “ The Night
Manager 2” and “ McMafia” provide opportunities as does anything
related to the recent Damien Lewis book “ Operation Manhunt”.
Use the Banca di Economii 2015 embezzlement scandal to highlight
how Moldova is intimately linked to the Russian and Ukrainian Deep
states. This would be especially appropriate for cluster publicity in
Italy, and in Scotland given the use of Scottish Limited partnerships
and Moldovan linked oligarch use of the private schools system
there.

On financial matters and engagement with banks and their
regulators and associated international and, especially, EU
institutions, Moldova is used as a transit hub for large scale financial
frauds and money laundering operations. See <b>overall strategic
background.</b>

==Means of deliveries and likely customers==

Close links with Customers are likely to ease delivery methods and
the topics and strategic background issues listed below are ones that
are increasingly impacting on other EU MS, especially in the southern
rim.

The mainstream print and online media in UK and North America
have covered the 2015 Banca di Economii case in Moldova with UK,
Cyprus, Israel ( too often forgotten) and Ukraine and Russia. The New
York Times was especially prominent on this. The IoS contacts on The
Times ( London) would also be potential conduits especially given
their extensive work on Malta and Spain, where Moldovan criminal
groups presence has been noted alongside the Tambov Group from
St. Petersburg. Edward Lucas is especially aware of the allegations of
the latter’s’ reported close and long term links with the Kremlin.
Colin Freeman reported, from this writer’s urging s
Given recent very large - scale cocaine seizures in Romania and the
immediate post Crimea seizures of heroin shipments there which
had transited Odessa and then Transnistria or directly to Western
Moldova would also give opportunities for interest in Italy and
Germany. The former has high level organised criminality links which
exploit the opportunities for false exports from the EU (Romania) for
the purposes of fraudulent tax rebates, these made much easier by
lack of verification of Moldovan transits or re-exports to Ukraine via
Transnistria ( a situation long well known in all these countries and
Russia, and fully exploited).

The BBC, which extensively covered Banca di Economii ( file on Four
October 2015) and corruption in the Odessa region ( Panorama 2018)
might also be interested, especially given in the light of McMafia 2
and the Night Manager 2 that there have been several books about
Russian state protected criminality which have been set in Moldova,
especially Transnistria, and some of which dealt with influence
buying in the Western Balkans, the UK and especially Germany and
Switzerland (see the Charles Cumming “Kell “ books, especially “ A
Colder War” – scheduled to be televised = and the “ Alex Dryden”
trilogy which started with “ Red to Black”, the latter works being
well known in EU diplomatic circles and in Moldova.

==Overall strategic background==

Transnistria remains a frozen conflict. Several of the separatist
leaders in Crimea in 2014 were from ethnic Russian families settled
in the territory after World War 2 and the Russian peacekeeping
force there is likely to maintain close links with “ former” Soviet era
GRU men, often ethnically Russian or even Russian citizens, in the
Odessa region which shares a border with both Western Moldova
and Transnistria. This gives Russia a toe hold in both Odessa and in
Tiraspol ( Transnistria) and, less openly, in Chisinau and onwards into
Romania. Political, business and criminal interests ( all extensively
linked) do cooperate across these international boundaries and the
internal demarcation lines. These networks frequently meet on the
Odessa coast in spring and summer and exploit Customs free zones
in Moldova and especially the Giurgiulesti port on the tiny stretch of
the Danube River allocated to Moldova. Much investment is
siphoned off in bribes through the complex chains of companies set
up in such as Cyprus, Malta, Austria, Luxembourg, Latvia and the UK
and its dependencies, especially Belize, and more recently in Dubai
and sovereign territories such as Mauritius, Seychelles and Singapore
as well as the USA ( Little Odessa in Brighton Beach, New York, and
Delaware as well as Florida, Nevada and Wyoming). Italian
businesses often disguise bribes and tax evasion through mispriced
or wholly fictitious exports of goods and services to Romania and
then to Moldova or through it to Ukraine and Russia. The modus
operandi and the nature of distribution of the proceeds is somewhat
similar to those seen in the Magnitsky case.

The leaderships in Chisinau have recognised growing Russian threats
and are hedging their bets by stalling progress towards EU urged
clean ups. Despite the Moscow links in the Banca di Economii case,
the authorities have very recently been brazen enough to have the
election of a pro - reform ( i.e. anti-Russian) candidate as mayor of
Chisinau annulled. They also know how much influence and bribe
potential Russia has in Odessa, so cannot be entirely sure it will
remain fully Ukrainian physically and in influence. Key oligarchs such
as, above all, Vladimir Plahotniuc, remain the powers behind the
throne and their multiple nationalities and ability to withstand
criminal investigations including in Italy highlight just how little has
changed, and the limitations of conventional law enforcement
approaches to minimising corruption and thereby directly limiting
Russian influence. These conclusions are also supported by the
limited progress in recovery of assets from the Banca di Economii
embezzlement, despite law enforcement agencies criminal
investigations in a number of countries including Scotland.

A fresh approach is needed.

==Initial topics for central and cluster distributions==

<b>It is suggested a multi lingual and multi- national publicity
approach might move things forward. Particularly if it involves
inviting Ukraine providing more, and more detailed information
which can be used publicly or privately to highlight Russian bribery
and capital flight, and the presence of the proceeds in cluster
countries. Such information may only be provided if Ukraine has
real assurances of asymmetric support in military materiel and
training, financial assistance and the creation in advance of a
comprehensive NATO / EU central / EU MS counter disinformation
programme, to be implemented immediately to deal with
inevitable Russian measures or counter - counter measures.</b>

<b>In Italy and, especially, Spain, the suggestions of links with the
Calabrian Mafia and the Venezuelan regime regarding failure to
effectively interdict cocaine trafficking to the Greater
Mediterranean including the Black Sea is, in the longer term, likely
to identify strong grounds for reasonable suspicion and, more
easily, of large scale corruption and bribery in relation to arms
trafficking in South America and Africa.</b>

<b>Russian linked Moldovan and Romanian criminality in Iberia and
Italy may provide the impetus for media groups and both domestic
and Anglosphere NGOs to start picking up the torch here, although
the flame would have to be carried for a long time.</b>

==Factors taken into account in this assessment==

Caution is needed here. As Artur Gherman will confirm, the strategic
significance of Moldova has not been fully appreciated, a part of a
wider failure by the EU and EU Member States, with exceptions, to
recognise the scale of Russian involvement and influence.
Highlighting these weaknesses will involve much tact. This is
especially so in Italy given the linguistic ties with Romania and
Moldova and the Russian sympathies of the new government. Spain
and the prosecutor’s drive against Russian criminals may therefore
be a better first location outside the English-speaking world.

Grounds for optimism in recognising the situation more completely
are the growing NATO and EU awareness of the strategic importance
of the Black Sea as seen by naval patrols by alliance warships and
greater concerns about Turkey. Sir Adam Thomson has recently
highlighted changes in the EU Brussels culture in relation to the
Common security and defence policy. There is greater awareness
that such matters cannot be left entirely to NATO. The EU has also
had time to digest the results of the 2015 Cooperation agreement
which granted visa free travel throughout the Schengen Zone for any
Moldovan citizen with a biometric passport, i.e. A document whose
issue is under the control of the Chisinau government, and not the “
authorities” in Transnistria. This is a very important information tool,
though not all other EU MS’ authorities may be aware that its impact
is not as great as it might seem, given that many ethnically Romanian
Moldovans already have full EU movement and working rights
through entitlement to Romanian citizenship.

The developments regarding EU CSDP issues are mirrored in a very
recent setting up of a new EU multi law enforcement operational cell
to be much more directly involved in the command and control of
the central Mediterranean refugee operation and the increasingly
frequent Europol reports on Romanian and Moldovan criminality in
the Mediterranean countries, these typically involving well
structured thefts and counterfeiting, but more ominously VAT
carousel fraud where the Romanian / Moldovan links make the
region ideally suited to major involvement. The EU central
institutions are making it increasingly clear they need to get more
closely involved as the losses are very high and the current reaction
times too slow. These frauds depend upon, and parallel the
structures of, bribery and corruption through capital flight and “
laundromats”, such as the Azeri money laundering networks recently
identified as using accounts and brass plate company registrations in
Malta. Artur Gherman’s alert on Henley & Partners highlighting a
similar “ golden visa” programme for Moldova’s new citizenship for
visas will undoubtedly be used on a large scale for capital flight and
other white-collar activities and will offer opportunities for Chisinau
and Tiraspol based elites to take bribes and act on behalf of Russian
and Russian speaking influences.

Having made these points about the growing central EU awareness
of Moldova’s position as a crossroads and multiple nationality and
passport country, and understanding of it, there are still widespread
gaps in the spread of awareness and so there is a long way to go. For
that reason, F&CO advice should be sought in relation to any
approaches to EU central institutions including the EEAS in Brussels,
Chisinau and Kyiv ( any look at Moldovan issues really needs to take
account of Romanian and both Odessa and Kyivian Ukrainian factors.
Embassies in the clusters’ home states and, particularly, the OSCE in
Chisinau where they have been strong Mission Heads (such as Mike
Scanlan of the USA) are other potential valuable sources. The EEAS
has recognised past missions to the immediate region such as EUAM
in Kyiv and EUBAM especially in Odessa with a Moldovan presence,
initially significantly so, have been largely tactical and flagships
rather than operationally significant. They may be reluctant to see
the Initiative and its representatives treading on ground the EC
hasn’t covered too well.