

# **A tale of three atrocities, version 7.0**

**by**

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Mr Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, the White House,  
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America

The CIA, Iran and Pan Am 103

This letter should lead to the abolition of the CIA.

Two hundred and seventy people died that one man should reach the White House and not have his candidacy brought down in flames by Iran. The decision to destroy the *Maid of the Seas* (Pan Am 103 of 21 December 1988) was made by the White House, following a secret agreement between a senior US government official and five Iranian emissaries, and implemented by the CIA, though the initial destructive device, sufficient to destroy the *Maid*, was stuck on the interior surface of baggage container AVE4041 PA by an Iranian hand.

There was no Libyan rôle whatsoever. Mr Megrahi is a complete innocent, the unfortunate victim of a vicious CIA plot.

Pan Am 103 was destroyed by an unknown Iranian using a plot that was conceived developed and implemented by the CIA. Two known CIA officers, at least, are guilty of conspiracy to murder, (and in some jurisdictions would face a charge of murder) for, if as I believe they did not start the destruction of the *Maid*, they ensured by acts of commission and omission that that aircraft was completely destroyed in the air, its remains landing on the town of Lockerbie, a small community in the Scottish Borders.

I have been working on this theory for nearly twenty years, and it relies solely on material in the public domain, with a couple of minor exceptions, which I clearly note.

The British angle is almost completely invisible, as its intelligence agencies do not seek the dangerous path of publicity the CIA craves.

I have set myself more than the task of showing Mr Megrahi is not guilty but put forward here a theory which entirely exonerates him for he is the victim of a brutal US inspired plot, which is better shown by demonstrating what that plot was, rather than by trying to tear apart the tangled of muddled information that convicted him.

Please would you consider what I have written.

Yours faithfully,

Charles Norrie

## The seventh version of “A tale of three atrocities”

This is my seventh iteration through the Lockerbie story, and one many may find the most unsatisfactory. It makes several **apparently** unsupportable claims, of which the evidence is there, if only it is read carefully and precisely. For example, much will be made of the **fact** that there was a second explosion aboard the *Maid* which was large enough to cause it to break into pieces. How do we know? It is reported in the AAIB published report in at least three places, but in such a way to persuade the casual reader of the opposite conclusion, a technique of report writing the British Civil Service is superbly skilled at. Then there is the debris trail map which shows two distinct fragmentation streams. The most logical way to arrive at two different streams is by saying there were two separate explosions.

It differs from version 6 in that it proposes a slightly different mechanism for the triggering of the second device the *materiel* on the CIA pallet

Why has this not come out? Firstly, the Zeist trial process was nothing to do with establishing the truth of the downfall of the aircraft, but only of the guilt of the two accused. The defence lawyers made no substantial criticism of the account of the disaster given in the heavily bowdlerized AAIB (UK Air Accident Investigation Branch) report, and the Scottish Crown Office is relying on that failure deny papers to Mr Megrahi's counsel, even today. The trial was simply a process by which Mr Megrahi could be convicted and was, and was nothing to do with establishing anything else. The evidence of a second explosion would not have helped in that endeavour and would indeed have been positively unhelpful. Mr Megrahi could not have had access to the CIA pallet, as I shall maintain (and is obvious), and the elements of the second explosion started in Cyprus or the Lebanon and Malta is 1700 km from the former.

### The explosion on the CIA pallet disproves every other theory

That explosion on a CIA pallet will disprove any other theory. It cannot just not be Megrahi – it can't be PFLP GC, Syria, South Africa or anyone else.

### The obligations on a prosecution

There is no obligation on a prosecution to place evidence before a court that is unhelpful (and in this case, if it had emerged it would have been disastrous to it). **Legal proof is immensely inferior to scientific proof**, for there there is an obligation on protagonists to place all their evidence on the table, and even to develop arguments that counter the proposition they wish to prove. (See Darwin's *Origin of Species*, as a superb example of careful science writing which answers as many possible critics of his theory, in arguments they would be familiar with. It stands today 150 years after it was published. Answers to all the Creationist and Intelligent design arguments can be found in the pages of the *Origin*, if not in the detail that has

since been discovered, then in the form of such arguments).

So, a Crown witness must be careful to respond only to the questions that are put to him by a prosecutor, and who may well have taken particular care to fillet his written evidence to support the thesis that he (the prosecutor) wishes to demonstrate (not prove). A Crown witness (especially an expert professional) who strays beyond this brief and causes the prosecution to fail, will soon find himself out of a job. Worse if his evidence is found wanting at appeal and a person who has been convicted has to be released, as had happened to Mr \*Thorne. (a \* means that the name is a pseudonym chosen by me ¶ by someone else (and I do not know the individual's real name), ‡ by someone else (and the pseudonym is publicly known)). I am quite willing to reveal pseudonyms, where I know, or have invented them, but not electronically, or in a way that would make it not possible to sue me in the UK or other courts).

I think a number of officials I mention in this document have relied of a certain intellectual *legerdemain* to permit them come to the conclusion the results of the Lockerbie investigation could be presented as true. If they hadn't, their careers would have been forfeit.

The next issue is that it is intended to try to demonstrate the complexity of the Lockerbie plot, both in its conception and execution, and that it was not a fixed but an almost organic and developing thing over several years. Do not believe the CIA knew the outcome it wanted at the start, because it is clear it didn't. Sometimes in this account, because there is no information whatsoever, it will be necessary to use fictional means to demonstrate what are real truths. Parts of the UK Government, authorities and services were, I think, extremely upset in the way in which the perpetrators of the Lockerbie plot seemed to expect British agencies to co-operate with the CIA often to the detriment of British institutions and facilities, and BSS (British Security Services - an American acronym for MI5 (the Security Service) and MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service), which may act covertly to influence the outcome of events in favour of national interests (according to its Wikipedia entry), which went far beyond what was intended by the initial agreement between the White House (in Mr Reagan's Presidency) and Number 10 (Mrs Thatcher's incumbency). Some of this I have had to put in the form of cheap novelette spy fiction.

### The eight big secrets about the Lockerbie tragedy

	Secret	Why true	Status
1	That a single IED was stuck to the inside of AVE4041 PA by an unidentified Iranian	Read Mr Claiden's (AAIB) evidence at the Zeist trial about the mild blast from a device apparently stuck to the side of AVE4041 PA, and	Not accepted yet

		the inferred real story of the break-in at Heathrow	
2	That there was a negotiation between a very senior (named) US official and 5 Iranian government officials in Glion Switzerland which resulted in a <b>one and one only revenge deal</b> for the downing of the Iranian Airbus	Ludwig de Breackeleer's claim, with which I concur	Not accepted yet
3	That there was a break-in a Heathrow Airport, and it was significant to the bombing, for it was the method by which an Iranian stuck an IED on the inside of AVE4041 PA	Proved at Zeist appeal, (but its real implication not accepted) and probably deliberately introduced to the appeal by BSS as a way drawing its teeth	Demonstrated at Zeist appeal, but wrongly interpreted by the Appeal Court as being too remote in time
4	That there was a second explosion of <i>materiel</i> aboard the <i>Maid</i> . I infer this was deliberate, but the AAIB swallowed the lie that it was accidental.  It was most probably triggered by a mobile phone call.	AAIB report, quantity of damage to aircraft  Debris trails and denial that there were 2 IEDs on the <i>Maid</i>	Not accepted yet  Not even considered yet
5	That the press release by the CIA of 22 December 1988 contained fully genuine claims of responsibility that had been received by the Agency	The silliness of the UDL claim. The others (Iran and Mossad) might have been genuine calls to the Agency	Not accepted yet, as it has been overlooked by everyone
6	That the Helsinki and Toshiba warnings were genuine, but both designed and promulgated by the CIA for separate and specific purposes	Both can be shown to have been devised by the CIA for different purposes	Both are accepted as genuine, though US SD denied truth of the Helsinki warning by 10 December 1988
7	That the PT 35 chip was genuine and had come from the device that brought	Began as circuit board probably	The item that has caused the

	down the <i>Maid</i>	obtained from Mr Lumpert of MEBO Switzerland possibly obtained by Mr ¶Orkin  Manufactured by CIA into remains of a timer, and planted in evidence stream at RARDE, Fort Halstead, England in late 1989	greatest problem to the courts and has raised the greatest suspicion
8	That material collected from the case said to be the blast suitcase was genuine	Original materials collected from various sources placed in a Samsonite suitcase and blown up at a CIA facility in the USA, transported across the Atlantic and placed in remains of AVE4041 PA just after the disaster	Does not cause as great a suspicion as the PT 35 chip

With those provisos, I suggest:

### **Why was Lockerbie carried out?**

**Two hundred and seventy people died so that one man should reach the White House and not have his candidacy brought down in flames by Iran.** That is my conclusion of nearly twenty years of trying to understanding Lockerbie, and is not the one I had ever expected to come to. I am very sad to have to come to that conclusion.

### **The CIA**

A strangely arrogant, inconsistent, foolhardy and leaky organisation the CIA insists that all countries in some way want to be the USA, even if a pale shadow of that country which takes its rôle in the world so seriously and discharges it so poorly.

For example the CIA is convinced the UK got its independence (from what) in 1927!, and while it corrects that impression somewhat in the potted history it gives (standard

fare from a children's encyclopaedia, it seems the CIA is not really happy unless you have a proper (i.e. American) revolutionary history). Yes UKGB&I became UKGB&NI in 1927, no there isn't a single national holiday, so why not choose 405, when the Romans left, leaving behind a country which thought of itself as Roman? England itself is a conquered land that has not yet thrown off the Norman yoke, so the question of independence is really rather silly, otherwise this document would be written in a different sort of German, unmodified by French and the Germans themselves would have been invaders, as Anglo-Saxons.

You may say this is a trivial point but it says much about the attitude of the organisation and its own self belief and that its agents at least in the USA are seen as a trusted source of wisdom and knowledge.

No it isn't; no they aren't.

### **Rôle of the CIA**

**No-one doubts that the CIA must have had some rôle in Lockerbie, but has anyone considered that the Agency arranged almost the whole operation with three major exceptions: the initial agreement between the US and those who wanted the destruction of a US plane, that the CIA demanded that a person from the nation which wanted that destruction should carry it out (and the nationals of that country desired the same end) and that the British declined to allow the CIA to claim that the device was loaded at Heathrow, and directed the cover up?**

This is no more than a development of what I've said before and not a refutation of it. Unfortunately I find the perfidy of elements of the US Government, especially the CIA, is greater, every time I return to the question.

In my view, some parts are indubitably true. Pan Am 103 fell from the sky as a result of a explosion aboard it (or just possibly a missile attack, though I doubt that, and can prove it). No-one doubts that, however eccentric and weird we may think their subsequent claims.

### **UT-772: or why Lockerbie is important to me**

My reasoning for coming to this view about Lockerbie because I had a personal interest in another plane crash of the era, UT-772 of 1989. Formally, no link was ever established between the two cases. In the background the spectre of UTA blights the whole of the latter parts of the Lockerbie story, because the CIA decided to blame Libya for the tragedy and came across two Libyans who fortuitously happened to be on Malta at a time when they could be depicted as air terrorists. I happen to have come to the conclusion that the fortuitous circumstances of UT-772, (I can detect no US involvement in that disaster), were shamelessly used by the CIA to create a Libyan attribution for the Lockerbie bombing, but these circumstances came to light (to the CIA) long after the downing of the *Maid of the Seas*. The Lockerbie investigation decried any connection except of the broadest sense, between the two

cases. I think the French forbade that though more tangential commentators (and governments) have made the obvious connections. My own fear is that the fact that the Libyans did down the UTA aircraft, which they did with at a more complete level of proof than is available over Pan Am 103, will mean that that nation's leaders will turn round and say 'we didn't do UTA either', when they demonstrably did, when the Lockerbie story fails.

The reasons Libya did UTA (and the evidence of it) are:

- as revenge by Libya for their defeat in the Aouzou strip (Chadean) war
- the hurried departure of Libyan ambassador to the Congo, Mr Elazragh, after the UTA bombing
- the placing of Mr Mangatany in charge of a Libyan financed Congolese opposition group (after a internal coup), his cultivation and his dispatch to Paris on UT-772 with a suitcase that was detonatable and detonated
- that Libya spent a small fortune in bribing the remaining members of that group to stay silent afterwards
- that suitcases had been obtained from the PLO exiled in Tripoli from Lebanon and were stored in the premises of the Joint Security Office/External Security Office (JSO/ESO) in Tripoli
- that copies unlabelled as evidence were found in its offices later by French investigators
- that two of the perpetrators (who directly caused the device to be primed and given unknowingly to a *mule*) were sent under cover as auditors for a Libyan/Congolese timber exploitation company in the Congo, but never appeared in its offices or submitted reports back to Tripoli and had no background in accountancy or timber, nor were copies of their reports found in company HQ in Tripoli
- that these two individuals, who were Libyan military personnel, received rewards and promotions after the attack
- that Taiwanese timers were obtained from a West German firm
- that there is a pretty full account of how the device got on UT-772 considering (a) one of the parties is dead and (b) the Libyans haven't exactly wanted to talk.
- that least one partner of a significant personage changed the date of their travel from the doomed aircraft
- that one Libyan diplomat delayed his flight by a week, so did not travel of the flight, but did so a week later
- that a delegation of Libyan delegates (some 80 people) did not turn up at an ICAO conference held coincidentally immediately after the bombing
- that an announcement was made in advance of the bombing 'that good news was to be expected', but there was no statement of what that good news might be, nor did it ever come
- that two previous attempts (failed) had been made on the same route within the previous ten years, both credited to Libya
- That there were widespread rumours in the extensive Libyan *diaspora* in North Africa that it was a Libyan job

- that Libya conducted a widespread public relations campaign after the disaster in France to deny responsibility
- that the Libyan Government claimed at one point after the bombing that it was the product of an as yet unidentified Libyan based group opposed to both Libyan and French policy. This point was considered particularly damning by Juge Bruguière
- That Moses Koses (all round bad guy and British asset, possibly a son of the Colonel) became extremely agitated when accusations of complicity in the downing were put to him by the French investigators
- that a mysterious Arab-looking advocate in proper French legal costume (for the Paris courts) appeared at the trial of the 6 Libyans accused in 1999, did not speak, but was not recognised by anyone
- that the Libyan government made voluntary compensation to the UTA relatives (though not on a Lockerbie scale) through both Libyan and French charitable foundations, though under no legal obligation to (as UN sanctions against the country had been lifted, thank you - Mr Jack Straw, then UK Foreign Secretary!))
- That the cost of the UTA settlement (\$170M) was to be claimed by Libya as being loaded on the re-entry fee of French oil firms, which under French pressure they denied
- The French negotiating committee (relatives of the deceased, government officials and lawyers) refused to admit a claim by Libya for compensation for 3 its military pilots killed by the French in a raid on a Chadean town, which immediately led to the conclusion that Libya regarded the destruction of the UT-772 flight as a reprisal against France, for its war with Libya over the Aouzou strip.

I make those 23 points at least 7 times as many independent clues as Lockerbie. Enough, surely!

I have deliberately excluded the claim by Mr Awad, a CIA asset resident in the US, who had been there for many years (since 1982) who said he knew Libya had carried out UTA. The Juge felt his point was evidentially worthless. Bruguière was not going to have his investigation into UTA contaminated by the CIA. This material was offered to the Juge in early 1990 during his *commission rogatoire* to the United States at the point the CIA had begun strongly to promote the Libyan attribution over Lockerbie.

### **CIA rôle continued**

The CIA was intimately involved with the downing of the *Maid*, but did not carry out the initial phase of the destruction. That assertion, I hope to demonstrate, but cannot prove. They facilitated it on the orders of the Administration, misdirected its true attribution, and in a sophisticated and progressive manner, cleared up after it, placing it as a responsibility of another country. That's a hard point to show, and for many people, such as the official investigators Marquise and Henderson too hard for them to consider accepting, though (according to the former) *they discussed the matter together on several occasions*, each time coming to the conclusion that what their security services told them must be truthful.

Here, one must start with a statement of what I think is true. The CIA should have no more agenda than a bus route scheduler. The managers of a bus company decide what routes to service (for their own reasons, which may be to maximise profit, or provide a social service). The operators of that service deliver the consumables, buses at bus-stops.

Similarly, the Agency only carries out with what it is tasked with by the US government (and in this circumstance it was tasked by the White House). Unlike the FBI, which is a police force, the CIA has two different and essentially conflicting rôles; as an analytical agency and an operational one, and they are no more deliberately confused than in Lockerbie. Both these activities were deployed in the Lockerbie operation, and it is often impossible to distinguish or to separate them.

The CIA set an agenda over Lockerbie (with which it was intimately bound from the earliest stages (well before the incident itself), which dates back to just after the destruction of the Iranian Airbus. Much of that was concerned to maintain the integrity and consistency of its initial involvement.

### **Marquise's attitude to the CIA**

Despite Richard Marquise's (who was the FBI lead investigator for much of the time of the investigation into Pan Am 103, though not at the start, where CIA interference was most visible) anger with the CIA at various points in the operation (especially in November 1990, where he considered the media initiative by \*Tomas Cattermole as entirely unhelpful), he seems to have believed that the CIA did not have its own agenda that led to the Lockerbie inquiry being deliberately misled. Both Marquise and Henderson, the Scottish SIO, though they claimed to have debated the matter seem to have been prejudiced against coming to any conclusion that would have scuppered the Lockerbie inquiry and certainly ended their careers.

Hence today, Marquise must be regarded as one of the strongest supporters of the CIA's rôle, as he sees it, which is of a organisation that has given up plotting and operational roguery to become a sort of US overseas detective agency. I cannot determine the point at which the CIA decided to turn over a new leaf, and its absence from Lockerbie after the initial run in with the Scots was based of the realistic understanding by themselves that their presence would be regarded as more harm than good. Nevertheless, they must have learned of the progress of the inquiry from the JIG within the Lockerbie inquiry, which Crawford (*The Lockerbie Incident, A Detective's Tale*, Trafford, Victoria, Canada, 2002, ISBN1-55369-806-1) complains kept to itself to itself. This book appallingly written book I would not recommend to anyone, unless, you are a hard-core mainlining Lockerbie junkie, like me. The public really should not have to have stuff like this inflicted on them.

Marquise was allowed to write *Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation*, Richard A. Marquise, Algora Pub, 2006, ISBN: 9780875864501, his story of Lockerbie in which he shows that he swallowed the CIA lie whole, though occasionally it seems to have stuck in his throat to do so; had he however reluctantly

come to the conclusion that Libya had not carried out the bombing of Pan Am 103, he would, I suggest, have become another casualty in the pursuit of the acceptable and necessary lie.

### **Crawford was not allowed to appear the Zeist trial**

I am indebted to both authors of books for taking the trouble to write them. Marquise's which is constructed as if it had been composed from a contemporaneous diary allowed me to construct a timeline of about two to three times the depth of the one I had.

Writing a timeline has been one of the most important exercises of the whole business. Mine (joint Lockerbie and UTA) currently runs to over 750 items and, if you include the fact that many items are subdivided, possibly over 1000.

### **Dates**

Very few of the dates used in this report are the subject of controversy. For the usual approach of the CIA has been to excise or not report inconvenient material, rather than engage in wholesale fabrication of dates. A typical almost 'sleight of hand' we will see in the tale of the manual Mrs Horton found. Another, is a slight an approximate misdating of an event, like Mr Bollier's first contact with the US embassy, Vienna, said to be early January 1989, turns out to be 19 January 1989. This misdating (or fudging, it would be more correct to say), was deliberately introduced to preserve the integrity of the claims regarding the PT 35 chip. I consider this to be one of the most damaging 'errors' that the CIA had to introduce.

Interestingly, there never seemed to be any major confusion over dates and sequencing of events – with the exception of Mr Bollier's first approach to the US embassy Vienna, given as early January 1989 in CIA sponsored accounts and 19 January 1989, a date spontaneously given to me by Mr Bollier when I asked him, and he had no reason to know why I wanted to know. By making up the 'semi-plenary troth', or downright lie, a term beloved by Mr Taylor, Mr Megrahi's defence lawyer, the CIA drew attention to the fact it what an antedating of the Libya based plot, to forestall the argument that the collection date of the Toshiba chip (PT 35) was after the date of Mr Bollier's approach to the US embassy Vienna. (In fact manufacture of this evidence took place months later in Kent and not Northumberland), but to protect the backstory of the finding of the chip, the date of Mr Bollier's approach to the US embassy had to be shifted, as Mrs Horton's finding of the manual could not as, of course, it was recorded in police records the CIA could not change.

Why this point was not adequately dealt with by defence counsel at the Zeist trial is a real mystery.

### **Money**

When it comes to money, the technique is very different. Exact facts are given about amounts and transactions. However, the recipients never seem to benefit by these

large sums, for the real benefit is part of the CIA fantasy factory's output to promote a particular claim of culpability.

### **Mr Marquise and Mr Crawford did not appear as a witness at the Zeist trial**

It is significant that Crawford was not called as a Crown witness at the Zeist trial as his bosses said he was too familiar with the case. In other words he knew too much of the distraction operation that followed the bombing which, if it had become known would have destroyed it completely. Nor was Marquise, I suspect for similar reasons, though he did appear before the FGJ that indicted Megrahi and Fhimah.

Put this into my scientific model of reasoning, it is like saying that when a great scientist produces a new theory, he hides his claims behind a phalanx of idle and relatively ignorant laboratory assistants, in case he should 'mis-speak' himself, while a silver tongued advocate tries to destroy his theory.

### **The CIA on its opponents' motives**

The CIA seems incapable of believing that anyone working against the interests of the USA as it sees them, could be doing such things for reasons other than money. That revenge, opposition to US policies, political commitment, honour or religious fervour could enter the equation is explicitly and implicitly denied.

We shall see this when we come to consider \*Rupert Hantzau's almost racist reasons for why Iran was not the Lockerbie paymaster.

### **The remit of the Agency**

An important point to bear in mind is that the remit of the Agency restricts it to carrying out operations outside the United States. It is inevitable that parts of the operation nevertheless took place in the US, and I suggest they include the following actions:

- Conception and planning of the plot
- Conception and design of the first Lockerbie device (even if, as I shall argue, built by Iranians) and manufacture of the second
- Sourcing of all CIA materials, such as radio traceable suitcases and *materiel* (by which I means bombs not defined as IEDs)
- Obtaining materials such as cassette-recorders suitcases and the like, which become evidence
- Plot development scenarios
- Briefings by foreign agencies and officials, especially Juge Bruguière, the lead investigator into UT- 772
- Briefings of personnel (either CIA, FBI or others)
- Manufacture of evidence such as blown up suitcases (even if in the US)
- Development of plot scenarios, which changed radically from inception onward

- Spin and management of the news release process

### **The CIA's position in law**

The CIA's constitution (it has one, and it was carefully drafted and approved by Congress in the late 1940s), allows it to act outside the law and carry out actions that would be unlawful or illegal if carried out by a private individual, only applies to actions outside the US. One reason is so hard to attach criminal culpability to the CIA over Lockerbie is that it was extremely careful to ensure that the hand of one of its employees did not set the fuse on the initial Lockerbie device (that, I argue had to be an Iranian), and has so far hidden the second, but beyond that constraint the Agency had a great freedom to operate.

There was a fundamental misunderstanding by most of the British here. They allowed themselves to be deluded by comforting English-speaking officers that they were on the side of the Lockerbie investigation, when the whole and singular purpose of those officers was to undermine it for the sake of singular US government objectives (by which I mean Bush's presidential ones). At the very highest levels of BSS (MI5 and MI6), the CIA's duplicity was entirely understood and no doubt private anger at 'the fucking turd the Agency had left on the British carpet and expected us to clean up', which the British did to a large extent on their terms.

Until I am well into my anecdotage and invited by someone in 'Circus to Sarratt' (Le Carré), and they take me aside after my rather foolish talk and having put a glass of good whisky in my hand say, 'you weren't entirely wrong in your portrayal of black and white, right and wrong over Lockerbie, nor very right', I shall have very little to say.

Lockerbie took the Agency into new territory. One of the closest examples to be found is from the Second World War. To enhance the credibility of a turned Nazi agent, the UK security services had to organise an explosion on a German war target in the UK. A small device was planted and blown up. No-one was killed and there was little damage, but enough to convince a Nazi controller that his agent was performing to snuff. This, of course was functionally different and much less sinister. The action was taken to maintain the credibility of a turned agent to the enemy, not to delude the British, and involved no loss of life. By contrast what happened at Lockerbie was designed to mislead the whole of the US public up to almost, but not quite, presidential level and caused 270 people to die.

### **An entirely cynical deal**

Lockerbie is the cynical outcome of a deal between the Iranians and the US to allow the first country a revenge for a wrong by the second. **No group of airline passengers has ever been so callously treated.** Many senior UK functionaries must have been sickened by what they were required to do for the sake of a career of a single US politician.

Certain aspects necessarily take place abroad, for legal reasons. Most notable is that

Giaka was debriefed on an unnamed US Naval ship by Scottish, FBI and CIA(!) officers, and none of his evidence was obtained from interviews in the US. The CIA officers were there to ensure he stuck to his story, which I think he found difficult. The only reason he was brought into the trial was (as Marquise recounts) that it was that Mueller of the FBI thought a court case could not be brought against Megrahi and Fhimah without his input, and so the CIA obliged. He was mocked by defence counsel, and damaging CIA telegrams were reluctantly produced, which entirely undermined his credibility, when they had to be revealed, for the Agency had little faith in him, and the trial judges dismissed his evidence as irrelevant, which makes one wonder why Mueller bothered. But Mr Megrahi was still convicted. Unless you believe the Zeist trial judges were entirely mendacious, they appear to really rather dim, despite their high-sounding titles of Lord This and Lord That.

Contrast this with Mr Bollier who was interviewed by the FBI in a US facility, and also Scotland. I can see no real reason why Giaka could not have been expected to appear before police in Scotland.

So why convict? Was the bench asked to come to a political verdict? By the nature of his questioning it is fairly easy to see that one member of that perverted court was aiming for a conviction. Why did he bother? Could he not get it out of his head there was no jury to suborn or overawe, and that if he could convince himself, he'd convinced a third of the jury!

### **Why did the US have to concede an airliner?**

In Lockerbie, for various reasons, that I'll only summarise in this article, the US Government was constrained to allow one of the airliners of its major carrier, considered in a nation that does not have a national airline to be the flag-carrier, to be destroyed.

I have no doubt that the hand that placed the device to blow up Pan Am 103 was not American. It was an Iranian, but an Iranian hand that was instructed by an American one.

It is possible that the CIA built the device that blew up the *Maid*, though I doubt it. I have argued elsewhere that Iran was quite technically capable of manufacturing something that mimicked a PFLP-GC device and required no expert handling.

It is a typical ploy of investigators who have some narrow knowledge of Lockerbie to say, 'but this is the fact that has been hidden' and write a one page to multi-volume thesis on that single fact, ignoring the fact that in the process they raise half a hundred issues which are gaily swept aside by saying, 'it must be so', and anyone that disagrees with me is an ignorant fool.

I've dealt with South Africa, Palestinian, Israeli, Irish, UFO, missile and industrial accident theories, and believe me they simply do not hold water.

It is inconceivable, surely, that a US agency, however much it is given an agenda that

allows it to act extra-judicially, even if restricted to extra-territorial action, would be allowed to destroy some 150 US lives, or even an American airliner, even outside the USA. But deluding those who would try to find out who did it was fair game, and setting up a scenario in which others, foreigners could be destroyed, was allowable.

But it happened.

Just remember in the immediate aftermath of the *Airbus* the Iranians proposed (or threatened) to down between 5 and 12 US aircraft; eventually an astute US negotiator beat them down to just one aircraft in reply.

But the US Government (and I think we have to say, at the highest levels) gave the CIA the job of arranging for the destruction of a US aircraft, and clearing up the mess afterwards.

### **The why!**

'For why?', as Sir Keith Joseph, a sagacious minister in Mrs Thatcher's government used to say, when supplying the blindingly obvious question to the blindingly stupid answer.

### **Because the *USS Vincennes* had downed the Iranian Airbus.**

It became clear that Iran demanded reciprocation in kind, and the constraining of that reply to the *Maid* must be judged one of finest pieces of US *realpolitik* in dealing with a very prickly, upset country attached to dirigiste politico-religious principles, in my opinion as a decent, agnostic, humanitarian, scientific-rationalist Englishman.

My disagreement with the many 'theorists' (and I must admit in that word I must include myself), who infer an Iranian attribution, is that they distance the Iranian involvement, focusing on the person who set the device and not who caused it to be put in place. It's rather like blaming the deaths of those on Pan Am 103 on the fact that the *Maid of the Seas* met the ground rather than on the on-board explosion and who might have caused it.

### **The Iranians demand blood**

It must have been clear to the US Administration that UN Security Council Resolution 616 of 21<sup>st</sup> July 1988, which condemned the US downing of the *Vincennes*, would not satisfy Iran's anger for long, and that that state would demand a more substantive reply, in the form of bodies, under the Iranian version of the Hammurabi code, *qesas*. It became clearer as that troupe of stock theatre Iranian commentators from the radical right, to the moderate middle, angrily began to demand revenge, for what was regarded as a deliberate action and not, as I believe, the action of a Naval commander who was virtually out of control and should never been promoted to officer rank, let alone given charge of a warship. Gradually the number of US aircraft that would be downed in reply rose to between five and a dozen. The matter began to cause alarm in the very highest ranks, I suggest, of the US Government, who were

handling the crisis with more than their usual ineptness. Almost every comment made by senior US leaders inflamed the Iranians (and may even have been intended to).

I think the most one of the most sinister comments came from a spokesman at the Iranian Embassy, London, who simply asked what the resolution might be.

In particular, the decision of the US Navy to award ribbons to the crew of the *Vincennes*, and in particular to honour Captain Rogers, at the end of its tour of duty caused the greatest offence. The Iranians appeared to be unaware that the US military attaches great importance to the recognition of the most mundane performance of duty and awards the crews of routine operations, where neither particular skill nor courage is required, and the honours were not deliberately intended to cause offence.

They were simply designed as a purely internal official tribute at the end of an operation, and were not in recognition of the downing of the *Airbus*, though that had been the singular most important event of Rogers' watch. Had they been done more privately or a more sanguine approach taken to Captain Rogers singular methods of keeping international peace, it would have given the Iranians fewer reasons for a *casus belli*.

But it was a supplementary, and not a compelling reason. The downing was offence enough.

In addition, Vice President H W Bush made the most mealy-mouthed apology for the behaviour of the *Vincennes* to the United Nations and is reported as saying he did not intend to apologise for the behaviour of the United States. If that was intended for purely domestic consumption, it was reported world-wide.

### **After all, it was election year**

Elections tend to bring out the worst in nations, and the US is no exception. Unless the country is transfixed by some great economic crisis as in the recent one (this piece is written in the summer of 2009), US elections seem to be suffused with war-fever and become what in the UK are known as khaki elections, with the parties are driven on by the patriotic need for dashing campaign and daring victory, preferably with as little blood lost as possible. All done in the name of upholding peace, and in pursuance of, in the case of the US, its singular vision of its rôle in the world.

There is very little difference between the mood of a baseball ground full, say, of Red Socks supporters, in full pursuit of a team win, and the American public at election time, for indeed the electorate are made up of those supporters and those of the Jays, the Blues and others like them.

In an election year don't expect your leaders seeking election to give a rational account of your military's doings. So when the VP said he would not apologise for 'these United States', it was intended for domestic consumption only, but was regarded in Iran as an offence, compounding the offence of the original downing.

Hadn't, after all, the Iranians helped get the current leader of the 'Great Satan' (Ronald Reagan) into power, by releasing the Tehran embassy hostages some eight years before, the Americans surrounding the newly elected President operating on the basis "my enemies' enemies must be my friends". As we shall see these "enemies' enemies" would soon reap the whirlwind of the wind they had sown.

It was, of course, not just President Carter or his Party who were the enemy, it was the irreconcilable split between the official CIA and those elements of the counter-cultural CIA which are called 'Iran-Contra'.

Not enough attention is paid to the ideological rifts within the ruling cliques of the US Government.

At the highest level, President Reagan and his Vice-President represented two entirely different positions within ruling right-wing circles. The VP came from a moneyed New England background, whose forbears had become rich in speculation and development of the US railway network, largely enabled by Congressional land grants to the incipient railway empires and later by banking, until recently the most reputable way to get reliably rich in America.

Bush, himself, had successfully relocated to Texas, where he had become prominent in oil development, before deciding to climb the precariously greasy pole of US politics. Such a man was not of the same caste or class as Reagan, whose vision of America owed much to the frontier myths so artfully deployed in many of his movies.

Ronald Reagan did not call his Vice-President 'the elephant in the corner' for nothing *to his face*. It was a conceptual difference in the sort of Republicanism each represented.

As Reagan's second term in office progressed, and he faced increasing physical difficulty (the VP was Acting President during one operation in hospital, having control of the nuclear button), he demonstrated less interest in the exercise of the power of his office, and Bush appears to have taken a more active position, almost of a Presidential nature. It was no more visible than during the response to the downing of the Iranian Airbus where, publicly at least, Bush seemed to be leading policy. This was a difficult time for him, as when the crisis happened, he had not secured the Republican nomination, and although he appeared to be the front-runner, it was a race that was far from being won. Bush's publicly intransigent position on the matter may have done much to help him secure that nomination and the subsequent election.

But, in July 1988, the US Presidential Election was still four months away, and the Iranians were baying for revenge.

The first problem that the Administration faced was how to respond to the virulent Iranian demands. Perhaps the VP recognised that a failure to discover an appropriate response would threaten his accession to the Presidency in the way that President

Carter's re-election had been doomed.

Had attacks to meet these Iranian desires been made, not only Bush's candidature would be under the severest possible pressure, it would have signalled almost the complete closure of US international air traffic, and probably all out war with Iran.

So it is reasonable to assume the first steps were taken by the US.

### **Mr Dominic \*Brandon**

At this point, I believe the CIA was not yet the most significant party involved, although it was plotting away as early as August, 1988. (See my little point on \*Hantzau's autobiography). Given that the character who seems to have played an important part in the subsequent negotiations with the Iranians worked for the Department of Defense at the time, it is reasonable to assume that Reagan's Secretary of State for Defense, Frank Charles Carlucci III, was formally in charge of the response.

Dominic \*Brandon was a person of great experience, and is still near the heart of power today, so his actions over the *Airbus* must have been considered a success. Bush, \*Brandon and Carlucci had all had senior rôles in the Agency in the past, and Bush had led it for a short while. It seems obvious that needing expert help in responding to the Iranian crisis, it is to the Agency that the Administration turned.

### **'Reasonableness'**

There is a 'doctrine of reasonableness' which claims not that the parties in a issue should act 'reasonably', but says that each party in the issue should be able to achieve what it wants, commensurate with the other party's understanding of what it must concede. And their actions should be clear to the parties, *if not transparent to observers and outsiders*. And the real meaning of Lockerbie has been particularly successfully hidden for over 20 years. The CIA and senior negotiators knew that well and it is clear that both sides understood that over the *Airbus* matter, the burning desire for revenge by Iran must be accommodated on terms acceptable to the US.

***But at very least it meant that the Iranians had to be allowed to down one US aircraft in full international service.***

That means that the US had to recognise that the offence that the Iranians felt they had suffered was so great that it could only be met by the destruction of at least one US aircraft, loaded with passengers. That response happened to be Pan Am 103 of 21 December 1988.

### **Deep Washington cabals, the summer of 1988**

Clever semanticists and foreign policy advisers must have come to the conclusion that Iran would require the downing of a aircraft in reply in cold air-conditioned deep Washington cabals in the hot mid-summer of 1988. And I suggest that having come

to that conclusion, they had to convert it to the US government's bottom line. So the problem changed its focus. The issue must have transformed itself from 'what revenge did the Iranians seek' to 'what response could the US bargain the Iranians down to'. The US entered the negotiations, to be described below, knowing full well that they would have to sacrifice at least one plane. The negotiations took place in a small village outside Montreux, Switzerland.

### **A pleasant 4\* hotel on the banks of Lake Geneva**

“Our guests don’t come to the hotel, they come to our home”. This is the boast of the proprietors of the Hôtel Victoria in Glion, near Montreux Switzerland, and despite the name suggesting a slightly dilapidated Gothic pile, it is a rectangular box of an affair in what might in Britain be called 'Festival of Britain' style, but certainly without the aspect of austerity that era suggests, set in its own grounds with a fine view over Lake Geneva, the perfect site to debate the intentional and deliberate destruction of 'innocent' lives (by which I mean all lives are innocent, and thus all expendable if your government decides) in the matter of what was essentially national 'honour', a hateful word. Either here or possibly at the Hotel Rigi, also in the town, and also 4-star (did the budget not run to a 5-star hotel one wonders, and would the victims of Pan Am 103 have felt their lives short-changed by this apparent economy?), the two sides sat and deliberated the fate of one or several aircraft.

There were four meetings between July and October (alternatively between August and November, according to another account). Five Iranians attended. The names have been reported elsewhere. We don't know the others in the US delegation besides \*Brandon, though I am beginning to believe \*Hantzau was somewhere in the background.

I think the first thing that Mr \*Brandon did (and my story became conjectural, but hopefully you will regard as entirely plausible conjecture) was to read the riot act. He must have said that if any action were taken by the Iranians before an agreement with *him* was reached, a state of war would exist between the US and Iran. He pointed out that while Iran might be getting the better of Iraq in its war with that country (despite US support for Iraq as its client), it would be an entirely different matter if the Iranians decided to take on the US directly.

### **A one and one only deal**

Secondly, he said that it would have to be a 'one and one only' deal. The Iranians, I am sure argued that according to *qesas* (a rule of reciprocal retribution (the essence of 'an eye for an eye'), which is a life saving deal, preventing tribal- or Mafia- style unending internecine warfare) the loss of life must be equal on the Iranian and the US side. \*Brandon saw the point of that, and said that, of course, he meant that the aircraft brought down in reply would be a fully functioning international commercial service of a leading US airline. He might even have specified Pan Am at this point, as either it or TWA were the logical targets as the leading US carriers, in a country which does not have a national carrier.

## **The necessity of an Iranian hand**

Thirdly, the hand that placed the explosive would have to be Iranian. As I am going to raise the complicated and contentious issue of a second explosion, (not an IED) which is very easy to demonstrate, (I should clarify that and say: the first device to explode must be the one placed by an Iranian and it should be of sufficient size and power to bring down a 'hardened' Boeing 747. In fact it was, and the second explosion was scarcely necessary. But the CIA didn't know that). That necessarily had to be done to protect US citizens who might be implicated in the plot, if it should become public, from a charge of murder. But at least one of them acted incautiously.

## **A second explosion again**

As I believe there was demonstrably a second explosion on the *Maid*, ***this had to be accidental or arguably portrayable as accidental or I think the UK's AAIB would not have become involved in what might be called the cover-up.***

I cannot prove the second explosion on the aircraft was deliberately triggered or not, though more and more I think it was. I usually come to the conclusion that despite, what I think were the CIA's denials to the AAIB, it was deliberate, for nothing, but nothing is left to chance in the tragedy of Pan Am 103.

## **Argument is based on interpretation of facts, not stories**

Remember, my arguments are not based upon what some deep throat has told me, they are all based on what is in the public domain, and anybody have could come to the same conclusions, if only they cared to look, by carefully considering what the various parties would consent to do, if they were so inclined.

You cannot simply, as some commentators do say: 'they're all in it together', because the parties have different agendas. The views of BSS are entirely different from AAIB or the CIA. It is lazy and sloppy thinking to go round blackening everyone with the same tar brush.

## **But we must be suspicious about anything the CIA says...**

I have one ruling *caveat*. I treat any statement by a known or former CIA officer as an outright lie until proven otherwise.

The necessity of an Iranian hand is not a debatable point. The Agency is a bureaucracy and heavily regulated. One can be sure that the CIA's lawyers looked hard at the bottom-line of the Agency's and its operatives' responsibilities to ensure they would be in the clear, at least as far as US law was concerned. When the truth 'comes out', and it is a long and stony path to that eventuality, which the CIA will try to make harder every step of the way, if murder or conspiracy charges cannot be bought in the US, they might well in the UK. If the truth emerges, any CIA officials involved (in this report pseudonymised), Mr \*Brandon and even ex-President H W Bush, should consider very carefully making any trips to Europe. Scottish prisons, as

poor Mr Megrahi has found, are not holiday camps, though he has not suffered torture as he might have done in some CIA-operated facility, or even by his own government, if he had fallen foul of it.

But it is possible that some agents did not reveal to the CIA legal department their full rôle in the Lockerbie plot.

So the Iranians were instructed to build their own device. I have argued elsewhere that the manufacture of the device would be quite within the competency of a physics undergraduate, and so there need be no hint of any US involvement. Unlike some commentators, I have demonstrated that no special skills in handling explosives would be required by the individual who deployed the device. It was so designed that it would be completely destroyed in the explosion in AVE4041 PA, leaving no traces for forensic recovery. None has ever been found, not even of the detonator.

### **The other details of the agreement**

Once the principle was struck, agreement to the other items was quite trivial. The US Government would be allowed to extract its *direct* employees from the flight, though such a consideration would not be applied to other US citizens outside the magic ring of state-employment. However such warnings would have to be internal to Government and private to those employees. There could be no general warning about the flight chosen. Other travellers (mainly foreigners) would occupy the seats vacated by US government employees. But the Iranians presumably reasoned that the lives of all foreigners were equal, and if they had chosen to travel by an American airline, they could be treated as if they were Americans and provided the body count were met, honour would be satisfied. Have the Iranians been troubled by the deficiency of 20 in the respective death tolls between the *Airbus* and the *Maid*, or ever in the fact those replaced bodies were not American?

The US would be allowed to attribute the bombing to any party, provided Iran were not, *finally*, an important qualification, directly implicated. The Americans intended to do this by having the Iranians build a device that would be reliably destroyed by the explosion of the IED. So effective was that blast that not even the detonator was recovered. In the UTA blast 2.4 times the size of the Lockerbie IED, the detonator (of ICI build) was recovered.

This would be a difficult matter as the biggest source of grievance between the two nations was the matter of the *Airbus*. Conversely, therefore the Iranians agreed not to rejoice in the destruction of an American aircraft, but would be allowed to make a cautious claim through one of the more irresponsible parts of the Iranian nationalist repertory theatre, a known spokesman – the Guardians of the Revolution, the Pasharan. It would thus be possible for the Americans to issue a routine denial and say they were not looking for *particular* Iranians and allow the claim to stand but eventually be ignored. What it was not possible to do was deny from the outset any possibility of an Iranian rational, as it was so obvious. It came to pass.

It would be important that in the run-up to the reprisal that no claims of 'good news to

be expected' about the revenge of the Airbus be made, though in the end such a dangerous statement was made when Dr Ali Akbar Velayati, Iranian Foreign Minister and promoter of an Iranian organised conference in Beirut, made an oblique reference to the 'approaching of the ordained revenge on America for its crime against the Iranian civilian airliner', on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1988.

Another variant of this tale says it was on 18<sup>th</sup> December 1988, which suggests that Dr Velayati may have sounded off more than once. The CIA has never drawn any attention to the good doctor's claim which, in itself, suggests that story that it was made, is true. Certainly, if the CIA had wanted to direct investigation in this direction, it would have drawn attention to the remark, and the strength of its being ignored is that one is compelled to come to the conclusion that the remark is very, very significant.

In the run-up to the UTA bombing there were such damaging claims in the Libyan media that 'good news was to be expected', whilst the meaning of that good news was deliberately left unclear, which Juge Bruguière regarded as very sinister.

There were a number of relatively minor matters. Firstly, the US wanted the release of the hostages in the Lebanon. Not a problem, said the Iranians, and they duly were so in the latter weeks of the Lockerbie investigation and with the last ones including Terry Waite, a particular Iranian *bête noire*, after the Lockerbie indictments were made. That his release was so late, and to me quite unexpected, for I had thought that he was long dead, suggests the Iranians did not finally accept the Americans had performed until after the indictments against the Libyan two were in.

### **Mr McKee's fate is sealed**

The Iranians wanted an end to US adventurism in the Lebanon, especially the annoying and amateur activities of Mr McKee. That happened and the CIA decided to use his recall as part of its response process, arranging for him to die on the *Maid*, and use *certain features of his luggage and the materiel returned with him* to further their plot.

This, of course, would cut across and render entirely nugatory the work of his buffoonery of an operation in the Lebanon, but no matter, as an agreement to release the hostages was part of the deal. Iranian assets in the US would be unfrozen, and so it came to pass. The Iranian relatives of the dead would be allowed to claim compensation, but on a scale (Warsaw Convention) that would be minuscule compared with what the Lockerbie relatives would receive. By the same token, no compensation from the relatives of what would be the Lockerbie bombing would be paid by Iran, but if the US could raise compensation from any other source, good luck to them. (Which, as we know, came to pass).

### **Why the Lockerbie bombing had to happen when it did**

The date of what would become the Lockerbie bombing needed to be set. It had to be in that curious dead period of the four-year cycle of the US political process

between the US General Election (nobody wanted to disturb Mr Bush's coronation) and his inauguration (ditto, his accession to power). Thus it had to be between 9 November 1988 and 19 January 1989, and in fact the bombing took place just three days after the half-way point of that dead period.

Given that Lockerbie had occurred after the General Election, why did the US not simply renege on the deal with the Iranians. I think that's because the Iranian campaign of between 5 and 12 aircraft was simply put on hold until the Americans performed their part of the bargain, and the Iranians could also make a plausible claim that the Bush clique had negotiated with them, and then denounce them, if the Americans had not performed.

Whether Mr \*Brandon deserves 270 lifetimes in jail for his work or the Nobel Prize for Peace depends on whether you are an old-fashioned American sentimentalist or a hard-headed body counter. Mr Bush has had to live with his own conscience on this matter, as have many others, though whether the ex-President has a conscience is a matter of debate.

### ***Herbstlaub***

Some time during these negotiations the German Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office) mounted Operation *Herbstlaub* (*Autumn Leaves*). (*Autumn leaves* is a literal translation of *Herbstlaub*). A Palestinian group in West Germany was found in the possession and the process of manufacturing a number of barometric bombs to be placed in Toshiba cassette recorders, and capable of blowing up aircraft.

This story has become the hoary old chestnut of all who deny (like me) a Libyan attribution. What can be said about it?

Firstly, it is quite possible that some radical Iranians had contracted a Palestinian dissident group, the PFLP-GC in Germany and asked them to construct and deploy devices, of which they had had the experience of constructing. It would fit in quite well with the theory of between 5 and 12 aircraft being brought down in the revenge bombings. For, they could have manufactured that many.

The appalling Mr \*Hantzau (ex CIA), is currently promoting a theory that Palestinian elements carried out the bombing, and they were paid by Iran. My belief is that he is falling back on an old CIA attribution (necessarily false), for when the Libyan one fails.

Perhaps then, radical Iranians having started the operation, the \*Brandon talks having resulted in a measured and *agreed* conclusion, the Palestinian initiative was no longer needed and the Iranians shopped their protégés to the BKA, or to the Americans, who passed the information on to the BKA.

Perhaps, the Iranians brought up the Palestinian initiative as a bargaining point in the talks themselves. Certainly, that source of disinformation and intrigue, the CIA, was

going to make much of the *Autumn Leaves*, affair.

The device that is attributed to the Libyans (for God's sake) turns out to be a Toshiba cassette, as known to be used by PFLP-GC bombers, although the detonation mechanism (claimed to be a long-timer, is entirely different from the pressure trigger and short timer the PFLP-GC are claimed to have used).

Why the Libyans should accidentally appear (according to the evidence at the Zeist trial) to employ exactly the same camouflage as a known Palestinian device is inexplicable, unless you realise very little about *Autumn Leaves* is to be produced at that trial, and what is not produced at the trial is in effect idle speculation, at least as far as the court is concerned. So presumably the law of the undistributed middle (as logicians have it) does not apply.

### **The undistributed middle**

In Lockerbie, one of these incomplete syllogisms (with an 'undivided middle' much beloved by the long neglected detective story writer R. Austin Freeman) could run:

All terrorists are bad: Mr Megrahi is a bad man; is a sanctions-breaker; and, a member of the JSO/ESO. Therefore, Mr Megrahi did Lockerbie.

It breaks the rule of the undivided middle, but this basic essential of legal proof appeared to be unknown to their Lordships at Zeist, so cavalier with logic did they appear to be.

It is one of the great mysteries of the Zeist process that the defence did not manage to get enough information into it to demonstrate the existence of other Toshiba devices. Had the defence managed to get Mr Dalqamuni or Mr Khreesat into the box, their very presence would have ensured that Mr Megrahi would have been acquitted. For, they could have testified to having made Toshiba cassette bombs.

We don't know why exactly they declined to come to Zeist, or possibly they were made aware that they might be detained for other matters, if they did. It says much for so-called Islamic solidarity. Anyone who believes there is much common feeling in different parts of the Muslim world should consider how badly Mr Megrahi has been let down by his co-religionists.

Mr Talb was produced and the fact that he was is very significant. If the Crown had had any inkling that he was involved with the bombing, he would not have been produced. We can say as a categorical conclusion that because he was, if Mr Megrahi is released on appeal, a case against the PFLP GC will get nowhere. In fact, it was simply an early CIA lie to cover its Iranian agreement and its own perfidy.

No wonder \*Hantzau is so fond of it, for it is the threadbare cover for his own criminal duplicity.

The prosecution had to destroy the BKA's evidence of the Palestinian Toshibas,

however. Lord Sutherland, in the court's judgement does the prosecution's work for them, arguing that the Palestinian Toshibas and the one recovered at Lockerbie were different (colour) (which becomes a categorical difference), and then going off on an entirely different track by arguing that there was no evidence that the Palestinians had access to MEBO timers, which allows the prosecution to prove Libyans.

Accepting the validity of doubtful evidence as truly valid is one of the prosecutor's tricks that makes the Zeist court in all its deliberations so unconvincing.

I shall come later to what was the Toshiba cassette on the ground at Lockerbie.

With the Brandon agreement safely out of the way, it had to put it into operation.

### **Current CIA views on a PFLP-GC thesis**

However, a variant of PFLP-GC/Iranian thesis began to be circulated in 2002 as the case against Megrahi became increasingly untenable. The person chosen to do this is a retired CIA man, Rupert \*Hantzau, who has a pleasant world-weary, 'we're all CIA men and grown ups' style of delivery. He seems to have been chosen (or chose himself) to develop the back-up position should Megrahi be released.

Because he says he is a CIA man, **everything he says must be treated as false**, until proven true, beyond all possible doubt. And once a CIA man, always a CIA man. If a CIA man says it's raining outside, the sun is shining; if he says it's six o'clock in the morning, it's certainly evening. If he says believe me over Lockerbie, believe anything else about it. At the very start, begin by reading every statement he says in reverse. How an organisation of pathological liars manages to hang together is difficult to understand. Even managing the expense claims of agents must be a nightmare!

His theory neatly chimes with Jim Swire's view and is a little different and it is that the deed was carried out by Syrians/Iranians with some sort of PFLP-GC input. Elegant variations can be played on the theme. Essentially such exercises can be made to work as:

- a. Nobody really wants to end the game;
- b. Any statement by a participant in the game can be derided as false and may thus be rejected; and,
- c. The CIA is never portrayed as the real criminal in the plot.

Plausibly \*Hantzau says the US could not confront the Iranians over the downing of the *Maid*, but entirely avoids the issue of the issue - *why?* It allows him to slide over the issue to be denied of why the Iranians or even the Syrians would want to bring down a US aircraft. The first offence is made to seem to be on the Iranian or Syrian part, whereas the truth is quite the opposite. Perhaps we are simply meant to infer that Iranians, Syrians or whoever else are simply natural terrorists (and that is the

sort of thing these people do. Nobody surely could have had a legitimate reason for downing the *Maid*). It is a consistent line of the US commentators of any persuasion. It's a universal American mindset of the equivalent claimed British contempt for foreigners as having no notion of fair play in cricket – not playing the game and, worst of all, they practise!

So what in my opinion is a deal done to ensure that George Bush Senior's path to glory is not interrupted, is portrayed as an inability of the US to deal with a local would-be hegemonist, for fear of the oil flow from the Gulf being interrupted. If that is so, why did the Administration indulge the Iraqis to such an extent that the latter thought they would be allowed to invade Kuwait, with a far greater possibility of the interruption of that oil flow. That was compensated for simply by the US getting the Saudis to turn up the taps of their virtually limitless supply. And if the Saudis would disoblige an essentially Sunni regime in Iraq to preserve a US (Christian) hegemony surely they would do the same for the US to a despised Shia theocracy? No \*Hantzau, you're no geopolitical thinker.

## **PFLP-GC theory 2009**

The typical journalistic herd commentator who says if it isn't Libya it must be the PFLP-GC today simply dusts down that first attribution after the Lockerbie crash and says it must be right. To the extent that the CIA has successfully managed to confuse the origins of Lockerbie blast, it must be said that from their point of view the strategy has been entirely successful. Here, for example is an absolutely typical comment from a website which calls itself 'Justice Denied'.

It is wrong in several critical aspects:

*Among the wreckage was a thumbnail size piece of a circuit board from a Toshiba radio-cassette recorder. Small Semtex bombs were concealed in the same model of recorder seized two months earlier in a West German raid on a Palestinian militant group: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC).*

Actually there were problems over both the number of speakers and colour of the two types of Toshiba.

*Until Gauci's ID of Megrahi, the PFLP-GC was the prime suspect for the bombing.*

We don't know that, as the Lockerbie investigation has never told us about its internal workings and provisional conclusions

*Additional evidence implicating the PFLP-GC is that two days after Flight 103's bombing the Iranian government deposited \$11 million in a PFLP-GC bank account.*

That claim came from the CIA, who cooked up the Megrahi evidence. If we can't believe them over that, why should we believe them over this? The strategy of the writer is just to say what is wrong now must be disproved by what happened before. It is exactly the opposite of what Mr Marquise thought about the CIA: that they had given up tricks and were now telling the truth.

*Also, Abu Talb is an Egyptian PFLP-GC member convicted of bombings in Copenhagen and Amsterdam. He is currently serving a life prison sentence in Sweden. Talb was in Malta in the fall of 1988. When the FBI first contacted Gauci he was shown a photo of Talb. Gauci said Talb looked "similar" to the man who bought the clothes.*

That Mr Talb is serving a life sentence in a Swedish prison for murder is no evidence he did Lockerbie, as the author of the article ought to know, if he believes that a defendant should be tried on the merits of the case and not on the character of the defendant.

Mr Gauci has been confused about the appearance and time of the mysterious visit to his shop so often that I hardly think his evidence would impress any other court.

*The picture painted by the evidence Megrahi's lawyers have obtained since his conviction is the Iran backed PFLP-GC was likely responsible for the bombing, and even if the clothes believed to be in the bomber's suitcase were bought at Gauci's Malta shop, they were bought by a person other than Megrahi.*

And bloody poor stuff the defence has assembled since.

I am sorry to have to attack Mr Hans Sherrer, the author of the 'Justice Denied' article, in this way, but he is repeating, without a single novel thought \*Hantzau's lies. Surely we aren't just selecting amongst variants of lie the CIA wishes to put forward?

### **Dr Swire, Paul Foot and *Private Eye***

Essentially Dr Swire does exactly the same thing when he goes on about his PFLP-GC theory. But he compounds the offence as he and others put a lot of effort into persuading many that the PFLP-GC was to blame, notable Mr Paul Foot of *Private Eye*. I have never managed to get that magazine to understand the circularity of its arguments or apply any critical thinking to PFLP-GC theory. Mr Foot remains a household icon whose mere theories, now over 20 years old, cannot be doubted as the truth, Carlisle Street asserts.

### **Professor Ludwig de Braeckelear, an incisive observer**

I have closely followed Ludwig de Braeckelear's comments in the past, and while I can't source them any more authoritatively than he does, what fell out of the Iran crisis seems to fit neatly.

The reason that the story cannot be sourced better than Ludwig's second or even third hand account is obvious. Neither party (the US or Iran) has had any interest in drawing attention to these negotiations. The US has never disclosed officially that negotiations took place and as they took place in the *omerta* of Government privilege, there is no reason why it should ever. No government would ever want to have to admit that it allowed a foreign power to destroy one of its own aircraft, even if this was the best deal that could be obtained in the circumstances, and it had been allowed to save its own employees!

I concluded that the following outcomes from the US-Iranian talks at the Hôtel Victoria were:

- The Iranians would be allowed to destroy one US aircraft in commercial service from a leading carrier
- **The incident must visibly be seen to be an act of terrorism, and the US would not be allowed to pass it off as a mechanical failure or an industrial accident. The aircraft could not thus, say, disappear at sea**
- The US could *finally* blame who else it liked for the downing of their aircraft, but not Iran
- But Iran was in essence the only party that had such a grievance against the USA. 290 dead bodies are the telling reason for grievance
- However, it is obvious the Iranians did not mind a circumstantial case being built against them, but there must be no tangible proof in the form of microchips and the like that would lead to them. (It was BSS who objected to

Heathrow being used, not the Iranians; but I must be careful here – there was no link whatsoever between BSS and the Iranians)

- The Iranians would be allowed no other reply at that level. It was a 'one and one only' deal
- There was no possibility of US Naval personnel being surrendered to Iranian justice
- Or of being pursued through the US courts, nor could their awards be revoked.
- The US aircraft had to be carrying fare-paying passengers
- The US Government would be allowed to extract its own employees, which it did with remarkable success
- The relatives of those killed on the *Airbus* could make modest claims for compensation within the Warsaw Convention (circa \$60,000/life) limits
- Sanctions would be lifted against Iran and Iranian bank accounts in the US would be unfrozen
- The US would ensure that no 'independent' or unofficial teams continued to try to release the Lebanese hostages, and those in the field would be recalled
- On the other hand, when the US could *demonstrate* that Iran was no longer considered as suspected of what would become Lockerbie, the Lebanese hostages would be released
- Iran would never be accused by the US of downing the US aircraft
- Iran would not make any 'good news is to be expected' announcement before the bombing. (It went a bit leaky on that, but no matter). Though Dr Velayati's pronouncement must have sorely tested the agreement. (Perhaps, the doctor was reported as speaking off the record, and the \*Brandon agreement referred only to official statements)
- Iran would not boast that revenge had been obtained, but would be allowed to make an unofficial claim.

It has required no special information to work this out, once it had been suggested that there was a deal. ***It was what happened.*** From the downing of a US aircraft to the release of the hostages, through the investigation the trial and the appeals, with the exception of some extraordinary leakiness on the part of the US and some damning disclosures from the Iranian side, both parties have held true to the agreement. Interestingly the BSS, intimately involved in the cover-up and re-allocation of blame to Libya, has been more reticent, beyond the point of visibility and I have only been able to understand their rôle by using a fictional account

### **Bletchley Park**

Astonishingly, it took 30 years for the truth about Bletchley Park in WWII *to begin* to be disclosed and there were 10,000 people involved in that! When it comes to secrecy, the British are far better than the braggart CIA which consistently trips over its own shoelaces.

The \*Brandon agreement is, I suggest still in force, and the parties, as far as they are able, adhere to it to this day.

## **US Government employees who died on the *Maid***

Notice that despite the clause that US Government employees were not to be amongst the victims, at least six were. They were:

- Michael Bernstein: United States Department of Justice – attached to Office of Special Investigations hunting down war criminals. He is a possible candidate as a victim if the CIA had wanted headlines like 'Lockerbie plane brought down by a crypto-Nazi terror gang'? A particular Austrian national, an Auschwitz guard was being sought and was deported from the USA where he had settled on 27 March 1989
- John Patrick Curry: described by John Crawford in his book as a US special forces captain who had been attending an international security conference in Italy
- Matthew Gannon: CIA deputy head of station, Beirut
- Ronald LaRiviere: United States Department of State - Diplomatic Security Service
- Charles McKee: head of the Lebanese team (possibly the only member of it)
- Daniel O'Connor: United States Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service, who flew into Frankfurt with McKee

The death of one of these individuals, Charles McKee, may have been *required* as a result of the Glion agreement, but also may only be a useful point of exploitation by the CIA. There isn't enough information to decide the matter yet. It is said Mr McKee behaved very untypically when he was due to return to the US. He phoned his mother, something he had never done before, and asked her to pick him up at a local New England airport. Perhaps, by that time, he had understood that \*Hantzau's joke (see below) might be a killer. Perhaps he was aware something was awry; it is the sort of point to be generous to the CIA's position that one could overlook as a mere coincidence. It should neither be overgeneralised from nor ignored.

The FBI would choose to ignore it when, so much later on, they became aware of it. So too the broken padlock.

I shall deal with the matter of Mr McKee in more detail below.

### **Mr Bernt Carlsson**

The courtesy of warning US Government officials did not extend to the UN. So Bernt Carlsson died. The chief protagonist of 'South Africa' theory has not replied to my extended criticism of why his theory is wrong and until he does, and I can accept it, my thesis here stands. I shall refer further to Mr Carlsson *in passim*.

### **Were the Americans who died a group?**

In some accounts it is traditional to refer to this disparate group of Americans as a CIA team, and sometimes the number is expanded to eight people. Who the others

were meant to be, or whether all those commentators on the matter have these six individuals in mind, I am not sure. Other accounts I have seen are four (with an unidentified fifth): Gannon, McKee, with Larivière, and O'Connor, in economy (*Guardian*, 27 June 2001). It would have been possible to have saved the lives of these individuals (or indeed anyone on Pan Am 103), by the simple expedient of extracting them from the flight, which could have happened at any time until the door was closed on the *Maid* prior to take off on 21 December 1988, and it rose to 8000 metres and flew for 30 minutes thereafter.

I have no doubt that the CIA was fully aware of the full passenger lists of the *Maid* and could have acted on that knowledge. In other words, that by omission the CIA sentenced these six people to death. But the CIA fully intended Pan Am 103 to die. It would of course have been helpful in showing that there was no US Government complicity in the downing of the *Maid* if there were some US governmental officials from whatever department aboard. Had there been none one would be entitled to say there must have been US governmental complicity for no Pan Am flight out of London (especially at Christmas) would surely contain no such people. Indeed the number of six, just before that joyous festival is suspiciously small. So it is quite possible that after the Toshiba warning had been issued, any other US governmental official would not have been specifically had his attention drawn to the warning later, as the CIA needed to have innocent US government officials aboard to prove that the flight was in no way unusual. But it is an issue about which known CIA officials are very vulnerable if anyone should come knocking.

### **The Heathrow break-in**

The break-in at Heathrow Airport, which I examine below, raises an interesting question. Did a CIA inspector (I have a man in mind) visit AVE4041 PA sometime between say 1:00 on 21 December 1988 and the late afternoon of that day to ensure that the Iranians had installed their device properly, which was stuck on the rear inside surface of the container AVE4041 PA 30 cm from the bottom of it on the side which would become adjacent to AVN 7511 PA in the front hold of the *Maid*, when loaded - or would that be tweaking the tail of responsibility just a bit too far? When, exactly, was the CIA in London made aware of the break-in and that it had been successful (again a curious inversion of language)?

There is the rumour, no more than that, and which no reliance should be made whatsoever, other than that it fits, is that the CIA station manager at Heathrow (an airport so important its has such an official) waved off the *Maid* at push-back. Was there some day-glo bright orange clad figure there on the tarmac who knew the aircraft would not see its American landfall.

Secondly, when did the UK security (MI5) and secret services (MI6) – (BSS an acronym for British Security Services used by Marquise) become informed of the CIA operation. It's my belief they were told extremely late on, but that the CIA had prepared themselves carefully for the eventuality that BSS would disapprove of a Heathrow based plot. So perhaps the BSS were told after the *Maid* had left the ground at Heathrow. Yes, there ought to have been clues that both BSS

organisations should have picked up especially the warnings and the broken padlock but these in themselves were not sufficient to alert the services. Did they not want to know?

But, as I believe that an early intention was for the investigation to learn of the break-in and hence conclude the device had been installed at Heathrow and the CIA arrived at Lockerbie with a pre-prepared blown up suitcase, BSS must have told them that Heathrow could not be allowed to be the point of installation of the bomb, and hence BSS knew of the operation before it happened, and acquiesced in CIA criminality. Conversely, the CIA realising that BSS were going to be difficult, had prepared themselves with a back-up plan.

### **If BSS learn late...**

A 'just possible scenario' is that the CIA head in London told his opposite number in MI6 at about 18:50 on 21 December 1988 that Pan Am 103 was going to crash, far too late for ATC instructions to be issued to stop the flight (even if MI5 or MI6 could have issued such specific instructions to land a single aircraft). Remember at about 18:38 the timer on the IED switches on as the aircraft rises through 2,400m and the aircraft would have had to be safely landed during the next half-hour.

The head of the CIA London is a very senior posting, but also a bit of a sinecure. Awarded to a senior CIA officer on the point of retirement, it includes (as a high point) attendance at the first half of the weekly meeting of the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee. It meets, I suppose, in a deep Whitehall basement together with representatives from Canada and Australia, (the Old White Commonwealth less New Zealand (which has gone beyond the pale over its nuclear policy) and post apartheid South Africa). UK domestic matters are discussed when the 'old white lions' leave.

Not knowing in advance what the response of BSS would be (though it might be surmised), the CIA might have played safe by ensuring the announcement (it was hardly a warning) to BSS came far too late.

### **How officialdom arrived at Lockerbie**

One problem that I've found there are two separate accounts of how officials came to arrive at Lockerbie. (There are usually at least two stories about anything over any issue that concerns the disaster. Is it more than a need for 'elegant variation'?) One story has an aircraft leaving Farnborough at 20:40, the other that a Pan Am 737 arrives from Heathrow at Carlisle at midnight. One should have arrived by 21:40, the other should have left around 23:00. The Farnborough plane mainly has AAIB men on it; the London plane the Aviation Minister, US SD officials, and BSS (MI5 and MI6) and other AAIB. The timing of the latter plane perhaps suggests no UK foreknowledge of the plot, that latter suggests there might be some.

AAIB obviously knew absolutely nothing about what was intended, and so the meeting with the CIA at Lockerbie must have been to say the least, frosty. Why were they there, and so quickly? They weren't expecting the crash, were they? One can

only imagine AAIB's feelings about the CIA's obtrusive and intrusive appearance at the disaster site.

The AAIB report says that they learnt of the destruction of the *Maid* at 19:40. (By the way, I implicitly accept any and every statement in the AAIB report as a true fact. The problem is that there are far too few, and the report is heavily and demonstrably biasedly edited by excision and the use of accurate, if entirely misleading, language on occasion. But every fact made in it can be regarded as unfailingly true.)

When and who briefed the Prime Minister on this tragedy? Did the PM give permission for this sad piece of American melodrama to take place on UK soil, and when she said, yes, of course, anything for our transatlantic cousins, how much did they tell her was intended? Was there a phone call to Number 10 just before 19:00 from the Head of MI16, Sir Christopher Curwen? And was he told, when he contacted No. 10, to give the Americans every assistance they wanted?

If BSS are told late-on that the CIA has an ongoing operation on UK soil, they would necessarily have had to check with Government at the most senior level (which means Mrs Thatcher) that this was so, and what the parameters for co-operation were.

Remember by holding Lockerbie here, the CIA fulfilled to the letter that it did not carry out jobs in the US, while ensuring it took place on possibly the most friendly location on earth to US interests. In the UK, the CIA was practically on its home ground, but without the distracting diktats of an importunate Congress.

### **Mrs Thatcher's knowledge of the plot**

Did Mrs Thatcher have foreknowledge of the US plot and had agreed to the use of 'Airstrip One' (Orwell's immortal phrase) in this way? Did she agree to allow the CIA to use the UK for its fun and games? I hope she lives long enough that some of the true story emerges and she learns why she is to be denied a state funeral, for the betrayal of our real national interests.

There were special reasons why the US could call on the UK in this way. Firstly, the CIA and MI6 are very close and historically the forerunner of the CIA (the OSS) was essentially set up by the British early in WWII.

"We just wish we could do more to comfort the relatives of the dead," said Margaret Thatcher. "But everything that can be done will be done." Looked at in the cold light of twenty years of disinformation and drivel from the UK authorities, it is a remarkably sinister statement. Surely Thatcher could have stopped the Americans little game, simply by saying the UK would not co-operate with the Lockerbie operation and would denounce the US Government, its President-to-be and the CIA if it were mounted here.

One of the consequences of British complicity is that the UK agencies take more than their fair share of responsibility for the tragedy than the US Government and its sacred and sacrosanct Agency, the CIA.

One consequence I hope will come out a proper inquiry is that the British authorities will cease to bend their knee to US policy and began to treat it and its Agencies as the shabby criminal elements it is and they are. The first step would be to ban the CIA or any foreign presence at the weekly JIC meetings. CIA personnel would be p.n.g.'ed as possible diplomatic representatives to the UK, and a more mature and less supine regard to US interests should be taken.

Again, I say to you the CIA committed murder at Lockerbie, and it is a crime to be avenged (not revenged).

### **The Falklands War**

Secondly, the US government had quite a few debts it could call in. The most prominent of these dated back to the Falklands War where, very much against its initial stance, the Administration swung its position round to support Britain, a realignment which ensured that Britain won that war. This re-orientation of policy had begun in the White House, when Mrs Thatcher had made a specific appeal to President Reagan to back the British position.

Many elements of the Administration were in favour of the Argentinian position.

Had the US simply denied the right of the use of the airport on Ascension Island (though UK territory) to the RAF, the fight for the islands would have been over even before it started, and there was a sufficiency of people on the right in the US who held to traditional anti-British and anti-imperialist views to argue that the Argentinian invasion as a legitimate anti-colonial action. The Monroe doctrine (that European powers should not involve themselves in the Western Hemisphere) runs deep in parts of American political folklore.

### **Bawbies**

Remember only two US presidents have been given knighthoods by the UK, Reagan and Bush (senior). But bawbies, even as rare as Grand Commander of the Bath, are a mere decoration. About Lockerbie the US demanded services in kind.

Is it not a real hope that Sir George Bush's knighthood is "cancelled and annulled", as the proper words have it, by the Queen? I use the word "Sir", because there is nothing to prevent me a UK citizen from calling a man made knight by my sovereign by his proper title, however little I believe he deserves it, or whether he thinks it should be used or not.

I call Sir George Bush that because that is his proper appellation.

Sometimes, and I think the main part of the CIA's briefing comes after the farce over Mr McKee's suitcase, the CIA has to come clean (as much as is possible for a pathologically lying organisation) and in return is told by BSS what they, the British, are prepared to do.

### **The BSS doesn't like what the CIA is up to**

As the CIA agents outlined their plot against what was essentially themselves, BSS became very angry, and it's quite possible high words were exchanged between secret services of the two allies. Firstly, BSS was very angry that the CIA had selected Heathrow for its little job.

Whilst Mrs Thatcher may have gaily agreed in the spirit of mutual solidarity of the two allies to a nostalgic re-run of the wartime alliance, and in her increasingly megalomaniac view of the world saw herself as a second Churchill, MI6 understood that the US would take all and give nothing back in return, just as they'd stolen penicillin, RDF and the jet, and denied Britain its share in the atomic bomb. Such resentments go a long way back and can fester for generations.

### **An altercation between the British and the Americans**

On the ground possible at Carlisle a little altercation is happening. As these matters have never come to light, and never will, it is best to treat it as a sub-Le Carré novelette, and use a bit of direct speech.

"No, you can't use Heathrow," said the MI6 man.

"Game and set," said the CIA. "When the break-in is discovered," it will be known it was loaded at Heathrow. It was a PFLP-GC copy timer for God's sake?

"What will be the proof of that? You've said that all the material evidence, the ice-cube timer and even the detonator and the circuitry will be destroyed in the explosion, so there will be no evidence it was a PFLP concoction."

"When the break-in becomes known, it will be obvious, as it is the obvious, but

unprovable conclusion.”

Perhaps this was the first time MI6 learned that the break-in, of which they'd had only a low-level police report, was part of the plot.

“We will decide whether there was a break-in or not.”

“We won't let you use Heathrow,” He repeated. “But how will you stop us?” asked the CIA man. “The plane is down, the deed is done. And Mrs Thatcher gave the Vice-President every assurance of the assistance of the British authorities.”

“You can't release any information about the break-in, without breaking cover,” was the reply. “And you can't use known Heathrow security failures as the background for the job. Or we can blow you sky-high.”

Certainly at that point BSS possessed the capacity to denounce the Lockerbie scam, but would it be in their interest?

### **A little story from UTA**

It reminds me of a conundrum which faced one of the UTA groups I belonged to. The question of the removal of United Nations sanctions against Libya came up at the UN. Interestingly only the name of Pan Am 103, not UTA, though they had been imposed in regard of both tragedies. The French Foreign Minister said he would be advised by the UTA families' group. But he made a condition. If he was asked to use France's veto (for France has a veto power in the UNSC), that would be the last bit of support the UTA families' group would get from the French Government. What would they choose to do? The choice was in their hands.

It was a difficult decision for Guillaume Denoix de St Marc, our chair. We weren't consulted. “Abstain on the veto, so we can continue to negotiate,” he said, unequivocally. So France abstained on the veto and continued to support *Union des Familles en Cholère's* demand for compensation.

Guillaume, in my view, made the right decision. After all one tenth of a loaf is better than none, and the UTA crust was still substantial.

The same reasoning dictated how BSS would respond to the mess the CIA had dumped them in. *Walk off the field, or continue to play the game.* The UK is, par excellence, a games playing nation, so the reply was a foregone conclusion.

### **The CIA comes a little clean**

But then the CIA had then to come clean (well a bit), while BSS assessed what the British response would be. Firstly, the CIA explained how they would locate McKee's suitcase, whose transponder had been switched on by the crash and would run for some hours.

Secondly, they said a second device had gone off. The CIA *matériel* that was being taken back to America had been doctored by them and had blown, accidentally.

“So the two devices blow up at the same time? Didn't your bomb have a safety switch?”

I think that BSS probably accepted that for the fairy story, it seems to be. And then they had to convince the AAIB.

I think the AAIB were determined to do a thorough investigation and carried one out, and only consented to issuing the highly misleading final report of their findings under immense political pressure. It contains some of the finest civil service-ese it has ever been my privilege to read.

### **A short review of the CIA's possible different approaches**

There are roughly three different approaches that the CIA adopted at different times. The Agency and especially its operatives and erstwhile operatives have not been consistent in the methods and motivations. Here's another little table about strands of thought in the CIA.

<b>Strand</b>	<b>Who?</b>	<b>How official ?</b>	<b>Signified by</b>	<b>Issues</b>
Conundrumists	Agency at first	Very	Heathrow loaded device	BSS won't allow
Limiters	Agency under compulsion from BSS	Some reluctance at first but becomes official policy	PFLP-GC/ Syrian theory	Lets CIA off hook over potential claim it did Lockerbie.  Much liked by *Hantzau and he is trying to resurrect it
Exploiters	Part of agency, which became official policy	Official policy is changed to Libya	Libyan theory	Not liked by *Hantzau, probably as it is very much of a 'fudge'

### **Why the CIA didn't mind if the break-in at Heathrow came to light**

The CIA did not mind if the break-in were discovered, and even if the adjacency of the Pan Am and Iran Air facilities at Heathrow would lead to the implication of an

Iranian break-in. But there would be no evidential trail for the device that had been stuck on at Heathrow had been designed to be destroyed in the destruction of the aircraft. But, because of BSS reservations about a Heathrow plot, the CIA intended to dump a pre-blown suitcase at the site containing numbers of clues that could lead to any number of suspects, particularly the PFLP-GC, Syria, Libya and even Ireland, if it could not get BSS's admittedly limited co-operation. There may have been other clues in that blown-up suitcase pointing to other perpetrators, but these are the only possible perpetrators that have come to light.

But BSS did mind. As BSS controlled whether the break-in at Heathrow became public knowledge or not (it was not with the CIA's power to do that), it necessarily follows the BSS thought it was a bad idea and so that fact did not reach the public.

### **A PIRA attribution is banned by MI5**

MI5 has been very cautious in explaining its rôle over Lockerbie and in one statement Dame Stella Rimington, who was head of the service during the matter, has only said "The Service played a major part in the investigation into the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie in December 1988..."

That in my opinion is a dissimulation for MI5 surely was to work out the method of corrupting the RARDE evidence.

Both elements of BSS must be compared in their reticence with the CIA's garrulousness.

The MI5 man put his foot down. "Not Ireland," their man said, seeing the draft press release by the CIA of 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1988; "We have a working arrangement with the PIRA and don't want it destabilised by blundering Americans. The Irish have never used air terrorism and there isn't any reason for them to start now. And remember much of the problem arises from your Government's indulgence of terror loving groups in the States and their funding of quixotic and impractical revolutionary strategies, (otherwise NORAIID). May I remind you that it is commonly thought in some your more ignorant quarters that people in Ulster don't even have the vote!"

### **The CIA press release of 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1988**

The CIA produced the draft of the press-release they wanted to issue on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. "No, you cannot refer to an Irish Republican claim," they were told. That is, I suggest, how the statement issued by the CIA referred to a group, unknown for nearly 80 years, the UDL or Ulster Defence League, and obviously of the opposite persuasion to the PIRA. If the suggestion of an Irish Republicans was a fantasy, the possibility of any sort of Unionist group doing it was with the fairies. It might just have been suggested to the CIA (who possibly thought they were doing BSS a favour by accusing certain Irish groups of terrorism) that they were wrong. The BSS amendment told the world that the Agency was verging on the lunatic.

As far as I can determine no-one has drawn attention to the 'Irish issue' in the 22<sup>nd</sup> December press release, let alone make the inference made here from it.

The senior Agencies must have looked with disdain at their American counterparts.

### **BSS take control**

I expect the senior MI6 man took the senior CIA man aside and in the presence of the State Department representative told him bluntly:

“If you do not do exactly as we tell you, we can blow this operation sky high. It is a matter of such seriousness that your new President might have to resign even before he takes office. Do you understand exactly what we are saying to you?”

“The first important issue at will be how much investigation the AAIB will carry out. The AAIB offer only minimal co-operation, agreeing simply to allow a final editing of the report.”

If the CIA offered the support of (or delegation to) the US NTSB of the Lockerbie investigation, wresting it away from the AAIB, at this point, I expect BSS looked at them as if they had gone barmy.

In other words, if anyone is brave and clever enough to get the AAIB to issue all their research under the FIA, it will revolutionise our understanding of Lockerbie.

“Restricting the scope of their inquiry will be very difficult indeed. One careless statement in their report, which we cannot openly edit,” say BSS, “and your cover will be blown. You must trust us to guide you in this.”

### **BSS say the IED must not have been loaded at Heathrow**

“Next, there is the matter of Heathrow. Whatever resolution comes out of this there must be no implication whatsoever that the IED was loaded at Heathrow. Heathrow is one of our most important economic assets and we cannot have you tossing it lightly aside in one of your trivial power games. If you insist on Heathrow, then we shall have to, with greatest reluctance reveal the perfidy of your plot to the world. You must understand the meaning of that. However, we understand that the plot has gone so far that the IED at least must have travelled through Heathrow undetected.”

The CIA said that of course they respected BSS's position, but they considered it a done deal at the political level.

“Not ours,” was the reply. This was the British position, determined by the foot-soldier, not the general.

“We could check again with No. 10.”

“Do you think that would help you,” was the reply. “You're dealing with us, not Mrs Thatcher. Would you assist in an operation if it were controlled and operated from the White House?”

Actually, yes, but the CIA couldn't say that.

### **What the BSS said they would help the CIA over**

Having made their position absolutely clear, but without any semblance of a resolution on the horizon, BSS asked what the CIA wanted most on its agenda.

A containment of material which might point to a second explosion, and of material from McKee's suitcase, papers, and the infiltration of the blown suitcase in the remains of AVE4041 PA, and if a prosecution ever became possible, suppression of evidence of the second explosion. Searchers were issued with instructions to look out for something that it was wished to recover, but were not told what it was, but it would be obvious when it was found. Suggestions might be the \$500,000, the plan of the Beirut flat, cocaine or something else, and whether it was ever found or not, has never been revealed.

“Tough,” said BSS, “But don't blame us if it goes tip over arse. If it goes wrong \*Cattermole gets it in the neck.”

“Hardly, not.” The forced smile on the CIA man's face, said everything. These people had lost an empire, whilst every other nation in Europe had been coruscated by war and revolution over that, and blandly muddled along as if nothing had happened. They actually found the War (for them there was only one) almost a matter of happy nostalgia!

“If evidence of a second explosion is not presented, it need not be, if an accused is in the dock for planting the IED. You're convinced that the IED was enough to bring down the *Maid*.”

“Yes.” Was there a hesitation in the voice?

“And if it were not?”

“No dice. Nor, if it ever became known that we had to arrange for a certain Iranian gent to do a little job at Heathrow.”

“Iranian, only. For, the implication would be that we'd done a deal with over the *Maid*.”

“So you wouldn't have minded if an unidentifiable gent, probably PFLP-GC, based in London, had been found to have decided to take little shopping trip to the airport?”

“We had several ideas lined up.”

“Until we banned Heathrow.”

“That's the meat of it.”

“And,” said the MI6 man, “We won't co-operate on that target.”

“So what are you going to do?”

“It looks as if Frankfurt's out too. The Germans don't want a security scandal either.”

“They did us a good turn over *Autumn Leaves*, then said one good turn a year's enough. Nine months to go. Might just be able to turn them round, but I doubt it.”

“So what happened there?”

“The Iranians told us that all sorts of multiple bombings were to be staged by the PFLP-GC, so we bargained it down to one, insisted an Iranian do the dirty, and agreed cover.”

“Why would the Iranians care?”

“They don't, we do. Look I've said far, far too much already. We agree London's off.”

“Finally.”

“Last word?”

Nod of the head.

“What'll you do?”

“Probably go outside Europe. Egypt, Cyprus, Malta...” (*Note, all these have been proposed as starting places for the IED, by some observer or commentator at some time*).

“We've made it difficult for you.”

“Not half.” In deference to his hosts, he used the anglicism.

### **BSS sum up their views on the Heathrow plot**

The MI6 man summed up: “I don't think I've heard such a deliberately cruel and mendacious plot ever. You will get our assistance, but I don't think there'll be an ice-cube in hell's chance it'll work. What will you do if it comes out that the second explosion was necessary to bring down the *Maid*?”

“Confess that were carrying *matériel* and shouldn't have done. Probably blame it on sloppy procedures by a man who wasn't quite one of us.”

Another anglicism: the CIA man was quite adept at the local argot, but found the Scottish accents hard to follow.

One reason for presenting the argument in this way is that it seems the initial planting of the IED at Heathrow is so professional, provocative and original, but all the steps in the current story, the route through Frankfurt, the agent who happens to be in Luqa Airport at the right time, Semtex in the desk drawer at that Airport, look like a complicated and rather ineffective kludge as Michael Mansfield has pointed out, with the evidence leading to a fortuitous conclusion. The only way in the end to present it is by going on and on about dedicated police work, appalling weather conditions, a bit of luck and brilliant forensic investigators and they seem to have had feet of clay. And if a case is left in the Interline Shed at Heathrow, the story's almost as wooden. That is why carrying out Lockerbie was nothing to do with the British, but clearing up afterwards was. Remember that MI6 has a rule that it doesn't do "wet jobs". Mr Bond's powers are a figment of Mr Broccoli's as much as Mr Fleming's imaginations.

So to summarise, BSS are told very late of the plot against the *Maid*. It assumes that BSS are not a poodle of the CIA which can give orders to the British, but a dangerous but unreliable fellow player, prone to impetuous and virtually unsanctionable (at least from the American point of view) operations.

The CIA tells BSS that there is a plot. BSS have some inkling, having seen the Frankfurt and Helsinki warnings, but may have come to the conclusion they related to direct flights to New York, not an indirect flight through London.

Secondly, BSS realises that a mystery break-in and targeting of a US plane at Heathrow will cause suspicion of the of probable cause – the *Airbus* downing. They refuse to co-operate except of their own terms, which are harsh: BSS must supervise all plot developments on UK soil. Chastened, the CIA provisionally consents. Just to rub it in, BSS accompany the CIA to the crash site (as they must), where the CIA behave foolishly, interfere with the scene of a crime and bring themselves to the notice of the police and worse, journalists and other ne'er do wells, eventually – like us.

### **BSS allow the pre-blown suitcase to be planted in the remains of AVE4041 PA**

Very quickly BSS assess the plot, and decide what to do. They allow the site to be polluted with the CIA's pre-blown suitcase, but it is done very, very privately and this job doesn't come to the attention of the police. Johnston reports that a helicopter arrived at a Tundergarth farm and an American gentleman got out, and asked the farmers not to go up on his fields for a couple of days. BSS would not allow even one of their operatives to break cover.

The CIA is also told that it can't present the IED as a Palestinian-mimicking device, which it truth it was, which would be the implication of the break-in at Heathrow, but must present it as a long-timer pushing the loading of the bomb back to Frankfurt or before, though they must have come to that conclusion themselves. A multi-stage ice-cube timer, though perfectly easy to achieve is a bit far-fetched to put in the

hands of real terrorists.

### **The lie over the date of Mr Bollier's visit to the US Embassy Vienna**

Early in January 1989 (actually the 19<sup>th</sup> and it is a very interesting and deliberate error by the CIA as Bollier's approach to the US embassy Vienna is usually portrayed as in 'early January' in official accounts) he comes knocking on the US embassy door, and these parts of a cover-up plot, not well-executed, begin to fall into place. I shall return to this thread below. I latched on to this point because of the imprecision in the date 'early in January'. A real CIA date would have been specific. Because the date was specific, the CIA was obviously dissimulating over something or other.

### **The CIA team in the Lebanon**

My suggestion for the 'CIA team theory' is this. As CIA deputy head in Beirut, Mr Gannon was detailed to accompany Mr McKee, the CIA/Contra (or black team member) back from the Lebanon to Washington, as his services were no longer required (by the Glion agreement), and his presence in the Middle East at least an embarrassment.

At some point the CIA decides to use his return to further its plot (I believe at the outset because of \*Hantzau's story, below), and decided that he should die by arranging for him to travel on Pan Am 103, changing his ticket so he should. (This disproves the *Tale of the Octopus* story that: he "had disregarded standing orders by choosing to fly home from Beirut on an American-flag airline, and a DEA Lebanese-American courier who had previously carried out at least three controlled deliveries of heroin to Detroit as part of the 'sting'." (*Tale of the Octopus*, Ch 1)

His CIA suitcase if destroyed (or in an air crash) would emit a radio signal. He travelled with his 'boss', Mr Gannon.

More and more I believe Mr \*Hantzau knows more than he has said about Mr McKee's death.

### **A little bad sub-editing in Mr \*Hantzau's autobiography**

Apropos of very little Mr \*Hantzau in his autobiography, begins his account of Pan Am 103 with an anecdote which claims McKee to be a friend of his and finishes with \*Hantzau saying as he leaves a war-torn Lebanon in June 1988; paraphrase: \*Hantzau advised Mr McKee to leave Beirut or he would be killed by terrorists. As this incident is said to have happened in June 1988 (six months before Lockerbie, according to \*Hantzau) this can be no foretelling of Mr McKee's tragic death. If the incident had in fact happened later after the downing of the Airbus which, we hasten to say, it did not, it would be a matter of more than black comedy. And Mr \*Hantzau is, and was, a CIA man.

But there is a little overlooked issue with this anecdote. \*Chapter XXX (real title suppressed), in which it is placed, beginning on page \*nn (page number suppressed)

of *\*Ignore the wrong* (real title suppressed) is entitled **\*Sometime in the late summer in a war torn Middle East capital.** (again real words paraphrased). There is nothing in the piece to suggest that the events are not taking place three months earlier in June, or anything to suggest they aren't. It is rather as if \*Hantzau's editor has noted that the date given by \*Hantzau (perhaps \*Hantzau originally wrote four months) which made it after the downing of the Airbus and corrected it to six, so \*Hantzau's joke which is said to have happened in June, nearly two months before the downing of the Airbus, but actually later, **but forgot to adjust the title of the chapter!** For \*Hantzau, the man who could tell us the other side of the story is fortuitously dead. What might be overlooked as a bit of comedy becomes a foully tasteless joke, or no even a joke at all. Sinister, I call it.

It's what I would have called as a pedantically logical teenager an "Oh, what a give-away moment", when faced with a logical falsity, by a parent, teacher or friend.

That short chapter was Mr \*Hantzau's "give-away" moment, and he fell on his face with his metaphorical shoelaces tied together.

Interestingly, despite this appalling gaffe, for which he should have been disciplined, \*Hantzau has been allowed to continue to promote this story.

### **Mr \*Hantzau and the one and one only theory**

\*Hantzau is said either to get very angry or uptight when asked about 'one and one only' theory. The theory doesn't necessarily mean there was a deal or that there was a collusive agreement between the US and Iran. The Iranians could quite well have turned to the Americans and said: "We're going to do one of your aircraft. We won't tell you where or when." They bring down Pan Am 103. What says there was a deal is:

- The Brandon story
- The Helsinki warning
- The Toshiba warning
- The comparative lack of US government personnel on the flight
- The huge presence of the CIA in disguise at Lockerbie
- And the rest of the scenario as it played out

Thus Mr \*Hantzau gets angry not because of the one and only theory but because of his singularly high-profile part in the whole affair, and that it was cooked up by the CIA, and the steps taken to prevent it from coming to light have begun to appear desperately thin.

### **Mr \*Brandon takes a series of holidays by Lake Geneva in Switzerland**

Now in August 1988 according to de Breackeleer's story, \*Brandon met the Iranians at Glion for the first time (according to one account). \*Hantzau says he was reassigned to Paris in August 1988. Is it just possible he became part of \*Brandon's team at Glion on secondment from Paris?

Did \*Hantzau leave the Lebanon in June or August? It should be an easy thing to determine. If he left in June, he's in the clear, if in August, he has a number of questions to answer, by inquisitors who are better able pose a problem with a little factual answer than me.

### **The death of Mr Gannon**

In the death of Mr Gannon, the CIA could ostensibly demonstrate to other agencies and the police investigation that the destruction of the *Maid* was nothing to do with it (for the Agency could surely not contemplate allowing the destruction of one of its most senior officers). That of course leads to a strange conundrum. It is really impossible to believe that Mr Gannon could have been entirely ignorant of the Toshiba or the Helsinki warnings, so if he had acted rationally he would have taken a different airline. (*I take it that he wouldn't wish to have died for his country in this particular way, even if ordered.*) Therefore, Mr Gannon must have had an assurance (from the Agency itself) that it would be safe to travel on that flight, whatever the tapes were saying. But it was not. So Mr Gannon must have been lied to, by Agency staff in on the plot. It's that inability of the investigation ever to begin to consider the Agency's innermost motivations at the outset that is one of the places where the investigation begins to break down.

### **The deaths of the other US Government employees**

I know nothing about the other deaths, whether they were intended, incidental or otherwise. But reasonable disquiet about McKee's and Gannon's death is surely enough to need an enquiry to be opened.

### **The CIA misbehaves at Lockerbie**

The almost immediate arrival of agents at Lockerbie and their pantomime efforts at the recovery of Mr McKee's suitcase seem to be a ploy to assess how the Scottish police (and their CIA's BSS handlers) would respond to the Agency as interlopers. The BSS allowed the CIA to cope on their own to see how they fared, and it was badly.

I believe a reasonable take on what happened would show that certain Americans ran the serious risk of arrest for the offence of interfering with the scene of a crime. In Scottish legal jurisdiction as separately in England, there are very strict rules (Judges' Rules), not actually legislated for, but as a part of court procedure that render people who interfere in the scenes of what is obviously or possibly a crime, make themselves the possible subject of criminal procedures.

The watchword of the process is 'the integrity of the evidence chain', which can be demonstrated in court by showing that proper procedure has been observed every step of the way.

The actions of the CIA cannot in any way be presented as preserving the integrity of the evidence chain!

Unfortunately in Lockerbie, there is doubt about so many of the individual steps of significant evidence (too many to list here), that a reasonable observer can only conclude that there was a determined process to undermine the real case.

### **The Scottish Police have their Judges' Rules**

Perhaps the CIA did not know how seriously the Scots would take proper procedure.

They found that their intrusion was unwelcome, (and when they had done their necessary business) the Agency quickly and pointedly had nothing to do with the investigation until June 1990, when it began to promote the Libyan story. In the background, of course, it was doing everything necessary to distract and mislead the investigation, probably informed of developments by the JIG, and they began that operation even before locating Mr McKee's suitcase. The extent to which BSS were a party to these machinations is unknown.

### **How do you find a single suitcase (one amongst about a thousand on a Scottish hillside)?**

The Agency located the suitcase, because of its transponder (which we can infer, for how do you locate one particular suitcase on a hillside of nearly a thousand in the dark on a wet windy, winter Scottish hillside)? The Agency said it contained papers of value, which the Agency claimed it needed to recover. It need not have. None are said to have been officially recovered, though a plan of a flat in the Lebanon would (it is claimed, Johnstone, 1991, *Guardian*, 27 June 2001) was recovered from an army range at Otterburn, about 80 miles to the south of Lockerbie. The flat it was inferred was one where some of the Lebanese hostages were being held.

The fact that there is the story that the CIA cut a hole in the side of McKee's suitcase suggests (a) it was locked and (b) had survived intact its fall to earth. Possibly a special issue one!

But papers might not have been from the same suitcase. However the need to locate McKee's suitcase was needed for a far more sinister reason than any incriminating papers it could have contained.

### **Suppose it had not been possible to locate the suitcase?**

If McKee's suitcase transponder had been damaged so it did not work, or he had omitted or forgotten to set it, or he had doubts about his return to the US, and decided to leave a 'non-clue' behind about his death, the CIA would not have been reliably able to pollute the remains of AVE4041 PA. It would therefore have been harder to suppress the story of the Heathrow break-in, for there would be no distracting remains for Holmes to work on.

It suggests that whatever doubts McKee had, he observed his security procedures which he had been trained to use, properly, and hence he did not expect he would die.

## **Mr McKee's phone call**

Mr McKee's phone call to his mother can thus either be regarded as an unexpected filial duty, or perhaps a very human need to communicate with someone very important to him, because he had begun to doubt that his recall to Washington was all it seemed. For Mr McKee had a very valuable asset with him in that transpondered suitcase, which if it were involved in a depressurisation event would be triggered, and begin to emit a traceable radio signal.

This will always be a difficult area to understand, but please start with my thesis.

## **The Helsinki and Toshiba warnings**

Both the Helsinki and the Toshiba warnings are total cod. They are placed there as part of the deliberate deception of what will happen at Lockerbie, or more importantly that Lockerbie is an Iranian job with specific American assistance.

The first job facing Mr \*Brandon and the CIA was getting US government personnel off the chosen flight.

At some point a particular flight was chosen, and I think its fair to suggest it happened before the Helsinki warning was issued. As so much of what later transpired depends on the circumstances of that flight, I think it is US sources that selected it.

The Iranians were given a small but essential walk on part and no more. One of their agents was required to stick a bomb that they had created which in function modelled a PLFP-GC device, on the inner surface of AVE4041 PA.

All evidence of that bomb was destroyed in the crash. By getting Iran to do that the Agency demonstrated that it had not killed those who flew on Pan Am 103.

## **How do you get US Government personnel off the doomed flight**

Now, how do you tailor a warning so that it is acted on by US Government personnel alone? How do you ensure that amongst the dozens (as claimed) warnings daily it is taken as seriously as to make people change flights or airlines?

You can't very well say, 'there is a risk of travelling by a US carrier in December 1988, but it's only dangerous for US government personnel'. Bombs are singularly indiscriminating devices. And you can't close down US air traffic indefinitely. In any case, the \*Brandon accord is an *agreement*, in which a US plane *must* be destroyed, and *must* be carried out. I suggest that the operative word was Helsinki.

Now that northern capital is not the most likely centre of terrorism. The phone call, an Arabic voice speaking poor English, that the US Embassy received, was quite specific – a Finnish woman would carry a bomb on board a US bound aircraft. Parts

of that story are suspiciously like the circumstances of the Hindawi affair, and if you substitute Irish for Finnish, it's identical. That matter had happened eighteen months earlier.

### **Multi-part keys words known only to Helsinki Embassy security officials**

Perhaps the codeword is two part – a phone call to the US Embassy, Helsinki and a Finnish woman, or three part – Arabic sounding voice, Helsinki and Finnish woman. Less chance of false positives.

The security man in the Helsinki embassy (who may or may not have been informed about the full meaning of the words) Helsinki and Finnish, and an Arabic sounding voice, performed to snuff and the warning appeared on US embassy bulletin boards (an early form of email) throughout the world. I expect those who did not heed the warning had their travel arrangements unexpectedly changed for them.

Notice, that only the security man in Helsinki needs to be in the warning loop (and possibly he doesn't know the full meaning of what he's reporting), and it doesn't require knowledge by every US embassy security official in every US embassy to be in the scam. That is why, I suggest, the cod nature of the Helsinki warning has never come to light. And, of course, the official in the Helsinki embassy would have no reason to believe he was being warned by his own Government of its decision to bomb one of its country's own aircraft, because he was simply reporting the essence of the Arabic sounding English warning! He would simply know that it was the sort of warning he knew he had to treat as absolutely serious and to be distinguished from any other.

### **Structural reasons why the Helsinki warning is cod**

There are other reasons why the Helsinki warning is cod. Either you have to believe that a 'bleeding heart' terrorist got a conscience and has decided to warn the Americans or he was paid a very large sum of money to do so. Nobody, but nobody has had such a conscience in terrorist circles since the 'Lord Mounteagle' warning in the Gunpowder Plot, and that, if you recall that was to the brother-in-law of one of the plotters. As usual there are no signs of payment, nor in this instance any claims of it.

But while the origins of the Helsinki warning are false, its message is true, though after the Lockerbie bombing the US SD had decided it was a lie, by 10<sup>th</sup> December 1988, but did not make that rejection public! By specifically naming Frankfurt, the US government announced to the world, (though to a specialist audience, its employees) that it had reached a peace treaty with Iran over the Airbus and all that was necessary to complete the deal was simply to allow the bombing to take place.

In retrospect the State Department was to claim they knew on the 10<sup>th</sup> December 1988 that the Helsinki warning was false. However, if SD passengers had returned to after that date to Pan Am 103 of the 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988, they would have been killed, so it is a very odd sort of logic that led to say the warning was false. But the higher diplomatic mind is capable of the finest acts of self delusion.

The original intention may well at an early stage have been to place the device on a New York bound Pan Am flight from Frankfurt. We can only speculate why the place at which the device was loaded was switched to London. It may have been that, if the plot went awry, it would be easier to manage the fall-out in London than Frankfurt. The BSS would require the loading of the device to be made before London.

### **Could an equivalent of the *Maid* have been destroyed over the Netherlands?**

If the IED had been put on a direct New York bound flight from Frankfurt, it would possibly have downed the *Maid* near Herenveen in the Netherlands (365km from Frankfurt on the main route to the US, the same distance as Heathrow is from Lockerbie). It would have been brought down in a much more populated area (117-195 people per km<sup>2</sup> versus 10-25 people per km<sup>2</sup> ) and at the same toll rate that would have been between 40 and 200 Dutch people). Perhaps the CIA had some conscience, or simply management of the consequences of the tragedy would simply be easier on UK soil.

The warning is almost too efficient and the CIA had to go some lengths to ensure there were some US Government personnel aboard, especially one or two who had been selected to die.

### **The Toshiba warning**

The Toshiba warning is an entirely different kettle. It is the beginning of the distraction plan.

Consider the situation from the Administration's point of view. The \*Brandon accord has been a brilliant coup that has avoided a possible nuclear or a least very serious war. However, its major downside is that it requires the destruction of a full American civil airliner. Firstly, no Government can ever admit to the fact that it knowingly allowed its citizens to fly to their deaths, and agreed to that, using one of its intelligence agencies to ensure it took place. Secondly, there's an agreement with Iran that it will not be *finally* fingered for the tragedy.

Yet Iran is the most obvious culprit. When Lockerbie happens everyone's going to assume that Iran is behind it, simply because of the *causus belli* of the Airbus (let alone the other factors such as the adjacency of the Iran Air and Pan Am facilities at Heathrow). The press release of 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1988 admits as much. And the investigation would inevitably start with an Iranian premiss. Persuading the Lockerbie Inquiry to start 'from the evidence on the ground' filtered through the complex but flawed HOLMES computer system, will be both a challenge and a lucky happenstance for the CIA.

### **The rule of the undistributed middle again**

When I write about the CIA, I must be careful not to fall into another undistributed middle which runs:

- a. The CIA does wicked things;
- b. Lockerbie is also a wicked thing;
- c. Therefore the CIA carried out Lockerbie.

Some of these points must have occurred immediately to Mr \*Tomas Cattermole a senior CIA man when the \*Brandon accord was dumped on his desk and he was given the task of carrying it out. It is more his rôle in operations than of analysis that concerns us. (You can see a similar dichotomy in Mr \*Hantzau's behaviour – a operations man, if ever there was one pontificating on practical geopolitics). Clearly no person can reasonably be expected to wear two such separate hats and in my opinion, Lockerbie shows very much itself as a highly deliberate operation. It is best to regard the Lockerbie affair as a multi-stage process at the start, that is adapted in the light of developments, one that is modified and grows with the unfolding of new circumstances.

### **The CIA wants the bombing done properly**

What the CIA actually did to execute the \*Brandon accord is also typical of the Agency. Having allowed a foreigner to bring down an American 747 they had every intention that it should be done properly, and they did not think a foreigner could. Firstly, there was the matter of the size of a device that could be planted on the *Maid* using the stratagem of a stuck on bomb. Then perhaps the CIA's experts came up with a similar calculation to the question 'what size of explosion can be relied upon to bring down a hardened 747 and got the same result as the New Mexico investigators' – 5kg-10kg. Gloomily they must have concluded that the CIA would have to supply its own explosion besides that of the Iranians, though in fact they were wrong to the extent that the IED proved sufficient to down the *Maid*, for the whole cockpit was ripped off the plane and the pressure skin was more than ruptured (as in TWA 840), which was probably their damage model.

Whilst it may have been possible for an Iranian to carry say up to half a dozen copies of the stuck-on device and attach them to the rear side of AVE4041 PA, that explosion say of 4kg-6kg might still be too small to achieve the desired producing many survivors, if some were mortally injured. The \*Brandon accord demanded deaths not survivors. Every extra device the Iranian stuck on increased the possibility of the interference being noted, and the possibility of glue failure. Make, therefore, the Iranian's job as simple as possible and the CIA would clear up the consequences.

The Iranians followed their instructions to the letter, and did not try to substitute the device they were told to place for one of a larger size. If the CIA did check during the 21<sup>st</sup> that the Iranians had placed their device they were partly there to see that the Iranians had worked exactly to their instructions.

But it may just show that the Iranians thought the leading intelligence agency of the Great Satan was as evil as the regime of the country itself, it was an evil to be trusted. Having started the destruction of the *Maid* the Iranians could ensure the CIA finished the job off for them.

## How could they do that?

But that left the CIA with a dilemma, how to carry out the *coup de grâce*. It could not be an independent (or seemingly independent) destruction. It could not be a missile (sorry Mr Vials), for that would clearly have been two independent attacks and been seen as such (and the timing would have been much too complicated to work out). So the explosion had to be aboard the *Maid*. What was the *safest* (I am sorry to have to use that unintended irony, but trying to understand what the CIA does, tends to invert one's concepts of good and bad and right and wrong. The solution lay in the CIA pallet. The *Maid* had been hardened for reason. To allow it carry weaponry, so that when a weapon fired accidentally, it would not bring the whole aircraft down. Despite the claims of certain commentators, I have found no instructions making the carriage of *materiel* on civil flights illegal. If there were, why was the *Maid* hardened and a part of the CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet)? If the CIA deliberately allowed a weapon to be loaded with the safety switches in the off position or more likely placed a specially designed explosive charge that would be arranged to blow *after* the Iranian device went off. The easiest way to ensure that this took place was a simple pressure transducer switch that would be activated when the pressure hull of the *Maid* was breached. In fact I believe that the *Maid* had fallen less than 1000m when this second device blew, which it did less than 14 seconds after the pressure hull failed.

## A problem with 14 seconds

When I tried to account for a fourteen second gap between the first explosion and the second, I honestly believed that depressurisation of the *Maid* could take that amount of time. It doesn't. If the nose is torn off the front of a large commercial aircraft depressurisation is almost immediate. Indeed it takes about 1/20<sup>th</sup> of a second to depressurise an aircraft from about atmospheric pressure to 1/10<sup>th</sup> atmosphere for the size of a large aircraft (about 3000 cubic metres) and a hole the width of the aircraft (about 75 sq metres) See: [www.geoffreylandis.com/higgins.html](http://www.geoffreylandis.com/higgins.html). Possibly though, as the hole blown in the side of the *Maid* as shown in the puff of air from the small puncture in the AAIB report, the process of the ripping off of the nose took some seconds.

It's appropriate to look at Figure C-14 which shows the situation at 68578 seconds (after some arbitrary starting point). It shows 6 secondary radar blips at 11 second intervals leading up to 68578 seconds and 4 primary radar blips at 68578 that time.

The two on the left are bits of debris, the third one the main body of the aircraft proceeding northwards and the one on the right the sheared off fore cabin and cockpit. It is heading off at a velocity of about 250km/hr at right angles to the direction of the flight (but still, of course with a forward component). The speed along the track of the flight was 804 km/hr, before break-up.

The time of the explosion of the cockpit voice recorder was 19:02:50, and the last radar sweep (final secondary radar reflection was 19.02:46.9. The next would have been at 19:02.57.9 (assuming an 11 second interval between sweeps), so the earliest anyone watching (with radar equipment) would have known about the explosion on the *Maid* would have been at that time, or nearly 8 seconds after the break-up had begun. This is the position shown in the composite secondary and primary scans in Figure C-14.

Suppose a watching CIA operative (and not just the ever attentive Alan Topp) has before him a two radar receivers. The first is tuned to the 1090 MHz (or thereabouts) the frequency of the primary radar signal emitted by Shanwick. The emission of the radar itself, is of course blanked and the much weaker reflected signal is picked up. The second is tuned to the IFF transponder signal which emits its more informative signal at 1030 MHz, and is triggered by the primary radar.

On the second screen (and indeed on the first) we see a series of signals at 11 second intervals. However, on the second screen the signal at 19.02:46.9 is the last, but on the first screen (showing the primaries), not one but four points are seen. By that time the *Maid* has been disintegrating for nearly 8 seconds.

Now suppose that in his hand the CIA operative has an ordinary commercial mobile phone, ready prepared with a number set up ready to be dialled. The number to be dialled is that of a similar device attached to the *materiel* on the CIA pallet in the rear hold of the plane and has been set up it explode it. The call takes about 6 seconds to go through. (I have found that typical evening connections times for mobile phones in the UK to international mobile phones are about 6-8 seconds.

When the absence of the secondary radar return is seen and the primary has broken into 4 parts and as a result the operative has 'dialled' the CIA bomb *materiel* trigger exactly 14 seconds, or exactly the difference in time between the start of the southern debris trail and of start the northern.

I was utterly astonished at the closeness of the figure derived from the debris trail map and the calculation from the radar tracks and mobile phone call connection that I have no doubt this is the way that the CIA brought down the dying *Maid*.

### **\*Hantzau and the Madrid railway bombers**

I am sure that \*Hantzau dialled that call to the device in the belly of the *Maid*. **He did not delegate.** (I have considered the possibility that an Iranian accompanied \*Hantzau actually to make the fatal mobile call, but I think it's unlikely. It wouldn't actually reduce the CIA's culpability by much, would it?)

It is exactly the stratagem that the Madrid commuter bombers used to trigger their devices 15 years later. It is a tribute to the sanity of so many Muslims and members of the CIA that the mechanism of triggering explosions in this way does not seem to have been used since.

### **If I kill a man certain of death, without just cause, can I be called a murderer?**

Suppose a wicked man is about to die in the electric chair and all the preparations have been made. An incensed witness of the performance pulls a gun and shoots him dead first.

Is that man guilty of murder?

Yes, certainly. Every death must be by due process and shooting a man in this extremis of his life does not alter the fact.

More cogently, for the Lockerbie example, even if the passengers in the main cabin of the *Maid* would not have survived their fall to earth, the killing of them by the second device would be murder.

The doctor who kills a dying man is still in the UK culpable of murder and a charge can be brought against him, however much the 'victim' may have wanted that end. I am sure nobody on flight Pan Am 103 even wanted such an eventuality.

The CIA man who called that number that triggered the bomb has no defence in law against a charge of murder whatsoever.

### **Curiously**

Mr Gannon and Mr McKee were travelling in the first class passenger cabin at the front, which was torn away when the IED went off and so they never experienced the explosion aft, but only that of the device 'placed by an Iranian hand'. Small comfort.

**If it is true what you have written about the CIA's involvement with the downing of the *Maid*, is their responsibility one of criminality as to murder?**

Yes

**Was the CIA legal department aware what \*Hantzau was actually doing**

About this I have doubts.

The CIA is above all a secret organisation. It may be difficult to get even simple statements properly understood, internally.

If the CIA legal department had been asked, 'Can a CIA operative down an aircraft already in the process of being destroyed', I am sure they would have said 'No' for the reasons outlined above.

So \*Hantzau, who might have outlined the Heathrow (Iranian) ploy, did not tell them about what he intended to do at or near Lockerbie.

\*Hantzau thus went on to destroy the *Maid* without being properly advised as to his liabilities under law.

**Do the shades of the prison house concern \*Hantzau yet?**

I wonder. They should.

**Timetable of events leading up to the destruction of the *Maid***

Day and time	Event	Problems	Issues arising
20 <sup>th</sup> December 1988-21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988 – Lebanon, Cyprus, Frankfurt Airport, Heathrow	Mobile phone trigger attached to CIA <i>matériel</i> on their pallet to be activated by a mobile telephone call. It contains a detonator, never said to have been recovered	Can't locate and time this action any more accurately.	It will come out when the criminal case against the IA and its operatives is brought
20 <sup>th</sup> December 1988 23:05-23:59, Heathrow Airport	Iranian agent masquerading as airline official breaks into secure area, airside, Heathrow enters Interline Shed and places IED on previously identified baggage container AVE4041 PA		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, day	*Hantzau arrives near Lockerbie with radar equipment and mobile phone trigger device	Probably in a hotel room, with a good view and open windows	
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 18:00	Pan Am 103, <i>Maid of the Seas</i> , due to take off		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 18:04	Pan Am 103 pushes back		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 18:25	Pan Am 103 takes off		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 18:56	The aircraft levelled off at FL 310 north west of Pole Hill VOR.		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.02:37.9	Penultimate return obtained from the secondary radar for Pan Am 103		

21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.02:44	Approximately 7 minutes later, Shanwick Oceanic Control transmitted the aircraft's oceanic clearance but this transmission was not acknowledged.	The secondary radar return from Flight PA103 disappeared from the radar screen during this transmission.	If the Shanwick transmission had triggered either the IED or the device on the CIA pallet, the <i>Maid</i> would have been destroyed at the start of the transmission. As usual the AAIB's report is absolutely accurate.
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.02:46.9	Last return obtained from the secondary radar track for Pan Am 103.  This return was received 3.1±1 seconds before the loud sound was recorded on the CVR.		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.02:50±1 second	IED detonated	Interpreted as the explosive destruction of the IED (stuck on AVE4041 PA)	From the stop of the CVR
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.02:52, approximately	Cockpit and nose break off and travel in an easterly direction for 4km before crashing at Tundergarth		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.02:57.9	No point on secondary radar  Now 4 points on primary radar		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.02:58.2	*Hantzau initiates mobile phone call to detonating device on the CIA pallet		

21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.03:04	Second device, on the CIA pallet explodes., triggered by the mobile phone call.	Calculated from the AAIB debris map as the start of the northern debris stream – 14 seconds and 3.1 km north of the southern stream	The aircraft is brought down over the town of Lockerbie. 11 people are killed
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.03	Police patrol informs HQ about massive explosion		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.04	Emergency call to Dumfries and Galloway Fire Brigade.		
21 <sup>st</sup> December 1988, 19.40	AAIB informed		
later	CIA locates position of McKee's suitcase. Probably *Hantzau did that		
Later still	CIA plants previously blown up suitcase. Probably *Hantzau did that		

## Not a missile

There are two reasons I believe a moderately sized bomb was used rather than an unsecured missile. Firstly, there would be a danger a missile would not go off, and would have been recovered from the wreckage. A CIA tidy-up team in their Pan-Am engineering garb might have been able to do it. But no missile was found and whisked away, for there was, I believe, a second explosion *of materiel*. A missile firing would have been exceptionally revealing, for a randomly directed missile would leave a visible trail and could end up anywhere.

No reports of a missile firing were reported by passing air traffic, or seen from the ground. A massive explosion in the air was reported by a policeman in Lockerbie, and an early television report claimed a fireball rising nearly 250 metres in the air had been seen (which, by definition cannot be the IED). There are no reports or rumours of reports about a missile being recovered from the moors. So I believe it was a second and more massive explosion from a large bomb, probably Mr McKee's *materiel* supplied by the CIA itself.

## Industrial accident, one particular example

A theory currently doing the rounds is that there was an industrial accident on board the *Maid*. It is a theory that comes and goes and it seems reasonable as ordinary failures should be considered before terrorism.

The points against it are:

- The exact timing exactly fits that of a known PFLP GC device the pressure transducer and ice-cube timer. There is no reason why it should. (This is by far the strongest point)
- The protagonists of the theory say, though they have not carefully worked out the steps that electrical or radio interference between radio transmission such as ATC, LRMS or the like
- I can find no reliable evidence that any such crash has happened
- If it were an issue in wars enemies would fire off their opponents weaponry using Radhaz
- The proponents usually simply say electrical interference without recognising that the device to explode and the transmitter must be on the same frequency, and the transmitted signal must be modulated in such a way it that the receiving device interprets it as a valid trigger signal
- Two sets of frequencies are usually suggested VHF radio (such as Shanwick ATC) or those in the UHF band for LRMS and curiously garage doors
- Even the UHF frequencies are banded differently (315 MHz) for garage doors and (380-399.9MHz) for LRMS
- There is a case of garage doors in Toronto being operated by LRMS signals, but not of garage doors signals operating LRMS, I suspect as garage doors are a very simple domestic product simply detecting the presence or not of a signal, while the LRMS systems would have more sophisticated modulated control frequencies
- It requires the CIA (if an industrial accident) to have forgotten to switch off the systems (unlikely on a civil flight)
- The current claim is that what were said to be sewing machine needles at the trial were not – they were either hypodermic syringes or military flechettes
- The authors of the theory seem to be incapable of understanding that sewing machine needles are a very high value product (about \$5000/kg, greater than the value (per kg of the PC I am writing this on, which almost certainly was flown to the UK),
- They forget that they buy superior air imported vegetables from Kenya costing about \$5/kg
- So sewing machine needles do not need to go by sea, and need not be flechettes

### **The language of the AAIB surpasses even that of Mr Paul Channon**

I must return to one of the stories that tells of this second explosion in the final AAIB report. I am sure there is a much fuller internal report, which expands that single sentence, which technically spells out the duplicity of the CIA. The problem is over

the use of the acronym IED. ***Because the AAIB says there wasn't a second IED, there wasn't one.*** I accept every statement of the AAIB as implicitly true. But there was a second explosion. I have said it can't be a missile. Perhaps the AAIB went semantic here and argued to themselves that a device carried by the CIA on its own pallet could not be classified as an IED; several accounts refer to the explosion of a bomb the CIA were returning from the Lebanon. I expect the CIA had reluctantly to concede to the AAIB that their 'bomb' went off. It had been an accident, at least according to their account, which the AAIB chose to believe.

I believe the AAIB to have been naïve, if they hadn't worked out that the most logical cause of the second explosion was that it was mobile-phone triggered, but I can go no further than that.

The conundrum rebounded on the AAIB. What was the essence of IEDness; that it was not a bomb officially carried, or it was not primed to do so. They decided therefore that something officially carried, though designed to explode, and had done so accidentally, could not be an IED, and therefore they could claim in one single sentence in their report that there was not a second IED, whilst not commenting on the possibility of a second explosion. It was 'angels dancing on pinheads', coupled with that elasticity of language for which English is famed, and senior British civil servants know all about that. It was semantics on a par with the Channon statement that the IED was 'hidden amongst suitcases, which meant it wasn't in a suitcase.

Were indeed the Channon statement and the AAIB report written by the same man?

There are lots of problems with the AAIB report. At one point it simply says the aircraft was destroyed whilst not going into details.

### **Why Mr McKee was allowed to fly with secrets**

But why go to the complication of allowing Mr McKee to fly with damaging papers? Assume for the moment that McKee and Gannon have not volunteered to die and so know nothing of the fate that is intended for them. To convince them of this, the CIA in Washington allows them in Beirut to pack their cases in the normal way together with McKee's secret papers, McKee setting the transponder so that it will operate, if there is a crash. Mr McKee must have been well trained in his trade-craft for he set it, not thinking that if he omitted to, his suitcase could not be located when it came to earth, it would immensely complicate the cover-up. That he set his suitcase transponder, meant he did not believe he would be killed.

He had papers relating to his now blown operation and he stuffed them in a suitcase, which may not have been *the* transpondered suitcase (which, just to remind us, was not the one said to have carried the Toshiba cassette). There was no report that the transpondered one had broken open when it was seized by the CIA, but if a map of a flat in Beirut was found by the army at Otterburn it had come from a burst suitcase (but not bombed).

McKee, though he had doubts, evidenced by the phone call to his mother must have

argued to himself that the CIA would never deliberately destroy an aircraft filled with so many of its darkest secrets, which so surely would be spilled in the event of a crash. Here, he was wrong. For the official CIA detested what he was up to (and that means \*Hantzau, however much he says he was a good friend of McKee, saw him as expendable, and may even have resented the office horse-play, that McKee, a huge man (necessarily called Tiny, inflicted on him)) and the deliberate death of a footsoldier of fortune in the terrorist war mattered not a jot to them.

Perhaps, once in the airline baggage system, then, it was too difficult to remove the suitcase containing the incriminating papers either in London or Frankfurt, perhaps because they were carried by McKee in the cabin, and the CIA lacked sufficient authority to do so even on what was essentially its own airline, so its was better to clear up the mess later.

I hope Mr McKee died before he knew he had been betrayed. Mr Gannon too.

### **Cooking up the plot - a further reprise**

Then there is the question of operationalising the \*Brandon accord and laying a false trail to deflect inquiry from Iranian, or heaven forbid, American lines, and a CIA responsibility. These two questions began to see the light of day when a curious warning, the so-called Toshiba warning came to light. In fact this was three separate warnings all issued by the FAA, on the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> November 1988. Interestingly, the BKA raids were no later than the 26<sup>th</sup> October 1988.

One week is a very short time to cook up a plot about the destruction of an aircraft by a Toshiba bomb, so if you can agree with my theory, if only conditionally just for a moment, the breaking of the Palestinian ring in Germany begins to seem as if it is part of the agreed plot, by the Iranians (a group of whom have begun to commission the between 5 and 12 bombings) and the Americans (who have allowed them the 'just one and one only' reprisal). Bear in mind also the point in \*Hantzau's autobiograpjy.

### **Blowing up a suitcase**

So by mid-November all the elements of the Lockerbie plot are in place. There is just one more thing to do before Pan Am103 is destroyed. What's that? Why to blow up a suitcase that contains a copy of a Toshiba cassette and a very carefully made collection of miscellaneous items, of course! But no chip from a timer!

Who's doing it? The CIA, of course! Where? Some private facility of theirs in the USA.

I'll develop this point at length when we come to consider what happened at Lockerbie.

### **On a dark wet cold Scottish hillside**

We can skip forward to December 20 1988.

As usual, there isn't enough information as yet to more than partially reconstruct what happened. When I began seriously to work out 'Iran theory' I thought that an Iranian must have flown into London on 20 December 1988, placed the device and flown out. The story ran thus... On the daily Iran-Air flight to London from Tehran is a calm, passionate and dedicated young Iranian Revolutionary Guard. I expect he was clean-shaven, as when you're going on a bomb planting exercise it's as well to look as inconspicuous as possible, and a bearded man might just arouse suspicion.

### **A Iranian traveller's tale**

He was dressed in a conservative black suit and for it was winter in London wore an overcoat. It was the dress that might be worn either by an airline functionary or a businessman. He carried no luggage, or none that has come to light, and had a pair of bolt cutters. These will never be recovered. Those boltcutters will never be recovered because either the agent arrived by air, and there is no security control for inbound passengers or he arrived landside from London or elsewhere.

I do not know whether it was obligatory for all staff airside to wear high visibility vests in December 1988. If it was, he would have carried such a vest under his overcoat and put it on just before the break-in. He would have removed it as he left but carried it away with him. Discarding a security vest would be more problematic than leaving behind a broken padlock, for if the break-in is to be portrayed as a break-out by somebody airside, who would have been wearing a vest, the miscreant would have faced an inquiry when he next returned to work as to why he had lost his vest.

Inside a large inner pocket (8 inches by 8 inches) of his overcoat was a working *functional* copy of a Palestinian bomb – barometric circuit, timer, detonator, battery, and Semtex, of Iranian manufacture. It was 8” square. (My original estimate was A4, until I re-read Mr Claiden's (AAIB) evidence at Zeist)

Only this bomb is not scrunched up inside a Toshiba cassette. It's in the form of a square, about 7mm-8mm thick, painted a dull silver-grey on one side (metal or aluminium paint), with a peel-able sticky surface on the other. The thickness is derived from the consideration of an 8” square package containing 423g of Semtex.

Where does my information come from? It can be deduced from the circumstances of the evidence and the evidence itself that was revealed both at the Zeist trial and the Zeist appeal.

### **How the IED came to London**

Now let's go to a possible mechanism by which the bomb came to London. Here I tread ice so thin, it scarcely exists, and not any proof other than a single assertion of what happened. You may not wish to believe it, and I wouldn't do, if it did not fit. But it seems to.

The story is that the bomb was devised in Tehran and brought to London in stages. In fact it seems to have followed part of the route of the device claimed to have brought down the *Maid*. It was flown from Frankfurt to London, having been brought there by air from Iran. In particular the story says Frankfurt Airport was not used but one of two airports the Iranians 'controlled' there. What exactly the word 'control' means in this context, I don't know, and it may mean no more than the fact that Iranian planes had the right to land and take off. It may even hint that, at one point the Iranians had been instructed to introduce the device at Frankfurt, itself. What ever its precise meaning it suggests a route by which a device could be carried to or through Frankfurt, not necessarily in a format that would make a viable explosive device. (For example parts of the final assembled device could have been flown in separately, or arrived in separate suitcases, and parts may have been carried by diplomatic bag, if the Iranian Exterior Ministry had agreed). A similar constraint would apply to the introduction of the device to the UK.

Once here, it might have been assembled in the Iranian Embassy, a 'safe address' or a hotel room, prior to its final land journey through the break-in at Heathrow Airport. The answer to that question we are hardly likely ever to know. But given that the 'piece' fits, and does not suffer the objections of other stories, it must be treated as a more than a possibility.

As the mechanism of the bombing is so crucial to understanding what happened, I'll deal with it here.

### **Mr Megrahi's first appeal**

When Mr Megrahi was first convicted, he was allowed an appeal, which was held at Zeist. One new fact emerged. There had been a break-in at Heathrow on the evening of the 20 December, 1988. It had been discovered by a BAA security patrol just after midnight on the morning of the 21 December. The security guard who discovered it, a Mr Manly, had properly reported it to his superiors and an entry had been made in the BAA incident book, which was produced at the appeal, so we can have no doubt it happened. Mr Manly stated that it was the worst breach of security he had encountered in his 17 year career with BAA. (I shall exploit that particular fact in my analysis below).

### **A break-in is not properly reported and the Met sent back to London**

Dr Swire, I think, has said he believes that the Metropolitan Police were deliberately instructed not investigate the break-in. One thing we know. The Metropolitan Police were involved at the start in Lockerbie in the form of the Anti-Terrorist squad. The Lord Advocate (a Scottish politician) is said to have demanded that they pull out. A much more reasonable explanation is that the political leader of the Met, the Home Secretary (Douglas Hurd) having been told that Lockerbie was very much an American matter, decided to ask Sir Peter Imbert to pull his officers out, and that this fitted with parochial Scottish prejudices that the Scottish Police should be allowed investigate their most serious plane disaster. The Lord Advocate may well have been made aware that Lockerbie was very much a matter where UK Government's

indulgence of US antics should be tolerated.

John Crawford, who has written a thoroughly bad book on Lockerbie, sees this as a sort of Scottish victory, having a typical provincial policeman's distaste for the Met coupled with an intense kailyard nationalism. But what the Met was doing was casting the Scots to the wolves of the CIA.

There seems to be no evidence that the Met told the Scots about the break-in, and indeed the circumstances by which the defence became informed about it is unknown, so they could register it as grounds for appeal, are mysterious, and probably did not start with Mr Manly.

A week after Lockerbie, the security officer concerned handed the evidence, which consisted of a bar and a padlock cut through the hasp (like butter, said Manly (in other words, it was a professional job)) to a Metropolitan police officer and also made a statement. It promptly disappeared, and was presumably handed to the CIA, I suggest, and may be held as an exhibit in the Langley Black Museum. Perhaps the BAA should ask for their property back? They had been of no help whatsoever in developing this explanation, for they would prefer a story that only touches on Heathrow tangentially and not as the heart of the mystery.

### **Mr Manly becomes a witness**

When the trial at Zeist began, Mr Manly confidently expected to be called as a witness. The call never came, and on Mr Megrahi's conviction, Mr Manly decided to contact the defence.

That is one story. But Mr Manly does not seem to be a particular perspicacious person. I do not want to do him a disservice, but did the idea of getting his story into the public domain start with BSS? A fact made public, which can be discarded for it fails to become important by process is easier to deal with, because it has been rejected, than a fact which remains hidden, is suddenly revealed and acquires a momentum that might lead to a campaign to release the convict and quash the verdict.

### **BSS decides he should be**

Better then, manage the prospect of bad news as early as possible. BSS assessed three or four factors. If knowledge of the break-in emerged, would the defence realise that suitcase theory was wrong and the IED must be a stick-on, what would be the likelihood of the Appeal Court accepting the appeal on these grounds, and what quality of witness Mr Manly would make. They were helped by the fact the Mr Megrahi continued to retain Mr Taylor, and might have made a different choice had he retained Mr Keen, who certainly understood the matter of the square hole in AVE4041 PA. Manly must have looked as if he would not make a good witness, which would have been attractive to BSS. Appeal Courts have a habit of rejecting early appeals, as they seem to form a *post facto* argument that such claims are simply a form of special pleading. So BSS may have decided that the risk of a early

appeal was a better deal than a late revelation. So they arranged for the defence to learn of the break-in.

Manly was admitted as a witness for the defence at the appeal, and apparently did not make a good impression. But the failure to be a good witness: polite, deferential and concise doesn't make you a liar or a deliverer of falsity, though that would be sufficient to allow prosecuting counsel to portray you as such. An appeal court does not like retrying cases and often tends to refuse to do so, so the appeal bench (now of five) could be seen as wishing to sum up for a dismissal of the appeal. Prosecuting counsel used all the tricks a good prosecutor will use to discomfit Mr Manly – such as suggesting the door had been broken from airside, when his evidence was clearly that it had been broken from landside.

What I concluded from this, and it came at the end of a long period where I had tried to put Lockerbie to one side, was that there must be some truth in what Mr Manly was saying.

I decided to review my position on Lockerbie, and though understanding was a long, long time coming, it was the beginning of a revolution in my thinking.

### **Looking at the break-in**

Firstly, that there had been a break-in meant there was necessarily a different possibility of how the bomb got onto Pan Am 103. It could have been 'loaded' at Heathrow. Mr Manly has been informative about his career as a BAA security guard. He said the break-in was the worst security incident in his 17 year career with the company. So it seemed that major security incidents of this scale are rare, but how rare?

For this I needed to use a different approach. One based on statistics and probability rather than the 'rule of the undistributed middle'.

After all, the court had deliberately ignored that rule, for the simple demonstration of an alternative route by which the bomb *could* have been delivered aboard Pan Am 103 ought to have been sufficient to have acquitted Mr Megrahi. By demonstrating that there was an alternative mechanism by which a bomb could have been put aboard the plane ought to have led to Mr Megrahi's immediate release. But the appeal court deliberately ignored the force of this logic (using almost a balance of probabilities argument, inappropriate in murder case), and declined to free him. The court simply said the break-in was too remote from the departure of the *Maid* for there to have been any connection.

'Could have' as a mechanism for a conviction, is not sufficient in a criminal trial, especially one of murder, and especially of the worst mass murder in the UK. Any doubt *must* lead to an acquittal.

### **An approach from statistical inference**

Having some background in that arcane field of mathematics which is called statistical modelling I wondered whether I could apply that knowledge to the break-in.

If you are not happy with a statistical argument, such as the fact you are a lawyer (and if you consider that an insult to lawyers, consider how badly statistics was treated in the Professor Meadow affair by the courts), please jump to point %, and I shall try to simplify without essentially changing the argument when you come back .

### **How frequent are security incidents, given we aren't told how often they happen**

The important factor was to work out the rate of serious incidents (based solely upon the incident that Mr Megrahi found most serious in his career) at Heathrow. I found out (using such figures as the size of the BAA workforce, the proportion of them employed as security guards, the proportion on duty at any time (it takes about 5 people to cover 1 'job' position, for that position to be covered 24 hours a day (a figure I knew from my career as an operational research analyst)) and the proportion of BAA flights through Heathrow (40%)) that there were about 13 incidents as serious as the one that had happened to Mr Manly, in a year (at Heathrow).

About one a month seems reasonable. Some of them become public and there are about 1-2 cases about Heathrow security a year become well known. Usually stories about "Thiefrow", or the easy availability of security passes. Not every case comes to court or even to public notice, of course.

I converted that figure into a figure of flights per incident, and ended up with a figure of 1 in 40,000. (I also tried the calculation with different sorts of statistics and came up with a figure within 30% of the same value, more than sufficient for this sort of exercise).

### **How many security incidents are demonstrably terrorist**

I then looked at the relationship of flights to actual terrorist incidents over the period around Lockerbie. There had been two that we know about, Lockerbie and the Hindawi affair. Lockerbie, because it seems to be a Heathrow issue and Hindawi as a security failure which took place at Heathrow, for although it did not result in the destruction of an Israeli aircraft, the bomb was only detected by superior El Al security and not BAA's). I made that a figure of 1 in 600,000 flights.

Dividing the two figures I arrived at the figure that in the case of a serious incident as described by Mr Manly as the worst in his BAA career there was a 15:1 chance against there being a connection between a possible aircraft bombing and a security failure.

But this analysis had been conducted as if the two events had happened in the same year – the Pan Am device exploded just 18 hours after the break-in.

## **A digression on the rarity of security incidents**

I hope you will agree with my assumption that any genuine terror incident is properly prosecuted by the authorities and hence must be made public. In that case there have been only three real incidents of a terrorist nature at BAA in recent times.

They are:

<b>Incident</b>	<b>Explanation</b>	<b>Found?</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
Lockerbie	Stuck on, breaching airport and airline security	No	Revenge, Islamic connections
Hindawi	Mule	Not by BAA	Revenge, Islamic connections

Richard Reid	Explosive shoes	No	Islamic connections
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In two incidents the form of exploitation was novel when it happened, except Hindawi, as carry-on devices had been recorded before that. So, in two cases the existing security was not even designed to respond to the threat.

We are made painfully aware that BAA addresses its failed security issues every time our shoes are examined at a British Airport. Nothing that is a real terrorist incident had appeared in the courts since Reid.

The policy of security is that it is applied in an indiscriminating way. There is no pre-selection of the sorts of people who should undergo it. A sensible policy would sort out those passengers going to countries with know grievances, where air-terrorism in a feature a life, and recent religious converts. That'd reduce the need to check by up to 90%. I know that sounds unfair, but it is a rule we apply in insurance – that we are only charged according to the risk we bring to the bargain between the insurer and the insured. I don't in principle pay for others failures.

If I present myself aged 17 to be insured with a large new and expensive motor-car, with no insurance background, the insurer doesn't offer me the same rate as if I'd had have driving experience (providing it were good). It is very, very expensive, for he makes the worst possible assumptions about my driving abilities and he does that without any other knowledge about me.

I expect the time of queueing and the time of security examination are in some sort of balance. The actual business of inspection takes say, just over two minutes and there will be about 3-8 officials operating machine or hovering round. So I have probably consumed about 10-15 minutes worth of BAA's time for one person.

Reduce the scope of inspection to the 10% and you'd be able to go after the remaining 10% ten times as hard for the same security expenditure. It'd be about 2 hours a target.

A couple of hours extensive examination of that 10% would almost certainly yield more benefit as EL Al demonstrated to BAA by their identification of the Hindawi mule. Unlike BAA, El Al's security processes are designed to address its unique position as possibly the world's prime terrorist target.

For me, I factor in whether it is worth flying into my calculations and if possible, I don't fly. I now do it as a matter of necessity.

BAA staff I find unhelpful, rule-bound, self-absorbed, and introduce new and complicated finesses to the regulations, so one is often reduced to repacking in the security line to meed the latest faddish demand.

They can demand it as they are a virtual monopoly. Travelling through the DDR/BRD frontier in Berlin in the 1970s was infinitely less stressful than using an airport today.

You would think that I who am 'a victim of terror' in the conventional use of the word, would be in favour of more security. I'm not; I'm in favour of more intelligence in the use of security. Remember, again, when it comes to terror, in recent years BAA has had a 100% failure rate.

### **So how likely was it that the broken padlock was associated with the Lockerbie incident just after.**

Reducing the calculation to this a (I made it 24 hourly) basis led to a conclusion that rather than there being a 15:1 chance against a connection, there was now a 6:1 **on** chance of a connection.

Police who seek slender leads might image that a 15:1 chance against would be good odds that there was a connection, but here we have odds that are so clearly in favour that only the naïvest tyro could conclude that there was none.

### **If you don't like statistics start here!**

% (Welcome back) Using a bit of elementary statistics I proved that the break-in and the downing were connected beyond reasonable doubt.

If you don't like the thought of statistics at all, consider the following argument. You return home one day to find your front window broken and your television missing. Do you (a) say that there is no connection between television loss and window breakage (the position of the appeal court), (b) say there might be some connection, but decide to ignore the matter or (c) say that there is a connection, call the police, and start filling in a insurance claim form?

But I had a further need. If I could prove (to my satisfaction) that there was a break-in at Heathrow, how had it been exploited?

### **How was the break-in exploited**

The fact was Mr Manly appeared to patrol on an hourly basis, meant there was a period from about 23.05 on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1988 to 00.05 on the 21<sup>st</sup> December when the break-in had been discovered.

Was that sufficient time to place a break in, place a device and leave the airport?

More than enough!

### **It can't be in a suitcase!**

I also worked out that a suitcase sitting from midnight on the 20<sup>th</sup>/21<sup>st</sup> in AVE4041 PA was unlikely, because it would have probably been noticed by someone, and if it didn't become a terrorist issue, (unlikely), the label would have been looked at and it would have been sent on by the first available flight. Another reason why the bomb wasn't in a suitcase. (Note that this argument is entirely independent from the AAIB

report's statement of the punched hole).

I have examined this matter very very carefully.

On the 20<sup>th</sup> December 1988 a Pan Am aircraft (arguably the *Maid*) landed at Heathrow in the mid-afternoon. It discharged its baggage containers, which were emptied and placed in their various locations for re-loading.

The major point is that the baggage containers (any of them) discharged by the incoming *Maid* of the afternoon of the 20th December 1988 become the outgoing containers of the *Maid* of the 21st December 1988, on the third flight of the day the delayed 18:00 flight

So the containers have to sit around for more than 24 hours at Heathrow, for we need three sets of containers to handle all the flights of the service.

The trouble is there are three flights a day by Pan Am to New York.

After the *Maid* landed on the afternoon of the 20th, another Pan Am flight of the same three-a-day service would have landed later, and another probably the early next morning.

Each flight would have discharged its containers and they were quietly lined up behind each other.

Now assume at midnight or a few minutes before our Iranian having broken in to the airport drops a suitcase down.

Suppose it is properly labelled for a flight a to New York.

A baggage handler coming across it will not treat it as a bomb, but as a stray; and put it on the 'first available flight'.

Now consider the situation that it is not labelled. He also won't treat it as a bomb, but simply as a bag that lost its label. It will go into a pile of lost baggage.

Now suppose the case (in either variant) did contain a bomb.

If it is flown on the early morning, it explodes (assuming a PFLP GC type device). If it is not flown, because it is unlabelled, it can't.

It proves logically and beyond reasonable doubt that the Lockerbie bomb cannot be in a suitcase.

It is just possible the baggage handler would have slung the case in the wrong container (say the one going out on the evening of the 21<sup>st</sup>). It would have been a bit obvious, sitting there on its own, until joined by other bags delivered to the airport or later by Frankfurt transfers.

A real baggage handler would have taken pity on it, and put it in the container for the 'first available flight'.

You could claim that Heathrow baggage handlers were bribed; no-one has ever done that, nor even insinuated as much as an iota of criminality of their part.

In other words the Iranian agent breaking in just before midnight on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1988 chose exactly the container designed to go out on 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988 at 18:00 that would contain the baggage of the Frankfurt transfer of that afternoon and bring down the *Maid*.

Why didn't the Iranian choose the morning or midday flight. Because all the other parts of the plot were designed to happen on the evening flight and the CIA never expected a completely suspicious bastard like me to follow their tortuous plots!

Suitcase theory doesn't have a leg to stand on.

## **An interesting criticism**

Recently an interesting criticism has been made to me by someone (whose name I cannot divulge), about Pan Am baggage handling at Heathrow. He pointed out that AVE4041 PA would not have been labelled as an interline baggage container from Frankfurt designed to receive baggage from incoming Pan Am 103A until 07:00 or thereabouts on 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988.

I'll look at this in steps. I suggest the logical thing is that baggage containers from an incoming flight are placed in the positions they will be loaded onto the outgoing flight the next day, as soon as possible. An airline having set up a satisfactory system will want to change it as little as possible and won't want to push empty containers around, unless it were absolutely necessary.

So, immediately after unloading on the afternoon of 20<sup>th</sup> December 1988, AVE4041 PA is trundled round to the position in the Interline Shed from which it will make its last journey from.

It is unlabelled at this point.

Our Iranian knows to plant his IED on this container not because it is labelled 'AVE4041 PA', though that might be a useful check, nor because it is labelled 'Pan Am 103 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988' for it won't be until 7 o'clock the next morning, or 'Pan Am 103 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988, interline baggage from Frankfurt' (it might never be), but because of its position in the rank of lined up containers.

It might have carried a label which would say 'First Class', Interline, 'Last on, First Off', for that would define it in such a way that McKee's transpondered suitcase would be put in it. Or have no such extra label.

If it were impossible to work out in advance which container would be used by the Frankfurt incoming luggage, one would be able logically to decide which container to stick the IED on, for it would have occupied the same literal position in the baggage container line up for each flight. - but it exploded in AVE4041 PA, which carried McKee's transpondered suitcase.

Did the CIA phone the Iranian agent somewhere in the evening of the 21<sup>st</sup> to tell him to be sure to place his device on AVE4041 PA?

This is a very strong point for arguing for CIA malfeasance just to ask the question: 'by what mechanism did the IED and the McKee suitcase end up in the same baggage container?'

There is no need, in my view for the Iranian gentleman to stick around in the Interline Shed until the late morning, as my critic has suggested.

## **How long would it take to plant the IED**

It was a 20 minute walk from the break-in door to the interline shed where AVE4041 PA stood.

I reckon three minutes would be more than enough time to place the device, and so in three-quarters of an hour the device could be introduced, placed and the agent disappear.

It was then that an issue that had long troubled me came back to mind. My account here is a highly rationalised account of different issues that often bothered me for months or even years.

## **The Lockerbie bomb is different to the UTA bomb**

One point that bothered me from about one year after UT-772 was 'why were the Lockerbie bombs and the UTA bombs so different in size and construction'?

As a thought, this was not terribly productive except to point out that the devices were obviously the product of different organisations, which tended, in my opinion, to suggest (by, at earliest 1991, even before the indictments) Lockerbie wasn't kosher and therefore not Libyan.

But then as one began to appreciate the difficulties in introducing a device at Heathrow, it began to dawn on me that the only solution was *that it could not be in a suitcase, or any large device.*

## **An Iranian must not behave inappropriately landside or airside but must be able to blend in**

The argument went thus: Anybody airside illicitly had to behave in a manner appropriate to being there, or he would be challenged.

That restricted the sort of people to one of four sorts: a BAA security guard, a baggage handler, a loader, a minor airline functionary, or some kind of maintenance person. Landside, to blend in a person would have to look like a holidaymaker, a businessman, a BAA security guard, a maintenance person or an airline official, but not a loader. Disguising oneself as a BAA security guard posed the problem that the work routines of such people are highly regulated and other officers might become suspicious of a colleague, who though he might be dressed correctly, was unfamiliar.

A similar issue concerned anyone who disguised themselves as a maintenance worker. While a disguise of a loader or a baggage worker might be possible, such people don't usually walk round landside with bags and, at that time, I envisaged the possibility of 'my agent' boarding a flight to leave the UK. And a baggage handler is a bit conspicuous if he appears at a security gate as a passenger. A holidaymaker airside would cause immediate suspicion, and therefore there was only one option left: 'my agent' had to resemble a minor airline functionary airside and a businessman

landside, even if he didn't go to the gate. The plot of the classic Father Brown story, *The Twelve True Fishermen*.

### **How – an appeal to Chesterton**

I believe the CIA to be devotees of Chesterton. They use his plots so frequently. That would permit the bomb planter firstly to move around landside without interference (he could go to check in, the security gate or boarding) or airside. One problem. He could not walk around airside with a suitcase – that's baggage handler's work, and such a man as my agent could not be seen with a suitcase. So the device ends up hidden in the inside pocket of an overcoat. That restricts its dimensions. It really isn't possible to hide 2kg of explosive in an inside pocket, but 340g-450g (or 12-16oz) of the Lockerbie bomb is entirely possible.

This is how the concept of the stick-on device developed. Some thin thing of about A4 size. I had thought that I had exhausted this line of thought, but then I returned the evidence of the original trial. An AAIB witness, Mr Claiden was very persuasive. He had discovered that on the inside rear of AV4041 PA a square hole 8" square had been punched through the thin aluminium!

### **Mr Claiden of the AAIB says there is a square hole**

This was news to me, for like most people, I had never read the trial transcript that carefully. No one ever does.

He was badgered by prosecution counsel into asserting that it was possible for a suitcase to explode and direct the blast through this particular hole. Essentially counsel argued that the suitcase was a like a shot-gun with a square bore, which it isn't. When a suitcase explodes the produced debris is distributed in all directions and does not go in one direction.

Counsel rarely understand scientific matters (or even matters of common sense) and freely make claims that defy the laws of physics and this Scottish prosecutor was no exception.

Whilst Mr Claiden may have had to concede the theory that the bomb was in a suitcase, or at least not openly challenge it, as the prosecution, though they did not prove it, came relentlessly to assert and the court and the appeal court accepted, he could not be diverted from the curious nature of his evidence. Indeed the contention of the suitcase had been one of the particular conclusion of the FAI, years before. The Procurator Fiscal had come to conclusion that the suitcase containing the bomb had been 'ingested', his curiously inappropriate alimentary phrase in a suitcase at Frankfurt.

It was Taylor's odd decision to prove that a suitcase containing an IED had not been passed through Frankfurt, rather than the real meaning of the AAIB evidence at the Zeist trial that was Mr Megrahi's downfall. Had the defence worried away at the deficiencies of the entirely accurate, but entirely misleading AAIB report, he surely would have been acquitted.

So, it was possible to construct a new scenario of what had happened.

### **Why a broken padlock was left behind**

At this point one of my over-ingenuous critics will say that the CIA would not have done something as obvious as allowing the padlock to be left around. I fail to follow this logic. Presumably the CIA looked at the possibility of stealing the key and concluded that two attacks on Heathrow (which it would have required) was just too difficult. So why not take away the padlock and replace it with another? The problem is that the security guard on duty will not be able to open the door on the morning of the 21<sup>st</sup>. That surely have raised a major alarm at the airport, for one could not possibly overlook it as the work of a baggage loader eager to get home early four days before Christmas by taking a short cut.

### **A short walk to kill 270 people**

Having gained access to airside, our man walked purposefully to the interline shed (a twenty minute walk), took the device out of his pocket, peeled off the backing layer, revealing a sticky surface and carefully stuck it on the inner rear body of AVE4041 PA, a foot or so above the bottom of the container.

There was, of course, the possibility of his being apprehended. But airline officials presumably have to visit parked aircraft even at such unholy hours as midnight. As a test might I suggest disbelievers spend a few minutes counting the number of people airside that they can see next time they are waiting for a plane in a terminal with a good view of airside operations. Properly badged (and he need not have had an Iran Air badge, it might even have been a Pan Am one, but any Heathrow using airline might do) it would be most unlikely he would be stopped and questioned.

Reaching the Interline shed he pushed open the door and found it lit but abandoned. Work had ceased for the night, and would not being again until the next morning when early flights began to arrive.

Then he returned landside and disappeared 15 minutes before Mr Manly returned to discover the break-in. And he left the UK either on a late flight, went back to his hotel room, or into the into seething mass of London.

### **A similar probabalistic argument it's not in a suitcase**

Firstly, I then carried out a similar probability calculation if the bag had been in a stray suitcase loaded into AVE4041 PA, and found the probability of a stray suitcase (as

seen by Mr Bedford (a baggage loader witness at the Zeist trial) or not) as being 4000 times less likely than the broken padlock as being the mechanism for the deployment of the bomb.

As usual the full detail of this analysis is available to any who care to ask. No one ever has. No one likes complexity and Lockerbie is just one damn problem after another.

There are other points, but these are the two substantial ones.

The trouble is that we are not finished with the CIA's deception operation. By God they're clever.

### **Return to a wet and windy hillside at Lockerbie**

Let's go to the point sometime after the crash to the confusion on the ground at Lockerbie. A number of unidentified Americans have barged in upon the scene, and it is reported that the CIA, AAIB, Metropolitan Police - Anti-terrorist Branch and BSS (MI5 and MI6) were on a private flight to Carlisle immediately after the disaster. (Mike Charles of the AAIB asserts to the CIA presence). One group makes its behaviour very, very public. Why are they there, what are they doing?

Well, they're searching for one particular suitcase of course.

### **Finding Mr McKee's transpondered suitcase**

You will recall that Mr McKee and his 'team' are returning from the Lebanon. It is a sort of operation is disapproved of by the CIA itself, and possibly hated by a senior ex CIA leader, no less that George Bush senior himself and Mr Gannon is bringing Mr McKee back to the US.

### **No. 10 tells MI6 to give the Americans every help they want**

By the time the head of MI6 has fully checked with No 10. the *Maid* is a wreck on a Scottish hillside. BSS instructions are 'to give the Americans every help they want'. By 20:30 or 20:40 at the latest a plane full of CIA and MI5 and MI6 staff are flying off to Carlisle Airport, though there is a second story of a 737 arriving at Carlisle Airport at midnight.

'The CIA was at Lockerbie' is the claim of every other unofficial story of Lockerbie. The presence of the CIA will be denied by Henderson, Marquise and Crawford, minimised by others and ignored by many. Crawford, for example, ignores the issue, not analysing why US officials seem to be amongst the dead, whilst not denying they were there and does not refer to other US citizens, who were clearly 'innocents'. (That particularisation is absolutely deliberate).

But, if you accept, even if unofficially reported, there were (living) CIA personnel at Lockerbie, how did they get there? I don't think anyone would wish to argue that

every hillside, Scottish is filled CIA men waiting for a CIA operation to happen, so all those men came through Carlisle, and gained access to to the crash site. How did they do it? The BSS accompanied them, of course, acting almost as if they were couriers of a travel company.

### **A 737 flies north**

It must have been a strange and rather awkward flight north, probably conducted in silence. This was no team but two parties or more, rivals and antagonists. On the one part the hosts, BSS, the Met, AAIB were accompanying their guests the CIA and possibly the US State Department to a plane crash that only the latter parties had any real knowledge of, and that the former had only just been informed by their political masters about their duties in.

I don't think we can portray BSS and the CIA as in on some sort of joint operation. However, BSS had to be there to vouch for the CIA at the site.

### **The CIA briefs**

At some point the CIA must have briefed BSS first then more specialist agencies like the nascent Lockerbie Inquiry team, the AAIB and senior military staff about what they had done and what they expected the British to do about it. Their ultimate authority for their behaviour was a telephone call from the White House to Number 10 between Mr Reagan and Mrs Thatcher, which allowed the US to conduct this dreadful black farce on UK soil. And, having little understanding of the well oiled complexity of the British establishment at these levels, they thought that it would be simply a case of mentioning Mrs Thatcher's authority and getting compliance from the various UK agencies. They were to have some disabusement of their presumption.

### **First, the Police put their foot down**

In particular, the Police, as well as MI5 and MI6, would allow no political interference with the investigation of what even in the CIA's essentially limited imagination was a crime. At the same time, I am sure each agency was only admitted to the CIA's dirty secret on a need to know basis. British government is very compartmentalised and the CIA could be certain that if it shared a item of knowledge with one agency, it would not necessarily shared with another.

I am sure the CIA offered the assistance of US agencies. For example, they might have suggested to the AAIB that the US NTSB take over the investigation. AAIB would have taken one look at this and said politely and firmly that they would do their own work for themselves, but of course the NTSB would be offered all the facilities usually offered to the accident investigating agencies of the 'sending' country.

Niger, by contrast, handed over everything to do with the UT-772 crash to France, including the inquiry by Bureau Enquête. This statement is not intended to imply that as a result there is something wrong with the BE's conclusions.

At one point I had the delicious reason to enquire what would have been the compensation for my brother's life if it had been decided in a Nigerien (sic) court. The answer is one hundred head of cattle. In fact, that would probably have been more valuable than if it had been decided in either the French or the English courts, for the compensation payments for both Lockerbie and UTA were not decided by court processes. Confusingly the claims against Libya for the UTA US relatives were, though this was a judgement in default. If you are interested in the value of a US life in the US Federal Courts it is an astonishing \$840million (sic). Please check, if you don't believe me. The award was made in 2006!

## Jobs

Here is a table of the various jobs and how they must have been parcelled out.

<b>Job</b>	<b>Lead agency</b>	<b>Others</b>
To collect evidence of second explosion	Military, Police	Presumably police
To conduct air accident investigation	AAIB	Presumably police, military to collect debris
To collect bodies and body parts, identify and remove shrapnel	Medical Investigators	military
To collect evidence of crime	Lockerbie Investigation, using HOLMES	FBI; later CIA
To prosecute case	Lord Advocate	A long way down the line
To assess threats	BSS (MI6)	CIA
To cover up break-in	Metropolitan Police, ATB	BAA (but did not hide the break-in, or draw attention to it)
Overseas dimensions	FCO	MI6
To develop alternative theories	CIA	

After the short drive over the border, so important in jurisdictional terms, the party piled out of their cars and the CIA began to go about its business.

## Mr McKee's suitcase is found and the CIA breaks Judge's Rules

Using a simple radio receiver, the CIA finds McKee's suitcase and seizes and apparently helicopter it off. 'Not so fast' say the Scottish Police. 'There's Judges' Rules and interfering with the site of what is potentially a crime, is an offence, no matter that BSS have bought you here'. It is quite possible that CIA officers were threatened with arrest and only delicate negotiation between senior Scottish Police officers, the BSS, the US SD and even Lord Brabazon prevented the matter from becoming a awkward diplomatic incident. That they could be in the wrong must have astonished some of Langley's best.

The suitcase arrived in damaged condition at the temporary Lockerbie Investigation HQ, and was returned to the scene of the crime.

### **When did anyone realise there was dirty business going on at Lockerbie?**

Anyone seeing what the CIA was doing at this point could have come to no other conclusion that that there was dirty business going on. The Scottish Police must have been persuaded not to take the matter any further by the BSS if the case the CIA had seized was returned, but it must have been close to becoming an international incident, being the sort of behaviour one does not expect from one of the agencies of one's stoutest allies. What favours BSS had to call in to prevent this appalling débâcle from becoming public we'll never know, but any journalist who had reported it would have had the scoop of their career.

### **The suitcase is returned to where it was found to be rediscovered by BTP**

After spending an amount of time at the temporary Lockerbie incident HQ (Johnstone says), McKee's damaged suitcase was returned to the site of AVE4041 PA where the CIA expected ordinary police searchers to find it. Rather ceremoniously the case was replaced where it was found, having apparently been emptied of its valuable *papers* by the CIA and with a hole cut in it. The police expected to find it become suspicious as they say the case had been interfered with and could not be regarded as evidence any longer. In desperation the CIA collared some BTP police (a really rather dim force dedicated to low-level transport crime) and instructed them to discover it. As the BTP hadn't learnt of the CIA's shenanigans, they did, and it disappeared unremarked into the evidence stream, never to come to light again, for of course, as regards the explosions that destroyed the *Maid*, it is entirely irrelevant. Nothing to do with the crash of course, and a mere stratagem. What had been betrayed was the location of AVE4041 PA.

### **Why the trouble?**

Why go to all this trouble? I think the CIA just wanted to assess how the Scottish police would react to their interference as a way of deciding how they would have to conduct themselves through the long months of diversion and distraction that lay ahead. It also provided a cover for part 2 of the operation that night, or on the next day or a short while later.

### **Planting the blown-up suitcase**

Much more carefully, having located place of AVE4041 PA, it was necessary to plant the blown up suitcase. The job had two distinct steps. One was to place the suitcase, the other to embed a small piece of Toshiba cassette chip in the frame of AVE4041 PA. Delicate jobs carried out by much more cautious operatives, perhaps indeed only one. Naturally like his earlier colleagues he had to be introduced by a member of BSS, so there is at least one and perhaps many members of MI5 or MI6 who know that the CIA is salting the crash site for its own ends, but that this bit of theatre will necessary if it is decided to locate the origin of the device, more remote from Heathrow or even Frankfurt.

The suitcase was placed in such a way that it could seem to have produced the punched hole in the rear of AVE4041 PA, and appears to have been entirely successful in deluding everyone but the AAIB.

But whatever guilty knowledge he learnt I am sure that the MI5 or MI6 men were not parts of the plot to subvert the Scottish police and judicial system. He was just there to supervise the CIA.

The FBI would not turn up until the next day (22nd) and then through Newcastle Airport. Late as usual.

The explanation, if anyone has not twigged yet, must have been to hide the recognition that the destruction of the *Maid* was caused by a stuck on bomb, and not a suitcase bomb.

### **A hiatus in the theory**

But, your are entitled to say that there is a flaw in this theory. If the plan was to allow the discovery of the break-in at Heathrow, then why did the CIA supply a blown-up, carefully packed suitcase with clues point to all sorts of perpetrators at all? The solution lies in the fact the CIA hoped to win over BSS to their Heathrow theory, but in the event they couldn't, supplied themselves with a blown up suitcase. The alternative, which they must have been sorely tempted to use was not to turn up at all and necessarily allow the story of the break-in to emerge. I don't think that's in the 'emotional climate' of the Agency. But without the CIA giving direction about the cleansing of the site, Mr McKee's 'secret papers' would necessarily have come to light, which would have endangered the secrecy of the project from that angle.

But they could still have turned up to carry out the cleansing without the need to pollute the site, surely? This bedeviling hypothetical suggests that MI6 had some inkling of what the Americans intended to do, and required the CIA to turn up with the pre-blown. Either that or the CIA did it off their own bat.

### **A German argument**

If the Germans were not happy about a pre-blown suitcase, they would have been quite happy with a Heathrow break-in. Once the Germans knew that Heathrow was

not going to be the point of ingestion, they were eager to push that point up the line.

### The trail to Malta

The reason is that the evidence of the suitcase with lead to a trail that will link to Malta (though I don't think that had been fully thought out in December 1988) is that neither the Germans nor the British will allow the CIA to use their airports as the place the device was loaded. Libya would be introduced into the equation late in the day, although the CIA would have been aware from the start that by picking that island they could set a number of hares running.

### The original ideas

These, given that the CIA were barred from using Heathrow or Frankfurt were probably that Middle Eastern elements were involved. As the number of ideas grows, I'll simplify with another of my tables. This one includes all the 20 explanations I think don't work and the one that I think does, though the nineteenth is the one the CIA told AAIB had happened.

Though I won't reproduce all the arguments against each alternative here, I have necessarily been through some of them in great detail to be able to produce this table. I'll willingly assist anyone who is seriously interested in understanding my reasons.

Number	Theory	Major reason why wrong	First device explained	Second device explained
1	UFOs of any sort	I reject all UFO theories outright, without any exception. One might as well deal with magic. On 17 <sup>th</sup> August 2009 the UK Government released all its records into UFO sightings in recent years. Lockerbie is conspicuous by its absence	no	no
2	The Megrahi theory	Original weakness and arguments since trial brought forward (see text)	Yes, but wrong	no
3	PFLP GC theory	Because CIA originally backed it and then abandoned it, and *Hantzau is backing it again; because the CIA manufactured evidence against Megrahi is equally applicable to PFLP GC, because it is simply a device to exculpate the Agency	Just possibly	no
4	Syrian theory (drugs)/DEA	Because a drugs sting is simply too far fetched a reason to blow up a full aircraft.  Drugs were discovered, and illegally carried, possibly part of a DIA, DEA or	Yes, but wrong – drugs were recovered undamaged, so they could	no

Number	Theory	Major reason why wrong	First device explained	Second device explained
		CIA operation	not have been switched	
5	South Africa theory (Because Bernt Carlsson died and Pik Botha lived)	<p>Why the CIA shenanigans? Why is there no hint of a South African operation in London, Frankfurt, Malta or anywhere else? That Pik Botha did not fly on Pan Am 103 and Carlsson did not is not sufficient to create a complete theory.</p> <p>Possibly the CIA warned Botha off the <i>Maid</i>, and permitted Carlsson to fly, but I can think of no reason for any other possible perpetrator to do so, even if they knew Botha would have gone on the <i>Maid</i>.</p> <p>The death of Carlsson permitted South Africa temporarily to exercise a little more power in Namibia in the period leading up to independence, but it did not alter the course of that process.</p> <p>It seems to me that if South Africa had been the originator of the disaster something would have emerged during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission after the regime change that brought Mr Mandela to power</p>	possibly	no
6	Kitchen sink theories (Iran+PFLP GC+Libya)	Because of the kludginess and unprovability; and the CIA likes it (sometimes)	With kitchen sink theories anything is possible	
7	Industrial Accident (especially sewing machine needles, hypodermics or flechettes)	Because it explains so little and the facts are unclear, and why the complicated plot to jail Megrahi over an industrial accident?	Possibly, but wrong	No
8	Missiles fired from air or ground	Because no-one had said where they came from and how the event happens to take place just after the IED explodes. You need more than say 'there were US Navy ships in the area, which could have'	No, wrong evidence	No
9	Accidentally exploding missiles carried on <i>Maid</i>	Because there is no evidence of a missile on board the <i>Maid</i> that was fired	Possible but wrong	no
10	Because of radio messages transmitted from the	Because the authors seem to have little idea of frequencies or mechanisms, how they are	Possible but wrong	no

Number	Theory	Major reason why wrong	First device explained	Second device explained
	ground or Radhaz	intercepted or can activate any device  Coincidentally a voice transmission from ATC Shanwick had been received just before the tragedy, but if it was the ATC frequency that had caused it, the device would surely have exploded at first contact.  And why jail a Libyan?		
11	Mechanical failure	Because the <i>Maid</i> though old seemed to be in good health. See AAIB report.  And why jail a Libyan?	no	no
12	Human error by pilots	Because there are none  And why jail a Libyan?	no	no
13	Mules carrying devices on board	Because none is reported	No  IED is in AVE4041 PA  Yes if mule is carrying hold baggage	no
14	Crashes with other aircraft	Because the no remains of any other aircraft are reported.  And why jail a Libyan?	no	no
15	ATC errors	Because there are none. Alan Topp, for example, was an utterly professional officer, reporting the break up of the <i>Maid</i> to his superiors seconds after it broke up.  And why jail a Libyan?	no	no
16	Weather	Because though it was a wet windy night, there was nothing exceptional about the weather.  And why jail a Libyan?	no	no
17	Mossad, French, British..	Where's the evidence	Possible but wrong	no
18	Irish elements (UDL warning)	Irish Protestants would never bomb a US aircraft. If Republicans are meant, the IRA, PIRA or any other Irish Nationalist group has never called for or used airline terrorism, especially against a US carrier. They know	Possible but wrong	no

Number	Theory	Major reason why wrong	First device explained	Second device explained
		where their supporters are and don't want to alienate them		
19	IED in fore hold, planted by Iranian unilaterally without agreement of assistance of the US	How does one explain the massive CIA involvement	yes	no
20	IED in fore hold accidentally triggered 'bomb' on CIA pallet, in rear.	What I think this is what the CIA told AAIB what happened.  Why the AAIB agreed to that explanation, I don't know, for they could easily have carried out the analysis I have done here and more thoroughly, themselves	yes	yes
21	Any plot based on Frankfurt (other than a carry-through) of the device	Not allowed by Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND -BRD's security services)	yes	yes
22	IED in fore hold deliberately triggered 'bomb' by pressure trigger on CIA pallet, in rear.	My theory in version 6 superseded here	yes	yes
<b>What I think happened</b>				
23	<b>IED in fore hold deliberately triggered 'bomb' on CIA pallet, in rear, by mobile phone call.</b>	<b>What I think happened. See text for full details</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>yes</b>

## Mike Charles

I now come to one of the most difficult parts of my story. None of people I've been talking about I have met, have any relation to, and feel I can say what I want about them.

Not Mike Charles. After UTA was bombed I formed a close working relationship with John Sumner, brother of Peter who had had died on that flight. Like his brother, John was an engineer, a commissioning engineer for British Railways (as it then was). A man of intimidating intellect, but a slight political naïvety (in my opinion) John became concerned about the intermediate report of the Bureau Enquête, (the French equivalent of the AAIB) into the UTA crash.

## Getting involved with 'air investigation circles'

He therefore invited me to a regional professional meeting of the Institute of Mechanical Engineers in Mill Hill, London, to be addressed by a senior member of the AAIB on the work of the organisation.

Though I have a slight acquaintance with scientific issues, most of what was said passed over my head. At the end of the meeting John approached the speaker, and explained our situation, and without any hesitation, he said he would ask one of his colleagues to get in touch with us.

### **To the AAIB Farnborough**

A few weeks later, John and I have been invited to Farnborough and are sitting in Mike's office. John wants to know whether the French UTA report is any good. Mike assesses us carefully. John, like his brother has a first class degree in engineering from Cambridge. I admit to a qualification in chemistry.

Satisfied that at least one of us has some technical knowledge, Mike explains the BE report, saying it is a perfectly professional piece of work. I make a comment that the UTA bomb was 1kg, but the Lockerbie device is only 1lb. That, I infer Mike as implying, is not publicly known, so, after that, I decided to keep quiet.

I am sure the 1lb figure is about right. Estimates I have read are from about 336g to 1kg, but the latter is probably a misprint in Crawford, not picked up by his copy-editor, if he had one. Different values are given in the various trials, and all experimental destructions seem to have used something around the 1lb mark, and it would not be credible to scale up or down from an explosion of massively different size.

We shown the computer simulation of the last radar images (or possibly the black box recording replayed on a computer) of the last moments of the *Maid's* flight and then were taken down into a hangar to look at the re-construction of the important sections of the *Maid*, which of course had ended up at Farnborough. I found it a humbling experience.

I cannot recall any technical details of looking at that reconstruction, which was of course not of the aircraft my brother was on.

There are two other points. I told Mike that my brother was a glider pilot, and without further ado he placed before me copies of various obituaries about his flying career from magazines that I'd never read.

For the first time I would read that 'Tony was a real friend of flying'. It was touching, very, very human, and when I passed them over to my mother gave her much comfort at that terrible time.

### **The AAIB acts in a very far-sighted way**

He also said that when AAIB got involved with Lockerbie they had come to the

conclusion that they would treat relatives who approached them 'in the way, in which we, in similar circumstances, would wish to be treated'. At the time a wonderfully forward thinking point of view. And I still do. At that point, I had many friends in UKFF103, the UK Lockerbie families' group, and was helping to try to set up Disaster Action, a group to support the friends and relatives of UK mass disasters, of which there were several at the time. Possibly as a result of John's of my visit, which I recounted to members of the group, some of the UK Lockerbie families also went to AAIB.

And DA made it a policy to ask agencies and bodies to approach the relatives and friends of disasters in the spirit of 'treat us in the way you would wish to be treated'. That comment by a perceptive AAIB officer had a great impact on our developing thinking. Mike probably does not that, but I salute him, now.

### **But...**

I took home the impression that Mike Charles was a very straightforward, open and honest. There was no sloppy thinking here. It gave me much confidence in the authoritativeness and accuracy of the AAIB report into the crash. But he was still a cabined, cribbed and confined British civil servant.

I hope the AAIB and Mick will not see what I am writing here as any form of betrayal of confidence, for in reality, I learned nothing technical of their arguments from my visit and everything else I know from reading about the trial or the public AAIB report into Pan Am 103.

But there are some issues which began to cause disquiet.

### **Back to the stick-on**

Firstly, there was the matter of the CIA plot to permit an Iranian to stick a device on the inside of AVE4041 PA.

AAIB witnesses at the Zeist trial, who were in the main speaking not of the location of the blast but on its effects upon the *Maid*, were challenged by defence technical witnesses that the centre of the explosion had been much nearer the side of the *Maid* than their evidence said.

I don't know the full resolution of that argument, but it was not enough to disrupt the prosecution's claims and so Mr Megrahi was convicted. Actually, the claim of it being nearer the skin of the *Maid* fitted my argument of being a stuck on device marginally better.

## **AAIB at the Zeist trial**

Because the AAIB had produced a report which was designed to be misread, defence counsel never put the obvious question, 'Was there a second explosion on the *Maid*'? If that question had been allowed by the Bench, and I am sure it would not in that bald way, the intent might have been, by the examination of the contentions in para 2.4 and Appendix F.

The prosecution might have decided to drop the trial at that point, for any question about the existence of a second explosion, would immediately raise the question of why there was one. And here I think the CIA had lied to the AAIB.

## **Mr Claiden, in my opinion, the most important witness at the Zeist trial**

That explosion was described by Mr Claiden at the trial as relatively mild, a view which is not consistent with the huge break-up of the craft that took place.

## **A second explosion (or possibly an alternative to the mild one forr'ad)**

Much more worrying were claims that there had been a second explosion on the plane. This explosion was said to be caused either caused by a bomb that the CIA was carrying back to the US, or happened in *materiel* that Mr McKee was bringing back with him. Those who argue that Mr McKee was returning from a failed hostage release trip (either voluntarily or under duress) have no difficulty in suggesting that the material is of CIA origin. No one has suggested another source of this other explosion (neglecting Vialls, missiles and an industrial accident).

A variant of this claim was there had been a single large explosion in CIA *materiel*.

If a second explosion took place, the one argument one could dismiss is that it was coincidental, though it may have be accidentally triggered by the first.

The AAIB reference to this second explosion is written in that accurate but perfectly misleading style of which the British civil service is such a master. The full statement, placed as the last line of Appendix F of the report reads as follows:

## **Appendix F – AAIB report**

**(a) “No evidence was seen to suggest that more than one IED had detonated on Flight PA103.”**

It must have been very difficult for the AAIB to say even this much. Perhaps when BSS (and/or the CIA) saw the draft report they were horrified and demanded removal of every reference to a second explosion. 'Not so fast said', the AAIB. 'We're employed by the British Government, not the US one, and if we say there was a second explosion, there was.' They came down to what this bare statement conceded as a compromise. It is a very special form of British civil service writing.

It says everything and much more, and less. Firstly, it confirms there was an IED. Then it takes the ludicrous concept of a second IED and says there wasn't one. Why? Because of course, the real conclusion must be that there wasn't a second IED, **but there was a second explosion**. If the AAIB says there wasn't a second IED, there wasn't. Full stop. But what they aren't saying is there wasn't a second explosion. The most likely cause of that second explosion was McKee's *matériel* which had been interfered with by you know whom to ensure it was unstable (in some way, more below) after the first blast went off.

### **Other references in the AAIB report**

#### **(b) There was no evidence to indicate that there was more than one explosive charge. (para 2.4)**

Interpreting these two perversely conflicting claims is going to be a major difficulty in semantics.

Firstly there is no doubt these sentences either singly or concatenated are present in the document and they are in some way true valid and correct.

(a) refers to the impossibility of there being two IEDs, which I suggested might be explicable that if there were two explosions one was not a IED.

That fits in with statement (a) with that statement's incredibly precise and undefined use of the word IED.

### **The meaning of words...**

Statement (b) is problematic. To repeat: "There was no evidence to indicate that there was more than one explosive charge." If you have come as far as I have and now accept the AAIB was saying that two 'destructive events', to use a new coining, took place aboard the *Maid* in two places about 15 metres (and 14 seconds) apart (on the aircraft) (and 3.1km in flight distance) that I hope you will regard as unambiguous in meaning, then what is the meaning of sentence (b). It must either refer to the device that is an IED or the one that is not. It refers either to the explosive charge that sets the IED off, which is little more than a perverse form of elegant variation designed to deceive, or it is relating the CIA bomb or *matériel*. Perhaps it doesn't really matter which, for by its peculiar particularisation the statement wants one to believe there was only one 'destructive event' rather than two.

The statement is however the final line of paragraph 2.4 entitled IED position with the aircraft, which is entitled 'IED position within the aircraft', so it is not a general statement on explosions, but explosions which originated in IEDs. The point there was only one IED will be made fully and unequivocally at the end of paragraph F, but here it's almost as if it were said: 'An explosion of an IED is an illegitimate thing to be happening in an aircraft, and ought to be investigated. We the AAIB do that, but any other explosion that might have happened on the aircraft might have had a legitimate

origin, and though it clearly must have contributed in some way to the destruction of the *Maid*, *because it did not initiate that destruction*, it is beyond the contemplation of this report'.

A curious curate's egg of an argument.

## **Humpty Dumpty**

We are in Carroll's Humpty Dumpty world here.

'When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less'. 'The question is', said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things'.

'The question is', said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master - that's all'. - Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking-Glass*.

To quote 'Who is going to be the master here.' The AAIB uses words precisely but elastically defined in the context they are used. They are the master.

Take that sentence from out of its context in Paragraph 2.4 and it says there is only one explosion; keep in its context and it says something entirely different.

## **Ordinary and extraordinary usage of language**

Usually when something is quoted out of context it is the highlighting of a specific statement in a more general context. Exactly the opposite process is happening here. A very precise and restrictive paragraph has a general statement within it, which when quoted out of context removes the localised application and comes to the unequivocal statement 'there wasn't a second explosion'.

Read with the care and precision by a lawyer who fillets the gem from the dross, that man is told without doubt, no second explosion, but he's only come to that conclusion because in that process he's stripped off the localisation of the reference to the IED. It's the way any diligent lawyer works. But in this case the diligence does not work for the special application of the paragraph title allows the notion of a single explosion to be promulgated when in actuality there were two.

So common is the trick put the other way around where the specific issue is hidden away in a careless throw-away sentence in a general paragraph, that it is easy to forget that the trick can be carried out the other way about.

Can the AAIB in its report use words 'to mean so many different things', or as Humpty is saying do we have the right to pull apart its words in this chop-logic way to extract real meaning?

Yes, because they did it. It's for us to understand their code, and not to read it at its face value but to extract the meaning of what's being said.

## The reconstruction modelled

Perhaps the most telling artefact that came out of the AAIB investigation was an about 1:100 scale model of the *Maid*. That, I think, clearly demonstrates there was a second explosion aft.

## Cockpit voice recorder noise

The AAIB report reads:

'There can, therefore, be no doubt that the loud noise on the CVR was directly associated with the detonation of the IED and that this explosion initiated the disintegration process and directly caused the loss of the aircraft'.

This is placed at the end of section 2.2. Placing the 'spin' of an argument in the last sentence of a section seems to be a common way of delivering burden of what the 'second author' wants to say. It is a very awkward sentence. The sound on the CVR was of course the detonation of the IED and not associated with it. It sounds like the 'second author' is not technical but desperately wishing to sound so. But the predicate of the sentence is not about the sound but rambles on a trajectory of its own. We have to be told that the 'explosion initiated the disintegration process'. 'Process' is an awkward officialese sort of word and while the two word phrase 'disintegration process' is used elsewhere in the report it is always about specific aspects of the disintegration (e.g. petalling) and the 'first author' or 'first authors' never use it as a synonym for the break-up of the whole aircraft.

Taken as a whole the meaning of the sentence seems to be 'The noise on the CVR is from the explosion of the IED and that explosion caused the aircraft to break up'. **In other words**, the second author is saying, **there was no second explosion**. However the CVR had no back-up power supply but was wired into the 'mains', and when that was interrupted during break-up simply stopped. The second explosion took place 14 seconds later, necessarily unrecorded.

## Vialls' theory again and a swipe at industrial accident theory

Vialls' theory works if there is one and one only explosion on the *Maid*. But it's impossible to explain a second explosion. The second explosion, which is necessary to ensure that the aircraft is destroyed is forced on the CIA by the expediency of having to use a CRAF aircraft. If Shanwick radio can be used to trigger the first device why should the transmission not be used to trigger a second simultaneously. From the point of view of evidence that would be preferable, as there would be only one debris trail, not two.

## Accidental or deliberate

Unless that second device blew up accidentally, against which I will argue in a moment, it must have been deliberately triggered. The difference in time is so small,

it could not have any sort of parallel running timer, so I suggest that there would have been a detonator triggered by the pressure drop caused by the hole blown in the air tight skin by the first charge. Remember that the *Maid* was at 31,000' and it had been pressurised to 8,000'.

### **The CIA wanted a second explosion**

Remember, I am arguing that Lockerbie is a carefully orchestrated CIA operation. There would be a huge risk in transporting explosives on the *Maid*, that if it were intended that there should not be a second explosion, that there might be one. The CIA would have not made this mistake. Mr McKee's *materiel* could quite satisfactorily have been on another flight that it would not blow up. So the CIA wanted it to be blown up.

### **Why?**

But why was it necessary? We've got to apply two arguments here. Firstly the *Maid* was not an ordinary 747. It had been 'hardened' in 1987 and belonged to the Civil Air Reserve (CRAF). This 'hardening' largely related to the strengthen of the junction between the wings and the fuselage, sometimes called the 'box'. It has been argued by researchers at the Centre of Explosives Technology Research, Socorro, New Mexico that the explosion in AVE4041 PA was not even enough the fracture the skin of the aircraft and that a charge of 30lbs would have been needed to cause the sort of damage that the *Maid* suffered, for it broke into at least five large pieces. That's 15 times the size of the UTA device and between 20 to 30 times the recorded size of the Lockerbie device charge. If the skin were not breached by the AVE4041 PA explosion, then why did it not continue to fly. As it broke up, we must come to the conclusion that the small explosion was enough to penetrate the skin and trigger the pressure drop sufficient to cause the second device to blow. And was also sufficient to bring down the *Maid* for the cockpit was torn off.

### **Diagrams**

Here, I am a little suspicious of the diagram of the *Maid* showing a single puff of blast discharging through the side of the aircraft, as the only extant image showing a blast. A more reasonable interpretation is possibly that the explosion of the IED caused the failure in the pressurised fuselage of the aircraft which permitted the CIA *materiel* to explode, by the mechanism expounded above. That caused the its break-up. Is it being a little too ingenious to say that in the eventuality that the IED had failed to cause the failure of the pressure hull, and the aircraft had still been flyable, it would have been arranged for the *materiel* to explode as the aircraft dropped below 8000' and began to re-pressurise to ground pressure? That would not have happened. The crew would have been aware of the blowing up of the device, even if the pressure hold had held and arranged for an emergency landing at Prestwick or Glasgow. So the CIA would have achieved its goal, to allow the carrying out the provisions of the \*Brandon agreement, although they would have had to admit that the *Maid* was carrying CIA *materiel* which detonated.

## **A ground witness**

Secondly, a police officer on the ground saw a flash in the clouds over Lockerbie. This is scarcely to be squared with Mr Claiden's description of a relatively mild explosion in AVE4041 PA.

## **Are Mr Claiden and the ground witness reporting the same thing?**

One resolution that works therefore is that both the policeman and Mr Claiden, who does not seem to have been involved at Lockerbie itself, but worked quietly on reconstructing the baggage containers around position 14L on the front left hand side of the *Maid*, in a hangar at Longtown, near Carlisle, Cumbria are reporting two different explosions. The second major device was thus seen by the policeman, and is described in the TV report, the first skin-breaking was reconstructed by Mr Claiden, who did not concern himself with whatever may have been found in baggage positions on the right rear of the plane, where the CIA pallet was.

The compounding of the two is no more than astute prosecutor's trick. Take the partial views of a number of witnesses and weave them together so they appear to make a seamless whole.

A very good account of this process in reverse is given in A.L. Rowse's, *The last days of Hitler*, where the author, an academic, takes a series of muddling intelligence reports (eyewitness accounts from those who survived the end of the Berlin Bunker) and weaves them into a credible story to show that Hitler was indeed dead. The task was undertaken because the Soviets would not release the fact that they had discovered the Führer's body, and MI6 wanted to nip stories of his 'miraculous survival' in the bud.

Remember that lawyers are not historians.

## **Other accounts of a large explosion**

There is the account on TV of a fireball extending hundreds of feet into the air. This is not compatible with Claiden's 'mild explosion', and the fuel did not burn in the aircraft in the air but on the ground at Sherwood Crescent, Lockerbie.

If this is not bad enough at least one participant in the investigation (as a facilitator, not an investigator, but who had had experience of bodies recovered from munitions explosions) quoted by de Breackeleer, claimed that at least one child's body had suffered from what appeared to be shrapnel wounds. Again, journalists, who interviewed the chief pathologist at Lockerbie and challenged him with the account of another doctor at the scene, who claimed he seemed to be standing in a field of body parts said they had been created by the break up of bodies by 'air friction'.

Even a tyro of pathology like me knows that bodies do not break up when they fall through the air. An object the size of a body accelerates to a velocity of around 200 miles an hour downwards and then reaches terminal velocity. It does not break up.

Numerous whole bodies were discovered and reported (see John Crawford). He is curiously reticent on the fragmented body parts, of which he may well have had knowledge, but did not report in his book. But then, perhaps, he was engaged in 'another part of the battlefield' so to speak. But since he does not refer to known CIA men on the *Maid* as being from the CIA, but relies on circumlocutions, he has been carefully edited at least as far the facts that are palatable are concerned. It is a pity his editors did not pay any attention to his dire style prejudices, or egregious errors.

Another way to argue this is why if bodies break up as a result of air friction, they only do in over a single part of the crash site.

### **Medical evidence**

Forensic evidence was very limited at the trial as it had been at the FAI. May I suggest that there is at least evidence of selection is going on here. No evidence of shrapnel damage to bodies was presented (though the word was used freely by AAIB witnesses). Relatives were discouraged or prevented from viewing their dead before burial, and there is rumour than shrapnel was removed from some bodies. Perhaps an exhumation or two would begin to satisfy the matter.

### **Comparison of the UTA reconstruction and that at Lockerbie**

I walked round the entire reconstruction of the UTA plane in a hangar at Le Bourget airfield, Paris, though again it was only the fore to mid part that had been reconstructed, as in the Lockerbie reconstruction.

Remember these visits were back in the early 1990s before talk of a second explosion at Lockerbie had ever come to light, so I have no deep recollection of what I saw.

### **Causality**

I shall leave this matter as a conundrum. The important point is that if two explosions took place in Lockerbie, in sequence the smaller stuck on bomb was placed by a non-American hand (which I say was Iranian) and therefore and the **cause** of the destruction of the *Maid*. It is the first device not the second that we must lay the blame. In other words, the Iranians (if you believe my story) caused that destruction and not the Americans, for if the Iranian device had failed, the CIA one would not have been activated.

You have every right to say: Charles, this is very far-fetched and relies on many conditionals, and the extremes of recall; but if you care to follow the logic (which goes step by step), you will see that it possesses a rationality. You may attack me on grounds, for instance that you do not wish to blame the Iranians – then produce the proof that the PFLP GC or Syrians are responsible, for I have seen nothing of that; or if you disbelieve in the second explosion, which I can see may difficulties with, then please explain how such a small device as the IED (remember 423g) in AVE4041 PA

caused such huge disruption of the *Maid's* airframe and the lopsidedly written AAIB report.

### **Contamination, not cost**

There is an important point that Dr Swire raises. He says the PT 35 chip was not tested for explosive residue. I believe that to be true. There's a very good reason for that. The finding of explosive residue would not necessarily have been indicative that it came from Lockerbie. Because the RARDE forensic laboratory was located in a munitions factory the whole laboratory was necessarily contaminated with explosives. When the Maguire case came up with explosive residues they had most probably too come from the factory contamination, and \*Thorne had been wounded (professionally mortally, but not yet fatally) when he began work on Lockerbie.

Actually he didn't need any evidence of an explosion. That was obvious from the fact of the crash. So he used his expensively learned gas chromatographic skills as little as possible. If he had subjected the chip to that test, he would have come up with a positive result for explosives, but as light follows day the Appeal Court would have knocked him down for the conclusion. Cost was never the issue, contamination was.

A typical example of the sort of problem RARDE faced is that an 'intake' unit carefully opened all sample and then distributed them for analysis. That process necessarily meant contamination.

A further process was that all samples were checked for fingerprints. That process in itself, however carefully carried out, by an untrained (in forensic techniques) policeman, and not a forensic scientist necessarily implied contamination. \*Thorne's description of the precautions used to prevent contamination at the trial are laughably inadequate consisting of covering bench tops with sheets of plastic.

Poor Mr \*Thorne who understood these issues, as a good scientist, must have been driven almost mad by the sloppy procedures, he was reduced by the short-sightedness of his bosses to use.

### **The CIA have nothing to do with the Lockerbie inquiry**

Essentially for the next 18 months or so the CIA appeared to do nothing, and are conspicuously absent from the Lockerbie inquiry. Let's see what's been achieved.

### **What the CIA has achieved**

They have fulfilled their part of \*Brandon agreement and an Iranian has been enabled to down a US aircraft in full commercial flight. With the exception of the awkwardness on a Scottish hillside and the sequelae, which may either have been an attempt, to assess the response of the Scots, to a team that had acted too brashly, ignorantly, or arrogantly (or even a combination all three), but has been carefully swept under the carpet thanks to the Met and the BSS, there's no hint of

CIA involvement.

Neither the Helsinki warning nor the Toshiba ones appear to have any obvious CIA link.

And yet, on a bloody Scottish hillside a US aircraft lies dead, the product of the worst criminal catastrophe in UK history.

The most important clue (if clue it be, as the court doubted) is the break-in at Heathrow. In my argued opinion, the CIA had everything to do with this and nothing. The everything is that they proposed to the Iranians a way that they could extract their revenge; the nothing is that if the intruder who planted the device discovered during the break-in is not a CIA man or identifiable as one. I believe that there would have been a tacit (or even explicit agreement) that if the intruder had been arrested, some other attempt would have been permitted, and the Iranian extricated from his predicament, *provided he did not say that he had been put up to the job by the Americans*. If he had done, (and remember we are dealing with parties who essentially distrust each other) the Americans would have said all bets are off. You blew your chance.

### **Need to simplify**

Another thing is that the idle commentator like me (or many others) must not do is not to try to overcomplicate the story. For example, one criticism that has been put to me, by people who accept that there was a break-in at Heathrow and Mr Manly's story is correct, is that 'obviously' if it had been the method of the introduction of the device, the padlock and bar would not have been left around to be found by him. There are several answers to this, but they require the planter at least to have had a spare padlock, and require the old one to be carried away. In my early version of my story where the planter leaves the country, he would have had to take the padlock through security, which even in 1988 would have risked detection. But my main reservation is that every interference in the security of Heathrow, deliberate to plant the device or a decoy, runs the risk of detection, and if the break-in is a decoy, what is the real method of the deployment of the device. You would surely not cause a decoy break-in, to hide the fact that the real bomb was in a suitcase that had been introduced by another means.

Secondly, an explanation should try to provide fewer mysteries and confine those that remain in strictly defined limits. Alternative explanations are permissible, following Occam, but should be avoided where possible and the simplest argument used.

Now that the Lockerbie inquiry was getting into its stride, the CIA could relax for a little, and do no more than fan the embers of accusation, if necessary, and carry out other subtle and invisible steps. There are just two points in this complicated plot that require comment.

### **Was Scotland a deliberate choice?**

Firstly, the *Maid* blew up over Scotland. It is reasonable to think of this as accidental, and it seems unlikely that a pressure transducer/short timer device could have been set to operate so accurately that the device would explode just 90 seconds or 14.5 miles after crossing the border. But if it had blown up 2 minutes earlier it would have been under English jurisdiction. The Germans were particularly insistent that the elapsed time on a pressure transducer controlled IED meant that one could not be certain where an aircraft would be brought down. But two minutes is quite a long time, and aircraft flight paths are reasonably calculable. To cause the maximum disjoint between legal systems, in the UK, there would be no better place for CIA purposes than that the Lockerbie crash had happened in Scotland. As we have seen the Metropolitan Police were initially at Lockerbie, but were withdrawn. The Lord Advocate, a political appointee was particularly keen to see the Met withdrawn. He may well have fallen foul of that nationalist element in the Scots police that said they needed no help or guidance from London in 'their' disaster, (a point put crudely and with no finesse by John Crawford).

Furthermore, Lord Fraser was a part of that UK government that had, in my suggestion, specifically allowed the US to hold the Lockerbie Circus on UK territory. When Lord Fraser raised the matter of the unnecessary presence of the Met, he was pushing at a door that was more than ajar. Meanwhile the Met was delighted, because it distanced them from a potentially embarrassing internal conflict over the evidence of the break-in.

## **HOLMES**

The other was the use of HOLMES, the computerised inquiry system which amazed Mr Marquise, when he encountered it, until he became aware of its singular limitations. That system made investigators follow 'clues on the ground' and not 'investigators' hunches'. As I believe all the significant clues indicated an unlabelled blown *planted* suitcase had been responsible, but was not the real cause of the blast, it could not produce an outcome until a further operation to blame particular Libyans came to be necessary.

## **The Yorkshire Ripper**

If you think it not necessary to raise the issue of that squalid north of England serial murderer, I do.

Peter Sutcliffe, the Yorkshire Ripper revolutionised police procedure in the UK. The traditional investigator George Oldfield became convinced that the perpetrator was a Wearside man, because the investigation had received a telephone call from a man with what was determined to be such an accent. It led Oldfield to discount every lead that did not relate to Wearside, despite the opinions of his colleagues who knew that information the Wearside man claimed to have, had been made public. In fact Sutcliffe who never phoned the police was from Bradford, and had an accent entirely different from that of Wearside. Several women died because of that police bungle, so the Home Office decided to automate large scale inquiries to make them 'investigator proof'.

Because of this the Home Office invented the computerised system that amazed Marquise called HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System), which was essentially a diary booking system which did not allow an event to be abandoned until it had been followed up.

### **The CIA and HOLMES**

The CIA has never told us what it thought of HOLMES, but it played the instrument like professionals. It became skilled in providing the sort of lead that HOLMES in its plodding way was good at handing out as assignments to individual policeman. And so the CIA used it, for its own purposes.

### **Let's go back to the padlock again**

But why did the CIA go to all this complicated bother? I think it's a result of \*Brandon's Mephistophelean bargain. Suppose the evidence of the broken padlock had come out, but no blown suitcase had been dumped. The police would have been left with an unsolvable conundrum, and eventually some bright spark would have said "Iran", especially of the adjacency of the facilities at Heathrow. On the other hand there would be no further evidential trail, and the CIA could the 'hold hostage' whom it wanted, including, if necessary, the Iranians. The CIA had to act honestly towards its masters in this operation – the Iranian Revolutionary Regime, but only during their 'good behaviour'.

But, I suggest the BSS would not have allowed that solution for that would have lead to a Heathrow implication.

### **The Lockerbie inquiry gets mired in the mud**

In the following months, while the Lockerbie inquiry though busy, effectively goes to sleep, the CIA promotes various misleading lies. I do not intend to deal with them in any detail.

In the immediate aftermath of Lockerbie, the CIA began as it intended to continue.

### **Distractions**

My view is that the CIA had to uphold a rationale in which Iran was not to be held responsible. It used a number of 'distractions' to keep the focus of attention away from Iran. The most usual of these was to suggest large sums of money had been paid – a typical figure in Lockerbie is \$10M – a documentary trail if necessary made with named beneficiaries and intermediate banks, but I have yet to see even to see such paperwork, or been able to comment on it, and I have never heard of anyone benefiting from this fictional CIA largesse.

### **'Hidden amongst baggage', Mr Channon?**

There was one chink in the CIA's armour of deceit - Mr Paul Channon. The UK Minister of Transport said that the device on the Lockerbie plane was 'hidden amongst baggage', rather than 'being in a suitcase' to a question from UK Lockerbie family relatives. With some experience of British Civil Service argot which is designed to be accurate, but may be opaque, may mislead, **but must not lie**, I realised it meant the device was not in a suitcase. 'Hidden amongst baggage' said that. **If the IED had been in a suitcase, the answer would have said it was.** Although the question had not been put to him in Parliament, but only by UKFF103 relatives, Channon realised that it might well lead to a supplementary there, and so for consistency he decided to be closely advised by his civil servants. For his 'wobbliness' Channon was shortly later fired and died not long after.

Channon would have had no inkling what the answer was. He would have simply passed the question to his PS or PPS to get an answer. They, of course, would not have known either, but eventually it must have landed up on an AAIB desk (Mr Charles's?) and he could have written the extraordinarily accurate but misleading response. It then would have made its way inexorably back to Channon, and been issued, probably without any other gloss by him.

Those in the know must have been appalled.

I suppose AAIB could have stalled. But it would have been difficult to maintain the authorities had no idea where the device was that caused the destruction four months after the tragedy.

## **UT-772**

On 19 September 1989 UT-772 a French aircraft flying from Brazzaville, Congo via N'Djamena, Tchad was brought down by explosion near the Massif de Termit, Niger. Three days later the crash was held to be a terrorist attack, and Jean Louis Bruguière France's leading terrorist investigator (an examining magistrate of formidable reputation) was put in charge of the case, a man whom even Mr Marquise has told me was 'above his pay level'.

I can find no issue of CIA involvement over this. However, it would become a linchpin of the CIA's resolution of what would become its Lockerbie dilemma. There were two problems. Firstly, a tragedy such as Lockerbie needs resolution, or else the investigators will be seen as not doing their job. Secondly, no resolution can so much hint at Iran.

By deciding to blow up the French jet, the Libyans inadvertently sealed what was to be their responsibility over Lockerbie.

## **Understanding UTA**

I shall not spend any time considering Libyan culpability over UTA, except to say it took me 14 long years before I understood it sufficiently, though I had fully accepted it by 1999, and had had doubts about the attribution of both Lockerbie and UTA to

Libya since the announcement of Libyan culpability on Lockerbie as early as 1991, believing Libya did UTA. I have said a little at the start of this article. For me it was a process of growing awareness, not a lightning awakening of knowledge, but one that proceeded by steps, stalls and judders. Even today a informed critic might have the ability to undermine my position, though none has seriously managed to do for the last two years. Any of my critics has the power to induce panic in me because of some half-digested or wrongly remembered fact, which affects the nub of the narrative, and if you find such – please tell me.

And my doubts were not fully cleared up until the UTA criminal case papers were published in English in the pursuance of a civil claim in the US courts by the relatives of the 6 US citizens who died on board that plane.

But this is not my story, it's the CIA's.

### **The CIA learns the cause of UTA**

Unless the CIA had a agent or an informant in Juge Bruguière's investigation or possibly the Congolese secret police the earliest the CIA would have learned of a Libyan involvement in UTA was 27<sup>th</sup> August 1990 from an article in a little-regarded Parisian newspaper, *Le Point*. It said both Congolese and Libyans were involved in UTA.

### **Mr Gauci, proprietor of a clothes shop in Malta**

On 10<sup>th</sup> September 1990 Mr Gauci, a Maltese clothes shop proprietor, made a statement that he has not identified anyone up to that time, and I think this formally closed attempts to get him to blame others (such as Mr Talib), probably an attempt to blame Lockerbie on the PFLP GC. I suggest that this is the first time the CIA put forward any information that it had begun to identify anyone seriously, and ask the Scots to run with it, though we shall see their malfeasance over timer chips. Though the Scots are in charge of questioning Mr Gauci, the CIA must have persuaded them in the days up to 10 September that they should turn their attentions elsewhere. A logical first step could well be to ask him, 'has he identified anyone yet'. Mr Gauci signed a statement that he hadn't.

### **The Juge briefs the relatives of the UTA victims**

On 20<sup>th</sup> September 1990 in a unique meeting between the French juge and the *partie civiles*, mainly the relatives of the deceased, he tell us (I am a *partie civile*, for my brother had the misfortune to board UT-772 at N'Djamena in Tchad) that Congolese are to be found guilty of UTA with Libyan assistance.

I stand up and bring greeting from the Lockerbie families, and ask, 'Is there any connection between the two cases. The Juge says 'maybe'.

### **L'Éxpress carries an article**

On 28<sup>th</sup> September 1990 Xavier † Raufer in L'Éxpress carried an article that said the Scottish police have an example of the timer that brought down Pan Am 103, and the term MST 13 enters the debate publicly for the first time, though it had been made known to the FBI by the Scots in January 1990.

Nothing in the Lockerbie investigation (or UTA) appears to relate to this article. It is my suggestion that a CIA agent placed the story with † Raufer, for an attribution they had yet to tell the Lockerbie investigation.

### **Further press revelations**

On 9<sup>th</sup> October 1990, the Scottish police, the FBI and the CIA met for the *first* time in the same room in Washington. On 10<sup>th</sup> October 1990 the *New York Times* carried an article mentioning Libya for the first time in connection with Lockerbie. On 21<sup>st</sup> November 1990, a Swiss newspaper had an article that Lockerbie is a Libyan atrocity. Marquise becomes angry with \*Cattermole of the CIA over this. On 22<sup>nd</sup> November another article by Xavier † Raufer appears in the L'Éxpress blaming Libya. On 14<sup>th</sup> December 1990, an article appears in *The Independent*, London, blaming Libya. Whose telling porkies?

I interpret this an agenda of progressively blaming Libya, but unsupported by developments in the Lockerbie investigation. The Scots play their cards very closely and Marquise is angered, so unless he is lying, where are these stories coming from?

I can see no events in my extensive time line, which runs to over 50 pages and has over 1000 items in this period which relates to a huge breakthrough by the investigation of a Libyan attribution. The attributions which are progressive appear to be placed with journalists, and are certainly unsourced, except perhaps by some undisclosed agency which wishes to promote an agenda.

If anyone says 'but journalists always make things up', why the consistent directionality towards Libya, revealing matters that will be important in the court case that will be brought nine years later?

### **A CIA origin?**

I believe they all came from the CIA. Who else would wish to avoid the obvious Iranian attribution, and needs to disguise their own duplicity? Now why should the CIA, which had had nothing publicly to do with Lockerbie since those unfortunate scenes on a Scottish hillside 22 months before suddenly be leaking stories that Libya carried out Lockerbie.

If the CIA were a straightforward investigative agency, why not tell the Lockerbie inquiry directly, rather than resorting to a second-hand approach through the public prints?

### **Kuwait**

The reason I suggest is quite simple. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. That immediately transformed Syria (where the PFLP GC was formally based) into a putative ally and made Iran unassailable. Neither country could now be seen to have any responsibility for Lockerbie, even in the negative. In the eyes of the White House it became essential that there should be an end to continued speculation that either country could be involved. The issues over each country were rather different.

Whether, there were any negotiations or agreements between the parties over this is uncertain. But the Administration did not want a putative finding of Iranian, Iranian/PFLP GC, Syrian, Syrian/PFLP GC guilt or any other combination of the three during the months leading up to what would be the Allied attack on Iraq. None of the parties were the natural allies of each other.

When exactly did this volte face take place in US thinking. I think you've got to break it down into three separate parts at least. The US Government is not a monolith. There's the White House, (the President and his close cabal), the Administration (by which one means the broad sweep of Government (called Whitehall in the UK) and in this case, the CIA.

Normally, the President and his Administration 'sing from the same songbook'. The view from Whitehall is generally aligned with that of No. 10.

### **The view of the CIA, the White House and the Administration over the invasion of Kuwait**

Over the period leading up to the first Gulf War, there seems to have been a growing conflict between the CIA together with the White House and the Administration. Casey, the CIA director brought his concerns about Iraq to the President as early as the 1<sup>st</sup> September 1989. Casey said Iraq was trying to acquire nuclear materials. (Whether that was true or not is immaterial. It is the impression that the CIA wished to give the President). Nothing much appears to have developed at that time on this issue. It's well before the UTA tragedy, so no one can be lining up Libya for a fall. Casey, of course, still has to hide the US responsibility for Lockerbie and the Iranian connection.

By contrast some parts of the Administration were seemingly trying to claim that the Iraqis had not properly invaded Kuwait days before the 1st Gulf War, and intended to withdraw!

### **PT 35 photographs**

There are very few hints of anything developing until earlyish June 1990, when \*Lightbody who had received pictures of a PT 35 device from Henderson (or \*Byrd) has them explained to him by \*Orkin, of the CIA.

### **Steps in the manufacture of a clue, PT 35**

Date	What happened	Meaning
26 December 1988	Mrs Horton finds a manual in her garden	Will in most probably altered form be presented in court as in same suitcase as the Libyan IED which, a lie
Early January 1989	Mr Bollier is said to have gone to US embassy Vienna	
13 January 1989	Debris is collected from Kielder Forest (about 2 km from Mrs Horton's home)	
17 January 1989	At Dexter store it gets label 168	
19 January 1989	Actual date Mr Bollier went to US Embassy Vienna	The ante-dating of Bollier's visit is to prevent a defence cross-examination challenge that there might be some collusion between Mr Bollier and the finding of the chip on 13 January 1989
12 May 1989	*Thorne examines item 168	
22 June 1989	Lumpert gave a MEBO circuit board to an American	
30 December 1899	CIA (possibly ¶Orkin and BSS induce *Thorne to insert piece of MEBO chip into shirt collar) (of wrong size) and call it label 168	All three gentlemen thus commit perjury
15 September 1989	DCI Williamson receives a photograph of the metal part of label 168	
10 January 1990	FBI is told of PT 35 chip (as it has now become) by Lockerbie Investigation  Marquise raises possible doubts of the validity of the Arabic manual Arabic manual for Toshiba found near Lockerbie.	
In Spring and Summer 1990	Scots go round the world trying to identify the chip. They fail.	
23 March 1990	Bollier shown a photograph by *Lightbody of an MST timer he said was an MST,	
In June 1990	*Lightbody receives a Togo circuit board  *Byrd sees Togo boards at the FBI	
11 June 1990	*Lightbody receives PT 35 photographs from Henderson	
13 June 1990	In two days *Lightbody identifies them	

30 December 1990	<p>*Lightbody took the photos to ¶Orkin</p> <p>¶Orkin (CIA) had photos of a device found several years before in Togo, which had been handed over to the US.</p> <p>*Lightbody identifies the circuit board of this timer as being PT 35</p> <p>It was not barometric</p>	Therefore, it was a long timer
15 June 1990	Thurman claims he had the identification of the timer chip on this date	This essentially is the end of the PT 35 chip story

It seems to me this this the critical point when the Lockerbie investigation turns towards Libya. The steps towards the incarceration of Mr Megrahi will seem to be infinitely slow.

Now begins a period of immense confusion. On the one hand the Lockerbie investigators will be developing their MEBO chip theory (and changing their story), on the other the French will be pursuing their more credible Libyan theory.

Remember that in essence neither knows anything about the other's position.

### The 1<sup>st</sup> Gulf War begins

On the 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. But the manoeuvres regarding the need to attribute Lockerbie to Libya rather than anyone else might be claimed to have begun earlier. Would it not be a unreasonable inference that \*Orkin's interpretation of \*Lightbody's photograph (when he presented it to him) represented the first point that the CIA in any published commentary could be said that Libya, rather than any other party had carried out the Pan Am bombing?

This had been on 15<sup>th</sup> June 1990. But unlike the Administration, the CIA had been following an active policy against Iraq for at least 9 months from the time Casey had presented the White House with his hostile assessment in September 1989, which was, of course nearly nine months after the downing of the *Maid*. Casey's presentation may in part have been directed by the need that the CIA's position should be seen as consistent. Having befuddled the Lockerbie inquiry from the start, the CIA knew that such a high profile disaster would need some sort of resolution. It wouldn't really be satisfactory if a dozen years down the line there was no solution to the mystery. Had Mr Talib or the PFLP GC been announced by the Lockerbie Investigation as the culprits, say at the time the actual indictments against the Tripoli 2, from what little one has seen of the investigation they would have been thin. Mr Talib could be traced to Malta at *about* (no better than that) the same time as the clothes in question were bought from Mr Gauci, and he had definitely visited the

island twice before in that year), but he had an alibi for any connection with the device on 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988 (which can be thought of as strong); there would have been the *Autumn Leaves* material, but it's a long way from those two facts to creating a prosecution case. Because, and here I'm sorry to have to hammer it home, there was neither a case against Palestinians/Talib/Dalqamuni/Khreesat/Nidal than against anyone else, except as I argue here Iran and the CIA.

### **British issues over Iraq**

It's also interesting to ask where were the other players at this time. The British had their own problems with Iraq – Gerald Bull's supergun (parts manufactured by an Iraqi owned company in Sheffield) and the arrest and execution of the *Sunday Times* journalist Farzad Bazoft in Iraq. Similarly, Israel was deeply concerned about the supergun.

### **And Israel or even Iran!**

Only three months earlier Saddam had threatened to destroy half Israel. While one of the standard explanations says Israelis killed Bull, one theory is that it was an Iranian operation (for Tehran (350km from Iraq) is nearer than Jerusalem (400km from Iraq) could be threatened by the device). Which is true? Perhaps neither, but one should always be alert to the possibility that the strongest enemies can have interests in common. It has been argued that the Israeli agencies are prepared to take responsibility for actions they actually have not carried out. Might one say *pour discourager les autres*?

Let's return the suggested development of the CIA plot.

I have to introduce a new complexity here. It's this. Just because what will become a clue presented in cold blood in court can be dated to the collection of something on a Scottish hillside, does not mean that at the point of its collection, it was seen to be a clue. In fact, almost certainly not. Any number of innocent bits of circuit board, i/c fragments, even parts of detonators, discharged bullets, manuals and the like, must have been handed in during those tragic and difficult days after the crash. The Scottish Border countryside is not exactly *tabula rasa*.

### **Mrs Horton**

Mrs Gwendoline Horton found a fragment of instruction manual, or a manual itself, possibly in Arabic (for what would later be claimed to be a Toshiba cassette recorder) in her garden in Newcastleton on 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1988. Now it is just possible that Newcastleton some 56km ENE by E of Lockerbie is in the Lockerbie detritus zone. Some maps suggest it is. The low level wind on the evening of 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988 in the right direction, but the item collected would have been something of an outlier in distance.

Mrs Horton properly offered it to the police, as possibly having some connection with the crash, though she had to offer it to them twice. Then for many years, she

probably thought no more about it.

One thing one comes across in researching Lockerbie and any deep dark mystery is that important facts have a habit of becoming entirely overlooked or forgotten when they do not fit in with the current dogma. Sometimes you have to go back decades to find what people were writing at the time. Because the media pay more attention to what is currently officially being said and commenting on that (ad nauseam), the prosecution essentially sets the agenda. Criticisms made in the deep past are overlooked even (and may I say, especially) when they have been entirely ignored.

The manual or fragment found its way to RARDE.

Mrs Horton failed to recognise the manual at the trial, and the police will maintain that it has suffered through the forensic tests it has been through. By this time (2000) it really is about a Toshiba cassette recorder.

The strange conundrum remains as to why a competent 'state terrorist organisation' the Libyan JSO/ESO seemed to leave behind so many clues that would relate to it.

The MEBO chip, possibly, but the Toshiba manual and the Malta clothing is surely ingenuity too far!

Indeed in his section about the Lockerbie conference of 10<sup>th</sup> January 1990, Marquise raises the question whether the Arabic manual for the Toshiba found near Lockerbie was real, or not.

### **The debris recovered in the Kielder Forest acquires an antedating**

This will allow items collected on 13<sup>th</sup> January 1989 which had been collected by ordinary police finger-tip recovery just outside the town, though it will acquire a much more colourful alternative history to acquire by 'reasonable association' the date of Mrs Horton's finding. Two pieces of debris (probably neither to do with the bombing) have come to the ground in and near Newcastleton. One is deposited almost certainly by 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1988 in Mrs Horton's garden, the other collected on 13<sup>th</sup> January 1989. But the inference will be that they blew virtually together across Scotland into Northern England. (Newcastleton is almost the nearest town to Lockerbie in England). The choice of location (England rather than Scotland) may have been deliberate to introduce the possibility of jurisdictional issues, if necessary. It appears to be on the direct line of the northern debris stream from the stricken plane, but nearly two and a half times as far as the furthest point on the AAIB debris map.

A map is prepared that shows a debris trail stretching up into the Newcastleton Forest. But in reality it is not a debris trail of plane wreckage, but in many instances a map of pieces of material which had been collected by the Lockerbie investigation and *might* have been from the plane. Two very different things. A cautious selection of data points allows stuff that had nothing to do with the plane as shown as being from the plane. Thus a biased process is applied to collected materials to show that

the Horton and forest findings were of stuff from the plane.

Interestingly, in accordance with the AAIB's policy that they only report facts that are true, the data points for either the Horton manual or the PT 35 debris/later chip finding are not on the map of the debris trail provided in their report

### **A plan of a flat in Beirut found on a moor in Otterburn, Northumberland**

Indeed, there is even more evidence of falsity. In his remarkable book David Johnstone recounts that a plan of what appeared to be a flat had been recovered by a British Army team from its ranges at Otterburn in Northumberland. He surmised that this was a plan of one of the flats that Western hostages were being held in in Lebanon. Now Otterburn is due 140 km due south east of Lockerbie, one would expect debris to fly taking about one and a half hours in the 60 mph wind at a glide angle of about 1 in 150 in the prevailing wind direction. Did the Beirut map land after the disaster, land, get wet and then dry out to be carried by a more usual prevailing wind towards Otterburn?

Although McKee's suitcase had not contained the bomb it is difficult to believe that the force of the explosion would be sufficient to propel the map south in the face of the wind. Perhaps the map landed in a puddle, dried out and then was blown south in some favourably northerly wind later. Or what Johnstone is telling us is cod. It might have been from another suitcase McKee was carrying, which burst.

Naturally, this information did not come to light at the FAI or the trial. But a map, probably produced by the AAIB was shown (Plot of wreckage trails Figure B-4). It is almost certainly partial. It shows two lines of debris running ENE by E. The northerly one is clearly shows heavy material that did not blow in the wind and goes through the centre of the blast.

The second trail is about 1.5km south of the northerly one almost parallel but slightly deviating from it. If one were to project the centre lines of both distributions of debris westwards they would meet at a point about 20km in that direction, a little WSW by W of a line drawn from Lockerbie. The AAIB's account of the debris trails is a little different, claiming the two trails merged after 5km.

### **Debris map does not show major aircraft parts**

The map does not show the location of the 5 major parts of the blown up aircraft. Why?

Had there been a plot of the landing points of the major debris pieces, there would have been 4 or 5 major parts landing on Lockerbie and one outlier, the cockpit, which had broken off earlier. It would immediately give rise to speculation of the second explosion, so perhaps that is why the CIA and especially BSS campaigned to have it removed from the public report.

More and more I believe the numbers of lives lost at Lockerbie could have been much, much higher and the CIA was really rather lucky so few were killed. Had say, 50 or 100 been killed in the town, the truth might have been outed years ago.

### **The southern trail problem**

No debris is shown as having landed more than 3km south of the southern line, astonishing when you consider that the wind was 60mph and that meant that all the debris fell from 31000' in that distance. That means if any piece of debris had immediately been caught by the storm after being blown out of the aircraft, and blown in the direction of that wind, it had to have reached the ground in 2 minutes. Do you really ask me to believe that every single piece of paper and other rubbish blown out of the aircraft did that, in that wind?

At the same time this debris has the ability to fly 34km ENE by E at the same time as reaching the ground.

### **A highly partial map**

I suggest that this is a highly partial debris map. I am prepared to accept that every data point represents an actual data collection point, but whether it is right to assume that each point is of a piece of debris from the *Maid* is may not be true. Obviously the 'finger-tip' collecting detectives must have collected any amount of material that was nothing to do with Lockerbie, though that could not be determined until it had arrived at RARDE. No piece of material from those dark Scottish hills contained a magic badge which said 'this is from the *Maid*'. That had to be determined by experts in RARDE later, and even then there must have been doubts (let us say honestly expressed) that a particular item was or was not from the *Maid* or not.

The southern line probably represents the northern limit of paper debris collected from McKee's suitcase, as none of that could be presented in court. So to prevent the possibility of the defence raising issues about adjacent debris, certainly from Mr McKee's suitcase, the bottom of the map was cut off.

Project the northern line of debris it crosses Newcastleton, and within limits of error, may I suggest Mrs Horton's garden. If the Toshiba manual had been driven there by the storm that would have taken about 25 minutes. So it would have descended to her garden by 19:30 on 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988.

Assume, for the moment that the northern trail consists of points from the main explosion and are entirely genuine. The furthest item (marked by red crosses on

this line is about 10km). Assume that point is entirely genuine. For an item of debris blasted from the aircraft across the direction of the wind (and therefore not affected by it), means that it would not have been slowed or accelerated in its descent and thus would have travelled about 14km (31,000' vertically and 10km horizontally from the point of being ejected from the aircraft).

If it maintained its initial velocity, it would have take 50 seconds (less than a minute) to reach this point.

Professor \*Byrd expects us to believe that the manual must have been blasted 34km across the Borders, from the height of 31000'. By Pythagoras, that's still about 34km. It would have taken 2 minutes 40 seconds at about 600mph.

### **A shirt collar containing a piece of MEBO chip**

Similarly for the shirt collar containing the MEBO chip fragment. Professor de Breackeleer says that the collar fragment found with the chip in it and the shirt found in the suitcase remains are different, for the collar is of the wrong size.

This means, not so much that someone has been careless but that the packing of the suitcase and the manufacture of the fabricated detritus associated with the chip were done at different times, possibly more than a year apart, and quite possibly a small error of that sort could have been made by the CIA. Though it must be said that this is a carelessness the original plot does not seem to have suffered from.

\*Byrd must have been an accomplished actor, a master of self-deceit, or the fraud had been entirely carried out by \*Thorne.

### **Mr Lumpert's confession**

On 18 June 2007 Lumpert confessed that on 18 June 1989 he gave an 8 layer circuit board to a person investigating the Lockerbie case. 'It did not escape me that the MST-13 fragment shown [at the Lockerbie trial] on the police photograph No. PT 35 (he says PT/35(b)) came from the non-operational MST-13 prototype PC-board that I had stolen', Lumpert added.

'I am sorry for the consequences of my silence at that time, for the innocent Libyan Mr Abdelbaset Al Megrahi sentenced to life imprisonment, and for the country of Libya'.

This statement was certified by Officer Walter Wieland, presumably a Swiss policeman. As usual the Scottish Appeal Court, immensely unwilling to look at the changed evidence that has been put before it and the predecessors, believing implicitly that everything put to the courts through the years by the prosecution just treats is as a little excrescence, a little piece of dirt on a Rolls-Royce of a job to be polished and the case will stand fresh as if it were new.

Until the Scottish Courts get it into their head that there has wholesale and complete fraud by the Crown over the Lockerbie case, and the prosecutors have eagerly fallen into bed with the CIA over what has happened to Mr Megrahi, the case will never be properly understood.

There is a phrase 'miscarriage of justice' that is usually applied in these cases. It is wholly inappropriate for the scale of perversion here.

It is tradition to show the spirit of justice as blind, as the statute atop the Old Bailey shows, as a way of indicating justice is equal to all the parties who seek it. But in the case of the Scots and the idiotic processes that have gone on in Zeist and latterly Edinburgh, justice had been not only blind, but deaf to argument and entirely without a brain at all.

Is it possible to prosecute Scottish judges for their failures in their own courts? Some of them deserve to be there.

I suggest that pcb was taken to the US and given to the CIA's ¶Orkin. He might even have collected it. (This is not the same as the debate over whether \*Byrd took the fabricate evidence to the US).

## **Back to UTA**

On 19 September 1989 UT-772 blew up.

I think the CIA quickly assessed (in a way they would not allow the Lockerbie inquiry to do (Holmes computer system = facts on the ground)) that UTA was a Libyan job on the *casus belli* argument (the lost war in Chad).

2 October 1989 Congolese Defense Security produce a report on UTA mentioning Mangatany (who was a known member of a Libyan financed opposition group). Could the CIA have learned of that?

I suggest in early October 1989, CIA having provisionally assessed Libya as responsible for UTA decided to go for it over Lockerbie.

They decided to interfere with the Lockerbie evidence stream.

## **Introducing the PT 35 chip into the RARDE evidence stream**

### **A surmise**

¶Orkin (or another) is sent to RARDE with the chip cut from Lumpert's board.

¶Orkin is, I think, the only CIA man that Marquise gives a pseudonym to. For that reason alone this rôle in the plot must be substantial, and would certainly face charges on perjury in Scotland.

In late 1989 (see why below), or he meets \*Thorne and \*Byrd with a BSS (probably a MI5 representative), and possible a boss of \*Thorne' at RARDE. If \*Thorne has not retired by this time he is given a choice. Co-operate with the CIA and his pension will be protected and he may even get a payout, and can go early, and become a chiropodist (which he did) otherwise he will be dismissed and may be prosecuted for the Maguire failings (probably an empty threat, as \*Thorne could counter that it was the civil service's own decision to place a forensic laboratory in munitions factory, not his). \*Byrd will get \*Thorne's job but only if he too co-operates. \*Byrd is eager for the job as he never expected to rise to the dizzying heights of running RARDE, with a basic HNC qualification. So embarrassed are the government by the doings at Fort Halstead, that they later change its name of the forensics unit.

It is a sure sign in British Government that a change of name means something is wrong. Windscale became Sellafield. Same facility new name meant the matter of the second most serious radiation leak in world history in a nuclear reactor could be overlooked. The tomb of the old burnt out reactor still stands there today and will do for some hundreds of years.

### **Perjury is committed**

They sit down and set a date to attribute to their invention, which is a crime by all five or so men as they are all (including the CIA man) committing perjury. The CIA man suggests a date. He says it must be before the date Bollier first contacted the US Embassy Vienna (19 January 1989, personal information, from Bollier), for otherwise a clever counsel learning of Bollier's real date of visit will stand up and say 'but the date of this evidence is after Bollier's visit', creating an impression that Bollier may have given the CIA a circuit board a bit of which turns up on the ground at Newcastleton. By antedating the finding of the evidence, this line of reasoning is forestalled.

They choose label 168 collected 13 January 1989 registered to Dexter store on 17 January 1989. It is a piece of cloth, collected in the Newcastleton forest. But this is a little remote in time, and counsel may well argue that the collection date is so far after the bombing (25 days) that it is nothing to do with Lockerbie. A reasonable person will conclude that the actual date it fell was 22 December 1988, like the Horton manual finding.

They decide to date \*Thorne's investigation of 168 labelled 'cloth' to 12 May 1989, and that was the actual date \*Thorne had looked at it, on that day, but discarded it as not significant.

Certainly the 12 May *date* has not been interfered with, unlike the description, which was. A typical CIA stratagem. A date is sacrosanct; the event is not.

168 is emptied of its now irrelevant material and a piece of shirt collar substituted. The piece of chip brought from America is slipped into it. \*Thorne rewrites the label (possibly he believes it will be unproblematical, not disguising his handwriting (Bollier says the rewrite is \*Thorne's fist). Perhaps he (\*Thorne) is not fully aware of the

problems this will cause Gilchrist.

### **A small but damaging error**

A small slip up occurs. De Breackeleer writes: This issue is of paramount importance as forensic experts claimed to have discovered in the collar of one of these shirts the fragment of an electronic timer which provided the key link between the bombing and Libya. (NB, says de Breackeleer, 'this writer has never quite understood how the size of the breast pocket did not match the size of the collar of the shirt recovered at Lockerbie, but that is another story'.)

A bit of carelessness by the fiction factory, perhaps? (But a year or more has gone by since the two events (the blowing up of the suitcase and choosing the debris to be placed in 168), and errors are likely to take place). The doctored evidence is slipped back into the secure store. \*Byrd decides to use one of the photos he been supplied with to send to DCI Williamson with his lame story about the delay in photography .

### **Mr Leppard**

On 29 October 1989 in the Sunday Times, Leppard writes a piece saying that Lockerbie is Libyan inspired and involves a hard shell suitcase filled with clothing obtained in Malta. That is the first reference to Malta or a hard shell suitcase in public. (Surely he didn't invent that claim).

I reckon the lead time for an article to be about 1-2 weeks, so I suggest David Leppard was infected about 18 October 1989.

I am going so far with inference here that I am not sure exactly of the date of the interference with label 168. It will become painfully clear in the perjury case.

Though there is nothing about PT 35 or shirt collars in Leppard's piece (perhaps the CIA thought there was something the Scots rather than they should tell the world, it's about this time that the Libyan story on the ground is being put together.

There must have been much low level discussion in the inquiry and presumably the CIA thinks that everyone will believe that Leppard got his story from that.

In fact, the investigation is almost rumour tight, with the exception of the JIG who learn everything, and say nowt, except to the ever attentive and diligent CIA.

If you think this is far-fetched, then where did Mr Leppard's story come from. There has been no successful police inquiry into it, no one prosecuted, no sign of a failed one even, so we must come to the reasonable conclusion that there wasn't one.

Yet there was a serious leak.

So why wasn't it investigated. Was it possible that it began to dawn on senior policemen that unless they listened to the CIA's siren song, of conducted in the public

prints, they were never going to have a resolution of the Lockerbie investigation.

I wonder what Mr Henderson really thinks of CIA men in their soft accents and button down collars.

I can't see how that story could have come from anywhere except the Langley fiction factory and it is right as far as it goes in all particulars about the Libyan attribution. Details of the timer are left out, probably because the CIA had not decided to run with it yet.

### **Gideon Levy, an effective journalist, who knows the questions to ask**

Gideon Levy asked at the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Lockerbie at Arlington cemetery 21 December 2008) awkward questions of Marquise and Henderson. \*Lightbody refused to co-operate except to say he had first identified the timer chip.

This is the USA, and everyone treats the journalist, Levy, with courtesy and respect, though it is clear Henderson is deeply angered, and the same day threatened to kill those who disagreed with his findings, borrowing says Jim Swire, the Lockerbie families' microphone to do so. In the UK, Levy, the journalist, would have been thrown out. But this is the US of A where journalists are the fourth estate, not shabby figures in ill-fitting suits with a scrappy note-book and a pocket full of betting slips and used fivers for 'information', a tendency to drink too much, and do their business in public houses.

\*Lightbody adopts a typical trick when someone in a circumstance like this is being confronted with awkward truths. He refers to the solemnity of the occasion and implies Mr Levy's attentions are unwelcome, untimely and inappropriate. It's happened to me, and I am a relative though not of Lockerbie, but of UT-772. And I prefer the nasty truth to the comfortable lie.

### **A curious interview**

In the course of his programme Mr Levy interviewed a former Agency officer a Mr Robert Baer, who introduced himself as the chief bomber of the CIA. Why such an individual should be thought to have been worthy of offering his views is not certain. Building and deploying a bomb is not an investigator's job so Mr Baer's background (if it be true) is not appropriate. Mr Baer also turned out to be a proponent of PFLP-GC theory, which I have shown is wrong.

### **Mr Marquise's problem**

Henderson said the PT-35 had never left the jurisdiction as it was too valuable. Marquise, who had not been a party the Scots' trip to Washington says it had, though he later corrects himself.

This may be an honest misunderstanding, for Marquise had not been with \*Byrd and

Henderson with \*Lightbody.

But if Marquise had any knowledge of this backstory of the chip, he might have confused the origin of it in Langley and inadvertently blurted out the truth. I think it unlikely that \*Byrd brought the chip with him to the US, though it was almost certainly in RARDE's possession, as it would have been against RARDE rules and a serious disciplinary matter, and \*Byrd was a man who had to keep his nose very, very clean.

### **And they continue**

But Marquise has continued to maintain in Professor Black's blog that the chip crossed the Atlantic. It **originally** did of course, having been cut up in Langley, having been obtained from Lumpert before arriving at the strange meeting at RARDE. I think we must take Mr Henderson's statement at face value (or it is a blatant lie) value to the extent he didn't take it across the Atlantic, and didn't know it was being taken. It wouldn't have been in his control anyway but RARDE's so the obvious carrier would have been \*Byrd. Until that gentleman decides to end his self-imposed silence, we are not going to be any wiser.

If anyone says but this is too far-fetched, I think you're wrong. If you think the PT 35 is a corrupt piece of evidence you've got to come up with a hypothesis that explains the corruption and not simply repeat the tired old and ill-fitting story that is.

You must explain and simplify apparent complexity and difficulties until you have a sensible straightforward story that in time can be put to the parties involved.

Mr Ben Areyeh at this point claims in Professor Black's blog that Mr \*Lightbody said the fragments of circuit board had never left the mainland of the UK and when challenged on this he had shrugged his shoulders. If Professor \*Byrd had brought them to the US, perhaps, for some reason he did not show them to \*Lightbody, but then why bring them? I think we can be certain Mr Henderson had nothing whatsoever to do with their transport, even if he might not have known what \*Byrd was bringing them. They material was at that point surely in \*Byrd's custody at RARDE, not the Scottish Police's.

Marquise qualifies his story and says \*Byrd bought the circuit board to the US and distinguishes the chip from the circuit board, which are indeed two different kettles.

But the complexities of the chip story between members of the same investigation team are beginning to look like what a prosecution in court would claim amongst defendants was a inability to tell the truth.

### **DCI Williamson receives a photograph**

Very little happens; but on 15 September 1989 DCI Williamson receives photo of a metal part of label 168 for identification from \*Byrd, Mr \*Thorne's deputy (last seen by \*Thorne on 12 May 1989). \*Byrd apologises for the time it has taken to produce a Polaroid photograph for Williamson, a matter that would cause defence counsel to

look askance.

It is because of the date of this event that I think that the RARDE meeting with the CIA took place in early September, though I realise that a later date is possible, and I have not quite clarified in my mind which one is correct.

He also referred to a piece of chip, of which a photograph had been made by Professor Byrd RARDE and supplied to DCI Williamson, though it might be a separate photograph of the same element. I have decided to rely as little as possible on \*Byrd's claimed findings, as they appeared in the trial, as I believe them to be suspect, but CC Esson's statement is incontrovertible.

Another point is that the conference revealed that the Scottish Police were refusing to co-operate with the FBI. This would make their search for the origins of the chip in the photograph very difficult.

### **CIA decides to control the agenda**

My own view is that the CIA (who, of course were not at the January 1990 conference) had decided (as they often do) to raise problems at the outset, rather than allowing them to explode disastrously for their case much later. The conference comes to no overwhelmingly unexplainable conclusions (as I think the CIA hoped it would). We are well in advance of a position of where investigators will have to nail their colours to the mast of a particular theory.

### **It is early in the UTA investigation**

It is even before the point where the French have been demonstrably known to have begun seriously to speculate on a Libyan theory for UTA; it would however seem extraordinary if the French, who are not constrained to follow the 'facts on the ground' policy dictated by HOLMES, (the so-called) evidence based approach, had not put forward the possibility of Libya as the perpetrator of their tragedy at a very early date, but whether the CIA could have learned of that directly from the French inquiry or even the Congolese security services (who conducted their own inquiry), is uncertain.

### **Investigators hate to be told they are saying the obvious**

But while investigators and commentators are very willing to comment on other people's disasters in ways that the investigators are unwilling to do themselves (compare McNamara's claim that UTA was a revenge by the Libyans for having been defeated in the Aouzou strip war, and Bruguière's own comment that the downing was due to 'African reasons' in his talk to the UTA relatives in 1991), it seems quite reasonable to assume that the CIA in its analytical rôle was assessing the reasons for the disaster and concluded Libya was a possibility.

Only there was a further problem here. The CIA had packed the suitcase they had blown up with the wrong sort of Toshiba cassette recorder. They had used a white RT-8016 or RT-8026 (probably one sold in Germany or possibly the Middle East) and

the model that had been sold in Libya was the RT-SF16, which was black, a consignment of which had arrived in Libya on 11 November 1988. (No wonder the prosecution made little of the cassette's origins, but in reality it could have come from anywhere; do you really think it likely that a competent intelligence organisation charged with bringing down a jet of another country will have sourced the disguise in shops of its home country? They'll obviously go abroad.)

### **The French go to Washington**

On the 31 January 1990, the French sent letters for a *commission rogatoire* to Washington. They are answered very quickly and the commission began on 19 March 1990, continuing for an extraordinarily long 11 days. We don't know anything about what went on, whom the French met, or were allowed to meet. The commission may well have been as useful to certain US bodies as the French.

At the same time this high-level co-operation is taking place, Mr Caprioli (an UTA investigator) is given information, helpful to his inquiry, but the Sansomite report (one of the critical documents produced by the French) says:

*'neither the C.I.A. or the F.B.I. (section International Terrorism State-Sponsored) gave any elements concerning the inquiry carried out after the bombing of Pan Am 103... They indicated that only the investigating service (British Authorities) could do it.'* (Sansomite report p7 (pdf), D7541)).

The French were told they had to go the Lockerbie to the Lockerbie Investigation whose plodding computerised investigation they despised. The Juge had already been (in connection with the matter of French nations who had died on Pan Am 103 and I think it fair to say he held what he had seen of it in a fair degree of contempt. The Juge is not a fan of Scottish, British, American or what he would call Anglo-Saxon methods, which owe little to Descartes of the French school of inquiry, which he thought used far too much machinery and far too little of the 'little grey cells' for him.

The CIA were clearly wishing more to gain information than offer it. My suggestion is that they wanted to find out the French position on Libya, with regard to making a similar attribution their own disaster, and which might provide a developing scenario for Libyan attribution for Lockerbie.

This 'Sansomite' report will not be issued to Juge Bruguière until 9 March 1990 and not more widely but still internally until 4 September 1990, well after, I believe, the French investigation had decided to allocate the UTA tragedy to Libya alone, but had decided to tell the UTA relatives the Congo/Libya story on 20 September 1990. The world will only learn of it (in its full Libya alone story) when the US UTA relatives' case is brought to court in 2006.

### **Helping the Lockerbie investigators**

To assist \*Byrd and \*Lightbody to make up their minds, one or several

demonstrations were laid on by Langley of the destruction of a baggage container by an IED of about 423g of explosive in a Sansomite suitcase. The demonstration was carried out at a facility in the US and our two investigators were the principal audience. Buried away in a clothing filled suitcase, the baggage container barely moves. The CIA has been foolish enough to release the video of this incident and it is singularly unimpressive. The container, though disrupted, is scarcely destroyed. I have also seen the equivalent test of the UTA device. The disruption of the container is much greater, and you can feel that this was capable of bringing down a smaller, but unhardened, aircraft.

### **Mr Giaka**

On 18<sup>th</sup> May 1991 Mr Mueller of the FBI said that it might not be possible to progress the case and bring it to court without further evidence of what Mr Megrahi and Mr Fhimah were up to in Libya. Almost no problem.

Mr Giaka was spirited from Malta aboard a US Navy ship, an operation for which the FBI had to pay, and having been debriefed was placed in a US witness protection program. It is debatable how much Mr Giaka was paid for his evidence and whether that was in advance or not. (I have considered the matter in detail and decided whether Mr Giaka were paid or not is irrelevant, given how severely the Zeist court dealt with his evidence). One wonders why Mueller, who claimed this input was necessary for a trial went to the of securing Giaka's contribution, so negligible was its impact. Was the fear really of the CIA's making, for that agency has an overweening respect for its own abilities.

### **The UTA relatives are told almost exactly two years later what happened over UT-772**

In September 1991 the UTA *partie civiles* were gathered again together in Paris by Juge Bruguiere where we learnt that four Libyan citizens were to be charged over UT-772. About two years later this was expanded to six Libyan citizens. At the second anniversary meeting the matter of Congolese involvement was dropped as the person who was probably implicated died in the UTA crash was a mule, who had unwittingly carried on board a timer device attached to a plastic explosive, pentrite which lined a suitcase. The timer was not of MEBO manufacture but Taiwanese and had been sourced through BRD not Switzerland. The quantity of explosive was 2.4 times that in the Lockerbie IED, which was Semtex.

It immediately raised for Jim Swire, me and others the question 'if a mechanism had been successfully used at Lockerbie, why go to the trouble of sourcing a different type for UTA, multiplying the possibilities of detection'.

The commercial relations between MEBO and Megrahi or the German suppliers of the UT-772 timer were in no way secret, but why increase the chances of discovery, and the risks that a further attempt wouldn't work. After all Libya had had two failed attacks on comparable UTA flights from the Congo.

This would not prevent a Mr Thomas McNamara a senior ex-SD man of claiming that the Lockerbie investigation was ahead of the UTA one. It was a difficult article to write but it made \$840M for the relatives of every US man or woman killed on UT-772, until the spoilsports in the SD decided to make them accept a rather smaller sum.

With these differences some of which I was aware of by 1991 others only coming to light in 2006, I had no difficulty in determining that both attacks could not be laid at the feet of one country, or even organisation and that Lockerbie was not a Libyan affair.

I was finally convinced Messers Fhimah and Megrahi had nothing to do with Lockerbie when C4 produced a documentary in 1999 just before the Zeist trial. Heavily reliant on what must have been the case the Crown had had to detail to the defence, it was clear that the Lockerbie investigation had been shut down in 1991 and no progress had been made in that time.

Unlike wine, criminal cases rarely improve with age.

By contrast, the French had completed their inquiry, indicting two further Libyans by 1998 and passed the investigation file to the Paris Court Parquet for prosecution in 1996.

The six Libyans were tried *in absentia* (a valid French judicial process) in 1999 and 6 guilty verdicts obtained. The penalties in all cases were *réclusion perpétuelle* (life imprisonment).

### **From a Scottish hillside to indictments**

I notice that this piece is beginning to develop so many issues that it is beginning to lose shape, for I shall try just to summarise the steps in the progress of the investigation

### **Floundering with HOLMES**

From the outset the police intended to make the inquiry evidence driven, which removed the need from police officers for intellectual thought and replaced it with a bureaucratic and computer system that recorded every action by the police and generated a huge and complex to-do list, which essentially couldn't be amended. HOLMES would nag away asking why had this man not been interviewed, that lead not followed up, until it was done.

Had for instance a Luqa issued baggage tag ever been identified on the ground HOLMES would have found it. Henderson the Scottish SIO was convinced that just such a clue would be brought in by "his lads and lasses", which in his rather infantilising way, he regarded his officers.

But as we've seen the evidence you'd possibly expect was never there, and what was to be regarded as evidence was either dumped at the crash site by the CIA or

evidence which changed its nature in the RARDE laboratories.

### The stages

Having shaken the dust from their feet and returning to plotting in Langley, the CIA washed its hands of Lockerbie, or seemed to.

Having taken 120 pages to get even to the start of the investigation, and I wanted to finish in 100, I shall deal with the investigation and its betrayal quite shortly.

The betrayal is quite simple. The Lockerbie Investigation which I think the CIA followed carefully from the JIG, began its hopeless task of feeding data into the insatiable HOLMES, which obediently built up an agenda.

By April 1989 the blown up suitcase had been discovered and I believe the AAIB's real hunch that it was a stuck on device. Hence, the curious Channon statement, which senior members of the Government were not happy with, as revealing too much.

The Toshiba chip finding, which became PT 35 is dated to 13<sup>th</sup> January 1989 before Bollier's alleged visit to the US Embassy, Vienna, but after it in actuality.

The evidence was actually manufactured in RARDE sometime before 10 January 1990, when it became known to the FBI. I think probably took place in the last three months of 1989 during the period of Mr Leppard's *Sunday Times* articles or just fits in with \*Byrd's note to Williamson .

Mr Gauci studiously avoids identifying anyone through this period, except Mr Talib, whose picture he has seen in the *Sunday Times* Leppard articles. By the date this becomes known, the CIA is not interested in a PFLP GC theory and it's gunning for Megrahi and Libya.

The latest possible date for the abandonment of PFLP GC theory is the date of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, although the CIA had been warning the White House about Iraq since September 1989

### A useful exercise

A useful exercise is to look at all the places the IED could have been put. Only two of them can have a Libyan implication and not if stuck to AVE4041 PA

### Possible location of the IED in Pan Am 103

Location of device	Attached to hull outside	Attached to hull on inside	Between hull and baggage container	Attached baggage container on outside	Attached to baggage container on the inside	Inside the baggage container, not in suitcase	In suitcase
Suggested by	No-one	Bollier	defence counsel on occasion	No-one	Me	No one	Default assumption since FAI
Mach stem	No	Possible	Possible	Not mentioned	Not mentioned	Possible	Possible

evidence	comments on					Initial prosecution position	Initial prosecution position
Damage to container . Hole must go from inside to outside	Not possible	Not possible	Not possible	Not mentioned but probably not possible	Not mentioned but possible	Possible	Possible
Damage to hull. Hole must go from inside to outside	Not possible	Possible	Possible	Possible	Possible	Possible	Possible
Could Libya do it with a bag bomb	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Inference of broken padlock	Explainable	Explainable	Explainable	Explainable	Explainable	Inexplicable	Inexplicable
Conclusion	None	None	None	None	Iran	Iran,Libya or other	Iran, Libya or other

None of the parties could have had anything to with with a second device (not IED) as I've argued here on board the *Maid*. Only the CIA could have done that.

### Summary of the destructive events.

In fact the IED stuck on AVE4041 PA on its own was sufficient to bring down the *Maid*, for the front and cockpit were torn off the aircraft, but the CIA was not certain it would be (their model was TWA 840, flying at 11,000' and not 31,000') and so they arranged for a second blast that broke up the aircraft. That had to be portrayed to AAIB as an accident, and AAIB accepted that.

That meant the body of the *Maid* crashed over Lockerbie and if the second explosion had not happened 11 people who were killed would have lived.

### Writing this piece

When I began this piece, I set myself a target that it would be less than 100 pages.

There are so many other points I could raise:

- from the highly prejudicial behaviour of the judges at the Zeist trial and appeal
- to the relative incompetence of the defendants' counsel, especially Mr Taylor, and the complete incompetence of Mr Megrahi's current one
- the *idée fixé* of the suitcase case, which came from the FAI and was gently insinuated at the Zeist trial, but never proven beyond doubt
- the lack of a proper jury trial at Zeist
- the complete invisible nature of Iran Air, who facilities adjoined Pan Am's at Heathrow so that the good Ayatollah Khomeini's portrait hung glowering over Christian, hegemonist, capitalist and sinful excess

- a full account of the AAIB report's omissions
- a detailed account of the UK Government's toadying during the Reagan years
- a longer account of the UTA criminal trial as revealed in the case papers put into English
- The lack of good science at RARDE the result of a stupid decision to place a forensic laboratory in a munitions factory
- especially the failure to produce a map of the location of the major pieces of the downed *Maid* by AAIB
- the decision of Mrs Thatcher to ignore Lockerbie in one single and erroneous phrase in her autobiography
- the pathetic attempts of the pathologist Basutil to explain the break up of bodies near Sherwood Crescent as due to 'air-friction'
- The falling out of the FBI and the CIA in late 1990
- A more exact account of the dealings between the Scots, the French and the Americans during their two respective investigations
- The strange case of the falling out of the FBI and the Scottish police late in the day over various interviews with shady Middle Eastern types
- Mr Lumpert's confession that he had given a person he thought was a CIA man a copy of the MEBO chip, (which became PT 35)
- What a member of the Mr Bush's presidential commission actually told Mr Cadman, and what he knew, which I believe not much
- An account of why UFOs are completely and utterly wrong
- The failure of the international community to rise up and condemn the whole Lockerbie process
- The whole development of the UTA case and how different it is to Lockerbie, when essentially they are claiming to go for the same organisation
- especially Mr Thomas McNamara's singular contribution to the UTA civil case in the US Federal Courts
- Particularly important is the trip by the Juge to Washington in late 1990 after which the CIA fully developed its Libyan theory
- The failure of the UK or the US press or media to have covered my concerns through the years. (Are they all in the pay of the CIA?)
- Any reasonably full account of the compensation quantums and processes in each of the three disasters, which I have done
- The US compensation court processes
- I just want to hint at the depth in way I have tried to look at Lockerbie, which I don't think anyone else has had the stomach to, or needed to

### **Tips for anyone who wants to become an investigator into the CIA**

The first thing to remember is that the CIA implicitly believes its own propaganda. Do not tell such a man, for example that the downing of the *Vincennes* was in any way deliberate, for he believes it's an accident.

Next, the presence of either too many or no CIA men is a tell-tale something's up. Both circumstances happened at Lockerbie.

If a senior police official says there weren't any CIA (even if in disguise as Pan Am engineers), be suspicious, but if a respectable on the ground journalist does, trust him.

The CIA likes over-complicated or over-engineered solutions; they are not necessarily complex.

The CIA does not go in for ambiguity, nuance and dissimulation much. There is no-one of the moral ambiguity or complexity of Kim Philby here, who became committed as a very young man in Austria in the 1930s to the anti-fascist cause (which, at the time, meant the Communists); then became a fascist journalist disguising his true colours, got a job with SOE, then the FO and finally MI6. He was gradually outed, the CIA refusing to work with him and making him virtually p.n.g., perhaps because he said outrageously provocative things in his cups, which would alarm straight laced 1950s CIA officers, but be treated as an endearing little quirk (of that's the 'just so Kim' kind) in London. Eventually he did a runner and was found to have betrayed every important British asset to the Soviet Union since the beginning of WWII. He ran foul of Soviets over ingenuity, for Stalin had believed he must be a triple spy.

There is nothing of this in Lockerbie. It was over-complicated and unnecessary to hold a second explosion on the *Maid* as we have seen, but the CIA with a lot of effort managed to hide that. But it would all have seemed effortless if the CIA had been allowed to use London or Frankfurt. The failure to square BSS or BND meant that neither Heathrow nor Frankfurt could be used and the kludge of the blown suitcase came into its own, and then fortuitously allowed an attribution to Libya.

Had it not been decided to use a 'clue' for a plot directed at Libya later, all would have been well, for HOLMES would have turned up nothing of significance from the Scottish mud.

But such a (false) clue did turn up and became known in 1990. Why the CIA decided to make it Libya is uncertain, except for the 1st Gulf War, and there was no other credible alternative. It was difficult to redirect the meaning of the blown up suitcase and a number of awkward facts had to be squared like the colour of and number of speakers in a Toshiba cassette recorder. Libya was indeed well away from Syria, the PFLP GC and Iran. The pay-off would be high.

So it was worth implicating Libya. The clues were poor, damagingly poor, and the CIA had to come out of the cold to supervise the debriefing of Giaka. It was the first time they had broken cover since the crash.

Lockerbie was also costing. \*Hantzau makes much of the Agency's financial woes, so reusing the *Maid* incident to implicate Libya might have been an economy measure.

We then get into the more standard parts of the battery of techniques used to pollute the development of a story.

They planted newspaper articles, and the CIA's contact book is deep is one. But if a planted story does not have a counterpart development in the investigation story, and Marquise the SIO reads about a particular development in the investigation for the first time in a Swiss newspaper, one can be certain that the CIA's fiction factory has been up to no good, once the obvious point of whether the FBI or the Scots leaked (which they didn't except through the JIG) is solved. The internet makes the exposure of these machinations trivially easy.

### **Some thanks and thoughts**

We must thank Marquise for his blow by blow account of the investigation, though he might have been astonished that anyone could read it quite so assiduously as I have. The trouble is, the CIA uses the same tactic again and again and again; Swiss, French, American and British newspapers. The journalists are of course unwilling to say they have been dining at the Agency's expense, and I expect the cost was little more than that of a decent meal.

To Mr Crawford, Mr Johnstone, Mr Carroll and others mentioned in the text. To Mr Charles, whom I have had the privilege of meeting. To my various critics, some mentioned by name, some anonymous, who have enabled me to hone the story, a story which still today needs work.

Beware of Greeks bringing gifts. Nobody has paid me anything over my work.

Beware of legislative changes which improve the chance of court cases retrospectively.

Perhaps that would not have been fatal, if the accusation had been allowed to die after the indictments had been made, but by allowing the relatives the possibility of compensation, by passing three Acts of Congress to encourage them to do so made it inevitable there would be a trial.

A supine Scottish court, deprived of the usual checks of a jury and a hanging judge, what more can be said, all conducted in private in a US airfield in a small country far away. There was no TV coverage.

A fairly incompetent defence, highly fragmented and focussed evidence of which it is impossible to gain an overview, and opaque and legalistic means of procedure, where the principals appear to be ignorant of the basic matters of legal proof.

Pathetic.

### **The CIA continues to trip itself up**

Having won, the CIA still can't shut up.

It is not possible for a protagonist to say (as \*Hantzau did) in 2002 and then again in

2008 - but oh! It might not be Libya. Once a prosecutor (and the CIA is) had backed an attribution it is necessarily stuck with that story.

**It cannot be rewritten. Else it becomes inconsistent. Henderson, the Scottish SIO, realised and realises that. We don't know his real opinions, but he will have to go to his death believing Mr Megrahi did it. Or he is blown.**

The road to hell is paved with good intentions; *Hand-Book of Proverbs*, H. G. Bohn, 514, 1855

## **My reasons**

### **My reason for having undertaken this investigation**

***My single most compelling reason for having wasted so much time over this matter is: I do not want the Libyan Government turning round after the current Lockerbie attribution has died in flames, its protagonists investigated, prosecuted and jailed for perjury, conspiracy to murder and murder, saying but we didn't do UT-772 either.***

They did. Please refer to the issues that connect Libya with UTA at the top of this document.

### **What I am willing to do**

I am willing to assist a properly constituted inquiry into the Lockerbie fiasco. By that I mean, I shall not agree to any of its findings except on the terms that I've espoused here, that I roll my own, and come to my own conclusions.

I hope to be able to put this matter aside once I see a full public inquiry, in which nothing is held back, and those investigated and required to attend, and give full account of their doings under the threat of contempt, the maximum penalty for which is detention for full life (a whole life term).

And those who are found to have done wrong by such public hearing should be prosecuted with the full force of the law.

At the same time if the US authorities are courageous enough to bring a murder case against these rogues, I should oppose any intent to seek the death penalty as I am utterly opposed to it.

I hope I shall not be put to the recourse of having to support a campaign for the life of Mr Tomas \*Cattermole, Mr Rupert \*Hantzau and the like.

### **A final plea**

Please don't think that the concerns I have raised are antique, old hat, have been answered before, dealt with by the trial, appeals or whatever. As late as 16<sup>th</sup> July

2009, I teased out a small discrepancy in a book with a friend that suggests, (by his own admission) that one man mentioned in this letter is guilty of murder. And if this issue cannot be taken up by you, I can assure you that it will be with me as long as I can live.

## Envoi

In writing this which I am hoping to be with increasing confidence my approaching final views on Lockerbie, I suddenly became aware in a previous iteration of my theory in the power of writing it as fiction. Fiction is anathema to me and for every twenty books of fact, I read one of fiction. The nearest I ever get to it is reading lightly fictionalised biographies like Orwell's *Down and out in Paris and London*. Writing the stuff is even more difficult.

But for the first time ever because it was necessary to portray characters who don't talk and never will, they had to be portrayed as ciphers of their organisations to stand in for real voices in an actual dialogue between the parties which must have begun shortly before 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988 and ended a very short time after, but the consequences of those dialogues would take some months to be resolved. It was probably MI5 that lit upon the vulnerability of Professor \*Byrd and Mr \*Thorne, because MI5 would have had most to do with them over the Maguire affair and those two gents would be essential to the plot to lead to Bollier and Megrahi. (These processes are still working at this moment. Until I had written that last sentence I had thought it would have been a MI6 man who handled the delicate negotiations of subverting the two gents, but MI5 is much more probable because of the Maguire case). Fantasy perhaps, but more compelling than saying I can prove that the shirt collar came from a different sized shirt and leaving it at that. If that's all that's done we just stand there staring at the impossibility for years until it evaporates in another round of 'appeal innuendo'.

Another little anecdote which has worked subliminally on me is a story my mother told of the daughter of one of her friends, a withdrawn and uncommunicative teenager, with whom she had had to endure a Mediterranean holiday, who had remained silent until she had reproduced in perfect detail the facts of the Darnley plot from a novel, probably *The Royal Road to Fotheringay*, by Jean Plaidy. She could have told the story as if it had come out of the history GCSE syllabus, (as I would have done), but it was only by having the proponents fictionalised as actors, that the story made any sense to her. Aged seven, I was taken by that generous lady to the Mint (the one in London, not the hole in Wales) followed by lunch at the Great Eastern Hotel, Liverpool Street Station, for I was the best friend of one of her nephews. I can still remember the fish and chips.

My second anecdote is about one of the best local histories, about Kentish Town in London, ever written, Gillian Tindall's *The Fields Beneath*. Tindall, also a novelist, achieved a remarkable success. The less evidence she had, the better the story got. 'Follow with me she would say, to the backs of the gardens in Montpelier Grove, for there lies a line of scraggly sycamores, which was a field boundary once'. And a field boundary map of KT popped out from hundred and fifty year old brick terraces.

My third anecdote is from Imre Lakatos', book *Proofs and Refutations* which is about a fictional dialogue set in a mathematics class. The students attempt to prove the formula for the Euler characteristic in algebraic topology, one bright spark attempting to prove Archimedes theorem by making hundreds of small models of the gold brick Archimedes was attempting to find the density of, which he did simply by sitting in a bath full of water and seeing what he had displaced. The dialogue is meant to be the actual the attempted proofs which mathematicians throughout history offered for the conjecture, which are repeatedly refuted by counterexamples. Often the students quote famous mathematicians.

A sub-text of Lakatos' ideas is that story-telling is a way of arriving a truths impossible to achieve by other means.

I tried the fictional approach for the first time only on iteration 4 of this story. But I was acutely aware of the CIA's debt to G K Chesterton, from quite early on. Chesterton is a much more satisfying writer than Doyle and psychologically compelling in a way Doyle is not. I count the plots of three Father Brown stories in Lockerbie: *The Honour of Israel Gow*, *The Twelve True Fishermen* and *The Sign of the Broken Sword*. Can anyone find more?

## **Private information**

Only four facts, in any sense, have been privately made to me: two from the Juge in front of over 200 witnesses; Mike Charles reference on the size of the Lockerbie device, though there was a widespread rumour that it was 1lb; and, Bollier's statement on the date he went to the US Embassy, Vienna.

All other information is in the public domain.

## **Conclusion**

**Several retired CIA agents must be charged for their wrongdoings and tried. They and other senior US Government individuals face long sentences. Ex President George Bush senior is amongst them. But \*Cattermole and, especially, \*Hantzau face charges of the most serious kind.**

Libya must be re-compensated, which must be done at Government, and not victims' relatives level. (I have a complicated set of proposals to achieve this).

A huge apology must be made to the UK Government, the Scottish Courts, the relatives of 103, and compensation paid for wasting so much of their time by the US Government.

The culpability of various British agents and civil servants needs to be inquired into.

But I am not in favour, as some observers are of throwing the book at them. The major culpability lies with the CIA and its officials.

The staff and stockholders of Pan Am must be compensated.

The CIA requires abolition or the most thoroughgoing reform and must stop its dirty tricks.

Action against the Iranian who planted the Lockerbie IED must begin. The CIA certainly knows who he is.

Charles Norrie

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[CBNorrie@hotmail.com](mailto:CBNorrie@hotmail.com), brother of Tony Norrie, (31<sup>st</sup> March 1953 - 19<sup>th</sup> September 1989), who died on UT-772, Niger