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### Intelligence and disinformation in World War II and the early Cold War 1943-48: Stachowiak alias Drauschke alias Donoa, his intelligence activities in Sweden and Denmark, and the Raoul Wallenberg case

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## Intelligence and disinformation in World War II and the early Cold War 1943–48: Stachowiak alias Drauschke alias Donoa, his intelligence activities in Sweden and Denmark, and the Raoul Wallenberg case

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In September 1943, a Polish citizen Mieczyslaw Stachowiak, assigned with the German Wehrmacht's *Organisation Todt* to Norway, left his detachment and escaped to Sweden. In the following two years he maintained contacts with no less than five diplomatic missions in Sweden – Britain, Germany, Japan, Spain and the United States – and provided them with false intelligence in return for money. In May 1945, after having tried to trick the Japanese mission in Stockholm to believe that he was a defected Soviet agent operating in Sweden under the false cover of a US citizen, Henri Brunso Donoa, while simultaneously trying to have the Americans and British to believe that he had been assigned by the Japanese for an intelligence mission in the US, he was arrested by the Swedish police on charges of illegal intelligence activities and was deported later. After two years – in October 1947 – he turned up at the Swedish diplomatic mission in Warsaw claiming that the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who had been arrested by the Soviets in January 1945 in Budapest, had managed to escape his Soviet guards and was staying with Polish partisans in southeast Poland. This article describes Stachowiak's intelligence activities, the diplomatic missions and the Swedish police efforts to investigate his disinformation and discusses whether he acted on orders from Moscow when approaching the Swedes regarding Wallenberg.

**Keywords:** intelligence; disinformation; World War II; Sweden; Raoul Wallenberg; Stachowiak

### Introduction

States are by no means strangers to the use of disinformation for disorienting their adversaries and furthering their goals, either openly through media or through more discrete channels; purportedly trustworthy people with the knowledge, means and ties to get the message through.<sup>1</sup> Intelligence analysts, agents and diplomats at the receiving end are faced with the complex task of distinguishing between what is true and what is fabricated information aimed at laying false trails. At times, however, intelligence

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<sup>1</sup>On the study of disinformation, see for example Ladislav Bittman, *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation. An Insider's View* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985); Victor Zaslavsky, *Class Cleansing. The Massacre at Katyn* (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2008); and Thomas Boghardt, "Operation Infektion: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and its AIDS Disinformation Campaign," *Studies in Intelligence*, 53, no. 4 (December 2009): 1–24.

organizations and foreign services are targeted by private individuals whose objectives may at times correspond to those of the states but might also have more mundane motivations, such as desire for money, the excitement of being initiated in the secret world of espionage, to find an escape out of a totalitarian country, or simply to survive. The extent to which fraud distracts and disrupts the work of intelligence organizations remains largely unknown.

This article addresses a topic that lies in the borderland between criminology and intelligence studies; the repeated and partly successful attempts of an individual – the Polish citizen Mieczyslaw Stachowiak – in 1943–48 to acquire money and secret assignments by providing false intelligence to five foreign diplomatic missions in Sweden and the Swedish legations in Prague and Warsaw. This intelligence encompassed *inter alia* claims regarding Polish anti-German espionage activities, a secret Soviet espionage mission to the US, Soviet military support to adversaries of the Franco regime in Spain and information on the whereabouts of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who had disappeared under mysterious circumstances in Budapest in January 1945. The article also addresses the way in which “the street-level bureaucrats”, to paraphrase Michael Lipsky’s classic study<sup>2</sup> of intelligence organizations, and the Swedish police investigated Stachowiak’s activities and disinformation.

### Stachowiak alias Iriczenko and the Raoul Wallenberg case 1947–48

In June 1944 the Swedish and US governments agreed to dispatch the businessman Raoul Wallenberg, endowed with a Swedish diplomatic passport, to Budapest, Hungary, to report on the persecutions of the Jews and try to save as many as possible from the death trains to the Nazi extermination camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Half a year later in the wake of the Soviet capture of the eastern half of the Hungarian capital, Pest, Wallenberg was arrested by the Soviet military counterintelligence organization, *Death to the spies, SMERSH*, was brought to Moscow and incarcerated in the Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons. The motives behind his arrest, his tenure in Soviet custody as well as his eventual fate, remain largely unclear.<sup>3</sup>

The Swedish foreign ministry (Utrikesdepartementet, UD) was unaware of Wallenberg’s fate after 17 January 1945, when he was last seen by his staffers. UD received a note signed by the deputy commissar for foreign affairs Vladimir G.

<sup>2</sup>Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980, 2010).

<sup>3</sup>The Soviet and Swedish handling of Raoul Wallenberg has *inter alia* been addressed in Helene Carlbäck-Isotalo, “Glasnost and the Opening up of Soviet Archives. Time to Conclude the Raoul Wallenberg Case?” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 17 (1992): 175–207; Susanne Berger, *Swedish Aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg Case*, unpublished report, 2001 and *Stuck in Neutral: The Reasons Behind Sweden’s Passivity in the Raoul Wallenberg Case*, unpublished report, 2004, available online at <http://www.raoul-wallenberg.eu/articles/stuck-in-neutral-susanne-berger/> (accessed June 15, 2014); and Johan Matz, “Analogical Reasoning and the Diplomacy of the Raoul Wallenberg Case 1945-7,” *International History Review*, doi:10.1080/07075332.2014.918556. In 1991, the Russian and Swedish governments agreed to establish a working group consisting of Russian and Swedish diplomats, archivists and international experts to investigate the case in full. Ten years later, the Swedish part of the working group presented its report *Raoul Wallenberg: Redovisning från den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen*, Aktstycken utgivna av Utrikesdepartementet, ny serie, UD II:52, (Stockholm, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). See also the report of the Commission on the Swedish government’s handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case (the Eliasson-Commission), *Ett diplomatiskt misslyckande, (A failure of diplomacy)*, Statens offentliga utredningar (i.e. public inquiries) (SOU) 2003:18, (Stockholm: Elanders gotab, 2003).

Dekanozov on 16 January saying that Wallenberg had been found by Soviet troops in Budapest and taken under their protection.<sup>4</sup> From this point onwards however, the Soviets stonewalled whenever the Swedes brought the matter up. Only two and a half years later, in August 1947, did they reply through a note signed by deputy foreign minister Andrei Vyshinskii, according to which Wallenberg had been found by Soviet troops in Budapest but later went missing and was believed dead either due to a hostile aerial attack or murdered by adherents of the Hungarian fascists, *the Arrow Cross*.<sup>5</sup> The political controversy, in particular after November 1946, surrounding the Swedish government's feeble efforts to investigate his fate generated public interest and, partly as a result of that, a large number of witnesses who claimed to have heard of Wallenberg, or even seen him with their own eyes, at different places in Russia, Hungary and its neighboring countries. In the years from 1945 until the first Swedish demand for Wallenberg's release before the Soviet government in February 1952, these witnesses numbered well over fifty.

Although some of them were able to provide Swedish authorities with authentic information regarding Wallenberg's fate, the overwhelming majority provided either information that was so fragmentary that it was of limited value or simply flawed. It has been suggested that some of these witnesses were acting on orders from Soviet intelligence, knowingly providing the Swedes with disinformation with the aim of diverting their attention away from Moscow.<sup>6</sup> While there is no doubt that the Soviets presented disinformation regarding Wallenberg's whereabouts – the Vyshinskii note being the prime example – it is still far from clear who, if any, of the many witnesses that came forward in these years were actually working on instructions from Moscow, i.e. as part(s) of a possible Soviet *campaign* of disinformation.

In his major 1952 analysis of all witness accounts, the Swedish diplomat and chief responsible for the Wallenberg case at the UD, Stig Engfeldt, concluded that one of the informants, the Polish citizen Mieczyslaw Stachowiak, 'was undoubtedly engaged with secret Soviet intelligence, although there may be some hesitancy as to whether he was acting on orders from the Russians or not'.<sup>7</sup> Engfeldt was arguably in a good position to assess Stachowiak as he had himself met with him on a number of occasions four years earlier, March 1948 in Prague, Czechoslovakia, where Engfeldt was stationed as secretary at the Swedish diplomatic mission. Stachowiak had presented himself as a captain of the NKVD<sup>8</sup> in-charge of interrogating arrested Russian,

<sup>4</sup>Dekanozov's note is filed in the archive of the Russian foreign ministry (Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi federatsii, AVPRF), f. 0140, op. 30, d. 10, p. 129, l. 1.

<sup>5</sup>The note of Vyshinski was handed over to the Swedish envoy in Moscow, Rolf Sohlman, on 18 August 1947. See Riksarkivet (The Swedish National Archive, hereafter given as RA.) Utrikesdepartementet (The Swedish Foreign Ministry, hereafter given as UD.), the Raoul Wallenberg file (hereafter given as P 2 EuI), cable nr. 179, 19 August 1947.

<sup>6</sup>See for example Berndt Schiller, *Varför ryssarna tog Raoul Wallenberg* (Stockholm, Natur och kultur, 1991), 151–4; Kristian Gerner, "Fallet Raoul Wallenberg, Vilmos Böhm och Stalin," *Historieläroarnas förenings årskrift* (2005): 68–77; and the Eliasson Commission's report, 248–50.

<sup>7</sup>"P.M. angående Raoul Wallenberg," RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 30 January 1952. In March 1951, the Austrian émigré author Rudolph Philipp – whose 1946 biography on Wallenberg had contributed to turn his case into a politically sensitive issue – in a talk with the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Arne S. Lundberg held that Stachowiak had been assigned by the Soviets to compromise Swedish authorities. See "P.M. rörande samtal med Philipp den 18 mars 1951," memo by Lundberg in RA. UD. P 2 EuI.

<sup>8</sup>Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennykh del (NKVD), i.e. the Soviet People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, under which served the police and the secret police.

Polish and Ukrainian partisans and claimed to have recognized Wallenberg in a Czech prison and even talked to him. Wallenberg had, Stachowiak told, managed to escape his Russian guards somewhere in central Russia, joined with partisans in southwestern Ukraine and together with them crossed the border to Czechoslovakia where he had again been arrested and imprisoned, this time by the Czech secret police. The Russians had no knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts and the Czechs were unaware of his true identity. Stachowiak now offered to bring Wallenberg to the Swedish mission in return for a Swedish entry visa.<sup>9</sup> Stachowiak had also, Engfeldt reported, said that he had stayed in Sweden for a period in 1945 under the cover 'Henri Bromson or Donow or Donau'. He had been arrested on charges of illegal intelligence activities and deported after a two and half months' imprisonment:

During this stay in Sweden [he] had served as contact between Swedish, communist spies and the Russian legation. He had however himself not been actively engaged in any espionage activities. He was well acquainted with the Soviet-Russian espionage network in Sweden and possessed information of a military nature, in particular concerning Russian espionage on Sweden's military defense. He was willing to share this information with the Swedish authorities after his arrival in Sweden, but only if promised that he would not risk being extradited to Russia or any other power.<sup>10</sup>

This was however not the first time that Stachowiak had contacted a Swedish diplomatic mission claiming to have information about Wallenberg. About half a year earlier, on 22 October 1947, Tage Persson-Hörving, a member of the Swedish relief organization *Europahjälpen* in the city Poznan in Poland had been approached by a man who first presented himself as Stachowiak from the city of Inowroclaw, just to immediately confide that his real name was Irieczenko and that he was of Ukrainian origin, a member of the Polish underground army operating around the city of Przemysl by the southeastern border of Poland, and that two Swedish citizens, both in a bad state, had been found by the partisans and were now in their camp. One of the Swedes had served as minister at the Swedish diplomatic mission in Budapest during the war. He was seriously wounded from gunshots – two of his ribs had been shot out and he was suffering from a high fever.<sup>11</sup> He was in need of urgent help if his life was to be saved;

Who is this minister [Persson-Hörving] asked. Is it Raoul Wallenberg? Yes [Stachowiak] said. It is Raoul Wallenberg! How do you know it is he, I remarked. He is tall, meager, dark and besides I have had a lot to do with Wallenberg in Budapest during the war and I know him very well. [Stachowiak] said he had been enrolled with the German army in Hungary and described how he had helped Wallenberg to save Jews from the prisoner camps [...]. On my question how Wallenberg had ended up in their camp he said that a train transporting prisoners had collided somewhere in Russian Ukraine. In the chaos following the collision Wallenberg and the other Swede [...] had managed to escape from the scene.<sup>12</sup>

A few days later in Warsaw, in a talk with Counsellor Erik Kronvall of the Swedish diplomatic mission, Irieczenko/Stachowiak confirmed that the minister in question was

<sup>9</sup>Letter from Engfeldt, nr. 127, RA. UD, P 2 EuI, 21 April 1948.

<sup>10</sup>“P.M.” by Engfeldt, RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 19 April 1948.

<sup>11</sup>Hans Ehrenstråle and his wife Britt have described their trip to Przemysl with Stachowiak in their book *Sju dagar i oktober 1947* (Uppsala: Brombergs, 1980).

<sup>12</sup>“Hur vi sökte Raoul Wallenberg i Polen. Reseberättelse av Tage Persson-Hörving, Poznan, Polen, Oktober 1947,” in P 2 EuI, 15 November 1947.

Wallenberg and that the partisans had found him in the woods in southern Poland. The partisans were willing to hand over Wallenberg in return for a Swedish transit visa for Irieczenko and the leader of the partisans to the United States.<sup>13</sup> The next day Person-Hörving and Irieczenko together with the head of the *Europahjälpen*, Major Hans Ehrenstråle, travelled to Przemysl to try to locate Wallenberg but once there, Irieczenko suddenly admitted that Wallenberg was in fact held by a rival Polish underground movement, *the Armia Krajowa* (A.K.),<sup>14</sup> who intended to use Wallenberg for their own purposes (to establish contact with ‘Wallenberg’s American friends’ and get money from them). Irieczenko/Stachowiak also suddenly proved to speak fluent Swedish and admitted to having spent time in Sweden during the war as a refugee.<sup>15</sup>

While Ehrenstråle in his report to UD noted that Irieczenko/Stachowiak was in some way connected to German espionage in Sweden during the war and that he may well be a fraud or an agent assigned to disorient the Swedes, he also held that there may after all be some truth to his account and that Wallenberg was indeed held by some Polish guerilla movement around Przemysl.<sup>16</sup> On 2 December, the Swedish mission in Warsaw reported to UD that the informant had identified himself under the names Irieczenko and Stachowiak and that he had stayed in Sweden during the war.<sup>17</sup> UD’s bureaucracy quickly began investigating the matter and requested information from the governmental authority responsible for residence permits for refugees in Sweden, the *Aliens Appeal Board*, on Stachowiak.<sup>18</sup> A few days later, the Board responded that there was indeed a file on a Polish citizen by this name in its archive.<sup>19</sup> Having looked into a summary of his case, which *inter alia* specified that he had been charged in May 1945 with illegal intelligence activities in Sweden and deported later that year, the head of UD’s Political Department, Sven Grafström, instructed the Swedish minister in Warsaw, Claes Westring, that Irieczenko/Stachowiak was a fraud and that his story on Wallenberg was most likely made up.<sup>20</sup> All contacts with Stachowiak were subsequently halted.

When Engfeldt in April 1948 reported on his mysterious contact in Prague, UD warned of the Warsaw mission’s informant, i.e. ‘Stachowiak alias Irieczenko’, saying that he ‘is a scoundrel who should be avoided’.<sup>21</sup> Although Engfeldt confirmed that it was indeed Stachowiak who had turned up in Prague, he nonetheless maintained contacts with him for some time before finally concluding that the man ‘was an unscrupulous impostor who also seems to suffer from, I would even say a pathological, need to assert himself and play the leading role in a drama – not so important which’.<sup>22</sup> Engfeldt seems nonetheless to have been genuinely unsure over what

<sup>13</sup>Memo by Petri, 6 November 1947 in P 2 EuI.

<sup>14</sup>The *Armia Krajowa*, the Polish underground army fighting the German occupation, was formed in 1942 and disbanded in 1945, although several members stayed in the ranks fighting the Soviet occupants for several years, up to the 1950’s and even the 1960’s.

<sup>15</sup>Britt Ehrnestråle claims in her account to have been brought to the partisan camp where she had seen a wounded man who she believed to be Wallenberg. See Ehrenstråle, 100–10.

<sup>16</sup>Letter from Ehrenstråle to Westring, nr. 41, P 2 EuI, 21 November 1947.

<sup>17</sup>Cable from Kronvall to UD, nr. 80, P 2 EuI, 2 December 1947.

<sup>18</sup>Letter from Petri to the *Aliens Appeals Board* (hereafter given as AAB), nr. 867, P 2 EuI, 3 December 1947.

<sup>19</sup>Letter from R. Hansen of AAB, P 2 EuI, 16 December 1947.

<sup>20</sup>Letter from Grafström to Westring, nr. 1750, P 2 EuI, 16 December 1947.

<sup>21</sup>Cable from Stockholm, nr. 32, P 2 EuI, 26 April 1948.

<sup>22</sup>Letter from Engfeldt to Anger, P 2 EuI, 14 May 1948.

conclusions to draw from his contacts with Stachowiak. When reflecting over the episode in a memo to UD a year later, Engfeldt noted that ‘no matter how unlikely it may seem, several circumstances seemed to support the assumption that [Stachowiak’s] information actually had some basis in reality’. In support of his statement, Engfeldt noted that Stachowiak ‘displayed serious concerns and fear that his contacts with the Swedes should be revealed by his employer (the NKVD)’. Moreover;

[Stachowiak] was extremely well informed about the secret international communist activities. He delivered, from what I got to know from the Greek chargé d’affaires, some highly interesting intelligence regarding the activities of the Greek partisans. Since the Greeks could not provide him with a safe refuge, he turned to us with his second trump card, Wallenberg. [Stachowiak] told me of secret airline traffic between Czechoslovakia and Israel, information which at that point was probably unknown but later turned out to be confirmed in full. Regarding Masaryk’s death he left no room for doubt that he had fallen prey for the hands of a murderer.<sup>23</sup>

Was Engfeldt right in his later judgment of 1952, i.e. that Stachowiak may have been assigned by the Soviets to disorient the Swedes? If so, why would the Soviets have wanted to provide the Swedes at this particular point with information that contradicted the message of the Vyshinskii note? If not, what motives lay behind Stachowiak’s approaches? This article will not provide us with altogether indisputable answers to any of these questions. Stachowiak’s possible affiliation with Soviet intelligence can only be certified or discounted once the archives of the Russian internal and foreign security services, the FSB and the SVR, are made accessible for research. Such openness seems very unlikely, at least for the time being (and most probably for the foreseeable future).<sup>24</sup> However, by looking at material on Stachowiak in Swedish archives (the archives of the *Aliens Appeals Board* and the Swedish police), this article aims to investigate in further depth Stachowiak’s intelligence related activities in Sweden and whether his personal history can offer a reasonable explanation for his appearance in the search for Wallenberg.

Aside from clarifying Stachowiak’s role in the Wallenberg case this article also addresses the more general problem of how states – through their diplomats, intelligence officials and police investigators – handle disinformation. As will be outlined below, during his tenure in Sweden, Stachowiak maintained at times rather intense contacts with several diplomatic missions and provided them with various types of wholly or partially false information. Although he was eventually exposed and deported, those targeted by Stachowiak were still, at least for some time and to some degree, disoriented by his activities. The way in which intelligence and police officials went about analyzing and (eventually) seeing through Stachowiak’s disinformation is worth looking into.

#### Four narratives on Stachowiak’s background

Who was Stachowiak? How did he end up in Sweden? Why was he deported and how can we explain his activities with regard to the Wallenberg case? As for his life before

<sup>23</sup>Engfeldt’s report in “P.M: ang. efterforskning av Raoul Wallenberg,” RA. UD, P 2 EuI, 29 April 1949. Jan Masaryk was foreign minister of the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile in London from 1940–45 and foreign minister from 1945–48 in the first post-war Czechoslovak government. He died under mysterious circumstances (he fell from a window) in March 1948, shortly after the communist coup d’état (in February 1948). His death remains unexplained.

<sup>24</sup>*Federal’noie sluzhba bezopasnosti* (FSB), *Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki* (SVR).



his arrival in Sweden in September 1943, it is a fact that we know practically nothing with certainty.<sup>25</sup> Stachowiak has provided us with four narratives that to varying degrees differ from each other: *firstly*, sometime after his arrival in Sweden he told his story before the Polish mission in Stockholm. The main tenets of this narrative appear in a letter dated 5 October 1943 from the Polish mission to the owner of the Tågerup farm in Saxtorp, Landskrona, Sten Blomberg, where Stachowiak worked for a few days in late September 1943, before he was arrested (on 2 October) and brought to Malmö (he had refused to work and showed a gun to his fellow farmhands).<sup>26</sup> *Secondly*, details of his life appear in the Swedish police interrogation with Stachowiak in connection to this incident.<sup>27</sup> *Thirdly*, in March 1945 Stachowiak was questioned by the American and British diplomatic missions in Stockholm in connection with his attempt to have the Americans issue a passport and an entry visa to the US. There are, as will be further outlined below, reasons to believe that the stories given to the British and the Americans are less trustworthy (although we could probably not dismiss them altogether).<sup>28</sup> *Fourthly*, after his arrest on 17 May 1945, the Swedish police again had him interrogated, this time in great detail (the protocol encompasses 31 pages).<sup>29</sup>

According to the version given to the Polish mission, Stachowiak, then aged twelve, fled from his hometown Inowroclaw (situated close to pre-world war II Poland's western border) shortly after the German attack on Poland in September 1939. His parents and siblings were executed by the Nazis.<sup>30</sup> He stayed for some months in the so-called *General Government* (a Nazi controlled 'colony' encompassing the regions of Warsaw, Cracow, Radom, Lublin, and after the launch of *Operation Barbarossa* in 1941, Galizia, in southeastern Poland – Inowroclaw had at this point already been incorporated into the German *Reichsgebiet*). In January 1940 he made an attempt to go to Hungary but failed, he stayed with a Catholic priest for two months before leaving for Germany (under the false identity Kozubowski). In Germany he worked in a factory in Braunschweig for some period where he caused a gas explosion as a result of which he had to escape again, ending up in Spandau close to Berlin, where he managed to acquire a new false identity, this time as the German Heinrich Drauschke. Under this identity he joined the Wehrmacht

<sup>25</sup>Stachowiak's file in the Swedish police archive is filed in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1–2, Stachowiak.

<sup>26</sup>Letter from the Polish mission to Blomberg, 5 October 1943 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1. When examined by the police the gun turned out to be a starter's gun.

<sup>27</sup>Protokoll, fört av landsfiskalsassistenten I Kävlinge distrikt vid polisförhör den 2 oktober 1943 in 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>28</sup>*Report on the interrogation of subject Mieczyslaw Stachowiak alias Henry Donoa alias Stefan Kaminski alias Michal Kaminski alias Jescik alias Drauske*, US Legation, Stockholm, 17 March 1945, in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>29</sup>Interrogation of Stachowiak in 'Rapport', nr. 673, 25 May 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>30</sup>The Nazi-German occupation of the Reichsgebiet-zones in Poland implied massive terror directed against Jews, the Polish intelligentsia and the nobility entailing the killing and imprisonment of thousands of people. The 8-9 million Poles inhabiting these areas were to be deported and make place for ethnic Germans displaced as a result of the border adjustments following from the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its additional protocol of August 1939. Stachowiak's parents and siblings may well have been victims of this campaign of Germanization, although their fate, as evident from later interrogations with Stachowiak, seems uncertain. See Allen Paul, *Katyn*, (DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press), 2010, 66.

and was dispatched by the *Organisation Todt*,<sup>31</sup> first to Jakobstad and Petsamo in Finland and then to Norway, before defecting to Sweden in September 1943. The official of the Polish mission, in his letter to Blomberg, noted that it was hard to know with any certainty how much of Stachowiak's story was true.<sup>32</sup> In a letter two years later to Swedish military intelligence, the mission noted that Stachowiak was reported to have told a Danish citizen that the story he had given to the Poles had been a complete forgery.<sup>33</sup>

In the version given to the Swedish police on 2 October 1943, Stachowiak maintained that his parents and siblings had been killed but made no mention of his escape to the General Government. Instead he had gone straight to Germany where he had worked in different factories (no mention of any gas explosion) until he was provided (by a member of the former Polish mission in Berlin) with the false identity of Drauschke. He had joined the Wehrmacht and traveled between different military installations in Russia, Finland, and lastly Norway.<sup>34</sup>

The versions given to the Americans and the British are both very different from the ones above. Here, there was no mention of any execution of his parents and siblings. He had gone from Inowroclaw together with a friend by the name of Kazubowski, first to Warsaw and then to Debica in eastern Poland where he had stolen a significant amount of watches and jewelry from a watchmaker (who was allegedly doing business with the Germans). He was later arrested by the Germans and admitted his crimes, but they offered to release him if he consented to work for the Germans. He agreed and was sent to a spy school in Bavaria and later to Norway.<sup>35</sup>

According to the 25 May 1945 interrogation, which, as mentioned, is by far the most detailed, by the time of the arrival of the Nazis in Inowroclaw, Stachowiak was already known among Germans in the city for having taken part in various anti-German activities – demonstrations, riots, etc.<sup>36</sup> In March 1940 he therefore left Inowroclaw and went to

<sup>31</sup>The *Organisation Todt*, founded in 1933 by the engineer and Nazi Fritz Todt, was a civil and military engineer organization charged with building projects both in Germany and the occupied territories. Todt died in a plane crash in 1942 and was succeeded by Albert Speer.

<sup>32</sup>Letter from the Polish mission to Blomberg, 5 October 1943 in Stachowiak's file (two volumes) in the archive of the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) (deposited in the RA), hereafter given as HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>33</sup>Letter from the Polish mission to the Swedish Defence Staff, 16 March 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1. Whether this also means that his date of birth (11 November, 1927) is false is however unclear. Although it may seem a bit unexpected that Stachowiak was only sixteen years old when arriving in Sweden in 1943, it should not be excluded that this was in fact true. He was considered young by the officials, both Swedish and foreign, that he encountered in Sweden. In the letter to Blomberg from the Polish mission, referred to above, the responsible official noted that "[Stachowiak] is very precocious probably because ever since his twelfth year he had to look after himself" (Letter from the Polish mission to Blomberg, 5 October 1943 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1). In a memo by police commissar in Malmö, C. J. Ahlstedt, of 16 February 1944, Stachowiak was referred to as "a gamine" (memo by Ahlstedt, 16 February 1944, nr. 119 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1), and in the letter from the Polish mission to the Swedish Defence Staff of 16 March 1945, the Polish official noted that the legation had tried to have Stachowiak 'put in a reformatory since he was so young and so terribly depraved' but that he had 'refused [and had gone] over to the Germans'. Letter from the Polish mission to the Swedish Defence Staff, 16 March 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>34</sup>Protokoll, fört av landsfiskalsassistenten I Kävlinge distrikt vid polisförhör den 2 oktober 1943 in 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>35</sup>*Report on the interrogation of subject Mieczyslaw Stachowiak alias Henry Donoa ...*, US Legation, Stockholm, 17 March 1945, in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>36</sup>"Rapport," no. 673, 25 May 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

Warsaw. (He made no mention here of his parents' and siblings' fate). Since the situation in Poland was gradually becoming increasingly intolerable – the Germans had started to deport great numbers of Polish men to forced labor in Germany – by October 1940 Stachowiak made, as was also stated in the interrogations above, a failed attempt to escape to Hungary (from where, he had been told, one could go anywhere in the world). He returned to Poland (living on black market trades and selling of firearms) until he, under the identity Drauschke (this time provided to him by the Polish underground movement), reported to a German employment office in Krakow, from where he was brought to work at the *Reichswerke Hermann Göring* in Germany, repairing aircraft. Tired of the constant British aerial attacks he claimed to have intoxicated himself with aniline and was subsequently released from duty and free to return to Poland where he again lived on trading black market goods. By mid-1942 he enrolled with the *Organisation Todt* and was dispatched to Finnmark in northern Norway where he worked for some time building fortifications, before being assigned to work at the military airport of Banak in Lakselv, assembling aircrafts that were brought there in parts by boat and repairing planes damaged in combat.<sup>37</sup>

#### **In Sweden September 1943–January 1944, in the service of the Germans**

By mid-1943 Stachowiak was tired of his work. He successfully simulated suffering from a sexually transmitted disease and was moved to Tromsø for two months before being rumbled and ordered to return to Lakselv. However, his written order, the *Marschpapier*, did only specify that he was to report to field post 15,006 – there was no mention of Lakselv or the Banak airport – and since the geographical location of 15,006 was unknown to most people and since German military personnel could travel for free on Norwegian railways, Stachowiak repeatedly changed the date of the *Marschpapier* and travelled around in middle and southern Norway for about one and a half months.<sup>38</sup> Since he was unwilling to return to either Lakselv or to Poland, he decided to escape to Sweden. He went by train from Oslo to the small village of Berg close to the city of Halden, which is situated immediately north of Idefjorden Bay (in the middle of which runs the Norwegian-Swedish border). Following the advice of a local railway official in Berg, Stachowiak managed to cross the Idefjorden and arrived in Swedish territory on 3 September where he turned himself over to the police under his true identity, Stachowiak.<sup>39</sup>

After his arrival in Sweden, Stachowiak worked for a brief period at Tågerup, then for about a month at Björnkåbruk, Sollefteå, in northern Sweden, as a woodworker. In late November he received a permit from the authority in charge of assigning refugees to camps, work, etc. in Sweden, the *Socialstyrelsen*, to live and work in Malmö. By early December he decided, due to this precarious financial situation, to get in touch with the German consulate in Malmö and have them pay for intelligence. When meeting with the German Consul-General Eberhardt Schrott, in Gothenburg in December he told him of two Polish refugees in Sweden, Gustaf Herk and Josef Zdzistaw Häusler, who he claimed were about to go as couriers to Germany on orders of an anti-German espionage organization. In return for his account, Stachowiak was given 250 kronor.<sup>40</sup> Stachowiak

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 8. Today, June 2014, this would amount to approximately 5000 kronor or about 400 pounds (UK).

also told Schrott that the two were to apply for a German entry visa in Stockholm in the next few days. In order to alert his colleagues in Gothenburg and Stockholm, the German Vice Consul in Malmö, Theodor Muth, immediately forwarded this information to the German Consulates there.<sup>41</sup>

The story about Herk and Häusler was true insofar as the two existed and they were contemplating leaving Sweden for Germany (due to lack of money).<sup>42</sup> Stachowiak, who maintained contacts with several Poles in exile in Malmö, knew Herk and met him together with Häusler on a number of occasions throughout December 1943.<sup>43</sup> The fact that they had applied for visas sometime after Stachowiak's meeting with Schrott had obviously provided (at least) some degree of credibility to Stachowiak. The two Poles were hereafter under German surveillance. On 24 January 1944 Secretary Mark Nolda at the German mission in Stockholm, in a letter to the German consulate in Malmö, reported that the two had arrived in Malmö after a visit on 22 January to the Polish consulate in Stockholm, where they had allegedly received instructions and a large sum of money.<sup>44</sup> A few days later, in a telephone conversation that was tapped by the Swedish police, Muth reported to Ernst Peetz at the German mission in Stockholm that one of the two Poles (Herk) had boarded a ferry in Trelleborg bound for the port of Sassnitz in Germany. Peetz replied that he would brief the authorities in there.<sup>45</sup> According to a mole at the German mission in Stockholm, working for the Swedes under the cover 'Stevens', Herk was arrested on his arrival in Germany.<sup>46</sup>

In mid-December 1943, Stachowiak met again with Schrott, this time in Malmö, and told him yet another fabricated story about an airplane that was about to leave on a certain day from Stockholm to London with a number of high-ranking Polish officers, and that another airplane was to go in the opposite direction, from London to Stockholm, with

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<sup>41</sup>“P.M.,” interrogation with Schrott, 6 June in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>42</sup>See “Sammandrag ur Statens utlänningskommissions hemliga dossier angående statlöse f.d. polske undersåten Zdzistaw Josef Häusler,” 5 February 1944, memo on Häusler by B. Ågren, 27 July 1945 and “Protokoll över förhör, hållet å kriminalpolisens station måndagen den 30 juli 1945 med Häusler,” 30 July 1945, all in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>43</sup>Häusler has given a detailed account of their contacts with Stachowiak. See “Protokoll över förhör hållet med den polske medborgaren [...] Häusler,” 30 July 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>44</sup>Letter from German mission to German consulate Malmö. 24 January 1944 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2. After the fall of Germany a copy of this letter was handed over to the Swedish police.

<sup>45</sup>“Avskrift; från Malmö 21772, Tyska konsulatet, Muth talar. Till Stockholm 670755, Tyska Legationen, Peetz talar”. 3 February 1944, nr. 673 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2. See also “Protokoll, fört vid förhör med tyske medborgaren, f.d. konsulatsekreteraren Ernst Christian Walter Peetz,” 30 July 1945 in in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>46</sup>Försvarsstabens, Nr. Ed H 107, 26 February 1945, Stevens 21 February 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1. When interrogated by the police in June 1945, Schrott said he was unaware of what might have happened to Herk after his arrival in Sassnitz. He believed however that Berlin would have briefed him on the matter, if there had been any truth to Stachowiak's allegation on the courier travel and that he would have been instructed to investigate who had sent Herk. Schrott also added that the information provided by Stachowiak was of no value and probably stemmed from his fantasies (See P.M., interrogation with Schrott, 6 June in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2). In an earlier interrogation, of 21 May 1945, Schrott confirmed that he maintained contacts with Stachowiak although he seemed genuinely unsure over his identity; ‘I have also had a Pole whose name was Mich...Stachovja...?’ “Förhör med den tyske medborgaren konsuln Eberhardt Schrott,” 21 May 1945 in Säpo file, P 4426, vol. 1249, (Eberhardt Schrott). German Vice Consul Muth also confirmed that Stachowiak had met with Schrott at the German consulate in Malmö and provided information on Danish refugees. See protokoll över förhör [...] med tyske medborgaren Theodor Muth, 21 June 1945 in Säpo file P 6876, vol. 2334, (Theodor Muth).

money for the Polish mission in Sweden. Stachowiak received 200 kronor for this and was now, for the first time, given two minor assignments; to gather information regarding the British consul in Malmö and to establish contacts with Danes in Malmö in order to investigate illegal contacts between them and the resistance movements in Denmark. When seeing a representative of the German consulate shortly before Christmas he falsely claimed to have established contact with the maid at the British consul as well as a number of Danes (although these contacts had failed to provide any information of value). He also claimed to have come across a list of communists in Sweden (which he had put together himself on the basis of Christmas greetings published in Swedish communist papers). Stachowiak was given 150 kronor and another 200 kronor in early January when he handed over yet another list of communists and informed (again out of thin air) that two Polish resistance fighters were about to fly from Stockholm to London. In December Schrott had asked him if he was interested in going to work as a driver at the German mission in Copenhagen and at the meeting in January Stachowiak accepted this offer. He left Sweden on 19 February 1944.<sup>47</sup>

### **Intelligence activities in Denmark and Poland: February 1944–January 1945**

Stachowiak held that he did not realize that the job offer was false until he arrived in Copenhagen and was received by a major and a senior lieutenant of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* and its *Nachrichtenbüro*. Under the false identity Michael Kaminsky (but also Esterman), Stachowiak was charged with three intelligence assignments; he was to approach a lawyer whose wife, a student from Prague, was said to be involved in anti-German activities, he was to investigate whether the Romanian Knut Mouicke was engaged in similar activities and he was to ‘infiltrate’ a prison on Jylland where a number of Polish prisoners were believed to maintain secret contacts with the Polish resistance. Stachowiak failed to carry through any of his assigned duties – he reported falsely that he found nothing on the lawyer and his wife, he likewise made up a story that Mouicke visited a number of cafés and addresses (of no value), and the Jylland mission was for a variety of reasons never initiated. Realizing that his situation was becoming increasingly untenable he agreed with a Danish woman, Aase Jensen that he would provide the Gestapo with a false story on an attempt by Jensen to escape to Sweden. Jensen was arrested, brought to the Gestapo headquarter in the *Dagmarhus* building in Copenhagen and interrogated. Since nothing could be proved however she was later released. (Jensen would later, in interrogations with the Swedish police, tell a very different version of this episode, but for now we shall rest with Stachowiak’s account).<sup>48</sup>

In the middle of this, in May 1944, Stachowiak received a new assignment; to go to Krakow to infiltrate the Polish resistance under the false identity Stefan Kaminsky. Shortly after arriving in Krakow he was however given new instructions; to move behind enemy lines on the eastern front, to the Soviet controlled city of Lviv (Lemberg) and gather intelligence on Soviet troop movements. Stachowiak defected however and for the next six months, for a period under the false identity Stefan Zeromsky, he falsified one *Marschbefehl* after another, going first to Vienna (claiming that he was a refugee from the Soviet controlled part of Czechoslovakia), then to the Polish city of Jedrzejow (which was

<sup>47</sup>As he was about to leave on 18 February he was arrested on suspicion of having cheated the Polish mission in issuing a new Polish passport. The police found however only a temporary German passport with him and a number of bullets in his pockets. He was therefore allowed to go. Memo, Säkerhetspolisen, Malmö, nr. 119, 16 February 1944, in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>48</sup>See interrogation with Jensen in “Promemoria ang. polske medborgaren Mieczyslaw Bruno Stachowiak,” 4 June 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

about to fall under Soviet control any day – Stachowiak claimed to fear the Communists as much as the Nazis so he left after a short while), then back to Copenhagen (where he arrived on 25 December 1944) and then on to Oslo, where he reported to *Organisation Todt* under his false cover Zeromsky at a camp in Etterstad. Since he now acutely feared being exposed by the Germans he decided again to escape to Sweden. In the camp, he got to talk with five forcibly conscripted Frenchmen – Albert Casseau, Jacques Cassotte, Gustave Lemerrier, Andre Pilleaux and Julien Vedel – who were also looking for an escape to Sweden.<sup>49</sup>

### **Return to Sweden as Henri Brunssø Donoa: January 1945**

Through falsified papers Stachowiak managed to get the five Frenchmen and himself out of the camp and on board a train bound for the city of Halden. He planned to take the same route as he had in September 1943. As they arrived in Berg he was advised (by the same Norwegian railway official as the previous time) that the Swedes had tightened surveillance of the border but that they should try a little more to the east along the Idefjorden, closer to Halden. After a dramatic crossover (the ice was thin and their boat sank), the six managed to make their way across the bay and arrived in Swedish territory on 21 January where they were taken into custody by Swedish police.

This time Stachowiak did not dare to identify himself under his real name. Instead he came up with the idea of using yet another false identity – Henri Brunssø Donley, born in 1924 in Chicago. With this identity he hoped to have the US mission pay for his stay in Sweden, at least until the war's end, which he reckoned was not too far off. Moreover, he believed there would be little chance of the US authorities verifying his identity as long as the war lasted. He had, however, not expected that the Swedes would ask him to fill in documents on his identity, and since he was unsure how to spell 'Donley' he had written 'Donoa'.<sup>50</sup> Stachowiak alias Donoa was taken to a refugee camp in Strängnäs (Rosöga) and was soon allowed to visit the US mission where the responsible official demanded more detailed information than he had expected. He therefore had to come up with a story that his father, Henri Donoa, an employee of the US coal firm *Continental*, had emigrated to Czechoslovakia when Stachowiak was four and a half years old. The official had checked a telephone directory for Chicago and indeed found a firm by the name *Continental Coal and Coke Company*, 2802 West 38<sup>th</sup> Street, but this information was not sufficient to qualify Stachowiak for documents verifying US citizenship. Instead, the official asked him to acquire all necessary documentation from *Continental Coal* and then return.<sup>51</sup>

### **Failed attempts to renew contacts with the German mission, approaches to the Japanese: February 1945**

Stachowiak, disappointed with the outcome of this visit, decided to renew his contacts with Schrott and tell him that he had fulfilled his missions for German intelligence in Poland (i.e. the ones he had been assigned in May 1944). Schrott would be in no position to check this anyway since Poland was at this point (February 1945) controlled by the Soviets. He also made up a story to the effect that had been commissioned by Soviet

<sup>49</sup>The military attaché of the French mission in Stockholm certified that Donoa had organized the escape of the five Frenchmen. See 1007/45, 4 June 1945, in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>50</sup>“Rapport,” no. 673, 25 May 1945 in 140:162, P17, vol. 1, 21.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, 21–2.

intelligence under the false identity of Donoa to conduct espionage against Britain and the US, as well as the exiled Baltic and Polish governments in London. This story would probably, Stachowiak believed, lead to new assignments from Schrott, of which he would inform the Americans and thereby receive money from both (although he planned to work honestly for the US while betraying Schrott). On visiting the German mission in Stockholm on 6 February 1945 however, he was told that Schrott was not expected in Stockholm until the following week. Stachowiak left Stockholm empty handed to work as a kitchen assistant at the Grand Hotel in the city of Tranås, some 270 km south of the Swedish capital.<sup>52</sup>

On 20 February he went to Stockholm to again try to get in touch with Schrott who, however, turned out to be 'out traveling'. Not knowing how to pay for his return ticket to Tranås, he decided to call at the Japanese mission where he asked to see the military attaché, Onadera. He told him that he had been enrolled with German intelligence for the entire war but now, in light of the forthcoming collapse of *das Reich*, was intent on severing his contacts with the Germans. Moreover, he told his story (which he had intended to use on Schrott) about having been assigned by Soviet intelligence in Poland, under the false identity of Donoa, to go by way of Sweden, to the US, where he was to receive further instructions. Onadera, who appeared to believe him, explained that the person in charge of intelligence at the mission was away traveling, but that Stachowiak in due time would receive instructions via mail to travel to Stockholm and talk directly with him. Although nothing had been said directly about espionage in favor of the Japanese, there was a tacit understanding to this effect and Stachowiak was given 250 kronor.<sup>53</sup>

### **Initiates contacts with the British and Americans: March 1945**

On 7 March, with no instructions received, Stachowiak decided to return to the Japanese where he was received again by Onadera who presented him to a Major Chinassi, who, however, proved unwilling to have him engaged at this point and told him to come back in a few days. He was nonetheless given another 200 kronor. From the Japanese mission, Stachowiak went straight to the British mission with the intent of providing them with a story on his contacts with the Japanese in the hope of being engaged with the Secret Service. Stachowiak's account of what happened at the British mission is undoubtedly true since it can be verified by British documents.<sup>54</sup> He was questioned in great detail and described how, after the German occupation of Poland, he had been forcibly enlisted by the Gestapo, how he had been dispatched to a spy school in Bavaria in 1940, and thereafter presented by a Colonel von Crone at the *Stadtkommandatur* in Berlin to the Japanese Chinassi who had assigned him to a mission in Italy where he been active for German-Japanese intelligence until late 1942. From Italy he had gone to Poland where, through Polish patriot organizations, he had gathered intelligence on Soviet strategic planning, thereafter to Norway where he had again met with Chinassi who had instructed him to go to the US via Sweden under the identity Donoa and conduct espionage for the Japanese. According to Stachowiak, Chinassi had told him that;

this Henry Donoa was a genuine person, actually an American citizen, that his wife was dead (she died in 1936) and that he had two sons one dead and the other H. B. Donoa had left

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 22.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 22–3.

<sup>54</sup>“H. B. Donoa,” protocol from interrogation, British legation, 7 March 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

Chicago at the age of four and a half, there would be no possibility of the Americans detecting that he was not the person he was impersonating.<sup>55</sup>

He also told of a visit to the US mission under his false identity where the Americans had told him they 'had to refer to Washington to find out if he is genuine'.<sup>56</sup> Stachowiak had however failed to convince his British interlocutor;

Subject made a bad impression during interrogation. He was reluctant to produce any names at all and he stuck badly on addresses. The only one that he produced, Piazza Unita, took about five minutes for him to remember and appeared most unconvincing. It is almost certain that he was not telling the truth, but this does not cut out the possibility that large parts of the story are founded on facts. He is now anxious to be sent to America and also for money. The Japs have not paid him anything as they say that it is not in character for him to have money and the Swedes will only get suspicious of him if he has money.<sup>57</sup>

The British were thus not ready to altogether dismiss his story, at least not at this point. He was therefore given 40 kronor and told to report the next day to the British passport bureau in Stockholm. Once there he was instructed to visit the US mission the next day where he was to receive a written permit to enter the US.

On visiting the US mission (on 9 March) he told more or less the same story as he had to the British. When asked what the Japanese had told him at his meeting with them in more detail, he said that Major Chinassi had refused to give away any Japanese agents in the US before Stachowiak had acquired all documentation necessary for entering the US.<sup>58</sup> The mission issued a certificate stating that Donoa had applied for US citizenship and instructed him to show this document to the Japanese in the hope that they, as a result, would become more informative.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, he was given 140 kronor by the Americans, a promise of a monthly salary of 418 kronor, and an agreement was reached whereby he was to report to the US mission after each of his visits to the Japanese.<sup>60</sup>

Having thus established a contact with the Americans, Stachowiak went straight to the Japanese mission, asked for Major Chinassi and showed his application for US citizenship. Chinassi, who was generally happy with how things were developing, was still unwilling to issue any instructions until Stachowiak had received a US passport and entry visa. Again he was given money (200 kronor) and was instructed to return in 10 days. Stachowiak continued to the US mission, told of his talk with Chinassi, and was instructed to return to Tranås where he would receive, via mail, a cheque for 418 kronor as well as an application for a passport. These documents were only intended to be used for deceiving the Japanese and he was to take them on his next visit to the Japanese legation in Stockholm.<sup>61</sup>

### Swedish police takes an interest in Stachowiak/Drauschke

What Stachowiak did not know was that the Swedish police had begun to take an interest in his activities, at least those undertaken in his real name and his alias Heinrich

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 3

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 3

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 3–4

<sup>58</sup>“Rapport,” no. 673, 25 May 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1, 24–5.

<sup>59</sup>Letter from Consul Paul H. Pearson to Donoa, American Legation, 811.11, 13 March 1945, in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>60</sup>“Rapport,” no. 673, 25 May 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1, 26.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 26–27.



Drauschke. In a report by the above mentioned Swedish mole in the German mission, 'Stevens', dated 21 February 1945, Stachowiak's visit to the German consulate in Gothenburg in December 1943 was detailed. Stachowiak was reported to have provided the Germans with information regarding Polish refugees in Stockholm as well as lists containing names of communists. He had received money from the Germans to go to Copenhagen and then on to Poland, and had now returned to Stockholm and visited the German mission on 21 February 1945 (i.e. Stachowiak's second visit to the mission mentioned above). Stevens had also reported on Stachowiak's accusations against Herk and Häusler and that Herk had been arrested on his return to Germany.<sup>62</sup>

Moreover, on 16 March the Polish legation provided the Swedish Defence Staff (*Försvarsstaben*) with information regarding Stachowiak that was soon shared with the Swedish police. According to the Poles, in 1943 Stachowiak had offered his services to the American, British, German and Soviet missions in Stockholm. The Germans had dispatched him to Malmö to work against the Poles there. Once there however he had also offered to conduct espionage in favor of the Poles and the mission had also learned that Stachowiak had brought a letter to Aase Jensen in Copenhagen from her fiancé in Malmö to the effect that she should go to Sweden. Stachowiak had been given 3000 kronor by Jensen to arrange for the escape but once she, in accordance with Stachowiak's advice, had got to a certain fisherman who should bring her across the straits of Öresund, both she and the fisherman had been arrested by the Gestapo.<sup>63</sup> On 19 March the Swedish police issued a warrant to have Stachowiak alias Heinrich Drauschke arrested on charges of breaching the 8th Chapter of the penal code (i.e. illegal intelligence activities).<sup>64</sup>

The Swedes were, however, still unaware that Stachowiak was also operating under the new cover of Donoa. According to another report by Stevens, dated 9 February 1945, a 'Henry Donova' had visited the German mission at Hovslagargatan in Stockholm on 6 February (i.e. Stachowiak's first visit to the mission mentioned above), asking to see Schrott. The visitor had told the doorman to pass on greetings from Estermann 'and then Schrott would know what it was all about'.<sup>65</sup> As is evident from his two reports, Stevens believed that it was two different people – 'Donova' and Stachowiak – who had visited the German mission on 6 and 21 February. His report of 9 February to the *Försvarsstaben* was however not shared with the police until 24 March and it was to take another three weeks and additional information (interrogation protocols and a letter of clarification) from the American and British missions before the police realized that Donoa and Stachowiak were one and same person.

### **New attempts to have the Japanese issue instructions, Americans interrogate Donoa: March–April 1945**

On 21 March Stachowiak received his US visa application and cheque and returned to Stockholm to visit the Japanese mission (on 22 March). Chinassi again expressed his satisfaction with how things were developing but maintained that nothing could be done before Stachowiak had the US passport in his hand. Moreover, due to the fact that the US document specified a monthly salary, Chinassi said it would not look good if Stachowiak

<sup>62</sup>Försvarsstaben, Nr. Ed H 107, 26 February 1945, "Stevens," 21 February 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, Stachowiak 1<sup>st</sup>.

<sup>63</sup>Letter from Th. Söderström to lieutenant Hans Davidsson, Försvarsstaben, Stockholm, 16 March 1945, with attached letter from the Polish mission dated 16 March in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>64</sup>HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>65</sup>Report from "Stevens," HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

also received money from the Japanese. Stachowiak was therefore only given a minor sum of 80 kronor to cover his travel and stay in Stockholm. Chinassi also asked if Stachowiak would be willing to return to Poland and establish contact with Poles who would be willing to engage themselves in Japanese espionage against the USSR. Stachowiak refused to do so with reference to the fact that the Soviets had assigned him to the US and that he would risk being arrested. Chinassi understood Stachowiak's standpoint but asked him to provide the names of people in Poland who would be willing to cooperate with the Japanese.<sup>66</sup>

From the Japanese, Stachowiak went to the US mission to report. The official had taken notes and remarked that Stachowiak would receive the passport and that 'they would probably be successful in cheating the Japanese out of their shell'.<sup>67</sup> At this point Stachowiak had however been kept at the legation for four days during which he went through detailed interrogations regarding his contacts with German and Japanese intelligence (the protocol runs to 17 closely written pages).<sup>68</sup> Stachowiak had tried to stick to the central parts of his earlier account but had repeatedly found himself in some difficulty and had a hard time making the different parts of his story match.<sup>69</sup> When asked why he had not told of his Japanese assignment on his first visit to the US mission, Stachowiak said he found the official in charge unsympathetic and feared being kicked out of the building if he had told the full truth;

Further he considered this stuff of greater interest to the English than to the Americans as he knew that the English Secret Service was busy everywhere, and did not think the Americans had any intelligence service of any importance.<sup>70</sup>

### **Approach to the Spanish mission: 6 April**

On 6 April he returned to Stockholm to see the Japanese – neither Onadera or Chinassi had been in however – and he left the mission empty handed, reported to the Americans and was ready to return to Tranås, when he happened to read a short newspaper article reporting that Miguel Maura, the former Spanish Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet of Niceto Alcalá Zamora (for about a month in 1931), now living in exile in Paris, had given up his attempts to form a provisional government to replace the dictator Francisco Franco.<sup>71</sup> As always short of money, Stachowiak came up with the idea of visiting the Spanish mission in Stockholm pretending to be a Russian agent willing to share secret intelligence on courier routes between the USSR and Maura, as well as on secret transports of Soviet armaments and ammunition from France to supporters of Maura in Spain. He went to the mission, promised to provide crucial information in return for a monthly salary of 20,000 kronor and, in order to appear trustworthy, held that three of the Frenchmen with whom he had escaped from Norway – Albert Casseau, Jacques Cassotte and Julien Vedel – were in fact Soviet agents who were about to leave Stockholm in a short while and go to Marseille where

<sup>66</sup>“Rapport,” no. 673, 25 May 1945 in 140:162, P17, vol. 1, 27–8.

<sup>67</sup>“Rapport,” no. 673, 25 May 1945 in 140:162, P17, vol. 1, 28.

<sup>68</sup>*Report on the interrogation of subject Mieczyslaw Stachowiak alias Henry Donoa ...*, US Legation, Stockholm, 17 March 1945, in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>69</sup>“Rapport,” no. 673, 25 May 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1, 28.

<sup>70</sup>*Report on the interrogation of subject Mieczyslaw Stachowiak alias Henry Donoa ...*, US Legation, Stockholm, 17 March 1945, in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1. 17.

<sup>71</sup>A photocopy of this article, “Maura uppger striden mot Francoregimen” (which is really a telegram from the Swedish news agency *Tidningarnas telegrambyrå*) is attached to the second police report on his case, “Rapport ang. Stachowiak,” 20 June 1945, dnr. 673 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

they were to board a ship bound for Barcelona. The Spanish official seemed to believe Stachowiak, took detailed notes of his account but said he would have to await instructions from his government before making any agreements with Stachowiak. For his information, Stachowiak was given 100 kronor.<sup>72</sup>

### **American and British protocols handed over to the Swedish police: Stachowiak/Drauschke identical to Donoa**

Till early April, the Swedes were still unaware of Stachowiak's dealings under his alias Donoa. In a letter dated 13 April, the Malmö county police superintendent, O. Rosengren, was informed by Commissar Sandell in Stockholm that Donoa had visited the German mission on 6 February;

The reasons for his visit have not been clarified. It is however known [from Stevens' report] that he had asked for a very active Gestapo agent in Sweden [Schrott], who he claimed to have met in Copenhagen, where Donoa was operating under the name Esterman. In light of the foregoing Donoa can be suspected for intelligence activities for the Germans.<sup>73</sup>

A mere three days later, the US mission in Stockholm informed the Swedish police of Stachowiak's/Donoa's contacts. In a letter that was stamped as received by the Police on 16 April, the following was reported:

Subject came in to the American Legation in January 1945 and saw the American Vice-Consul [giving his] name as Henry Donoa and declared that he was an American citizen [...]. Subject claims that he endeavored to convince the Vice-Consul that he had special information to give, but the Vice-Consul would have nothing to do with him. On the 7th of March, Subject went to the British Legation, where he was interrogated, and the report of this interrogation is attached. My British counterpart turned the whole thing over to me. We then had subject interrogated here and are attaching a report of our interrogation [...] It is my opinion that Subject is a scoundrel and a rogue and cannot be trusted in any way. That he has not given us full information, and that when he says he does not remember names, etc. he is withholding information. You will note that there are many discrepancies between the two interrogations.<sup>74</sup>

Both the British and the American interrogations were thus in Swedish hands and on 20 April, Rosengren was informed that Stachowiak and Donoa were one and the same person, that he had tried to get in touch with 'the well-known Gestapo agent, Schrott' and that he had been dispatched by the Germans in 1943 to Malmö to acquire information concerning Danish refugees there.<sup>75</sup> Rosengren had promised (probably via telephone) to see to it that Stachowiak was put under surveillance.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup>“Rapport,” no. 673, 25 May 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1. 29.

<sup>73</sup>Letter from Sandell to Rosengren, 613/45, 13 April 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>74</sup>Letter from US Legation, 24 March 1945, registered 16 April 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>75</sup>Letter from Sandell to Rosengren, 499/45, 20 April in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>76</sup>Letter from Sandell to Westlin, Gothenburg police, 499/45, 11 May 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

### **A last attempt to have the Americans issue documents, Stachowiak arrested: May 1945**

In order to put some pressure on the Americans to finally issue the passport, Stachowiak, around 17 April, phoned the US mission explaining that he had a very important message for his contact, Consul Pearson, who traveled to Tranås to hear what Stachowiak had to say. Stachowiak told him that a Colonel Nubassi of the Japanese mission had come to see him to warn that the real Henri Brunso Donoa was now in Germany and that Stachowiak had to take into account that the Americans in Sweden may come to know of this. Against the backdrop of this false story, Stachowiak emphasized to Pearson that he needed the passport as fast as possible as the Japanese might otherwise withdraw from the entire operation. Pearson promised that Stachowiak would not have to wait long before he had all the necessary documentation. No documents were sent, however, except for a second cheque of 418 kronor.<sup>77</sup>

On 24 April, Stachowiak returned to Stockholm and met with Onadera and Chinassi, who (as always) said they were ready to provide instructions regarding the missions but only once the US passport and entry visa had been issued. Although Stachowiak only received 80 kronor, he was promised that he would receive 250 kronor by mail for each ten days. When Stachowiak reported to the Americans, they again promised that he was to receive a passport very soon. Stachowiak also called at the Spanish mission where the Minister explained that his government would most likely accept Stachowiak's offer but that he was still waiting for a formal decision from Madrid.<sup>78</sup>

The Swedes would probably have arrested Stachowiak somewhat earlier had it not been for the fact that Rosengren (who referred to 'a heavy workload') had failed to heed the instruction to have Stachowiak shadowed.<sup>79</sup> About a week later, at 10.00 am on 17 May, the police finally picked him up and took him to Gothenburg where he was incarcerated in Hårlanda prison.

### **Police investigation and deportation: May–October 1945**

The ensuing police investigation can be divided into three phases – a first spanning the period from 17 May to early June, a second from mid-June to mid-July and the last from late July to early August. In the course of the first phase Stachowiak was interrogated in great detail on 25 May. The police report, dated 4 June, mentioned some minor incidents, such as his arrest at the Tågerup farm in October 1943, the suspicions that he fooled the Polish mission into issuing a second passport for him (also in late 1943), and his departure from Copenhagen in January 1944 (with a German passport). In addition, the police had interrogated Aase Jensen who, in short, claimed she had been tricked by Stachowiak into believing that he would help her to escape to her fiancé in Sweden. Instead she had been arrested by the Gestapo, but later released.<sup>80</sup> In addition, the police had Schrott interrogated on his contacts with Stachowiak.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>77</sup>Letter from Vice-Consul Lawrence W. von Hellens. American Legation, 20 April 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>78</sup>"Rapport," no. 673, 25 May 1945 in 140:162, P17, vol. 1, 30–1.

<sup>79</sup>Letter from Sandell to Westlin, Gothenburg police, 499/45, 11 May 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 1.

<sup>80</sup>"Promemoria ang. polske medborgaren Mieczyslaw Bruno Stachowiak," 4 June 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>81</sup>See Memo, interrogation with Schrott, 6 June in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

The police also tried to investigate the whereabouts of Herk and Häusler. In the 25 May interrogation, Stachowiak had, perhaps in order to disorient, given the name Wrublewski instead of Häusler, and since Herk was no longer in Sweden, the police tried unsuccessfully to locate Wrublewski.<sup>82</sup> None of this was, however, sufficiently serious to have Stachowiak indicted.<sup>83</sup> Stachowiak remained in custody awaiting the decision of *the Aliens Appeals Board* on whether or not he was to be deported, and his case may well have ended here had it not been for the fact that one of the major Swedish dailies, *Dagens nyheter*, on 25 May reported on the arrest of Stachowiak and on the day after published a photo of him dressed in a uniform.<sup>84</sup>

A Polish refugee, living in the Swedish city of Norrköping, Wilma Tartakov, in mid-June got in touch with the Swedish police and the Polish legation claiming that she recognized the man on the photo as the Polish citizen and Gestapo agent Ludwig Kalkstein, who according to Tartakov, had infiltrated the Polish resistance movement in Warsaw in 1941–42 with the result that the entire Tartakov family had been arrested by the Germans. Her husband, Adam Tartakov, had later died in a prison camp and she herself had been imprisoned in camps in Majdanek, Ravensbrück and Veltern. When interrogated by the Gestapo she was questioned on details that she knew she had confided to Kalkstein. It is however questionable whether Tartakov's description of Kalkstein as a man in his early twenties matches with Stachowiak who (if we are to believe that his birth date was November 1927) a mere 14 years old in 1941.<sup>85</sup> A new police report was nonetheless put together on the case focusing primarily on Jenssen's and Tartakov's respective accounts.<sup>86</sup> When heard on 19 June, Stachowiak denied that he had ever acted as a German agent in Warsaw under the cover Kalkstein. As regards Jenssen's account, he said that she was not telling the truth since she was anxious to conceal that the two had had a love affair.<sup>87</sup>

The investigation was however not over with this either. Following the Nazi-German capitulation on 8 May, all premises and institutions belonging to the German diplomatic mission in Sweden were sealed and searched by the police in order to investigate *inter alia* German war time intelligence in Sweden.<sup>88</sup> By mid-July, among the heaps of archival documents left behind in the German consulate in Gothenburg, the police found a letter from Consul Muth to Secretary Nolda in which Häusler, under his actual name, was mentioned.<sup>89</sup> The police now managed to locate Häusler and have him interrogated.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>82</sup>They found however only a former Russian citizen by the name Nikita Wrublevskii, who was a refugee to Sweden. "P.M. angående i Göteborgsrapporten...", by Hans Nyström, 5 June 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>83</sup>In early June the Attorney-General (*Justitiekanslern*) decided that Stachowiak was not to be indicted. See memo by Tufvesson, 7 June 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>84</sup>"Utlänning fast för spionage" and "Donoa i uniform," *Dagens nyheter*, 25 and 26 May 1945.

<sup>85</sup>"P.M. över förhör med polska medborgaren fru Wilma Tartakov," 13 Juni 1945, in 140:162, P17, vol. 2. On Stachowiak's age, see discussion in note 33 above.

<sup>86</sup>"Rapport ang. Stachowiak," 20 June 1945, dnr. 673 in 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, 8–9.

<sup>88</sup>"P.M. ang. avvecklingen av den tyska beskickningen i Stockholm," in RA. UD, HP 80 A/allm, 15 June 1945. All staffers of the mission, the German tourist agency, the German Chamber of Commerce, etc. were interned together with their families, a total of 412 people. German officials like Muth, Nolda, Peetz and Schrott could hereby be interrogated by the Swedish police.

<sup>89</sup>"P.M." by Söderberg, 28 July 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2. See Letter from German mission to German consulate Malmö. 24 January 1944 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>90</sup>"Protokoll över förhör hållet med den polske medborgaren [...] Häusler," 30 July 1945 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

However, this yielded little that was not already known. On 3 September the *Aliens Appeals Board* finally decided that Stachowiak was to be deported and on 19 October, Stachowiak left Sweden from Gothenburg aboard the ship *Falken* bound for Gdynia. The police had agents in the harbor of Malmö (where *Falken* was to make a stop to load cargo), since they feared that Stachowiak might try to escape the ship.<sup>91</sup>

### Concluding remarks: Stachowiak and the Iron Curtain

Stachowiak's activities between October 1945 and his 1947 and 1948 appearances with the Swedish missions in Warsaw and Prague are unknown. There is however no doubt that Stachowiak soon found life in Soviet controlled Poland hard to bear. Just as he had got the idea of tricking money out of the Spanish mission in Stockholm from the newspaper article on Maura, the same *modus operandi* probably explains his activities with regard to the Wallenberg case. As he stated both in Warsaw and Prague, the ultimate aim of his approaches was to get a Swedish entry visa and escape the Iron Curtain.<sup>92</sup> On 1 September 1947 the paper *Dzeinnik Baltycki*, published in Gdynia, ran an article in French (a language with which Stachowiak was familiar) titled 'Raoul Wallenberg – l'héros de Budapest'. Here Wallenberg's mission and his heroic deeds in Budapest, as well as his mysterious disappearance were described in great detail. In light of Stachowiak's history of intelligence activities it seems reasonable to assume that his approach on the Wallenberg case should be traced to this particular article rather than to any secret instructions from Moscow.<sup>93</sup> Moreover, it seems utterly unlikely that the Soviets, a mere two months after having presented the Swedes with the Vyshinskii note (whose message as mentioned was that Wallenberg had died in Hungary) should have wanted to have the Swedes believe a story to the effect that Wallenberg had been incarcerated by the Soviets and even alive in Soviet controlled areas.

Stachowiak disappears from view not long after his encounter with Engfeldt in Prague. In one of the last documents in his file, dated 11 May 1948, Commissar Otto Danielsson noted the following:

[Informant] has reported that he has been told of a person who claims his name is Henry Bromsso Donoa and Stachowiak, around 24 years old, and to have stayed in Tranås from January 1945 till May 1945 where he allegedly worked in a hotel as a kitchen assistant. This man was probably in this country on false documents. He has told a Swedish witness that he received financial support from the American mission in return for false military and political intelligence. In fact he was working for the Russians and gathering intelligence regarding [military installations on] the Swedish west coast. He had managed to acquire an American sailor's book. He had been arrested by the public prosecutor in Tranås and brought to Härlanda [prison in Gothenburg]. He was later deported. This man is now trying to return to Sweden again and it is said that he is now at a place where he could possibly reach Sweden.

<sup>91</sup>See Stachowiak's file with the AAB in Statens utlänningskommission, kanslibyrån, F1AC, 19,780.

<sup>92</sup>In April 1948 Engfeldt noted that the *chargé d'affaires* of the Greek mission had told him that Stachowiak had offered to give very valuable information on the activities of the partisans in Greece in return for help 'to escape the Iron Curtain'. Engfeldt's report, 19 April 1948, in RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 5.

<sup>93</sup>The article is filed in RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 7 October 1947.

At the bottom of the report there is a handwritten note saying;

This man is a provocateur and a spy [...] He will probably go to Sweden under a false name by way of [the city of] Trelleborg. My informer will report when he turns up in Sweden. He says he wants to disclose the NKVD for whom he is presently working. He intends to continue to America.<sup>94</sup>

What conclusions can we draw from Stachowiak's case? First of all, the efforts that the officials of the missions and the Swedish police put into having his information investigated are quite intriguing from the perspectives of government and intelligence studies. Although eventually exposed, Stachowiak evidently still appeared sufficiently trustworthy to have his interlocutors listen attentively and pay for his information. The Germans undoubtedly charged him with assignments both in Malmö and in Copenhagen (possibly also in Poland), the Japanese, albeit very hesitant, did after all pay him a fairly good deal of money, the Americans and British, although agreeing that he was a 'scoundrel', were still open to the possibility that 'large parts of the story [were] founded on facts' and devoted substantial time (four days) and energy into interrogating and investigating his story, his background etc. Engfeldt likewise, although advised by UD to put an end to his contacts with Stachowiak, still maintained a sufficient degree of belief in his story to keep in touch with him for some time.

To this should obviously be added the many hours of writing protocols, checking all the different details and overall coherence of his accounts, corresponding with officials at other missions and with the superiors back home and, eventually, with the Swedish military and police. The Swedish police investigators likewise put in a remarkable amount of work, in three separate "waves", thoroughly investigating this man's personal history, his intelligence activities in Sweden and elsewhere, as well as the fate of some of the people who happened to have come into contact with him. All these efforts, including the highly interesting international cooperation between the Americans, the British and the Swedes resulted in the arrest and deportation of Stachowiak.<sup>95</sup> But how many other Stachowiaks were there in these dreadful days that were never revealed? And how much time and effort did diplomats and intelligence officials put in to having them interrogated and their information analyzed? As indicated by this article it seems like a reasonable guess that considerable energies may have been put into such work. Not to mention the money that was spent. In all, according to police estimates, Stachowiak had acquired no less than 3481 kronor from different missions in Sweden. In today's value this sum equals approximately 70,000 kronor or almost 6000 pounds (UK).<sup>96</sup>

<sup>94</sup>P.M. by Otto Danielsson, 11 May 1948 in HA 613/45, 140:162, P17, vol. 2.

<sup>95</sup>It is interesting to note that the Swedish police likewise cooperated quite closely with intelligence officials at the British and US missions in Stockholm regarding the (defected) agent, Voldemar Blankenfelds, who arrived in Sweden in June 1944, assigned by the Gestapo in Danzig to go via Sweden to South America (or Britain or the US) to conduct intelligence operations there, as well as regarding the agent and head of the German tourist agency in Sweden Bernd von Gossler. See Johan Matz, "German and Soviet intelligence activities in Sweden in 1944: Voldemar Blankenfelds and the deportation of Baron Bernd von Gossler," *Journal of Intelligence History* 13, no. 2 (2014): 111–30.

<sup>96</sup>The Americans had paid him 986 kronor, the Brits 40 kronor, the Germans 1045 kronor, the Japanese 1310 and the Spanish 100 kronor. See "Rapport," no. 673, 25 May 1945 in 140:162, P17, vol. 1, 31.

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