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# GERMAN WHITE BOOK

CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE  
AUTHORS OF THE WAR

Translated by the  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  
Division of International Law

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## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

During the course of the Peace Conference at Paris, a Commission of that body presented a Report on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties. This report embodied the view of the Allied and Associated Powers, since the Commission spoke for the Powers and its report was approved by the Powers. A commission was appointed by Germany to receive from the Allied and Associated Powers the terms of the treaty of peace prepared by the Paris Peace Conference—a conference composed exclusively of the Allied and Associated Powers, in whose deliberations, unfortunately, no Germans were permitted to take part. The German Commission, for whose members quarters had been provided in Versailles, was, however, permitted to communicate its views. One of its communications deals with the responsibilities of the authors of the war, and therein the Commission sets forth the German point of view, which, as was to be expected, differs greatly from the view on responsibility set forth in the Report of the Commission of the Allied and Associated Powers. This communication, in the nature of a report, was prepared by a group of German scholars and publicists and transmitted by the German Commission at Versailles to the Allied and Associated Powers.

As the undersigned was a member of the Allied Commission on Responsibility, it does not seem appropriate for him to indulge in any comments upon the German observations. It is the German case. At least it is the case which Germany put forward. It is an official document, whose importance can neither be overlooked nor minimized. It was read by the members of the Conference. It should be read by the public at large. For this reason and purpose the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is issuing it in a convenient form without criticism or comment.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT,  
*Director of the Division of International Law.*

WASHINGTON, D. C.,  
*June 17, 1924.*

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WHITE BOOK CONCERNING THE  
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE  
AUTHORS OF THE WAR





## ADDRESS OF COUNT BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU OF MAY 7, 1919

GENTLEMEN:

We are deeply impressed with the sublime task which has brought us together to give a durable peace to the world. We are under no illusion as to the extent of our defeat and the degree of our impotence. We know that the power of German arms is broken. We know the strength of the hatred which we encounter here, and we have heard the passionate demand that the victors should force us to pay as vanquished, and at the same time should punish us as guilty.

It is demanded of us that we shall confess ourselves to be alone guilty of the war. Such a confession from my lips would be a lie. We are far from declining all responsibility for the fact that this great World War took place, or that it was fought in the way that it was. The attitude of the former German Government at the Hague Peace Conferences, its acts and omissions during the tragic twelve days of July, have certainly contributed to the disaster. But we energetically deny that Germany and its people, who were convinced that they fought a war of defense, were alone guilty.

No one would want to assert that the disaster began only at that disastrous moment when the successor of Austria-Hungary fell a victim to murderous hands. In the last fifty years, the imperialism of all European states has chronically poisoned international relations. Policies of retaliation, policies of expansion, and disregard for the right of peoples to determine their own destiny, have contributed to the European malady which came to a crisis in the World War. The mobilization of Russia deprived statesmen of the opportunity of curing the disease, and placed the issue in the hands of the military powers.

Public opinion in all countries of our adversaries resound with the crimes which Germany is said to have committed in the war. Here also we are ready to confess what wrong may have been done. We have not come here to belittle the responsibility of the men who waged the war either politically or militarily, nor to deny any crimes which may have been committed against international law. We repeat the declaration which was made in the German Reichstag, at the beginning of the war that "wrong has been done to Belgium, and we will see that it is redressed."

But even in the manner of conducting the war, Germany is not the only guilty one. Every European nation knows of deeds and of people whom their own countrymen remember only with regret. I will not answer reproaches with reproaches; but when we are asked for reparation, the armi-

stice must not be forgotten. It was six weeks before we obtained it; it was six months before we knew your terms of peace. Crimes in war may not be excusable, but they are committed in struggle for victory, and in defense of national existence, and under the influence of passions which deaden the conscience of peoples. The hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have perished since the 11th of November by reason of the blockade, were killed with cold deliberation after our adversaries had conquered and victory had been assured them. Think of that when you speak of guilt and of punishment.

The measure of guilt of all participants can be fixed only by an impartial inquiry, by a neutral commission before whom all the leading actors of the tragedy may be heard, and to whom all archives will be opened. We have demanded such an inquiry and we repeat this demand.

In this Conference also, where we stand alone and without allies before the great assembly of our adversaries, we are not entirely unprotected. You yourselves have brought us an ally: justice, which is guaranteed us by the agreement regarding the principles of peace. Between October 5 and November 5, 1918, the Allied and Associated Governments foreswore a peace of violence, and inscribed a peace of justice on their banner. On October 5, 1918, the German Government proposed the principles of the President of the United States of America as the basis of peace, and on the 5th of November their Secretary of State Lansing declared that the Allied and Associated Powers were agreed upon this basis, with two express reservations. The principles of President Wilson have thus become binding on both parties to the war; upon you as well as upon us, and also upon our former allies.

The various principles demand from us heavy national and economic sacrifices, but the fundamental sacred rights of all peoples are protected by this treaty. The conscience of the world is behind it. There is no nation which may violate it without punishment.

You will find us ready to examine, upon this basis, the preliminary peace which you have proposed to us, with a firm intention of rebuilding, in cooperation with you, that which has been destroyed, of repairing the wrong that has been committed—principally the wrong to Belgium—and of showing to mankind new aims of political and social progress. Considering the overwhelming quantity of the problems to which our common task gives rise, we ought, as soon as possible, to make an examination of them by means of special commissions of experts, on the basis of the draft which you have proposed to us. In this connection it will be our chief task to restore the wasted man-power of the participant peoples by international protection of the life, health, and liberty of the working classes.

I consider as our next aim the reconstruction of the territories of Belgium and northern France which have been occupied by us, and which have been

destroyed by war. We have taken upon ourselves the solemn obligation to do so, and we are resolved to execute it to the full extent which has been agreed upon between us. This task we can not accomplish without the cooperation of our former adversaries. We can not carry on the work without the technical and financial participation of the victorious peoples, and they can not execute it without us. Impoverished Europe must desire that reconstruction shall be carried out with the best results and least expense possible. This desire can be fulfilled only by a clear understanding of the best methods to be employed. The worst method would be to have the work done by German prisoners of war. Certainly this labor is cheap; but it would cost the world dear if hatred and despair should seize the German people, when they consider that their brothers, sons, and fathers, who are prisoners, are to be kept prisoners at forced labor after the establishment of preliminary peace. Without an immediate solution of this question, which has been drawn out too long, we can not come to a durable peace.

The experts of both sides will have to examine how the German people can best meet their financial obligation without succumbing to the heavy burden. A collapse would deprive those entitled to reparation of the advantages which they claim, and would result in an irretrievable disorder of the whole European economic system. Conquerors, as well as conquered, must guard against this menacing danger with its incalculable consequences. There is only one means of preventing it; unconditional acceptance of the economic and social solidarity of all peoples in a free and comprehensive League of Nations.

Gentlemen, the sublime thought of deriving from the most terrible disaster in the history of the world, the greatest progress in the development of mankind, through a League of Nations, has found expression, and will find fulfilment. Only if the gates of the League of Nations are thrown open to all nations of good-will, can the goal be attained; and only then, will the dead of this war not have died in vain.

The German people in their hearts are ready to take upon themselves their heavy lot, if the foundations of peace which have been established are not shaken. A peace which could not be defended in the name of justice before the world, would always call forth new resistances. No one could sign it with a clear conscience, for it would not be possible of fulfilment. No one could take upon himself the guaranty of its execution, which its signature would imply.

We shall examine the document handed to us with good-will, and in the hope that the final result of our negotiations may be subscribed to by all.



## NOTE OF COUNT BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU OF MAY 13, 1919

VERSAILLES, *May 13, 1919.*

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the draft of a peace treaty submitted to the German delegates, Part VIII, concerning reparation, begins with Article 231, which reads as follows:

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Now the obligation to make reparation has been accepted by Germany by virtue of the note from Secretary of State Lansing of November 5, 1918, independently of the question of responsibility for the war. The German delegation can not admit that there could arise, out of a responsibility incurred by the former German Government in regard to the origin of the World War, any right for the Allied and Associated Powers to claim indemnification by Germany for losses suffered during the war. The representatives of the Allied and Associated States have moreover declared repeatedly that the German people should not be held responsible for the wrongs committed by their Government.

The German people did not will the war and would never have undertaken a war of aggression. They have always remained convinced that this war was for them a defensive war.

Nor do the German delegates share the views of the Allied and Associated Governments in regard to the origin of the war. They are unable to consider the former German Government as the party solely or chiefly responsible for this war. The draft treaty of peace transmitted contains no facts in support of this view; no proof on the subject is furnished therein. The German delegates, therefore, request the communication to them of the report of the Commission set up by the Allied and Associated Governments for the purpose of establishing the responsibility of the authors of the war.

Pray accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high consideration,

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU.

His Excellency Mr. Clemenceau,  
President of the Peace Conference, etc.

### 3

#### NOTE OF CLEMENCEAU OF MAY 20, 1919<sup>1</sup>

*May 20, 1919.*

MR. PRESIDENT:

In your note of May 13, you state that Germany, while "accepting" in November, 1918 "the obligation to make reparation" did not understand such an acceptance to mean that her responsibility was involved either for the war or for the acts of the former German Government.

It is only possible to conceive of such an obligation if its origin and cause is the responsibility of the author of the damage.

You add that the German people would never have undertaken a war of aggression. Yet, in the note from Secretary of State Lansing of November 5, 1918, of which you approve, and adduce in favor of your contention, it is stated that the obligation to make reparation arises out of "Germany's aggression by land, sea and air."

Since the German Government did not at the time make any protest against this allegation, it thereby recognized it as well founded.

Therefore Germany recognized in November, 1918, implicitly and clearly, both the aggression and her responsibility. It is too late to seek to deny them today.

It would be impossible, you state further, that the German people should be regarded as the accomplices to the wrongs committed by the "former German Government." However, Germany has never claimed, and such a declaration would have been contrary to all principles of international law that a modification of its political form of government or a change in its governing personnel would be sufficient to extinguish an obligation already undertaken by any nation. She did not act upon the principle she now contends for either in 1871, in regard to France, after the proclamation of the Republic, or in 1917, in regard to Russia after the revolution abolished the Czarist régime.

Finally, you ask that the report of the Commission on Responsibility may be communicated to you. In reply we beg to say that the Allied and Associated Powers consider the reports of the commissions set up by the Peace Conference as documents of an internal character which can not be transmitted to you.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

CLEMENCEAU.

His Excellency Count Brockdorff-Rantzau,  
President of the German Delegation, Versailles.

<sup>1</sup>[Translated from the original French.]



## NOTE OF COUNT BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU OF MAY 24, 1919

VERSAILLES, *May 24, 1919.*

MR. PRESIDENT:

The contents of Your Excellency's note of the twentieth instant, concerning the question of Germany's responsibility for the consequences of the war, have shown the German peace delegation that the Allied and Associated Governments have completely misunderstood the sense in which the German Government and the German nation tacitly gave their assent to the note of Secretary of State Lansing of November 5, 1918. In order to clear up this misunderstanding the German delegation feel compelled to recall to the memory of the Allied and Associated Governments the events which preceded that note.

The President of the United States of America had several times solemnly declared that the World War should be terminated not by a peace of might, but by a peace of right, and that America had entered the war solely in behalf of this peace of right. For this war-aim the formula was established: "No annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages." On the other hand, however, the President demanded the unconditional restitution of the violated right. The positive side of this demand found expression in the fourteen points which were laid down by President Wilson in his message of January 8, 1918. This message contains two principal claims against the German nation: First, the surrender of important parts of German territory in the west and in the east on the basis of national self-determination; secondly, the promise to restore the occupied territories of Belgium and the north of France. Both demands could be acceded to by the German Government and the German people, since the principle of self-determination was concordant with the new democratic constitution of Germany, and since the territories to be restored had been subjected by Germany to the terrors of war through an act contrary to the law of nations, namely, the violation of Belgium's neutrality.

The right of self-determination of the Polish nation had, as a matter of fact, already been acknowledged by the former German Government, just as had the wrong done to Belgium.

When, therefore, there was given in the note of the Entente transmitted by Secretary of State Lansing to the German Government, on November 5, 1918, a more detailed interpretation of what was meant by restoration of the occupied territories, it appeared from the German point of view to be a matter of course that the duty to make compensation, established in this

interpretation, could relate to no other territories than those the damaging of which had already been admitted as contrary to right, and the restoration of which had been emphasized as war-aims by the leading enemy statesmen. Thus President Wilson in his message of January 8, 1918, expressly termed the reparation of the wrong done to Belgium as the healing act without which the whole structure and validity of international law would be forever impaired. In a like manner the English Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech in the House of Commons on October 22, 1917,<sup>1</sup> proclaimed:

The first requirement . . . always put forward by the British Government and their Allies, has been the complete restoration, political, territorial and economic, of the independence of Belgium, and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces. This is no demand for war indemnity, such as that imposed on France by Germany in 1871. It is not an attempt to shift the cost of warlike operations from one belligerent to another.

What is here said in behalf of Belgium, Germany had to acknowledge also with regard to the north of France, since the German Armies had only reached French territory by the violation of Belgium's neutrality.

It was for this aggression that the German Government admitted Germany to be responsible, it did not admit Germany's alleged responsibility for the origin of the war, nor the merely incidental circumstance that the formal declaration of war had emanated from Germany. The importance of Secretary of State Lansing's note for Germany lay rather in the fact that the duty to make reparation was not limited to the restoration of material values, but was extended to every kind of damage suffered by the civilian population in the occupied territory, in person or in property, during the continuance of warfare, be it by land, by sea or from the air.

The German nation was fully conscious of the one-sidedness lying in their being charged with the restoration of Belgium and northern France, while they were denied compensation for the territories in the east of Germany which had been invaded and devastated by the troops of Russian Czarism acting on a long-premeditated plan. They have, however, recognized that the Russian aggression must bear a different relation to the formal provisions of the law of nations than would the invasion of Belgium and have therefore abstained from demanding compensation on their part.

If the Allied and Associated Governments should now maintain the view that, for every violation of the law of nations which has been committed during the war, compensation is due, the German delegation will not dispute the correctness in principle of this standpoint; they beg, however, to point out that in such an event Germany also would have a considerable damage

<sup>1</sup>[January 5, 1918? See *British War Aims. A Statement by the Right Honourable David Lloyd George, January fifth, nineteen hundred and eighteen*, New York, p. 7.]

account to be settled, and that the duty to compensate, incumbent upon her adversaries—particularly in the case of the German civilian population, which has suffered immeasurable injury by the hunger blockade, a measure contrary to the law of nations—is not limited to the period when actual warfare was still being carried on from both sides, but applies particularly to the time when war was waged from one side only, by the Allied and Associated Powers against a Germany which had voluntarily laid down arms. This view of the Allied and Associated Governments, at any rate, differs from the agreement which Germany had entered into before the Armistice was concluded. It raises an endless series of controversial questions on the horizon of the peace negotiations and can only be brought to a practical solution through a system of impartial international arbitration, such arbitration as is provided for in Article 18, Part 2, of the draft of the conditions of peace. This clause prescribes:

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.

Your Excellency has further pointed out in your note of the twentieth instant that, according to the principles of international law no nation could, through an alteration of its political form of government or through a change in the personnel of its leaders, cause to be extinguished an obligation once incurred by its government. The German peace delegation is far from contesting the correctness of this principle; nor do they protest against the execution of the agreement proposed by the former government on October 5, 1918, but they do make objection to the punishment, provided for by the draft of the peace treaty, for the alleged offenses of the former political and military leaders of Germany. The President of the United States of America, on December 4, 1917, declared that the war should not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation nor people should be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of the country had themselves done deep and abominable wrong. The German delegation does not plead these or other promises to evade any obligation incumbent on Germany by the law of nations, but they feel justified in recalling them to memory if the German nation is to be held responsible for the origin of the war and made liable for its damages.

While the public negotiations immediately preceding the conclusion of the Armistice were still in progress, the German nation was promised that Germany's fate would be fundamentally altered if it were severed from that of its rulers. The German delegation would not like to take Your Excellency's words to mean that the promise made by the Allied and Associated



Governments at that time was merely a ruse of war employed to paralyze the resistance of the German nation, and that this promise is now to be withdrawn.

Your Excellency has finally contended that the Allied and Associated Governments were justified in treating Germany after the same methods as had been adopted by her in the peace treaties of Frankfort and Brest-Litovsk. The German delegation for the present refrains from examining in what respects these two treaties of peace differ from the present draft, for it is now too late for the Allied and Associated Governments to found a legal claim on these precedents. The moment for so doing was when they had before them the alternative of accepting or rejecting the fourteen points of the President of the United States of America as basis of peace. In these fourteen points the reparation of the wrong done in 1870-1871 was expressly demanded, and the peace of Brest-Litovsk was spoken of as a deterrent example. The Allied and Associated Governments at that time declined to take a peace of violence belonging to the past as a model.

The German nation never having assumed the responsibility for the origin of the war, has a right to demand that it be informed by its opponents for what reasons, and on what evidence are the conditions of peace based upon Germany's being to blame for all damages and all sufferings of this war. It can not, therefore, consent to be put off with the remark that the data relating to the question of responsibility, collected by the Allied and Associated Governments through a special commission, are documents of an internal nature of those Governments. This, a question of life or death for the German nation, must be discussed in all publicity; methods of secret diplomacy are out of place here. The German Government reserve for themselves the right to return to the subject.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my high esteem.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU.

His Excellency Mr. Clemenceau,  
President of the Peace Conference, etc.

## COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND ON ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES

### OBJECT OF THE COMMISSION

The Preliminary Peace Conference at the plenary session on the 25th of January, 1919 (Protocol No. 2), decided to create, for the purpose of inquiring into the responsibilities relating to the war, a commission composed of fifteen members, two to be named by each of the Great Powers (United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) and five elected from among the Powers with special interests.

The Commission was charged to inquire into and report upon the following points:

1. The responsibility of the authors of the war.
2. The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.
3. The degree of responsibility for these offenses attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the general staffs, and other individuals, however highly placed.
4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offenses.
5. Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the inquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.

### COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION

At a meeting of the Powers with special interests held on the 27th of January, 1919, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania and Serbia were chosen as the Powers who should name representatives.<sup>1</sup>

After the several States had nominated their respective representatives, the Commission was constituted as follows:

#### *United States of America*

Hon. Robert Lansing.

Mr. James Brown Scott.

#### *Great Britain*

The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, K.C., M.P.

or

Sir Ernest Pollock, K.B.E., K.C., M.P.

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

<sup>1</sup> See Supplement VI to Protocol No. 2.



*France*

Mr. André Tardieu.  
 (Alternate: Captain R. Masson.)  
 Mr. F. Larnaude.

*Italy*

Mr. Scialoja.  
 (Alternates: Mr. Ricci Busatti, Mr. G. Tosti.)  
 Mr. Raimondo. Later, Mr. Brambilla (February 3);  
 Mr. M. d'Amelio (February 16).

*Japan*

Mr. Adatci.  
 Mr. Nagaoka. Later, Mr. S. Tachi (February 15).

*Belgium*

Mr. Rolin-Jaequemyns.

*Greece*

Mr. N. Politis.

*Poland*

Mr. C. Skirmunt. Later, Mr. N. Lubienski (February 14).

*Roumania*

Mr. S. Rosental.

*Serbia*

Professor S. Yovanovitch.  
 (Alternates: Mr. Koumanoudi, Mr. Novacovitch.)

## BUREAU OF COMMISSIONS

The Honorable R. Lansing was selected as Chairman of the Commission, and as Vice Chairmen, Sir Gordon Hewart or Sir Ernest Pollock and Mr. Scialoja. Mr. A. de Lapradelle (France) was named General Secretary and the Secretaries of the Commission were:

Mr. A. Kirk, United States of America; Lieutenant Colonel O. M. Biggar, British Empire; Mr. G. H. Tosti, Italy; Mr. Kuriyama, Japan; Lieutenant Baron J. Guillaume, Belgium; Mr. Spyridion Marchetti, Greece; Mr. Casimir Rybinski, Poland.

Mr. G. H. Carmerlynck, *Professeur agrégé* of the University of France, acted as interpreter to the Commission.

## SUBCOMMISSIONS

The Commission decided to appoint three Subcommissions.

Subcommission I, on Criminal Acts, was instructed to discover and collect the evidence necessary to establish the facts relating to culpable conduct which (a) brought about the World War and accompanied its inception, and (b) took place in the course of hostilities.

This Subcommission selected Mr. W. F. Massey as its Chairman.

Subcommission II, on the Responsibility for the War, was instructed to consider whether (1) on the facts established by the Subcommission on Criminal Acts in relation to the conduct which brought about the World War and accompanied its inception, prosecutions could be instituted, and, if it decided that prosecutions could be undertaken (2) to prepare a report indicating the individual or individuals who were, in its opinion, guilty, and the court before which prosecutions should proceed.

This Subcommission selected Sir Ernest Pollock as Chairman.

Subcommission III, on the Responsibility for the Violation of the Laws and Customs of War, was instructed to consider whether (1) on the facts established by the Subcommission on Criminal Acts in relation to conduct which took place in the course of hostilities, prosecutions could be instituted, and (2) if it decided that prosecutions could be undertaken, to prepare a report indicating the individual or individuals who were, in its opinion, guilty, and the court before which prosecutions should proceed.

This Subcommission selected the Hon. R. Lansing as its Chairman.

When the reports of the Subcommissions had been considered, a committee, composed of Mr. Rolin-Jaequemyns, Sir Ernest Pollock and Mr. M. d'Amelio was appointed to draft the report of the Commission. This committee was assisted by Mr. A. de Lapradelle and Lieutenant Colonel O. M. Biggar.

The Commission has the honor to submit its report to the Preliminary Peace Conference.

The report was adopted unanimously subject to certain reservations by the United States of America and certain other reservations by Japan.

The American delegation has set forth its reservations and the reasons therefor in a memorandum attached hereto,<sup>1</sup> and the same course has been taken by the Japanese Delegation.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Supplement II.

<sup>2</sup> Supplement III.

# REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE BY THE COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND ON ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES

## CHAPTER I.—RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR

On the question of the responsibility of the authors of the war, the Commission, after having examined a number of official documents relating to the origin of the World War, and to the violations of neutrality and of frontiers which accompanied its inception, has determined that the responsibility for it lies wholly upon the Powers which declared war in pursuance of a policy of aggression, the concealment of which gives to the origin of this war the character of a dark conspiracy against the peace of Europe.

This responsibility rests first on Germany and Austria, secondly on Turkey and Bulgaria. The responsibility is made all the graver by reason of the violation by Germany and Austria of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, which they themselves had guaranteed. It is increased, with regard to both France and Serbia, by the violation of their frontiers before the declaration of war.

### I. PREMEDITATION OF THE WAR

#### A. *Germany and Austria*

Many months before the crisis of 1914 the German Emperor had ceased to pose as the champion of peace. Naturally believing in the overwhelming superiority of his Army, he openly showed his enmity towards France. General von Moltke said to the King of the Belgians: "This time the matter must be settled." In vain the King protested. The Emperor and his Chief of Staff remained no less fixed in their attitude.<sup>1</sup>

On the 28th of June, 1914, occurred the assassination at Serajevo of the heir-apparent of Austria. "It is the act of a little group of madmen," said Francis Joseph.<sup>2</sup> The act, committed as it was by a subject of Austria-Hungary on Austro-Hungarian territory, could in no wise compromise Serbia, which very correctly expressed its condolences<sup>3</sup> and stopped public rejoicings in Belgrade. If the Government of Vienna thought that there was any Serbian complicity, Serbia was ready<sup>4</sup> to seek out the guilty parties. But this attitude failed to satisfy Austria and still less Germany, who, after their first astonishment had passed, saw in this royal and national misfortune a pretext to initiate war.

<sup>1</sup> Yellow Book; Mr. Cambon to Mr. Pichon, Berlin, November 22, 1913.

<sup>2</sup> Message to his people.

<sup>3</sup> Serbian Blue Book, p. 30.

<sup>4</sup> Yellow Book, No. 15; Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bienvenu-Martin, July 21, 1914.

At Potsdam a "decisive consultation" took place on the 5th of July, 1914.<sup>1</sup> Vienna and Berlin decided upon this plan: "Vienna will send to Belgrade a very emphatic ultimatum with a very short limit of time."<sup>2</sup>

The Bavarian Minister, von Lerchenfeld, said in a confidential dispatch dated the 18th of July, 1914, the facts stated in which have never been officially denied: "It is clear that Serbia can not accept the demands, which are inconsistent with the dignity of an independent state."<sup>3</sup> Count Lerchenfeld reveals in this report that, at the time it was made, the ultimatum to Serbia had been jointly decided upon by the Governments of Berlin and Vienna; that they were waiting to send it until President Poincaré and Mr. Viviani should have left for St. Petersburg; and that no illusions were cherished, either at Berlin or Vienna, as to the consequences which this threatening measure would involve. It was perfectly well known that war would be the result.

The Bavarian Minister explains, moreover, that the only fear of the Berlin Government was that Austria-Hungary might hesitate and draw back at the last minute, and that on the other hand Serbia, on the advice of France and Great Britain, might yield to the pressure put upon her. Now, "the Berlin Government considers that war is necessary." Therefore, it gave full powers to Count Berchtold, who instructed the Ballplatz on the 18th of July, 1914, to negotiate with Bulgaria to induce her to enter into an alliance and to participate in the war.

In order to mask this understanding, it was arranged that the Emperor should go for a cruise in the North Sea, and that the Prussian Minister of War should go for a holiday, so that the Imperial Government might pretend that events had taken it completely by surprise.

Austria suddenly sent Serbia an ultimatum that she had carefully prepared in such a way as to make it impossible to accept. Nobody could be deceived; "the whole world understands that this ultimatum means war."<sup>4</sup> According to Mr. Sazonoff, "Austria-Hungary wanted to devour Serbia."<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Sazonoff asked Vienna for an extension of the short time-limit of forty-eight hours given by Austria to Serbia for the most serious decision in its history.<sup>6</sup> Vienna refused the demand. On the 24th and 25th of July, England and France multiplied their efforts to persuade Serbia to satisfy the Austro-Hungarian demands. Russia threw in her weight on the side of conciliation.<sup>7</sup>

Contrary to the expectation of Austria-Hungary and Germany, Serbia yielded. She agreed to all the requirements of the ultimatum, subject to the single reservation that, in the judicial inquiry which she would commence for the purpose of seeking out the guilty parties, the participation of Austrian

<sup>1</sup> Lichnowsky memoir.

<sup>3</sup> Report of July 18, 1914.

<sup>5</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Muehlon's memoir.

<sup>4</sup> Lichnowsky memoir.

<sup>6</sup> Blue Book, No. 26.

<sup>7</sup> Yellow Book, No. 36; Blue Book, Nos. 12, 46, 55, 65, 94, 118.



officials would be kept within the limits assigned by international law. "If the Austro-Hungarian Government is not satisfied with this," Serbia declared she was ready "to submit to the decision of the Hague Tribunal."<sup>1</sup>

"A quarter of an hour before the expiration of the time limit," at 5.45 on the 25th, Mr. Pashitch, the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered this reply to Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

On Mr. Pashitch's return to his own office he found awaiting him a letter from Baron Giesl saying that he was not satisfied with the reply. At 6.30 the latter had left Belgrade, and even before he had arrived at Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Government had handed his passports to Mr. Yovanovitch, the Serbian Minister, and had prepared thirty-three mobilization proclamations, which were published on the following morning in the *Budapesti Kozlöní*, the official gazette of the Hungarian Government. On the 27th Sir Maurice de Bunsen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: "This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia."<sup>2</sup> At midday on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia. On the 29th the Austrian army commenced the bombardment of Belgrade, and made its dispositions to cross the frontier.

The reiterated suggestions of the Entente Powers with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the dispute only produced evasive replies on the part of Berlin or promises of intervention with the Government of Vienna without any effectual steps being taken.

On the 24th of July Russia and England asked that the Powers should be granted a reasonable delay in which to work in concert for the maintenance of peace. Germany did not join in this request.<sup>3</sup>

On the 25th of July Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation by four Powers (England, France, Italy and Germany). France<sup>4</sup> and Italy<sup>5</sup> immediately gave their concurrence. Germany<sup>6</sup> refused, alleging that it was not a question of mediation but of arbitration, as the conference of the four Powers was called to make proposals, not to decide.

On the 26th of July Russia proposed to negotiate directly with Austria. Austria refused.<sup>7</sup>

On the 27th of July England proposed a European conference. Germany refused.<sup>8</sup>

On the 29th of July Sir Edward Grey asked the Wilhelmstrasse to be good enough to "suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent a war between Austria and Russia."<sup>9</sup> She was asked herself to say what she desired.<sup>10</sup> Her reply was evasive.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Yellow Book, No. 46.

<sup>3</sup> Russian Orange Book, No. 4; Yellow Book, No. 43.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 72; Blue Book, No. 49.

<sup>7</sup> Yellow Book, No. 54.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 97; Blue Book, No. 84.

<sup>2</sup> Blue Book, No. 41.

<sup>4</sup> Yellow Book, No. 70.

<sup>6</sup> Blue Book, No. 43.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Nos. 68 and 73.

<sup>10</sup> Blue Book, No. 111.

<sup>11</sup> Yellow Book, Nos. 97, 98 and 109.



On the same day, the 29th of July, the Czar dispatched to the Emperor William II a telegram suggesting that the Austro-Serbian problem should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. This suggestion received no reply. This important telegram does not appear in the German White Book. It was made public by the Petrograd *Official Gazette* (January, 1915).

The Bavarian Legation, in a report dated the 31st of July, declared its conviction that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey to preserve peace would not hinder the march of events.<sup>1</sup>

As early as the 21st of July German mobilization had commenced by the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve,<sup>2</sup> then of German officers in Switzerland,<sup>3</sup> and finally of the Metz garrison on the 25th of July.<sup>4</sup> On the 26th of July the German Fleet was called back from Norway.<sup>5</sup>

The Entente did not relax its conciliatory efforts, but the German Government systematically brought all its attempts to nought. When Austria consented for the first time on the 31st of July to discuss the contents of the Serbian note with the Russian Government and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador received orders to "converse" with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs,<sup>6</sup> Germany made any negotiation impossible by sending her ultimatum to Russia. Prince Lichnowsky wrote that "a hint from Berlin would have been enough to decide Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and to declare that he was satisfied with the Serbian reply, but this hint was not given. *On the contrary they went forward towards war.*"<sup>7</sup>

On the 1st of August the German Emperor addressed a telegram to the King of England<sup>8</sup> containing the following sentence: "The troops on my frontier are, at this moment, being kept back by telegraphic and telephonic orders from crossing the French frontier." Now, war was not declared till two days after that date, and as the German mobilization orders were issued on that same day, the 1st of August, it follows that, as a matter of fact, the German Army had been mobilized and concentrated in pursuance of previous orders.

The attitude of the Entente nevertheless remained still to the very end so conciliatory that, at the very time at which the German fleet was bombarding Libau, Nicholas II gave his word of honor to William II that Russia would not undertake any aggressive action during the *pourparlers*,<sup>9</sup> and that when the German troops commenced their march across the French frontier Mr. Viviani telegraphed to all the French Ambassadors "we must not stop working for accommodation."

<sup>1</sup> Second report of Count Lerchenfeld, Bavarian plenipotentiary at Berlin, published on the instructions of Kurt Eisner.

<sup>2</sup> Yellow Book, No. 15.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 106.

<sup>6</sup> Blue Book, No. 133; Red Book, No. 55.

<sup>8</sup> White Book, Annex 32; Yellow Book, Annex II *bis*, No. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Telegram from Nicholas II to William II; Yellow Book, No. 6, Annex V.

<sup>3</sup> July 23, *ibid.*, No. 60.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 58.

<sup>7</sup> Lichnowsky memoir, p. 41.

On the 3d of August Mr. von Schoen went to the Quai d'Orsay with the declaration of war against France. Lacking a real cause of complaint, Germany alleged, in her declaration of war, that bombs had been dropped by French aeroplanes in various districts in Germany. This statement was entirely false. Moreover, it was either later admitted to be so<sup>1</sup> or no particulars were ever furnished by the German Government.

Moreover, in order to be manifestly above reproach, France was careful to withdraw her troops ten kilometers from the German frontier. Notwithstanding this precaution, numerous officially established violations of French territory preceded the declaration of war.<sup>2</sup>

The provocation was so flagrant that Italy, herself a member of the Triple Alliance, did not hesitate to declare that in view of the aggressive character of the war the *casus fœderis* ceased to apply.<sup>3</sup>

### B. Turkey and Bulgaria

The conflict was, however, destined to become more widespread and Germany and Austria were joined by allies.

Since the Balkan War the Young Turk Government had been drawing nearer and nearer Germany, whilst Germany on her part had constantly been extending her activities at Constantinople.

A few months before war broke out, Turkey handed over the command of her military and naval forces to the German General Liman von Sanders and the German Admiral Souchon.

In August, 1914, the former, acting under orders from the General Headquarters at Berlin, caused the Turkish army to begin mobilizing.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, on the 4th of August, the understanding between Turkey and Germany was definitely formulated in an alliance.<sup>5</sup> The consequence was that when the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* took refuge in the Bosphorus, Turkey closed the Dardanelles against the Entente squadrons and war followed.

On the 14th of October, 1915, Bulgaria declared war on Serbia, which country had been at war with Austria since the 28th of July, 1914, and had been attacked on all fronts by a large Austro-German Army since the 6th of October, 1915. Serbia had, however, committed no act of provocation against Bulgaria.

<sup>1</sup> Statement of the municipality of Nüremburg, dated April 3, 1916.

<sup>2</sup> (a) Patrols of various strengths crossed the French frontier at fifteen points, one on the 30th of July at Xures, eight on the 2d of August, and the others on the 3d of August, before war was declared.

The French troops lost one killed and several wounded. The enemy left on French territory four killed, one of whom was an officer, and seven prisoners. (b) At Suarce, on the 2d of August, the enemy carried off nine inhabitants, twenty-five horses, and three carriages. (c) Four incursions by German dirigibles took place between the 25th of July and the 1st of August. (d) Finally, German aeroplanes flew over Lunéville on the 3d of August, before the declaration of war, and dropped six bombs. (Yellow Book, Nos. 106, 136, 139, etc.)

<sup>3</sup> Yellow Book, No. 124.

<sup>4</sup> H. Morgenthau, *Secrets of the Bosphorus* (London, 1918), pp. 39, 40.

<sup>5</sup> Greek White Book, 1913, 1917, Nos. 19 and 20.

Serbia never formulated any claim against Bulgaria during the negotiations which took place between the Entente Powers and Bulgaria prior to the latter's entry into the war. On the contrary, she was offering herself ready to make certain territorial concessions to Bulgaria in order to second the efforts of the Entente Powers to induce Bulgaria to join them. According to Count Lerchenfeld's reports, however, Bulgaria had begun negotiations with the Central Powers as early as the 18th of July, 1914, with a view to entering the war on their side. In April, 1915, the Bulgars made an armed attack against Serbia near Valandovo and Struvmitza, where a real battle was fought on Serbian territory. Being defeated, the Bulgars retired, ascribing this act of aggression to some comitadjis. An international commission (composed of representatives of the Entente) discovered, however, that there had been Bulgarian regular officers and soldiers among the dead and the prisoners.<sup>1</sup>

On the 6th of September, 1915, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary concluded a treaty which recited that they had agreed to undertake common military action against Serbia and by which Austria-Hungary guaranteed to Bulgaria certain accretions of territory at Serbia's expense, and also agreed, jointly with Germany, to make to the Bulgarian Government a war loan of fr. 200,000,000, to be increased if the war lasted more than four months.<sup>2</sup> Even after this, Mr. Malinoff, one of the former Prime Ministers of Bulgaria, took part in negotiations with the Entente, and, while these negotiations were continuing, Bulgaria, on the 23d of September, mobilized, ostensibly to defend her neutrality.

No sooner had the army been mobilized and concentrated and Bulgarian forces massed on the whole length of the Serbian frontier, than the Bulgarian Government openly and categorically repudiated Mr. Malinoff, stating that he was in no way qualified to commit Bulgaria, and that he deserved "to be subjected to the utmost rigor of his country's laws for his conduct on that occasion." Some days later, Austro-German troops crossed the Danube and began to invade Serbia.

As soon as the Serbian troops began to retire, the Bulgars, on the pretext that the former had violated their frontier, launched the attack which eventually led to the complete subjugation of Serbia.

Two documents in the possession of the Serbian Government prove that this incident on the frontier was "arranged" and represented as a Serbian provocation. On the 10th of October, 1915, the Secretary General of the Foreign Office at Sofia, at the request of the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the following communication to Count Tarnowsky, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Sofia: "In order to divest the attack on Serbia of

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum I of the Serbian delegation, chap. II, par. c.

<sup>2</sup> Treaty between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, dated August 24/September 6, 1915 (furnished by the Serbian delegation).



the appearance of a preconceived plot, we shall, this evening or tomorrow morning, provoke a frontier incident in some uninhabited region.”<sup>1</sup> Also, on the 12th of October, 1915, Count Tarnowsky sent the following telegram to Vienna: “The commanding general informs me that the desired incident on the Serbian frontier was arranged yesterday.”<sup>2</sup>

Bulgaria, in fact, first attacked on October 12, 1915, two days before the declaration of war on Serbia, which took place on October 14, 1915. That this was the case does not prevent Bulgaria from asserting that the Serbs first crossed her frontier.

The above sequence of events proves that Bulgaria had premeditated war against Serbia, and perfidiously brought it about.

By means of German agents Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha had, since the spring of 1914, been aware of the Austro-German plan, *i.e.*, an attack by Austria against Serbia, the intervention by Germany against France, the passage through Belgium, the occupation of Paris in a fortnight, the closing of the Straits by Turkey, and the readiness of Bulgaria to take action. The Sultan acknowledged this plot to one of his intimates. It was indeed nothing but a plot engineered by heads of four States against the independence of Serbia and the peace of Europe.<sup>3</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

1. *The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable.*

2. *Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war.*

## 2.—VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

### A. Belgium

Germany is burdened by a specially heavy responsibility in respect to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg. Article I of the Treaty of London of the 19th of April, 1839, after declaring that Belgium should form a “perpetually neutral State,” had placed this neutrality under the protection of Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia and Prussia. On the 9th of August, 1870, Prussia had declared “her fixed determination to respect Belgian neutrality.” On the 22d of July, 1870, Bismarck wrote, “This declaration is rendered superfluous by existing treaties.”<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum I of the Serbian delegation, chap. II, par. c.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Basri Bey, *L'Orient débalkanisé et l'Albanie*, chap. II (Paris, 1919).

<sup>4</sup> To the Belgian Minister at Paris.

It may be of interest to recall that the attributes of neutrality were specifically defined by the fifth Hague Convention, of the 18th of October, 1907. That convention was declaratory of the law of nations, and contained these provisions: "The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable" (Article 1). "Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral Power" (Article 2). "The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts against its neutrality can not be regarded as a hostile act" (Article 10).

There can be no doubt of the binding force of the treaties which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. There is equally no doubt of Belgium's sincerity or of the sincerity of France in their recognition and respect of this neutrality.

On the 29th of July, 1914, the day following the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, Belgium put her army on its reinforced peace strength, and so advised the Powers by which her neutrality was guaranteed and also Holland and Luxemburg.<sup>1</sup>

On the 31st of July the French Minister at Brussels visited the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to notify him of the state of war proclaimed in Germany, and he spontaneously made the following statement: "I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile step. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities."<sup>2</sup>

On the 1st of August, the Belgian army was mobilized.<sup>3</sup>

On the 31st of July, the British Government had asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided that no other Power violated it.<sup>4</sup>

In notifying the Belgian Government on the same day of the action taken by the British Government, the British Minister added: "In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it."<sup>4</sup>

The immediate and quite definite reply of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs was that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing Belgian independence could rest assured that she would neglect no effort to maintain her neutrality.<sup>5</sup>

On the same day, Paris and Berlin were officially asked the question to which reference was made in the British communication. At Paris the reply was categorical: "The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other

<sup>1</sup> First Grey Book, No. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 11.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 9.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 10.



Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defense of her own security, to act otherwise."<sup>1</sup>

On the same day as this reply was made at Paris, the French Minister at Brussels made the following communication to Mr. Davignon, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs: "I am authorized to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defense, might find it necessary to modify their attitude."<sup>2</sup>

It was decided that this communication should forthwith be made to the Belgian press.

Meanwhile the attitude of the German Government remained enigmatic. At Brussels the German Minister, Mr. von Below, made efforts in his discussions to maintain confidence<sup>3</sup>; but at Berlin, in reply to the question which had been officially asked by the British Government, the Secretary of State informed the British Ambassador that "he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer."<sup>4</sup>

On the 2d of August, in the course of the day, Mr. von Below insisted to the Belgian Minister, Mr. Davignon, upon the feelings of security which Belgium had the right to entertain towards her eastern neighbor,<sup>5</sup> and on the same day, at seven o'clock in the evening, he sent him a "very confidential" note, which was nothing more than an ultimatum claiming free passage for German troops through Belgian territory.<sup>6</sup>

It was impossible to be under any delusion as to the purely imaginary character of the reason alleged by the German Government in support of its demand. It pretended that it had reliable information leaving "no doubt as to the intention of France to move through Belgian territory" against Germany, and consequently had notified its decision to direct its forces to enter Belgium.<sup>6</sup>

The facts themselves supply the answer to the German allegation that France intended to violate Belgian neutrality. According to the French plan of mobilization, the French forces were being concentrated at that very moment on the German frontier, and it was necessary, by reason of the situation created by the German violation of Belgian territory, to modify the arrangements for their transport.

In the meantime, at seven o'clock in the morning of the 3d of August, at the expiration of the time-limit fixed by the ultimatum, Belgium had sent her reply to the German Minister. Affected neither by Germany's promises nor her threats, the Belgian Government boldly declared that an attack upon

<sup>1</sup> Blue Book, No. 125.

<sup>4</sup> Blue Book, No. 122.

<sup>2</sup> First Grey Book, No. 15.

<sup>5</sup> First Grey Book, No. 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 19.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 20.

Belgian independence would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. "No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty toward Europe." In conclusion, the Belgian Government declared that they were "firmly resolved to repel by all the means in their power every attack upon their rights."<sup>1</sup>

Even on the 3d of August, Belgium refused to appeal to the guaranty of the Powers until there was an actual violation of territory.<sup>2</sup>

It was only on the 4th of August, after German troops had entered Belgian territory, that the Belgian Government sent his passports to Mr. von Below,<sup>3</sup> and it then appealed to Great Britain, France and Russia to cooperate as guaranteeing Powers in the defense of her territory.<sup>4</sup> At this point it may be recalled that the pretext invoked by Germany in justification of the violation of Belgian neutrality, and the invasion of Belgian territory, seemed to the German Government itself of so little weight, that in Sir Edward Goschen's conversations with the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, and with von Jagow, the Secretary of State, it was not a question of aggressive French intentions, but a "matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality," and of "a scrap of paper."<sup>5</sup> Further, in his speech on the 4th of August, the German Chancellor made his well-known avowal: "Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. . . . We have been obliged to refuse to pay attention to the justifiable protests of Belgium and Luxemburg. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we are thereby committing we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced, as we are, and is fighting for his all can only consider how he is to hack his way through."

To this avowal of the German Chancellor there is added the overwhelming testimony of Count von Lerchenfeld, who stated in a report of the 4th of August, 1914, that the German General Staff considered it "necessary to cross Belgium: France can only be successfully attacked from that side. At the risk of bringing about the intervention of England, Germany can not respect Belgian neutrality."<sup>6</sup>

As for the Austrian Government, it waited until the 28th of August to declare war against Belgium,<sup>7</sup> but as early as the middle of the month "the motor batteries sent by Austria had proved their excellence in the battles around Namur,"<sup>8</sup> as appears from a proclamation of the German general who

<sup>1</sup> First Grey Book, No. 22.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 24.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 30.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 42.

<sup>5</sup> Blue Book, No. 160.

<sup>6</sup> *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Dienstag, August 4, 1914.* See also E. Mühlner. *Des Weltkrieges und das Völkerrecht*, Berlin, G. Reimer, 1915, pp. 24 *et seq.*

<sup>7</sup> First Grey Book, No. 77.

<sup>8</sup> Second Grey Book, No. 104.

at the time was in command of the fortress of Liége, which German troops had seized.

Consequently, the participation of Austria-Hungary in the violation of Belgian neutrality is aggravated by the fact that she took part in that violation without any previous declaration of war.

### B. *Luxemburg*

The neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed by Article 2 of the Treaty of London, May 11, 1867, Prussia and Austria-Hungary being two of the guarantor Powers. On the 2d of August, 1914, German troops penetrated the territory of the Grand Duchy. Mr. Eyschen, Minister of State of Luxemburg, immediately made an energetic protest.<sup>1</sup>

The German Government alleged "that military measures had become inevitable, because trustworthy news had been received that French forces were marching on Luxemburg." This allegation was at once refuted by Mr. Eyschen.<sup>2</sup>

### CONCLUSION

*The neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by the treaties of April 19, 1839, and that of Luxemburg, guaranteed by the treaty of May 11, 1867, were deliberately violated by Germany and Austria-Hungary.*

## CHAPTER II.—VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR<sup>3</sup>

### SUPPLEMENT

#### MEMORANDUM OF RESERVATIONS PRESENTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON RESPONSIBILITIES

*April 4, 1919.*

The American members of the Commission on Responsibilities, in presenting their reservations to the report of the Commission, declare that they are as earnestly desirous as the other members of the Commission that those persons responsible for causing the Great War and those responsible for violations of the laws and customs of war should be punished for their crimes, moral and legal. The differences which have arisen between them and their colleagues lie in the means of accomplishing this common desire. The American members therefore submit to the Conference on the Preliminaries

<sup>1</sup> Yellow Book, No. 151.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 2d of August, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> [Chapters III, IV, and V omitted here.]



of Peace a memorandum of the reasons for their dissent from the report of the Commission and from certain provisions for insertion in treaties with enemy countries, as stated in Supplement IV, and suggestions as to the cause of action which they consider should be adopted in dealing with the subjects upon which the Commission on Responsibilities was directed to report.

Preliminary to a consideration of the points at issue and the irreconcilable differences which have developed and which make this dissenting report necessary, we desire to express our high appreciation of the conciliatory and considerate spirit manifested by our colleagues throughout the many and protracted sessions of the Commission. From the first of these, held on February 3, 1919, there was an earnest purpose shown to compose the differences which existed, to find a formula acceptable to all, and to render, if possible, a unanimous report. That this purpose failed was not because of want of effort on the part of any member of the Commission. It failed because, after all the proposed means of adjustment had been tested with frank and open minds, no practicable way could be found to harmonize the differences without an abandonment of principles which were fundamental. This the representatives of the United States could not do and they could not expect it of others.

In the early meetings of the Commission and the three subcommissions appointed to consider various phases of the subject submitted to the Commission, the American members declared that there were two classes of responsibilities, those of a legal nature and those of a moral nature, that legal offenses were justiciable and liable to trial and punishment by appropriate tribunals, but that moral offenses, however iniquitous and infamous and however terrible in their results, were beyond the reach of judicial procedure, and subject only to moral sanctions.

While this principle seems to have been adopted by the Commission in the report so far as the responsibility for the authorship of the war is concerned, the Commission appeared unwilling to apply it in the case of indirect responsibility for violations of the laws and customs of war committed after the outbreak of the war and during its course. It is respectfully submitted that this inconsistency was due in large measure to a determination to punish certain persons, high in authority, particularly the heads of enemy states, even though heads of states were not hitherto legally responsible for the atrocious acts committed by subordinate authorities. To such an inconsistency the American members of the Commission were unwilling to assent, and from the time it developed that this was the unchangeable determination of certain members of the Commission they doubted the possibility of a unanimous report. Nevertheless, they continued their efforts on behalf of the adoption of a consistent basis of principle, appreciating the desirability of unanimity if it could be attained. That their efforts were futile they deeply regret.

With the manifest purpose of trying and punishing those persons to whom reference has been made, it was proposed to create a high tribunal with an international character, and to bring before it those who had been marked as responsible, not only for directly ordering illegal acts of war, but for having abstained from preventing such illegal acts.

Appreciating the importance of a judicial proceeding of this nature, as well as its novelty, the American representatives laid before the Commission a memorandum upon the constitution and procedure of a tribunal of an international character which, in their opinion, should be formed by the union of existing national military tribunals or commissions of admitted competence in the premises. And in view of the fact that "customs" as well as "laws" were to be considered, they filed another memorandum, attached hereto, as to the principles which should, in their opinion, guide the Commission in considering and reporting on this subject.

The practice proposed in the memorandum as to the military commissions was in part accepted, but the purpose of constituting a high tribunal for the trial of persons exercising sovereign rights was persisted in, and the abstention from preventing violations of the laws and customs of war and of humanity was insisted upon. It was frankly stated that the purpose was to bring before this tribunal the ex-Kaiser of Germany, and that the jurisdiction of the tribunals must be broad enough to include him even if he had not directly ordered the violations.

To the unprecedented proposal of creating an international criminal tribunal and to the doctrine of negative criminality the American members refused to give their assent.

On January 25, 1919, the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace in plenary session recommended the appointment of a Commission to examine and to report to the Conference upon the following five points:

1. The responsibility of the authors of the war.
2. The facts as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and its Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.
3. The degree of responsibility for these crimes attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the general staffs, and other individuals, however highly placed.
4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offenses.
5. Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above points which may arise in the course of the inquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.

## I

The conclusions reached by the Commission as to the responsibility of the authors of the war, with which the representatives of the United States agree, are thus stated:



The war was premeditated by the Central Powers, together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable.

Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war.

The American representatives are happy to declare that they not only concur in these conclusions, but also in the process of reasoning by which they are reached and justified. However, in addition to the evidence adduced by the Commission, based for the most part upon official memoranda issued by the various governments in justification of their respective attitudes towards the Serbian question and the war which resulted because of the deliberate determination of Austria-Hungary and Germany to crush that gallant little country which blocked the way to the Dardanelles and to the realization of their larger ambitions, the American representatives call attention to four documents, three of which have been made known by His Excellency Milenko R. Vesnich, Serbian Minister at Paris. Of the three, the first is reproduced for the first time, and two of the others were only published during the sessions of the Commission.

The first of these documents is a report of von Wiesner, the Austro-Hungarian agent sent to Serajevo to investigate the assassination at that place on June 28, 1914, of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and the Duchess of Hohenberg, his morganatic wife.

The material portion of this report, in the form of a telegram, is as follows:

*Mr. von Wiesner, to the Foreign Ministry, Vienna*

SERAJEVO, July 13, 1914, 1.10 p. m.

Cognizance on the part of the Serbian Government, participation in the murderous assault, or in its preparation, and supplying the weapons, proved by nothing, nor even to be suspected. On the contrary there are indications which cause this to be rejected.

The second is likewise a telegram, dated Berlin, July 25, 1914, from Count Szögyeny, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, and reads as follows:

*Count Szögyeny to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vienna*

BERLIN, July 25, 1914.

Here it is generally taken for granted that in case of a possible refusal on the part of Serbia, our immediate declaration of war will be coincident with military operations. Delay in beginning military operations is here considered as a great danger because of the intervention of other Powers. We are urgently advised to proceed at once and to confront the world with a *fait accompli*.

The third, likewise a telegram in cipher, marked "strictly confidential," and dated Berlin, July 27, 1914, two days after the Serbian reply to the Aus-

tro-Hungarian ultimatum and the day before the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war upon that devoted kingdom, was from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna. The material portion of this document is as follows:

*Count Szögyeny to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna*

307, strictly confidential

BERLIN, July 27, 1914.

The Secretary of State informed me very definitely and in the strictest confidence that in the near future possible proposals for mediation on the part of England would be brought to Your Excellency's knowledge by the German Government.

The German Government gives its most binding assurance that *it does not in any way associate itself with the proposals*; on the contrary, it is absolutely opposed to their consideration and only transmits them in compliance with the English request.

Of the English propositions, to which reference is made in the above telegram, the following may be quoted, which, under date July 30, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin:

If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her Allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately.<sup>1</sup>

While comment upon these telegrams would only tend to weaken their force and effect, it may nevertheless be observed that the last of them was dated two days before the declaration of war by Germany against Russia, which might have been prevented, had not Germany, flushed with the hope of certain victory and of the fruits of conquest, determined to force the war.

The report of the Commission treats separately the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg, and reaches the conclusion, in which the American representatives concur, that the neutrality of both of these countries was deliberately violated. The American representatives believe, however, that it is not enough to state or to hold with the Commission that "the war was premeditated by the Central Powers," that "Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war," and to declare that the neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by the treaty of the 19th of April, 1839, and that of Luxemburg, guaranteed by the treaty of the 11th of May, 1867, were deliberately violated by Germany and Austria-Hungary. They are of the opinion that these acts should be condemned in no uncertain terms and that their perpetrators should be held up to the execration of mankind.

<sup>1</sup> British Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, No. 10 (1915), *Collected Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War*, p. 78.

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NOTE OF TRANSMITTAL OF COUNT BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU  
OF MAY 28, 1919

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

VERSAILLES, *May 28, 1919.*

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Allied and Associated Governments have in Your Excellency's note of the 20th of May refused to communicate to the German delegates the report of their commissions appointed to inquire into the question of the responsibility of the authors of the war. Material parts of the report having, however, been published by the press, the German delegates have called upon a committee of independent Germans, namely, Messrs. Hans Delbrück, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Count Max Montgelas and Max Weber, to examine the facts contained in this report and to make a statement thereon. I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the observations made by these gentlemen on the report of the Allied and Associated Governments concerning the responsibility of the authors of the war.

Kindly accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest regard.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU.

To His Excellency Mr. Clemenceau,  
President of the Peace Conference, etc.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE  
ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS ON THE  
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR

I. NECESSITY OF AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION

The undersigned are of opinion that the question of the responsibility for the outbreak of war can not be decided by one side which was itself a party to the war, but that only a commission of inquiry, recognized by both sides as impartial, to which all records are accessible and before which both parties alike can state their case, can venture to pronounce judgment as to the measure in which each single Government is responsible for the fact that the catastrophe dreaded by all nations has overtaken mankind.

Of the many entirely untenable opinions expressed in the report of the Commission of the Allied and Associated Governments, those points relating to purely military questions are dealt with in Supplements I to III. The political questions are discussed with all possible brevity in the following pages.

II. DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

It must be remarked, by way of introduction, that there can be no question of the overwhelming numerical superiority of the German Army. Incontestable statistics prove that, apart from the Landsturm and other equivalent formations, Germany and Austria-Hungary, with a joint population of 116,000,000, could bring not quite 6,000,000 combatants into the field, whereas Russia and France, with a population numbering 210,000,000, had at least 9,000,000 combatants at their disposal. An overwhelming numerical superiority there was, but it was not on the German side.

As regards the statement erroneously attributed to General von Moltke, reference is made to his letter in Supplement IV. Count Montgelas, a cosignatory hereof, who for two years was the immediate subordinate of General von Moltke, can prove by absolutely authentic facts that the sentiments of the General were opposed to any war. His skeptical opinion as to the issue of a world war is established by documentary evidence.

The underlying causes of the Serbo-Austrian conflict, the Greater-Serbian movement, which menaced the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on the one hand, and the policy of economic suppression of the Serbian nation on the other, can not here be exhaustively discussed. The assertion that a secret plot was engineered between Berlin and Vienna for the destruc-



tion of Serbia must, however, be denied in the most emphatic manner. In the memorandum laid before the Reichstag on August 3, 1914, the German Government publicly stated that it approved the attitude adopted in Vienna with regard to the Serajevo murder and the line of action which Vienna considered necessary. The objects aimed at by that action were not communicated to Berlin in detail, but were definitely limited and included no plan of annexation; it is known that Count Tisza made his consent to the ultimatum expressly conditional upon the renunciation of any such idea.

The alleged subsequent disclosures of Eisner and others mentioned in the report of the Commission, in so far as they did not contain inaccuracies, have added nothing fresh to the facts as they are stated above. The full text of the correspondence exchanged between the two Kaisers and their respective Governments at the beginning of July, 1914 has also been subsequently published. No Crown Council was held on the 5th of July. The report of the Commission makes mention, in vague terms only, of deliberations resulting in grave decisions. The topics with which these deliberations were actually concerned are set forth in Supplement V. The Kaiser's Scandinavian tour began on the date on which it usually began every year, while the Prussian Minister for War had already applied for leave on the 2d of July. It may also be mentioned in passing that the Bavarian report of the 18th of July mentioned by the Commission, which contains several inaccuracies already publicly corrected, did not emanate from the Minister, Count Lerchenfeld, but from the Counselor to the Legation, von Schoen. The utter lack of foundation for the statement that Bulgaria was at that time incited to make war on Serbia can further be proved by the German State records.

Austria had, it is true, adopted the position that the previous failures of Serbia to redeem her promises forbade her to be satisfied with the results of purely diplomatic action and constrained her to rely on the effect produced by a military expedition. Germany approved of this attitude and thereby encouraged Austria.

The world is now longing for a League of Nations, in which military measures shall no longer be admissible, and all nations, whether large or small, strong or weak, shall enjoy equal political and economic rights. But the measures taken against Serbia were not in conflict with the procedure employed *at that time* by other States, and they were conceived in good faith as a means of removing inflammable material which had for a long time contained within itself the danger of a world war. Nevertheless, in 1914 the German Government itself considered that the ultimatum went too far.<sup>1</sup> In the opinion of the undersigned an especially harsh feature consisted in the short time limit of forty-eight hours, which was not extended in spite of subsequent representations.

<sup>1</sup> Blue Book, No. 18.



Again, the German Government itself recognized, in its note of the 28th of July, which is discussed below,<sup>1</sup> the conciliatory character of the Serbian reply. A settlement by mediation of the differences of opinion outstanding after that reply would have been more in accordance with that spirit of trust referred to by Sir Edward Grey on the 30th of July,<sup>2</sup> a spirit which it is hoped will govern all future relations between nations and Governments. The primary condition for that, as for any feeling of trust which could exert decisive influence on other occasions would of course have been the belief that the English Foreign Secretary had not only the will, uninfluenced by any calculation of immediate advantage, but also the power to hold in check the indisputably warlike intentions of Russia. This is no longer doubted by any of the undersigned, so far as the good-will of Sir Edward Grey is concerned. The only question is whether that good-will was expressed in a manner and, in view of the bearing of Russia which compromised the whole situation, whether it could have been expressed in time to inspire the German Government with that confidence. For how far Imperial Russia was from sharing this modern outlook is shown by the attached Russo-Serbian State documents, which have not yet been published in their entirety.<sup>3</sup>

The Berlin Government, in its effort to localize the dispute between Serbia and Austria by diplomatic means, adopted at the outset a negative attitude towards the proposal of mediation made in particular by England. It thought that the danger which was continually threatening the peace of the world could not be averted in this way. Yet in the report of the Commission it is astounding that no mention is made of the fact that the direct exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd was proposed by Germany, and that Sir Edward Grey himself acknowledged this to be "the most preferable method of all."<sup>4</sup> Further, it is difficult to understand the mistake made in Blue Book No. 43, which attributes to Germany the refusal to accept mediation by the four Powers, since this telegram did not refer to that proposal, but to one for a conference. Germany was always prepared to accept mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia.<sup>5</sup> Finally, it is especially remarkable that no mention is made in the report of the Commission of the three well-known German notes, revealing how strong the pressure was which the Berlin Government brought to bear from the 28th of July onwards on the Cabinet at Vienna. The undersigned therefore venture to quote certain extracts from these important documents.

On the 28th of July the attention of Vienna was drawn to the conciliatory nature of the Serbian reply, and they were urged not to persist in their attitude of reserve towards proposals for mediation received from German and other sources (published in a Wolff telegram, the 12th of October, 1917).

On the 29th (dispatched on the night of the 29th/30th) the refusal to ex-

<sup>1</sup> Wolff telegram of the 12th of October, 1917.

<sup>3</sup> Supplement VI.

<sup>4</sup> Blue Book, No. 67.

<sup>2</sup> Blue Book, No. 101.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Nos. 18 and 46.

change views with Petersburg was characterized as a grave error, and it was stated, in addition: "We are indeed prepared to fulfil our duty as allies, but must refuse to allow Vienna to draw us light-heartedly into a world conflagration in disregard of our advice." (Already published in the *Westminster Gazette* of August 1, 1914, and also communicated to the German Reichstag on August 19, 1915.)

On the same night the following telegram was sent to Vienna in support of Sir Edward Grey's proposal, as contained in Blue Book No. 88:

If Austria refuses all intervention, we are faced by a conflagration in which England would be against us and, judging from all appearances, Italy and Roumania would not be with us, so that we two should be opposed to four great Powers. With England as an enemy, the brunt of the fighting would fall on Germany. Austria's political prestige, the honor of her arms, and her just claims against Serbia would receive full satisfaction by the occupation of Belgrade or other places. The humiliation of Serbia would reestablish Austria's position in the Balkans, and in relation to Russia. In these circumstances we must most emphatically urge the Cabinet at Vienna to consider seriously the possibility of accepting the mediation offered under such honorable conditions. Otherwise the responsibility for the consequences will be exceedingly heavy for Austria and for us.<sup>1</sup>

*The means of maintaining peace were found* in the above-mentioned proposal for mediation made on the afternoon of the 29th of July.<sup>2</sup> Berlin accepted it willingly and urged its acceptance on Vienna in such peremptory terms as probably no ally ever used before in addressing another ally in a solemn hour. It is indeed no fault of the German Government if the diplomatic negotiations, which came so near to success, were abruptly interrupted by military measures taken by the other side.

As regards the documents published by the Serbian Minister in Paris, von Wiesner's report of the 13th of July, 1914, was never brought to the notice of Berlin. The telegram of the 25th of July, 1914, from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Szögyeny, urging that military operations should be begun quickly in the event of a declaration of war, belongs to the same category of ideas as the already-mentioned view that the localization and speedy settlement of this conflict would be the best means of preventing the conflagration from spreading. As regards Count Szögyeny's telegram of the 27th of July concerning the rejection of possible English proposals for mediation, the Commission referred to von Bethmann-Hollweg, Imperial Chancellor at the time, and to von Jagow, the Secretary of State, and was informed by both with one voice that this report could not possibly be true. We consider the statements of both men trustworthy; especially in consideration of

<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Main Committee of the German Reichstag on the 9th of November, 1916.

<sup>2</sup> Blue Book, No. 88.

the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador was old even beyond his years. In reality—and this is the important consideration—the German Government did not act in that way, but from the 28th of July onwards did everything possible to induce Austria to accept proposals for mediation. With respect to the resumption of direct conversations, some measure of success was attained.<sup>1</sup> The Ambassador's assertion is, however, one of the numerous individual points which prove the urgent necessity for investigation by a neutral commission.

Finally we must touch upon the fact that the Czar's proposal of the 29th of July to submit the Austro-Serbian question to a court of arbitration at The Hague found no support. Official documents disclose nothing as to the reason, which is doubtless to be found in the fact that the mobilization of thirteen Russian army corps, ordered on that day, gave ground for the fear that Russia would make use of the period of The Hague negotiations to extend her preparations for war. However one may regard this reason in the light of present day ideas, the undersigned believe that the Czar's proposal would only have had a chance of success if it had been accompanied by the cessation of Russian mobilization. As a matter of fact, however, on the very day on which the Czar proposed reference to the Court of Arbitration, his military and diplomatic advisers decided to extend the Russian partial mobilization into a general mobilization (Supplement I).

### III. THE CATASTROPHE

This general mobilization by Russia had the effect of preventing any possibility of that happy solution of the crisis most emphatically supported by Germany on the lines indicated in Blue Book No. 88.

During recent years (as is shown in detail in Supplement I), preparations for Russian mobilization had been considerably increased and improved. The period of preparation for war throughout European Russia, and therefore against Germany, had already begun on the 26th of July. The partial Russian mobilization decided on in principle on the 25th of July, and ordered on the 29th of July, had already secured the numerical superiority of the Russian and Serbian troops over the Austro-Hungarian army. The general Russian mobilization determined upon on the twenty-ninth, and ordered on the thirtieth, was in no way justified by any military measure on the part of Germany or Austria-Hungary.

None of these facts receive even a passing notice in the report of the Commission. The silence concerning the general Russian mobilization is all the more remarkable inasmuch as no difference of opinion existed in 1914 with regard to the significance of this measure. It is known what urgent warnings were uttered by the British Ambassador in Petersburg against this fatal step.<sup>2</sup> In the *Times* of the 30th of July, Colonel Repington voiced the gen-

<sup>1</sup> Red Book, No. 50.

<sup>2</sup> Blue Book, No. 17.



eral impression in the following words: "and in a very short time after a Russian mobilization is announced, it will be a miracle if all Europe is not aflame."

Still less could the far-reaching effects of the Russian mobilization fail to be understood in France. On the 18th of August, 1892, the day following the conclusion of the Franco-Russian military convention, General Boisdeffre had in fact explained to the Czar that "mobilization is equivalent to a declaration of war."<sup>1</sup> It was no doubt their realization of the gravity of this step which induced the French Government to conceal for as long as possible the fact that Russia had mobilized. As late as the 31st of July at 7 p.m. (9 p.m. Petersburg time), the French Minister for Foreign Affairs assured the German Ambassador that "he had no information whatever of the alleged general mobilization of the Russian army and fleet."<sup>2</sup> Now it is absolutely impossible that a single member of the diplomatic corps in Petersburg should not have been aware of the order published there early that morning, and in any case, according to a secret telegram from Iswolsky, published in the *Pravda* of the 9th of March, 1919, a telegram from the French Ambassador in Petersburg announcing "the general and complete mobilization of the Russian army" had been received in Paris the morning of the thirty-first.

No person acquainted with the subject could have the slightest doubt as to the meaning of the Russian mobilization to Germany. War on two fronts stared her in the face, a war to be carried on against a crushing superiority of numbers. In the west there stood an army prepared in all respects for the immediate commencement of operations. Defensive tactics on both fronts meant certain disaster. In the opinion not only of the military authorities in Berlin, but of military authorities throughout the world, it was imperative that action should be taken with the greatest possible rapidity on the western front, that is to say, against the enemy who was best prepared and could be reached first; so that every week, and indeed every day gained, became of vital importance.

It is no doubt to be regretted that, in the German declaration of war on France, allegations of attacks by French aircraft were carelessly adopted without any examination of their accuracy; but it in no wise alters the fact that as soon as the Russian mobilization was known French mobilization had to be reckoned with, *i.e.*, war on two fronts. This view has subsequently been confirmed by the publication of clauses of the Franco-Russian military convention of the 17th of August, 1892, which stipulated that in case of the mobilization of only one of the States composing the Triple Alliance, the entire French and Russian forces should be mobilized immediately and simultaneously and should engage a decisive battle with all speed (*ces forces s'engageront à fond, en toute diligence*).

<sup>1</sup> "Je lui ai fait remarquer que la mobilisation c'était la déclaration de guerre." Third French Yellow Book, No. 71.

<sup>2</sup> Yellow Book, No. 117.



In the event of a general Russian mobilization, any German Government which waited on the pretext of an offer of negotiations until that mobilization had been completed would have taken upon itself a fearful responsibility before its own people—a responsibility which nobody could bear. The documents delivered to the enemy Governments prove that so long as Czarism lasted its plans were such as to render it impossible to assume responsibility for such a course. In any circumstances, such responsibility could have been incurred only if some international authority had existed invested with powers of coercion sufficient to guarantee unconditionally that the negotiations would not in any case be utilized as a means of developing that vast preponderance of strength, and subsequently broken off, thus involving Germany in a war to which there could be only one issue. But no international authority endowed with such powers existed at that time.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

Germany approved Austria's purpose of crushing forever the Greater-Serbian agitation by action to be supported, if necessary, by force of arms. It would have been of decisive importance if, immediately after the receipt of the Serbian reply on the twenty-seventh, the Cabinet of Vienna had been restrained from taking irrevocable measures, for by that day the Berlin Government had already received the impression that Serbia had gone a long way to meet Austria. On the twenty-eighth, after thorough examination of the note, every effort was made to induce the Cabinet of Vienna to alter its intentions. Berlin supported particularly by the strongest means imaginable the proposal made by Sir E. Grey on the afternoon of the 29th of July; this proposal guaranteed to Austria-Hungary the satisfaction which all the Great Powers agreed in regarding as her due. The reason for the delay in the reply of the Cabinet of Vienna to this last proposal is not known to the undersigned. This is one of the most vital points which still requires elucidation. As regards Berlin, the documents leave no room for doubt that a change of opinion took place between the twenty-sixth and the twenty-eighth, and the undersigned are convinced that it is solely ascribable to the inability to reach a decision that all the measures implied in this change were not carried into effect as soon as the twenty-seventh.

Germany did not desire the World War, although she may have regarded it as a danger which lay within the sphere of practical considerations. For more than forty years the German Government, to use the very words of the report of the Commission, was considered as a "champion of peace."<sup>1</sup> Plans of conquest were worlds removed from the thoughts of the leading German statesmen.

In Russia it was otherwise. The realization of the purposes of leading Panslavist circles was unattainable without war. These elements hostile

<sup>1</sup> Yellow Book, No. 6.

to peace made their will prevail during the decisive days, for just at the moment when peace appeared to be assured Russia took the measures which made it impossible. The undersigned cannot refrain from expressing the opinion that, if the pressure brought to bear on Petersburg by London and Paris had been as powerful as that exercised by Berlin on Vienna, the fatal step which the military, in their lust for war, were able to take against the will of the Czar might have been averted.

#### V. VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

As regards the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, the undersigned fully share the view expressed by the German Imperial Chancellor on the 4th of August, 1914, amid the applause of the Reichstag, that it was "a wrong to be made good." They regret that during the war this conception was temporarily abandoned, and that a subsequent justification of the German irruption should have been attempted.

#### VI. RETROSPECTIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Finally, the undersigned are constrained to make the following general observations, viz.:

In our opinion, the question of the origin of the war can never be settled in principle by the method adopted in the report of the enemy Commission—that is, by the enumeration of single occasions which transformed a chronic state of high political tension into a war. In addition to the utter and astonishing inaccuracy in the presentation of single facts, that is where the fundamental mistake of the entire proceeding lies. It is rather a case in which the following questions should be put:

1. Which governments had in the past done most to promote that state of constant menace of war from which Europe suffered for years before the war?

Further, and in connection therewith—

2. Which governments pursued political and economic aims which could only be realized by means of a war?

As regards the main point of the second question, we cannot refrain from observing that in the future evidence on which to base an answer will also be found in the conditions of peace now under discussion—especially such conditions as have an economic and territorial character—if they are to be insisted on.

However, as regards both the points which are of decisive importance in forming a judgment on the problem, the following must be said:

The former German Government, in our view, committed serious errors, but they are to be found in quite a different quarter from that in which a certain section of public opinion among our enemies seeks them. Above all they certainly do not lie in the direction of "premeditation" of war with any of the enemy Powers on the part of any responsible German statesman.

Such a policy would, moreover, have received no support among the German people. It is one of the most lamentable mistakes of a section of foreign public opinion that the reprehensible and irresponsible utterances of a small group of chauvinist writers should be regarded as the expression of the mental attitude of the German nation, whilst, unfortunately, much larger groups in other countries pandered in at least as great a degree to chauvinism by their utterances.

The real mistakes of German policy lay much further back. The German Chancellor who was in office in 1914 had taken over a political inheritance which either condemned as hopeless, from the very start, his unreservedly honest attempt to relieve the tension of the international situation, or demanded a degree of statesmanship and above all a strength of decision which on the one hand he did not sufficiently possess, and on the other could not make effective within the structure of the German State as it existed at that time. It is a capital error to seek to place moral blame in quarters where in reality nervousness, weakness in face of the noisy demeanor of the above-mentioned small but unscrupulous group, and lack of ability to make quick unequivocal decisions in difficult situations brought about disaster. As regards the period of German diplomacy immediately prior to the outbreak of war, an exhaustive account will be given in a publication filling several volumes, which it has taken many months to prepare. Any one, however, who reads the instructions of the Imperial Chancellor during the time immediately preceding the outbreak of war must acquiesce in the judgment pronounced above. As an immediate inference derived from statements received from the Cabinet in Vienna, the German Government considered an Austrian military expedition against Serbia essential for the preservation of peace. The German Government held itself obliged to take the risk of Russian intervention with its implication for itself of a *casus fœderis*. Germany gave her ally, Austria, a completely free hand as to the nature of the demands to be made by her on Serbia. When the ultimatum was followed by an answer which appeared to Germany herself sufficient to justify the abandonment of the expedition after all, she communicated this view to Vienna. But she clearly had too great confidence in the conduct of foreign affairs at that time in Vienna, and so did not act at once but only on the next day; then, indeed, she acted with the greatest possible energy and took the extreme step of threatening to refuse the help due to her ally. It is, however, uncertain whether a world war could have been averted even if she had acted more promptly.

For, as regards responsibility in the sense attached to the word in this present discussion, we must set it upon record that among the great European Powers, there existed at least one, whose policy, pursued systematically for many years before the war, could only be realized by an offensive war, and which therefore worked deliberately towards that end. That power



was Russian Czarism, acting in conjunction with the highly influential Russian circles, which had been drawn into the orbit of its policy. The documents quoted above, of which part have not yet been published, and more especially Sazonoff's letter to Hartwig, the Minister at Belgrade, prove that the Russian Government was deliberately luring Serbia, by instructions to its representatives in Belgrade and by other means, along the path of conquest at the expense of the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary, within which lay Serbia's "promised land," and had in view joint military action with this aggressive object. In the opinion of the undersigned it is fully evident that Russia did not act thus out of disinterested friendship for Serbia, but because she was persistently pursuing the disruption of Austria-Hungary as a political aim in her own interest. Moreover, Russia's main motive was to remove every obstacle to the extension of her power in the Balkans, and especially to the conquest of the Straits. The documents given in Supplement VI prove that she systematically pursued and prepared the forcible annexation of both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In so doing, she was perfectly aware that there was no one in Germany, either in the Government or among the people, who would have desired a war with Russia, for the prospects of such a war were notoriously regarded by all the military authorities with extreme skepticism, and even in the event of success no one expected any tangible advantage. On the other hand, Russia also knew that Germany was closely bound to the Danubian monarchy by historical ties, by alliance and by kinship with a large portion of the Austrian population, and that therefore in case of an attack on the integrity of the monarchy, she would have to reckon with military resistance on the part of Germany. For her purposes she therefore utilized her military alliance with France concluded in 1892, and extended in 1912 by a naval convention and further alliances in order to set in motion the "machinery of the Entente," at the moment which seemed favorable, and to drag her friends into the long-premeditated war. Herein lies the real cause of the World War.

We consider it to be Germany's great misfortune—due partly to fate, but partly to faults in our political leadership—that our inevitable opposition to Czarism brought us also into opposition, and finally into warlike complications, with countries to which we were bound by a strong community of intellectual interests, and with which we are convinced that an understanding was possible.

It should, however, be emphasized that, before the war, the French Government had never unreservedly relinquished its intention to regain possession of Alsace-Lorraine, that this purpose could be realized only through the instrumentality of war, and that no certain means can be suggested by which an understanding on this question with the last French Government could have been brought about before the war. On the other hand, before the war the views of the French parties under the leadership of Jaurès, and those of



the German Socialists and middle-class Democrats were extraordinarily closely akin. Any exertion by those parties of their influence in favor of a peaceful compromise with Germany was, however, prevented by the fact that France was bound by her close alliance to the policy of Russian Czarism. Official documents prove that, on occasions which might have given rise to a conflict between Russia and Germany, the French Government gave no advice of a nature to dissuade Russia in principle from her warlike attitude, but rather often offered counsels calculated to encourage her in maintaining it. Thus the Ambassador Iswolsky informed the Minister Sazonoff in his telegram No. 369 of 17th/18th November, 1912, which had previously been read to M. Poincaré, that the French President of the Council would regard as a *casus fœderis* any action on the part of Germany giving support to Austria in the Balkan war. On the 25th of February, 1913, the Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, informed his Government that of all the Powers, France was, in his opinion, the only one which would contemplate war without regret. As early as the 24th of July, 1914, that is to say, before the rupture of relations between Austria and Serbia, the French Ambassador declared to the Russian Government that, apart from vigorous diplomatic support, France would, in case of necessity, fulfil all obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia.

In such a state of affairs it is quite impossible to deduce from the circumstance that the war against France had, from a military point of view, to take the form of an offensive operation, that it should also be regarded from a political point of view as a war of aggression by Germany on France. France was bound hand and foot to Czarism.

So far as England is concerned, we cannot make in this place an exhaustive examination of the steps which her Governments ought or ought not to have taken in the past to dispel the state of mutual distrust which undoubtedly existed on both sides, and was fraught with such disastrous consequences. The English Government has often declared that its attitude was dependent on the public opinion of the country. There was, however, a very strong tendency in the public opinion of that country to frustrate any understanding between Germany and France. We would recall Mr. Lloyd George's well-known words in 1908, in which he deprecated this tendency. It was solely on account of this mutual mistrust that the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and Lord Haldane were unable to find a basis of agreement in 1912, and therein likewise lay the final reason for which the German Government found it impossible, in 1914, to accept the conference suggested by the English Minister for Foreign Affairs. For our part, we admit unreservedly that the ultimate extent and the spirit of German naval construction in recent years—not the fact of its accomplishment—might have aroused mistrust in England. As this mutual mistrust was undoubtedly one of the principal causes of the strained situation in Europe, we think it regrettable that no

means of removing it was found. We should have wished for a different attitude on the part of Germany in connection with the Hague Peace Conference and on the occasion of the statement of German plans for naval construction. On the other hand, we regret that deep mistrust was fostered in Germany by well-known and frequently-quoted articles in English newspapers, by the agitation carried on by the Northcliffe press and the influence which it commanded, and by acts such as the refusal to codify maritime law in the English House of Lords.

It is also a subject for regret that a theory current in certain circles of all countries—a theory which we regard as completely erroneous—regarding the alleged natural necessity for a commercial war, should have received powerful support from the work of a very capable American writer (Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise*, 1914). Thus the nationalist agitations in the various countries reacted upon each other, intensifying their violence. In view of all this, we must regard it as especially deplorable that the opinion combated by us, to wit, that the war was prepared and waged on the part of England as a means of overthrowing a troublesome competitor, will probably be established for all time in German public opinion by the conditions of peace at present laid before us.

Germany's position in the decade preceding the war was determined by the fact that, in an age which knew as yet no means of preventing war, the country could not honorably avoid the ordeal of arms with an apparently impregnable Czarism without sacrificing not only her pledged faith, but her own national independence. The sole remedy in those circumstances would have been a firm and binding alliance with England, which would have inspired both parties with confidence, and protected Germany as well as France from any war of aggression. It has yet to be proved that such an agreement could have been concluded by an English Minister, considering the state of English public opinion during the years immediately preceding the war and in the teeth of those tendencies which we have had to record above. We repeat that we would recognize every demonstrable step taken by an English Government towards this end as meritorious, and any failure of a German Government to seize such an opportunity as a blunder.

Czarism, with which any real understanding was completely impossible, constituted the most fearful system of individual and national slavery ever conceived before the Peace Treaty which is now laid before us. The German nation, as the whole of Social Democracy then rightly declared, only agreed to fight whole-heartedly and resolutely in 1914 on the understanding that the war was one of defense against Czarism. Even now, when Germany's military power is destroyed forever, we consider that this war of defense was unavoidable. The moment the object of overthrowing the power of Czarism was attained, the war lost its meaning. We should stigmatize its continuation as an act of criminal insanity on the part of the former Government so

soon as it was clearly demonstrated that our opponents were ready to conclude with us a peace without victors or vanquished, on the basis of mutual respect of honor. So far, there is no such proof. The peace conditions presented in defiance of solemn promises to the people of a Germany recreated on a democratic basis are so sadly eloquent in a contrary sense that if they are upheld there will never be means of making such a proof convincing.

HANS DELBRÜCK.

MAX WEBER.

MAX GRAF MONTGELAS.

ALBRECHT MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY.

VERSAILLES, *May 27, 1919.*

## SUPPLEMENTS

The following introductory remarks may be added, in explanation of the annexed documents and observations:

It is intended to publish at an early date a compilation upon which months of labor have been expended of all the material in the Foreign Office at Berlin relating to the diplomatic action immediately preceding the war.

The sole object of the following documents is to substantiate the statements of fact contained in the foregoing memorandum, but especially to shed such light as can be derived from the material available at present upon the source of the World War, the Balkan question, and the attitude towards it of the Great Powers, especially Russia. The comments appended to it which abstain from any kind of partisanship are intended exclusively to aid the reader in finding his way about the documents.

### SUPPLEMENT I

#### THE GERMAN AND RUSSIAN MOBILIZATIONS

##### I

The report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War makes the following statements in regard to the German mobilization in 1914:

As early as the 21st of July, German mobilization had commenced in the first place with the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve, then of German officers in Switzerland, and finally of the Metz garrison on the 25th of July. On the 26th of July the German Fleet was recalled from Norway. . . . On the 1st of August the German Emperor addressed a telegram to the King of England containing the following sentence: "The troops on my frontier are at this moment being restrained by telegraphic and telephonic orders from crossing the French frontier . . ." Now, war was not declared till two days after that date, and as the German mobilization orders were issued on that same day, August the 1st, it follows that, as a matter of fact, the German Army had been mobilized and concentrated in pursuance of orders issued earlier.

It is thus asserted that an Army of more than 2,000,000 men was secretly mobilized and concentrated on the frontier, that all the reserves required to bring up units to war strength were called up, that all horses and vehicles were collected, that military transport operations had been in progress for days and weeks without the foreign Ambassadors, Ministers, consuls, mili-



tary attachés, and newspaper reporters or other agents then in Germany being aware of any of these measures. Such an idea is so preposterous that it does not require any special refutation. The sentence in the Emperor's telegram can only refer to the fact that in order to avoid any frontier incidents strict orders had been issued to troops not to cross the frontier, even when on patrol duty. This interpretation becomes particularly obvious in the light of the telegram sent at the same time by the German Imperial Chancellor (German White Book, 1915, p. 46) in which a guaranty was given that the French frontier would not be crossed by German troops "before 7 p.m. on Monday, the 3d of August."

It is a fact beyond all doubt, and one which can be established by all the surviving members of the German Field Army of 1914, that prior to the proclamation of the *Kriegsgefahrzustand* on the afternoon of the 31st of July, and the issue of the mobilization order on the 1st of August at 5 p.m., no measures whatsoever had been taken beyond those which the most obvious considerations of prudence demanded.

The allegation as regards the calling up of a number of classes of the reserve from the 21st of July onwards is based on a report from the French Ambassador of that date<sup>1</sup> to the effect that he had been assured that *avis préliminaires* (preliminary notices) had been issued. There is no proof of this assertion, nor even any allusion in the report itself to a *rappel* (calling up). No. 59 of the Yellow Book shows that as late as the 26th of July, and even in the immediate vicinity of the frontier (close to Diedenhofen), measures had not been taken to call up the reservists. In point of fact no such summons was issued before the proclamation of the *Kriegsgefahrzustand* on the afternoon of the 31st of July, and even then only to a limited extent. In July, 1914, as in previous years, reservists, those, for example, of the 14th Army Corps, were called up for the usual peace training. This, no doubt, also took place in every other army at that season.

If any German officers were recalled from leave in Switzerland on the 23d of July,<sup>2</sup> it can only have been in consequence of orders issued by individual subordinate commands. The great majority of German officers on leave never received any such instruction. No general recall of officers on leave, such as was ordered in France as early as the 26th of July,<sup>3</sup> was ever carried out in Germany. At 10.40 p.m., on the 29th of July, an order was issued in the Eastern districts recalling persons on leave.

The grounds for the assertion that the Metz garrison was reinforced as early as the 25th of July are not apparent. Dispatch No. 106 of the Yellow Book, dated the 30th of July, mentions this reinforcement in paragraph 5, but without giving a date. In point of fact it was not until the 27th of July that the men belonging to the Bavarian regiments stationed in Metz who

<sup>1</sup> Yellow Book, No. 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 60.

<sup>3</sup> Report of the French Minister for War of the 16th of February, 1915, Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 118, Appendix 1.

had been given leave for harvesting work were recalled. This did not, however, involve any special strengthening of the garrison, but merely meant that the ordinary peace establishment was brought up to strength.<sup>1</sup>

The question of setting the defensive positions in order was first raised by a letter from the office of the Inspector General of Engineer and Pioneer Corps on the 29th of July, and orders to that effect were not given till the 30th of July.

Finally, the recall on the 26th of July of the German Fleet from its exposed position in Norwegian waters was a measure dictated by the most elementary considerations of prudence. It should be remembered in this connection that the demobilization of the British fleet, which had been assembled for maneuvers, had been suspended two days earlier, on the 24th of July.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the other German military measures mentioned in the French Yellow Book<sup>3</sup> were either never taken at all, or else were confined to the most elementary dispositions adopted in the interests of safety, e.g., the recall on the 28th and 29th of July of troops from training camps to their garrisons, on the 29th of July the protection of the Rhine bridges in the Cologne district, and on the thirtieth in the Strassburg district. As late as 6 p.m. on the 30th of July a proposal made by the general headquarters of the 16th Army Corps at Metz, to the effect that the whole of the railway and frontier guards should proceed towards their war stations, was rejected by the Ministry for War.

In France, on the other hand, as is shown by the report of the French Minister for War, dated the 16th of February, 1915<sup>4</sup> the *mesures de précaution* (precautionary measures) began as early as the 26th of July.

The compilation in Supplement II of the reports which had reached the German official authorities show that the German measures lagged far behind the French, and that the frontier violations committed by France were substantially more numerous than those committed by Germany.

## II

Whereas the report of the Commission gives such an incorrect description of the German mobilization, and attributes a menacing character to even the most insignificant measures, it passes over the Russian mobilization in complete silence.

During the years preceding the war Russia had prepared her mobilization plans with extraordinary care. The effectives which formed the regular peace establishment were permanently and substantially exceeded, in winter by the retention of the oldest classes, in summer by the calling out of reservists and militiamen (*Reichswehrleute*). In the summer of 1914 there must have been several hundred thousand men with the colors in excess of

<sup>1</sup> Yellow Book, No. 89.    <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 66.    <sup>3</sup> Nos. 59, 60, 88, 89, 105, 106 and 159.

<sup>4</sup> Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 118, Appendix 1.

the normal peace strength. Simultaneously, purchases were effected of horses, stocks of provisions, and war material of all kinds. Test mobilizations and musters rendered it possible to make further preparations to ensure the readiness of the army at the shortest possible notice.

During the Austro-Serbian crisis a council of Ministers held in the presence of the Czar had contemplated, as early as the 25th of July, the "mobilization of the thirteen army corps (in the four military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan) detailed, should the case arise, for operations against Austria"; moreover, this mobilization was to be carried out if "Austria resorted to military measures against Serbia."<sup>1</sup>

However, as early as the 26th of July, the beginning of the period of preparation for war was proclaimed for the entire territory of European Russia, and thereby also against Germany (letter and telegram of the 15th Army Corps at Warsaw of the 13th/26th of July, No. 614, of the Gendarmerie Administration of the Government of Livonia of the 14th/27th of July, No. 858, and of the Government of Livonia, of the 14th/27th of July, No. 300). This entailed, among other things, the return of troops from their camps to their garrisons, an increased severity of the censorship and the beginning of the requisitioning of horses.

On the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth the period of preparation for war was systematically maintained, as is proved by the withdrawal of the frontier guards at several points, the recall of officers on leave, the placing of the fortress of Kovno upon a war footing (Government Order of the 13th/26th of July, No. 55), and by several other reports dealing with the requisitioning of horses and getting railway material ready.

On the 29th of July orders were given for the partial mobilization against Austria which had been decided in principle on the 25th of July.<sup>2</sup> It was, however, immediately extended into a general mobilization. An official Russian report of the 15th of September, 1917<sup>3</sup> not only admits that Russia had taken "secret measures" on the German front as early as the twenty-eighth, but also establishes the fact that the decision to extend the partial mobilization into a general one was taken on the twenty-ninth, and that the order to that effect was issued on the evening of the thirtieth, and publicly posted up in the streets of Petersburg on the thirty-first.<sup>4</sup>

The general Russian mobilization was in no way justified by any German or Austro-Hungarian military measure. Russia, it is true, on the 31st of July excused herself in Paris on the ground that Germany had taken secret mobilization measures,<sup>5</sup> but she did not repeat the assertion in the comprehensive communiqué of the 20th of July/2d of August,<sup>6</sup> nor make any repre-

<sup>1</sup> Yellow Book, No. 50.

<sup>2</sup> White Book, 1915, p. 7; Blue Book, No. 70.

<sup>3</sup> R. Puaux, *études de la guerre*, vol. ii, pp. 130 *et seq.*

<sup>4</sup> Cf. also Red Book, No. 52, Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Yellow Book, No. 118.

<sup>6</sup> Orange Book, No. 77.

sentations in Berlin. In point of fact the German measures, even in the East, were restricted to those which were urgently necessary, as is shown by Supplement III, up to the moment when the Russian general mobilization became known. The assertion that the German Fleet had prematurely bombarded Libau must be emphatically denied. The order to open hostilities was given to the ships *Augsburg* and *Magdeburg* at 8 a.m. on the 2d of August, that is to say, after a state of war had arisen, and the bombardment of Libau took place on the same day from 7.45 p.m. to 8.08 p.m.

As regards Austria-Hungary, that Power had in the first instance mobilized eight army corps against Serbia. As the Serbian army, apart from five second line reserve divisions, consisted of fifteen divisions, the calling out of twenty-four Austro-Hungarian divisions cannot be described as excessive. In any case Russia could not consider herself threatened in the slightest degree. After the Russian partial mobilization of the 29th of July Austria-Hungary was confronted by thirty-nine Russian and fifteen Serbian infantry divisions, fifty-four in all. Thus the general Austro-Hungarian mobilization which followed two days later on the morning of the 31st of July,<sup>1</sup> and brought into line fifty-one divisions in all (including Honved and Landwehr), did not constitute an aggressive menace, but was a purely defensive measure taken in the interests of safety.

It was the Russian general mobilization which, without the slightest trace of justification, brought about the catastrophe.

## SUPPLEMENT II

### REPORTS RELATING TO FRENCH PREPARATIONS FOR MOBILIZATION AND VIOLATIONS OF FRONTIER

*July 27.*—Recall of officers on leave.

Cessation of the maneuvers of the 14th Army Corps.

On the eastern frontier, close supervision, establishment of searchlights, alarm drill.

Holding in readiness of freight-trucks for the transport of troops in the stations Toul, Nancy, and Maubeuge.

*July 28.*—Continued return of troops from training camps and recall of persons on leave.

The press forbidden to report movements of troops.

Posting of sentinels on buildings of artistic value, and on the canals and railways.

Motor vehicles put in readiness for the transport of troops at Longwy and in its neighborhood.

<sup>1</sup> Yellow Book, No. 115.



Calling up of reservists to Verdun.

Requisitioning of rolling-stock on the Eastern Railway by the military administration. Dispatch of empty trucks from the frontier to the interior. Military trains put in readiness. Closing of banks at Nancy. Gold no longer obtainable in the frontier districts.

Lieutenant Colonel Dupont, Chief of the Second Bureau of the General Staff, states that he is in possession of accurate information respecting the German preparations for war, which were, however, only on an important scale at Metz and not nearly so far advanced as the French measures. He cannot understand why Russia does not strike. (Report of the German military attaché.)

*July 29.*—Horse owners in the frontier district receive an order to bring in their horses.

Reports are received of the calling up of the youngest class of reservists in various places.

Fortification works and strengthening of the garrisons at several frontier forts.

Mobilization of the *douaniers*.

Military occupation of motor-blockade cordon on the frontier.

Reports of frontier violations by French troops.

Intensified preparation of military trains.

*July 30.*—Calling up of reservists for several frontier units.

Reports of the requisitioning of horses.

Armament of Toul since the evening of the twenty-eighth.

Three reports relating to military occupation of the frontier.

Preparations on the railways.

Supervision and closing of the frontiers by mobilized gendarmes, customs and forestry officials, and in some cases by the military. Judging from all appearance the *ordre de départ en couverture* has been issued, whereby eleven infantry and three cavalry divisions, independently of the issue of the general mobilization order, can be mobilized by the Minister for War, brought up to war strength and posted in the frontier defense positions.

*July 31.*—Establishment of the frontier defense.

Frontier violations by French *chasseurs*, also by cavalry with artillery.

One airman lands near Dieuze.

Railway personnel is placed under military orders.

Landing in Marseilles of troops from Algiers, Senegal and Madagascar: Here we have a measure which must have been set in train a long time previously.

*August 1.*—3.45 p.m. (4.45 Central European time).—Issue of mobilization order.

Reports that the frontier defense troops have taken up their positions are confirmed.

Spahis are reported in Toul and Verdun.

*August 2.*—At least fifty frontier violations.

*August 3.*—Up to the beginning of the state of war at 6 p.m., sixteen additional frontier violations established as certain, four probable, one possible.

### SUPPLEMENT III

#### GERMAN MILITARY MEASURES IN THE EAST BEFORE THE RUSSIAN GENERAL MOBILIZATION BECAME KNOWN

*July 26.*—Accelerated completion of the peace-time preparations for damming the Netze and the Obra.

*July 27.*—Strengthened supervision of the railways by officials (not military).  
*July 28.*

*July 29.*—Recall of troops from their training camps to their garrisons, and recall of persons on leave.

Posting of sentinels on exposed stretches of railway-line by troops on active service.

Orders to begin completion of fortified positions on purely military sites.

*July 30.*—Measures for defense of the frontier undertaken by several frontier corps.

First steps in the work on armaments in the frontier fortresses.

Orders for ensuring the "safety" of the Fleet.

### SUPPLEMENT IV

#### DISPATCH FROM THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF VON MOLTKE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

BERLIN, *December 18, 1914.*

I have the honor to make the following reply to Your Excellency in regard to the extracts from the French Yellow Book which were transmitted to me:

No conversation between His Majesty the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians at which I was present took place. His Majesty the King of the Belgians on the occasion of his last visit to the *Neues Palais* in Potsdam, drew me into conversation after we had left the table, but His Majesty the Kaiser was not present thereat. The King told me that he had repeatedly been

present incognito at the German maneuvers as a spectator, and openly expressed his admiration for the German Army. In the course of conversation a comparison was drawn between the German and French armies, which was, nevertheless, treated in a purely hypothetical manner. I took this opportunity to give emphatic expression to my conviction that our Army would show itself superior to the French in training and intrinsic merit, if there should ever be a collision between them. I never said that we wished for war, nor could I have done so, as I have never entertained any doubt that a war between France and Germany would be tantamount to a general European war and would involve Germany in all the grave difficulties of a war on two fronts. I have never been light-minded enough to wish for this war, although I did indeed express my conviction to the King that the strength of the German people would show itself in a manner which would astonish the whole world if Germany were attacked. In that case, I said, the entire German people would stand together as one man for the defense of their national existence. I deny with all emphasis having said that I considered that war was necessary and inevitable, or that *cette fois il faut en finir* (this time we must settle the matter).

This conversation was carried on between the King and myself in the presence of no one else. His Majesty the Kaiser took no part in it, nor did I participate in any conversation which took place between the two monarchs.

As regards the statements attributed to me by Mr. Cambon in his report of the 6th of May, 1913, the source of which he does not however mention, I declare them to be inventions from start to finish. Conscious as I am of the responsibility of my position, I have never been so imprudent as to express an opinion, either before a large or a small company except in the direct discharge of my military functions, in regard to our conduct of a possible war. Everything which Mr. Cambon has reported as being my statement has been invented either by him or by his informant.

## SUPPLEMENT V

### THE ALLEGED CROWN COUNCIL AT POTSDAM

A legend has been circulated with great persistency in the most various quarters to the effect that a Crown Council was held at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, at which the war on Serbia, or, according to other interpretations, the World War, was decided on. To begin with, it must be pointed out that none of the official publications relating to the outbreak of war give any information in regard to any such Crown Council, and that, moreover, the majority of the persons alleged to have taken part therein were not even on the spot at the time. Sir Horace Rumbold, at that time Counselor of the

British Embassy at Berlin, and Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, were obliged to admit that this slanderous assertion was groundless.<sup>1</sup>

The actual facts underlying this legend are as follows: The Secretary for Balkan Affairs at the Imperial and Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs was instructed to take to Berlin an autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph to the Emperor William,<sup>2</sup> to which was annexed a memorandum on Balkan questions.<sup>3</sup> Count Hoyos discussed the questions touched upon in this memorandum with the competent authority at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (that is to say, with the Under-Secretary of State, Zimmermann, representing the Secretary of State, von Jagow, who was absent on leave), and had in the course of that discussion set forth his personal views on the solution of the problem arising out of the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Vienna later considered it important to set it on record that they did not share the purely personal views of Count Hoyos, which comprised the acquisition of Serbian territory and even a partition of Serbia.

Count Hoyos did not, so far as is known, meet the Emperor William. The Emperor Franz Joseph's letter was delivered by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin on the 5th of July, 1914, after a luncheon at the *Neues Palais* at Potsdam. At that luncheon, when the letter was handed over, neither the Imperial Chancellor nor a representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was present. It was only in the course of the afternoon that the Imperial Chancellor and Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (the latter representing von Jagow, the Secretary of State), drove to Potsdam and had a conversation with the Emperor. No particular resolutions *of any kind* were reached on this occasion, for it was decided from the outset that it was not possible to refuse to Austria-Hungary that support to which she was entitled under the alliance in her endeavor to obtain real guaranties from Serbia. The standpoint of the German Government becomes evident from the telegram of the 6th of July, 1914, to the Ambassador at Vienna<sup>4</sup> and the Emperor's autograph letter of the 14th of July, 1914.<sup>5</sup> No conference in the sense suggested by the enemy was held either on the 5th of July or on any other day.

It is evident from the telegram of the 6th of July to Vienna and from the autograph letter of the Emperor William of the 14th of July<sup>6</sup> that the possibility of Russian intervention and the consequences thereof were also weighed at Berlin, but that any probability of a general war was not taken into consideration. There cannot be any question of an intention to start an European war, as is indisputably shown by the annexed documents.

<sup>1</sup> Annexes 1 and 2.

<sup>4</sup> Annex 5.

<sup>2</sup> Annex 3.

<sup>5</sup> Annex 6.

<sup>3</sup> Annex 4.

<sup>6</sup> See Annex 6.



## ANNEX 1

*Sir Horace Rumbold on the "Potsdam Crown Council"*<sup>1</sup>

The Wolff denial in itself carries no conviction to my mind. In fact, the habitual mendacity of the German Government is such that I am tempted instinctively to believe every statement which they deny. . . . But I certainly never heard that any joint meeting like that indicated in the *Times* took place on the date mentioned or on any other date. Nor, so far as I am aware, did any of my colleagues have any inkling of such a meeting. I do not deny that it may have taken place, but it would seem difficult to conceal the presence at Potsdam of the leading Austro-Hungarians mentioned at a time when they would naturally have been at Vienna for the Archduke's (Franz Ferdinand) funeral, or in connection with the arrangements entailed by that event. . . . I do not know what authorities the *Times* has for making its statement. It may have got hold of a mare's nest; but on the assumption that the information is genuine, it explains some things which I have often puzzled my head over. . . . But I doubt whether such a council ever took place, and I remain of the opinion which I have always held, viz., that war was only decided upon at the council held at Potsdam on the 29th of July, although the military party had decided on it on principle long before that date.

## ANNEX 2

*Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the "Potsdam Crown Council"*<sup>1</sup>

I venture to remark that I share Sir H. Rumbold's doubts about the Potsdam meeting of the 5th of July, 1914. It is difficult to believe that the Archduke Frederik, Count Berchtold and Conrad von Hötzendorff could have gone to Berlin at that time without the fact becoming known in Vienna, which it did not.

## ANNEX 3

*Autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph to the Emperor William*<sup>2</sup>

I sincerely regret that you were compelled to abandon your intention of coming to Vienna to be present at the funeral celebrations. I should have been very happy to express in person my heartfelt gratitude for the comfort of your sympathy with me in my grievous affliction.

Once again you have proved to me by your warm and sympathetic partici-

<sup>1</sup> From C. Oman, *The Outbreak of the War of 1914-1918*.

<sup>2</sup> Conveyed to him on the 5th of July, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.

pation in my sorrows that I have in you a loyal and reliable friend and that I can count upon you in every hour of trial.

I should, moreover, have been very glad to discuss the political situation with you. As this is no longer possible, I venture to send you the report<sup>1</sup> dealing with this question which was drawn up by my Minister for Foreign Affairs before the terrible disaster at Serajevo. Today, after that tragic event, it seems worthy of particular attention.

The outrage perpetrated upon my nephew is the direct result of the agitation conducted by the Russian and Serbian Pan Slavists with the sole aim of weakening the Triple Alliance and laying my Empire in ruins.

It is clear from all the information received up to the present, that the Serajevo occurrence must not be treated as the crime of a single person, but as the outcome of a well-organized conspiracy, with threads reaching to Belgrade. And further, even if it is admittedly unlikely that their complicity can be brought home to the Serbian Government, there is no room for doubt that the policy by which they seek to unite all the southern Slavs under the Serbian flag encourages such crimes, and that, if the present situation lasts, it will constitute a standing menace to my House and my domains.

The danger from this source is increased by the fact that Roumania also, notwithstanding the alliance by which she is bound to us, has entered upon relations of intimate friendship with Serbia, and tolerates even in her own country a campaign of agitation directed against us with all the animosity which marks the movement on foot in Serbia.

I am very loath to doubt the loyalty and good-will of so old a friend as Charles of Roumania. But he himself assured my Ambassador twice during the last few months that if war were to break out he would be unable to fulfil his duties as my ally in the teeth of the excited and hostile temper of his people.

Moreover, the present Roumanian Government openly encourages the activities of the *Kulturliga*, shows favor to the *rapprochement* with Serbia, and aspires to lend Roumanian support to the foundation of a new Balkan League, which could only be directed against my Empire.

At the very beginning of Charles' reign, the sound political instinct of Roumanian statesmen was clouded by fantastic ideas, similar in character to those which are now propagated by the *Kulturliga*, and the kingdom stood in some danger of pursuing a policy of adventure. In those days your lamented grandfather intervened, through his Government, with vigorous action and well-defined purpose, and pointed out to Roumania the course along which she has travelled to a position of eminence in Europe, becoming a staunch upholder of order in every sphere.

Today the kingdom is exposed to that same danger. I am afraid that counsel alone will no longer avail, and that Roumania can only be retained

<sup>1</sup> See Annex 4 to Supplement V, *post* p. 55.

for the Triple Alliance if, on the one hand, the formation of a Balkan League under the ægis of Russia be rendered impossible by the union of Bulgaria with the Triple Alliance; and, on the other, if Bucharest be plainly shown that the friends of Serbia cannot be accounted our friends, and that Roumania can no longer rely upon us as her allies unless she severs her connection with Serbia and devotes all her energies to the suppression of the agitation, which is being carried on against the existence of my Empire within the limits of her territory.

The efforts of my Government must in the future be directed towards the isolation and reduction of Serbia. Their first step in this direction would consist in strengthening the position of the present Bulgarian Government, to guard against any recurrence of Russophile tendencies in Bulgaria, whose real interests are identical with our own.

If it be understood in Bucharest that the Triple Alliance is determined not to abandon the project of union with Bulgaria, but would be ready to supply inducements to the latter State to form an alliance with Roumania, and to guarantee the integrity of Roumanian territory, Roumania would probably turn aside from the dangerous path along which friendship with Serbia and the *rapprochement* with Russia are leading her.

If this project succeeds, the attempt might then be made to reconcile Greece with Bulgaria and Turkey. That would lead to the formation of a new Balkan League under the ægis of the Triple Alliance, conceived with the aim of damming the rising tide of Pan Slavism and securing tranquillity to our territories.

This, however, would only be possible if Serbia, who at present forms the pivot of Pan Slavist designs, be eliminated as a factor in Balkan politics.

The horrible events which have just occurred in Bosnia will have convinced you, too, that it is no longer possible to think of any reconciliation of the enmity which divides us from Serbia, and that the efforts of all European crowns to pursue a policy of peace will be exposed to menace so long as this asylum of criminal agitators in Belgrade enjoys immunity.

#### ANNEX 4

##### *Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government*

The situation in the Balkans has, after the convulsions of the last two years, become sufficiently clear to enable us to make some survey of the effects of the crisis, and to ascertain how far the interests of the Triple Alliance, particularly of the two Central Empires, are affected by the course of events, and what conclusions must be drawn respecting their influence upon the European and Balkan policy of these Powers.

If the present situation be compared honestly with that which existed be-

fore the great crisis it must be admitted that the general outlook, as viewed from the standpoint of Austria-Hungary and the Triple Alliance, cannot by any means be described as favorable.

Some items may, however, be placed to our credit. We have been successful in creating an independent Albanian State to counterbalance the forward movement of Serbia. When, in the course of time, its internal organization is complete, the new State may even enter into the calculations of the Triple Alliance as a factor of military importance. The relations subsisting between the Triple Alliance and the Kingdom of Greece, since it has been strengthened by the extension of its frontiers, have gradually assumed such a shape that, notwithstanding her alliance with Serbia, Greece cannot be regarded as unconditionally hostile.

But the main outcome of the events from which the second Balkan War took its rise is the awakening of Bulgaria from the spell of Russian influence. Today she can no longer count as the index of Russian policy. On the contrary, the aims of the Bulgarian Government lie in the direction of closer intercourse with the Triple Alliance.

Against these factors, however, which weigh in our favor, others must be set of greater moment. Turkey, whose interests were naturally identical with those of the Triple Alliance, a State which had formerly supplied a weighty counterpoise to Russia and the Balkan States, is almost entirely thrust out of Europe, with her status as a Great Power materially impaired. Serbia has for years directed her policy at the bidding of motives hostile to Austria-Hungary, and lies completely under the influence of Russia—she has now secured an increase in territory and population which far exceeds her own expectations. Her proximity to Montenegro and the growing strength of the ideal of a Greater Serbia, which is apparent on all sides, bring the possibility of a further aggrandizement of Serbia by means of union with Montenegro nearer. Finally, the course of the crisis has modified the relations between Roumania and the Triple Alliance in vital respects.

While the Balkan crisis gave rise in this way to results which are naturally anything but favorable in their effect for the Triple Alliance, and bear the germ of a further process which will prove particularly undesirable for Austria-Hungary, we behold Russian and French diplomacy, on the other hand, taking action on well-conceived uniform lines to develop the advantages which they have gained and to effect the necessary modifications in factors which do not harmonize with their interests.

A rapid survey of the European situation makes it quite clear why the Triple Entente—more correctly the Dual Alliance, for, since the Balkan crisis, England has adopted an attitude of reserve, for easily explicable and highly significant reasons—could not rest satisfied with the readjustment of factors in the Balkans, favorable as it was to their interests.

While the policy of the two Empires, and to a certain extent the policy of



Italy, is conservative, and the Triple Alliance is purely defensive in character, the policies of France and Russia alike pursue certain tendencies which are hostile to the established order, and the Franco-Russian Alliance, the outcome of the concurrent development of these tendencies, is primarily offensive in character. The success attained hitherto by the Triple Alliance in carrying its policy into effect, and the fact that the peace of Europe has not been disturbed by Russia and France, were attributable to the superiority over Russia and France which the armies of the Triple Alliance, particularly those of Austria-Hungary and Germany, undoubtedly possessed. In this connection the alliance of Roumania with the Central Powers became a factor of the first importance.

The practical principle that the Christian populations of the Balkans should be liberated from the Turkish yoke to be used as a weapon against Central Europe has ever lurked behind the traditional interest of Russia in these peoples. Recent times have seen the development of the project which took its rise from that principle—a project conceived in Russia and intelligently adopted by France, of uniting the Balkan States into a Balkan League which should serve to make an end of the military superiority of the Triple Alliance. The realization of this scheme depended primarily upon the dislodgment of Turkey from the territories inhabited by the Christian populations of the Balkans, in order that these States might be strengthened and left free to expand on the West. This preliminary condition has been fulfilled in its main outlines by the issue of the last war. On the other hand, the crisis has led to the division of the Balkans into two hostile groups, nearly equal in strength, of which one comprises Turkey and Bulgaria, and the other the two Serb States, Greece and Roumania.

To heal this schism was the first task which Russia set herself, in cooperation with France, so soon as the crisis had passed over, with the aim of using all the Balkan States, or at least a decisive majority amongst them, to displace the balance of power in Europe.

Since Greece and Serbia had already formed an alliance, and Roumania had declared herself to be at one with these two States, at least in regard to the outcome of the Peace of Bucharest, the real problem confronting the Dual Alliance lay in reconciling the intense antagonism which the Macedonian question had aroused between Bulgaria and Greece, and, above all, between Bulgaria and Serbia. In the second place, they were concerned to find a basis upon which Roumania would be willing to pass altogether into the camp of the Dual Alliance, and even to become a partner in a political combination with Bulgaria, upon whom she looked with so much mistrust. Finally, they sought to bring about, if possible, a peaceful settlement of the question of the Islands to pave the way for a *rapprochement* between Turkey and the Balkan States, or for a union between them.

There is no room for uncertainty in regard to the basis which French and

Russian diplomacy intend to adopt for the reconciliation of these differences and rivalries and the creation of a new Balkan League. In the present situation, which excludes any policy of common action against Turkey, an alliance between the Balkan States can only rise into being upon a program which will hold out the prospect of territorial expansion to all the members by a gradual shifting of frontiers towards the west at the expense, finally, of Austria-Hungary. Such a League can be directed against her alone. It is barely conceivable that the Balkan States would unite upon any other basis, but on this basis the League is not only not impossible, but in a fair way to becoming an accomplished fact.

There is really no doubt that, under pressure from Russia, Serbia would agree to pay a reasonable price in Macedonia to Bulgaria if she would become a partner in an alliance directed against the Dual Monarchy to secure Bosnia and the neighboring territories.

In Sofia there are graver difficulties in the way.

Even before the second Balkan war, Russia approached Bulgaria with proposals based upon the principles which have been indicated, and renewed them after the Peace of Bucharest. Bulgaria, however, who was evidently thoroughly alarmed at the prospect of any arrangement with Serbia, refused to enter into the Russian plans, and has since pursued a policy which aims by no means at a peaceful understanding with Serbia under the ægis of Russia. But in Petersburg the issue is emphatically not regarded as lost, Russian agents are working in the interior to bring about the downfall of the existing régime, while the Dual Alliance is making strenuous efforts through its diplomacy to place Bulgaria in complete isolation in the hope of rendering her accessible to the Russian offers.

In view of the successful efforts of Bulgaria to secure Turkish support after the conclusion of peace, and of the disposition evinced by the Porte to take part in an alliance with Bulgaria and to draw towards the Triple Alliance, the influence of France and Russia has for some time been actively employed at the Bosphorus to counteract Turkish policy in this direction, to attract Turkey towards the Dual Alliance and thus, either by the pressure of complete isolation or Turkish influence, to compel Bulgaria to adopt a new line of policy. Reports from Constantinople, which have received some confirmation from the journey of Talaat Bey to Livadia, show that these efforts, so far as Turkey is concerned, have not been without success. By drawing attention to plans for the partition of Turkish possessions in Asia Minor, allegedly entertained by other Powers, Russia has succeeded in diverting the historic mistrust of Turkey from herself and with energetic support from France, who understands how to exploit Turkey's financial difficulties, in inducing Turkish statesmen to bestow serious consideration upon the project of a *rapprochement* not with the Triple Alliance but with the other group of Powers.

The journey of Talaat Bey to Bucharest is ascribable to the activities of French and Russian diplomacy, and it has not only succeeded in securing the intervention of Roumania in the question of the Islands, but also in advancing the policy of "encircling" Bulgaria by paving the way for friendly relations between Constantinople and Bucharest.

Bulgarian politics have not as yet shown any signs of the effects of this policy of *encirclement*, probably because the occasion has not arisen in Sofia for looking with suspicion upon the intentions of Turkey. But Russia is, in any case, fully justified in her expectation that if Bulgaria be completely isolated in the Balkans and in Europe, she will finally be driven to abandon the line of policy which she has been following, and to accept the terms on which Russia would consent to readmit her to her patronage and protection.

In the internal and foreign policy of Bulgaria, Macedonia stands out in peculiar prominence. Once her rulers are convinced that the peaceful settlement proposed by Russia and the alliance with Serbia offer the only means of securing at least some portions of Macedonia for Bulgaria, no Bulgarian Government, however disillusioned, could venture to reject this combination. Only a policy framed to strengthen Bulgaria's powers of resistance to the lure and menace of Russia and to safeguard her from the peril of isolation could prevent her from ultimately acceding to the scheme for a Balkan League.

Turning now to Roumania, we see France and Russia working there at full pressure, even during the Balkan crisis. The art of misrepresentation was employed with amazing ingenuity, and the hidden fires which ever smoulder around the ideal of a Greater Roumania were adroitly fanned into a blaze, stirring public opinion to hostility against the Dual Monarchy and tempting the foreign policy of Roumania into an armed cooperation with Serbia, which accorded ill with her obligations as an ally of Austria-Hungary.

Since the crisis these activities have by no means been relaxed. On the contrary, they have been and will be pursued with the utmost energy with the aid of such effective and ostentatious methods as the Czar's visit to the Roumanian court.

This campaign synchronized with a revolution in Roumanian public opinion, the effects of which have been felt with growing intensity, and today there can be no doubt that the project for a readjustment of Roumanian policy has gained numerous adherents in the army and amongst the educated classes and the people in support of a union with Russia which should bring freedom to "our brothers beyond the Carpathians." A movement of this character is clearly a most efficient instrument in preparing the ground for the entry of Roumania into a Balkan League when this is formed.

Official circles in Roumania have hitherto withstood the tide of popular feeling and the solicitations of Russia and France to an extent that renders it impossible to speak at present of an open defection to the camp of the Dual



Alliance, or of a policy of avowed hostility to Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that a significant change is apparent in the direction of Roumanian foreign policy, which, apart from the prospect of further developments in the same direction, has already reacted with considerable effect upon the political and military situation of Austria-Hungary—indeed, of the Triple Alliance as a whole.

For, while formerly there were no conclusive reasons for doubting that Roumania would fulfil the obligations arising from her pact with the Triple Alliance, notwithstanding the secrecy in which it was shrouded, on several occasions of late it has been publicly stated in authoritative quarters in Roumania—the clause in the convention which prescribes secrecy depriving the Triple Alliance of any opportunity for raising a protest—that full liberty of action will be the ruling principle of Roumanian policy. Similarly, King Carol, in harmony with the frankness which belongs to his noble nature, while assuring the Imperial and Royal Ambassador that during his lifetime his efforts would be directed to avoiding any armed encounter between Roumania and Austria-Hungary, declared that, in the Roumania of today, he could not pursue any policy in the teeth of public opinion, and that therefore, notwithstanding the alliance, if Austria-Hungary should be attacked by Russia, there could be no question of Roumania taking the field on the side of the Dual Monarchy. The Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs went a step beyond this, stating openly in an interview which took place—it is significant, immediately after the visit of the Czar to Constantza—that a *rapprochement* had actually been reached between Roumania and Russia, and that the two States had interests in common.

The present situation may thus be depicted in the following manner. The Dual Monarchy takes its stand in all respects upon the alliance, and is ready now, as before, to come to the assistance of Roumania with all its forces *in casu faderis*. Roumania, on the other hand, dissociates herself from the obligations which the alliance imposes upon her, and holds out to the Monarchy the bare prospect of her neutrality. And even that is guaranteed only by the present engagement of King Carol, which holds good naturally only for the duration of his reign, and is subordinated to the further condition that he retains full control over the direction of foreign policy. It is impossible to deny that the monarch might prove unequal to this task at a time when the whole country was in the grip of a nationalistic agitation, all the more impossible in that at this very hour King Carol invokes the strength of popular feeling as a reason for the failure of Roumania to fulfil all her obligations in the alliance. Finally, the fact must not be overlooked that Roumania is already bound to Serbia, the bitterest enemy of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans, by ties of friendship and community of interests.

Up to the present the Dual Monarchy has confined itself to friendly remonstrances at Bucharest respecting the altered direction of Roumanian policy,



feeling that the occasion has not arisen for drawing any serious inference from the new departure, the full effects of which become clearer every day. In taking this course the Cabinet at Vienna has been primarily influenced by the fact that the German Government has declared itself convinced that nothing more serious is involved than a temporary vacillation—a phenomenon traceable to certain misunderstandings arising during the crisis, which would vanish automatically if a calm and patient attitude were preserved. But events have shown that this policy of calm expectancy and friendly remonstrances has not produced the desired effect, that there has been no diminution in the growing estrangement between Austria-Hungary and Roumania, but that, on the other hand, the process has developed with increased rapidity. The very fact that the "liberty of action" secured by the present situation is altogether to the advantage of Roumania and prejudicial only to the Dual Monarchy, speaks convincingly against any hope that this policy might develop to our advantage in the future.

The question arises whether Austria-Hungary could improve her relations with Roumania by means of frank discussions, confronting the kingdom with the choice of cutting adrift altogether from the Triple Alliance, or—perhaps by a public avowal of its membership in the alliance—of giving an adequate guaranty that the obligations which that Alliance imposes would be executed in their entirety by Roumania no less than by the other members. A solution of this character, which would revive a tradition of thirty years' standing, would certainly be most in harmony with the wishes of Austria-Hungary. But in the present circumstances there is unfortunately little likelihood that King Carol or any Roumanian government, even in the event of an extension of the scope of the present treaty, would be prepared to proclaim Roumania's membership in the Triple Alliance in the teeth of public opinion. It follows that if the Dual Monarchy were to confront Roumania with a categorical choice of alternative courses, an open breach might result. It is difficult for Vienna to judge whether the German Cabinet could succeed in inducing Roumania to adopt a position which would give reliable guaranties of complete and lasting loyalty to the Alliance by making earnest and energetic representations, accompanied, if necessary, by a proposal in the sense which has been sketched. Judging from appearances, however, the prospects of success are doubtful.

The present circumstances practically exclude any possibility of reshaping the alliance with Roumania upon a sufficiently reliable and solid basis to justify Austria-Hungary in treating it as the pivot of her Balkan policy.

For the Monarchy to persist in a more or less passive attitude towards the events which are unfolding themselves in Roumania, and to neglect the military preparation and political action which should be adopted without delay to annul or at least to diminish the effects of the neutrality and possible hostility of Roumania would not only serve no purpose, but, in view of the politi-

cal and military importance of that country, would imply an inexcusable levity, exposing the defense of the Empire to hazard at vital points.

For the Monarchy the military importance of the alliance with Roumania lay in the fact that, in the event of a conflict with Russia, Austria-Hungary would have enjoyed full liberty of action against Russia on the Roumanian side, while a considerable portion of the Russian forces would be contained by the flank attack of the Roumanian army. In the present position, on the other hand, if an armed encounter took place between the Dual Monarchy and Russia, an almost opposite situation would arise. For Russia need not under any circumstances fear an attack on the part of Roumania, against whom she would have to place hardly a single man in the field, while Austria-Hungary would not be able to place implicit reliance upon Roumanian neutrality, and would therefore be compelled to retain a sufficient reserve of troops to deal with Roumania who would now lie upon her flank.

Hitherto, Austria-Hungary has based her military dispositions for a conflict with Russia upon the assumption that Roumania would take part on her side. If this assumption falls to the ground—nay, if there is not even any absolute security against the prospect of an attack by Roumania—the Dual Monarchy must adopt other measures to meet the outbreak of war, and even consider the desirability of erecting fortifications against her.

In the sphere of politics we are called upon to convince Roumania, by the evidence of facts, that we are in a position to create another base upon which Austria-Hungary may rest her policy in the Balkans. The course which must be pursued to achieve this purpose coincides in respect of its character and the moment for its initiation with the need for adopting effective measures to counteract the efforts of the Dual Alliance to establish a new Balkan League. In the existing situation in the Balkans these two aims can only be attained if the Dual Monarchy accepts the offer which Bulgaria tendered as much as a year ago, and has many times renewed, and establishes its relations with that Power upon the basis of a treaty. The Monarchy must, at the same time, direct its efforts towards the formation of an alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey. Until quite recently the state of feeling which prevailed in both countries was so favorable to a project of this character that an instrument had already been drawn up, although it was never actually signed. In this connection, too, to persist in the old policy of temporization, which the Monarchy was induced to adopt, showing a far more genuine regard for the alliance than was displayed at Bucharest, might entail a heavy damage which could not be repaired. Further delay, and, above all, the failure to initiate a counter-campaign in Sofia, would leave the field altogether free for the intensive and well-directed efforts of Russia and France. The attitude of Roumania leaves the Monarchy no choice but to grant Bulgaria the support for which

she has long been craving, for by hardly any other means can the Russian policy of "encirclement" be defeated. But this course will only be possible while the road to Sofia and Constantinople remains open.

The treaty with Bulgaria—the details of its provisions will call for a close examination—must naturally, in its general outlines, be framed to avoid any conflict with the obligations which the treaty with Roumania has imposed upon the Dual Monarchy. Further, the compact should not be concealed from Roumania, since it does not connote any hostility towards that kingdom, but only conveys a serious warning which should impress upon responsible persons in Bucharest the full implication of a permanent reliance upon Russia as their sole political guide.

Before, however, entering upon the course which has been outlined, Austria-Hungary attaches the greatest importance to the establishment of a full understanding with the German Empire. In this she is actuated, not merely by considerations of tradition and of the close tie of alliance which binds her to Germany, but above all by the fact that important interests of Germany and of the Triple Alliance are deeply involved, and by the certainty that these interests, which are ultimately her interests, can only be fully secured if the united action of France and Russia be opposed by the same measure of unity on the part of the Triple Alliance, particularly of Austria-Hungary and the German Empire.

For if Russia attempts with French support to unite the Balkan States against Austria-Hungary and strives to intensify the confusion into which our relations with Roumania have already been thrown, the hostility implied in these efforts is not directed against Austria-Hungary out of regard for her importance alone. It is not as a remote consequence that a blow will be struck at that ally of the German Empire whose geographical position and internal structure render her the most exposed and readily assailable member of the European *bloc* which bars the way to Russia in her efforts to realize her scheme of world-politics.

The Dual Alliance aims at the destruction of the military superiority of the two Empires by means of auxiliaries drawn from the Balkans, but this does not represent the final aim of Russia.

While France strives to weaken the Dual Monarchy in the hope of advancing her *revanche* policy, the Czardom entertains far more comprehensive designs.

To survey the evolution of Russia in the last two centuries, the steady growth of her territory, the enormous advance of her population, which far exceeds that of other European Powers, and the tremendous increase of her economic and military resources, bearing in mind the fact that this great Empire is even now practically shut off from the open sea by its geographical position and the ruling of treaties, is to realize that aggression has been the inevitable characteristic of Russian policy from time immemorial.



It would be absurd to credit Russia with schemes of territorial conquest at the expense of the German Empire. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the unprecedented armaments and military preparations, the construction of strategic railways in the west and other measures on the part of the Russian Government are directed against Germany rather than Austria-Hungary.

For Russia has grasped the fact that in executing the plans imposed upon her in Europe and Asia by needs which are rooted in her being, she cannot at the very outset avoid the infliction of injury upon extremely important German interests, and must therefore inevitably meet with resistance on the part of Germany.

The policy of Russia is conditioned by circumstances which can undergo no modification. It is therefore itself unchanging and commands an ample prospect.

In her undisguised attempt to "encircle" the Dual Monarchy, which pursues no universal policy, Russia is aiming ultimately at depriving the German Empire of the means of resisting her designs as they have been described above and her efforts to achieve political and economic supremacy.

For these reasons it is the conviction of those to whom the direction of Austro-Hungarian foreign affairs has been entrusted that, in the present phase of Balkan politics, the Dual Monarchy and Germany are equally interested in a timely and vigorous intervention to hinder the consummation towards which Russia is systematically directing her efforts before matters have travelled beyond the limits of our control.

The accompanying report had just been drawn up when the appalling events at Serajevo occurred.

It is hardly possible to estimate at present the full significance of this atrocious crime. But in any case, if an indubitable proof were needed of the irreconcilable hostility which exists between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia and of the menace which lies in the designs of the "Greater Serbia" party, and of the reckless fervor with which they are pursued, it is now at hand.

Austria-Hungary has left untried no expedient which good-will and a conciliatory disposition could suggest to establish a tolerable basis for her relations with Serbia. But recent events have shown that these efforts were made in vain, and that in the future, as in the past, the Monarchy will have to reckon with obstinate, irreconcilable and aggressive hostility on the part of Serbia.

All the more imperative is the necessity that Austria-Hungary should proceed with determination to tear asunder the threads with which her enemies design to weave a net about her head.



## ANNEX 5

*Telegram from the German Chancellor to the German Ambassador at Vienna*

Secret.

For Your Excellency's personal guidance.

BERLIN, July 6, 1914.

Yesterday the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador delivered to His Majesty a confidential letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph which depicted the present situation from the Austro-Hungarian standpoint, and developed the measures which Vienna has in view. A copy is being sent to your Excellency herewith.

I replied today to Count Szögyeny, at the instance of His Majesty, that His Majesty sends his thanks to the Emperor Francis Joseph for the communication, and will answer it personally forthwith. Meanwhile His Majesty desires to lose no time in emphasizing the fact that he is not blind to the danger which threatens Austria-Hungary, and therefore the Triple Alliance, from the agitation conducted by the Russian and Serbian Pan Slav movement. Although His Majesty, as is well known, does not repose implicit confidence in Bulgaria and her ruler, and naturally inclines to his old ally, Roumania, and her Hohenzollern Prince, he yet understands that the Emperor Francis Joseph desires to bring about the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance in view of Roumania's attitude and the danger of the formation of a new Balkan League directed immediately against the Danube Monarchy. His Majesty will, therefore, instruct his Ambassador in Sofia to support the steps taken with this aim in view by the Austro-Hungarian representative at the latter's desire. His Majesty will further put forth efforts in Bucharest in the direction suggested by the Emperor Francis Joseph to induce King Carol to fulfil the obligations entailed upon him by the alliance, to sever himself from Serbia, and to suppress the agitation in Roumania against Austria-Hungary.

Finally, in regard to Serbia, His Majesty naturally cannot commit himself to any pronouncement on the questions at issue between Austria-Hungary and this country, because they would be beyond his competence. The Emperor Francis Joseph can, however, rely on the certainty that His Majesty will stand faithfully at Austria-Hungary's side in accordance with the duties of his alliance and his old friendship.

V. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

## ANNEX 6

*Autograph letter from the Emperor William to the Emperor Francis Joseph*

BORNHOLM, July 14, 1914.

MY DEAR FRIEND:

It is with a sense of sincere gratitude that I see you turn your thoughts towards our friendship at an hour when a desolating tragedy has invaded your life and grave decisions are demanded, and make that friendship the starting-point of your kindly letter to me. I esteem the comradeship by which I am bound so closely to you as a precious legacy from my father and grandfather, and see in your response the best security for the safe-keeping of our lands. The respect and loyalty which I cherish towards you personally may afford some token of my regret at being compelled to abandon my journey to Vienna, and to renounce the opportunity of giving a public expression to my sincere sympathy with you in your profound affliction.

Your trusty Ambassador, whom I regard with feelings of genuine esteem, will convey to you my assurance that in the hour of trouble you will find me and my Empire stationed loyally at your side in full accordance with the demands of our friendship which has stood the test of time and with the claims imposed by our alliance. I rejoice that it is my duty to renew this assurance here.

The appalling crime of Serajevo has thrown a glaring light upon the nefarious machinations of insensate fanatics and upon the Panslavist intrigues which threaten the structure of the State. It is not for me to comment upon the question at issue between your Government and Serbia. But I view it not merely as their moral duty, but as a behest of self-preservation, that all civilized States should oppose with every weapon at their command this propaganda by violence which selects the very framework of Government as the fittest object of attack. Again, I am not indifferent to the serious danger with which your territories and, in the final issue, the Triple Alliance, are threatened from the Panslavist agitation which is pursued by Russian and Serbian agencies, and recognize that it is necessary that the southern frontiers of your States should be relieved from the grievous pressure which this involves.

Accordingly, I am ready to do all in my power to aid your Government in its efforts to frustrate the formation of a new Balkan League, directed against Austria-Hungary under the patronage of Russia, and to counter-balance it by securing the adherence of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance. In harmony with this purpose I have, notwithstanding some hesitation, due primarily to the little reliance that can be placed upon the Bulgarian character, instructed my Minister at Sofia to support the measures adopted by your representative to further this object, if he so desires.

I have, further, instructed my Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to speak to King Carol in the terms which you have suggested, and, in view of the position created by recent events, to emphasize the need for severing the connection with Serbia, and putting a stop to the agitation directed against your territories. At the same time I have laid stress upon the fact that I attach the greatest importance to the maintenance of the relations of mutual confidence which have hitherto marked our alliance with Roumania, an alliance which need not suffer any prejudice even in the event of the union of Bulgaria with the Triple Alliance.

Let me, in conclusion, give expression to my heartfelt wish that after your grievous affliction you may find some relaxation in your sojourn at Ischl.

With sincere devotion and friendship I remain your faithful friend.

WILLIAM.

## SUPPLEMENT VI

### SERBIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE ENTENTE, MORE ESPECIALLY WITH RUSSIA

In order to judge the attitude adopted by Russia and Serbia towards Austria-Hungary during the crisis following on the Serajevo murder, it is important to obtain some insight into the relations subsisting between Russia and Serbia during the years immediately preceding the war. Documentary evidence of these relations dates appropriately from the time of the crisis following on the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as autonomous crown lands in the Danubian Monarchy. Apart from the Berlin Treaty, the Danubian Monarchy was indisputably justified by the terms of a special agreement with Russia in taking this step. The postponement of its fulfilment was, as far as is known, due to motives of expediency; the incorporation was effected in order to anticipate formal complications arising in connection with the new Turkish constitution. The question of the political wisdom of the step may be set aside, but the view that it ran counter to any treaty rights held by Russia or Serbia has never been put forward.

#### 1. AFTER THE ANNEXATION CRISIS

On the 22d of September, 1908, Vesnitch, the Serbian Minister at Paris, reported that Iswolsky, in the course of a conversation relative to the occupation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, had declared that Russia would support Serbia wherever and whenever she could. "In reality you lose nothing, while you gain our support. Let the Serbian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina continue as hitherto to work towards its intellectual renaissance. A people whose consciousness has been awakened to such a pitch can never be robbed of their nationality."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Annex I.

According to a report emanating from the Serbian Minister Simitch, on the 27th of September, 1908, Urusoff, the Russian Ambassador to Vienna, drew his attention to the possibility of annexing the occupied provinces in the future in the event of a successful revolution in Bosnia, or of a war of which the issue should be unfavorable to Austria-Hungary.<sup>1</sup>

On the same day (September 27, 1908) Grouitch, the Serbian Minister in London, wired that Sir Charles Hardinge had assured him of the deep sympathy of England toward the Serbian people in the distressing position in which they were placed.<sup>2</sup> In a further report dispatched some days later (September 30, 1908) he states that Iswolsky had referred to the annexation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a grave error on the part of Austria-Hungary, as this step had had the effect of consolidating the alliance between Russia, France and England, and making it much stronger.<sup>3</sup>

The Serbian Minister Milovanovitch reported from Berlin on the 12th of October, 1908, that Iswolsky's policy was clearly directed towards bringing back Russia into the path of her European aims whilst liquidating all Russian extra-European questions; in this policy Serbia constituted a very important factor as the center of the southern Slavs.<sup>4</sup>

On the 16th of October, 1908, the Serbian Minister in London reported that Serbia could rely upon England. "On my renewed and urgent representations, Grey and Hardinge finally pledged themselves to continue to support our claims for territorial compensation, so long as they are upheld by Russia."<sup>5</sup> The Serbian Minister Pashitch wrote from St. Petersburg on the 30th of October, 1908, that, according to a statement made by the Czar of Russia, the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina could only be finally settled by a war.<sup>6</sup>

On the 19th of February, 1909, Kosutitch, the Serbian Minister at Petersburg, reported: "Gutschkow has said to me: 'As soon as our military preparations are fully completed, we can settle matters with Austria-Hungary; do not begin a war now, that would be suicidal to you; keep silence about your intentions and prepare yourselves; the days of your rejoicing are drawing near.'" Bobrinsky added: "I felt no hatred for Austria-Hungary, but the humiliation which Austria prepared for us has aroused fearful rage and hatred against her."<sup>7</sup>

According to a further report from the same Minister, dated the 26th of February, 1909, Iswolsky, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed himself to the effect that, whereas Italy played an inactive rôle in the Triple Alliance, the harmony between England, France and Russia was continually improving in consequence of the deterioration suffered by the political position of Austria-Hungary from the annexation of Bosnia, and

<sup>1</sup> Annex 2.  
<sup>6</sup> Annex 6.

<sup>2</sup> Annex 3.  
<sup>6</sup> Annex 7.

<sup>8</sup> Annex 4.  
<sup>7</sup> Annex 8.

<sup>4</sup> Annex 5.



that the war with Germanism was inevitable. Serbia would be condemned to a paltry existence until the collapse of Austria set in.<sup>1</sup>

This idea was further developed in a report dated the 6th of March, 1909, in which Kosutitch speaks of a consultation with Khomiakoff, the President of the Duma, who told him that in the opinion of the Czar of Russia a conflict with Germanism in the future was "inevitable." Russia had, it was true, declared that she would not go to war, as she was not at that time in a position to do so, but any violence inflicted upon Serbia might in future always be regarded as the beginning of a European conflagration, so soon as Russia was once more capable of "making her voice heard."<sup>2</sup>

In conclusion, two further decrees of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, issued in 1909, must be mentioned. In the first of these, Dr. Milovanovitch, on the 1st of April, 1909, requested the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in London, Dr. Grouitch, to make representations to the Foreign Office with a view to inducing Bulgaria to declare her solidarity with Serbia. Although Grey refused in the first place to take any steps in this matter, a *démarche* in this direction was undertaken by England, as is shown by the minute as to action taken endorsed on the document of the 7th of April, 1909, which has been discovered. This step is apparently explained in a communication from the Serbian Minister in St. Petersburg, dated the 5th of March, 1909, according to which Grey had stated to the Russian Minister that he wished to support the Russian policy in every respect.

A further circular decree from Belgrade, dated the 22d of June, 1909, also deals with Serbo-Bulgarian relations. It lays down that solidarity with the Powers of the Triple Entente is absolutely necessary to the Balkan States, as the triumph of the Germanic hegemony in Europe would be equivalent to definitive subjugation of Serbia to Austria-Hungary.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. BEFORE THE BALKAN WAR

The Serbian Minister, Grouitch, reported from London on September 8, 1911, a conversation with the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, in which the latter spoke quite openly to the Serbian Minister of the French military preparations for a war which would break out in the immediate future. As the preparations would not be completed before 1914, they would be forced to postpone the war until that date. Grouitch reported on the 9th of November of the same year that England was ready to cooperate with France in the war which was planned in this way.<sup>4</sup>

On the other hand, Popovitch, the Serbian Minister accredited to the Russian Court, informed his Prime Minister from St. Petersburg on the 4th of December, 1911, that Sazonoff foresaw that political complications would arise in the Balkans in the spring.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Annex 9.

<sup>4</sup> Annexes 14 and 15.

<sup>2</sup> Annex 10.

<sup>3</sup> Annexes 11, 12, 13.

<sup>5</sup> Annex 16.

In a report dated the 17th of February, 1912, Popovitch, the Minister in St. Petersburg, characterized the King of Montenegro as a "vassal of Russia," a remark which is worthy of note in view of the fact that Montenegro began the Balkan War.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. THE BALKAN WAR

All the momentous agreements which had for their subject the action of the Balkan States against Turkey—one of the most serious threats to the peace of Europe—agreements which were dictated throughout by Russian diplomacy, were certainly communicated to the French and English Governments, but no hint thereof was given to the Central Powers. Neither at the meeting of the Emperors at Baltic-Port (July 4 and 5, 1912) nor when Sazonoff visited Berlin in October, 1912, was any mention made of the intentions of Russia. On the contrary, Sazonoff, who, like the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, was also present at the meeting at Baltic-Port, stated that: "Russia had no thought of utilizing the present difficulties of Turkey to her own advantage." In the same way, on that occasion the Czar twice asserted that he had "most emphatically urged the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins to maintain a tranquil attitude." Moreover, when Sazonoff passed through Berlin on his return from Paris in October, 1912, he had a conversation (on the 8th of October) with the Imperial Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The news of the declaration of war by Montenegro on Turkey had just become known. When it was hinted to Sazonoff by the Germans that danger had always lain in the aim of Russia *de patroniser l'alliance des États balkaniques*, Sazonoff did not dispute this, but emphasized the fact that Russia had expressly enjoined upon the Balkan States that their Union must harbor no aggressive tendencies.

The Russian Minister was apparently sure that the Balkan Alliance treaties would remain secret. He did not fear the dangers of European complications, for Russia and her allies were well prepared for the event of war.

The Serbian archives, moreover, contain the following:

In a report dated the 14th of October, 1912, the Serbian Minister in London, Grouitch, stated that he had informed Nicholson of his personal conviction that if Austria-Hungary should occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar, Serbia would oppose that action by force of arms. Nicholson had listened to his statements with interest. The Class A reservists of the English fleet, numbering 30,000 men, were shortly afterwards placed on a war footing.<sup>2</sup>

Ristitch, the Serbian Minister at Bucharest, reported that he believed political complications to be imminent. On the 13th of November, 1912,

<sup>1</sup> Annex 17.

<sup>2</sup> Annex 18.

he reported that the Russian and French Ministers were advising patience with respect to the Serbian wishes for an Adriatic port, as everything depended on being well prepared now for the tremendous events which must occur hereafter among the Great Powers.<sup>1</sup>

On the 14th of December, 1912, the Serbian Minister Popovitch reported from St. Petersburg a conversation with an unnamed assistant of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had declared to him that Russia had full confidence in Serbia's strength, and hoped that the Allied Powers would succeed in shattering the power of Austria-Hungary. Serbia should be satisfied for the time being with what she would gain from conquests by her arms during the Balkan war. The present was to be looked upon merely as a stage in the path to a future which "is ours!"<sup>2</sup>

Some months later (on the 29th of April, 1913), Popovitch reported similarly that Sazonoff had said to him that Serbia must work for the future, when she would receive much land from Austria-Hungary.<sup>3</sup> To this end, however, as Popovitch reports on the 20th of July of the same year, from a further conversation with Sazonoff, it was necessary for Serbia to endeavor carefully to preserve her friendship with Roumania, for the help of Roumania would continue in the future to be absolutely necessary in view of Serbia's aspirations respecting Austria-Hungary.<sup>4</sup>

On the 22d of March, 1913, Vesnitch, the Serbian Minister in Paris, reported that he had heard from a reliable informant in the political world that the danger of a general European war at the beginning of the month had been averted by certain moral sacrifices, as the Entente intended to give the Balkan Alliance opportunity to recover, rally its forces and prepare for contingencies which might arise in a not too distant future.<sup>5</sup>

On the 10th of July, 1913, Ristitch reported that the Russian Minister in Bucharest advised both Serbia and Bulgaria to accept every award without reservation, since the whole combination of affairs as they stood at present was only of a most transitory nature.<sup>6</sup>

#### 4. AFTER THE BALKAN WAR

On the 11th of November, 1913, Popovitch reported from St. Petersburg that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that Serbia was the only State in the Balkans which Russia trusted, and for which Russia would do everything.<sup>7</sup>

At the beginning of January, 1914, the Czar made the same declaration to Pashitch, who was sent on a special mission to St. Petersburg, and submitted a report of his audience, dated the 20th of January, 1914. In the course of that conversation the Czar pointed out to the Serbian Prime Minister the

<sup>1</sup> Annex 19.

<sup>4</sup> Annex 22.

<sup>2</sup> Annex 20.

<sup>5</sup> Annex 23.

<sup>7</sup> Annex 25.

<sup>3</sup> Annex 21.

<sup>6</sup> Annex 24.



desirability of cooperation with Roumania, who was also aiming at the acquisition of portions of Austro-Hungarian territory. He proposed to the Minister that Serbian arsenals should be replenished by Russian war material. When discussing Serbo-Bulgarian relations the Czar advised conciliatory tactics with a view to the time when Bulgaria might be of assistance "in the solution of the Serbo-Croatian question." He then discussed the warlike aims of the joint policy against Austria-Hungary as a matter of course in detail with the Serbian Premier. His remarks culminated in the request that the Serbian King should be given the message: "We will do everything for Serbia."<sup>1</sup> To these Serbian reports must be added the following letter from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sazonoff, to Mr. von Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Belgrade:

ST. PETERSBURG, PALACE SQUARE, 6,

*April 23, 1913.*

DEAR NIKOLAI GENRIKHOVITCH:

I am taking advantage of Strandtmann's<sup>2</sup> departure to write you a few lines to supplement the official pronouncement which he will hand over to you, provided that it is ready before he goes.

I cannot tell you how anxious I feel about the question of Serbo-Bulgarian relations. It is destined to play the part of touchstone for the political maturity of the partners to the Balkan Alliance. If they do not bear this test they would be placed in an unendurable position, which would be no less complicated for us. All Austria's efforts are at present directed towards estranging the Bulgars both from ourselves and from the Serbs, and for this purpose her expedients are inexhaustible. You are acquainted with Bulgarian psychology, and will therefore not be surprised when I tell you that she has already achieved something in this direction. In Sofia we are beginning to be viewed with some mistrust, although there still appears to be a tendency to rely on our support for settling the difference with the Serbs, notwithstanding the reports spread by the Austrians that the award must indisputably give full emancipation to the Serbs. We are firmly resolved not to refuse the rôle of empire assigned to Russia by the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, as we can see no other peaceful solution. The reason for our decision is to be found solely and wholly in the text of the treaty itself, from which we shall not be able to depart upon any essential issue, and in this my opinion is confirmed by the supplementary agreements between the chiefs of the general staffs of the two armies, which have recently come to my knowledge. I am very much afraid of the spread of disappointment among the Serbs at the issue of their recent heroic efforts. Apparently this nation—for which we feel more sympathy than for any other Slav nation—is beginning to imagine that it is pursued by fate, that Russia stands by indifferent, etc. The prevalence of such ideas is extremely dangerous, and I beg you to use all your influence with the Serbian Government and public opinion to dissipate them. In the new situation in the Balkans it is impossible to establish complete equality

<sup>1</sup> Annex 26.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary to the Russian Legation in Belgrade.



between Serbia and Bulgaria, and it is equally impossible that Serbia should fail to realize this. Bulgaria has, through her victories, fully realized her national ideals. She can go no further without coming into conflict with far more powerful neighbors. Serbia, on the other hand, has but just completed the first stage of her historical journey, and before her<sup>1</sup> goal can be attained, must pass through a terrible struggle, in the course of which her very existence may well be jeopardized. Serbia's promised land lies upon the territory of the Austria-Hungary of today, and not in the quarter whither she is now striving, the way to which is barred by Bulgaria. In these circumstances it is of vital interest to Serbia on the one hand to maintain her alliance with Bulgaria, and, on the other, by patient and unremitting labor to attain the necessary degree of preparedness for the inevitable struggle in the future. Time is on the side of Serbia, and against her enemies, who already show manifest signs of dissolution.

Explain all this to the Serbs. From all sides I hear that if any voice carries conviction in Belgrade, it is yours. Take this opportunity to tell them that we are not losing sight of their interests, and are energetically supporting their cause in Bulgaria. A breach between Serbia and Bulgaria would be a triumph for Austria. Her agony would thereby be prolonged for many years.

I write in haste, as I must leave immediately for Tsarskoye for an audience.

Yours most truly,

S. SAZONOFF.

## ANNEX 1

### *Conversation between the Serbian Minister Vesnitch and Mr. Iswolsky*

Vésnitch wrote from Paris on the 22d of September (5th of October), 1908, as follows:

I continue my report after the return of Mr. Iswolsky, whom I visited at noon, and with whom I had a full half-hour's conversation. Mr. Nelidoff and Mr. Louis had already informed him of the agitation in Serbia, so that he immediately broached the subject. He assured me that Serbia and the Serbian people would not only lose nothing by the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government, but would actually gain thereby.

You Serbians (he said) cannot after all contemplate driving Austria-Hungary out of Bosnia and Herzegovina by force of arms. Neither can we Russians go to war with Austria-Hungary for the sake of those two provinces. (You realize that I cannot admit that Russia is at present unable to do so, but that is in fact the real reason.) In reality Austria-Hungary gains nothing by her action. She is rather abandoning a secure acquisition by renouncing her right over the Sanjak of Novibazar, and by withdrawing from this province—a fact which should hearten the Serbians, since it opens the prospect of a greater proximity between the frontiers of Serbia and Montenegro. Austria

<sup>1</sup>One word illegible.

will publicly renounce her rights over the Sanjak at our request, as Mr. Milovanovitch already knows from our conversation at Karlsbad, where he himself expressed the view that Serbia could accept the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina if accompanied by a renunciation of Austria's rights over the Sanjak. I foresaw this step on the part of Austria-Hungary, and it did not take me by surprise. For this reason I have made our consent subject to the above-mentioned condition. The proclamation of annexation will be made simultaneously with the renunciation of Austrian rights over the Sanjak, and will be followed by the revision or modification of the Treaty of Berlin in accordance with our wishes. This will give Serbia an opportunity to advance her claims for a readjustment of her frontier. This winter I announced in the Duma that I was an optimist, and an optimist I remain even now. In the winter after Baron Ährenthal's outburst over the Sanjak Railway I uttered no protest, but gave my immediate support to the proposal for the Adriatic Railway. And I feel now that it would be more advantageous to secure the withdrawal from the Sanjak, in the interests of Serbia, than to enter a simple protest. In 1878, Austria put Russia and her allies into the dock at Berlin; now it is we who are going to put Austria in the dock. Mr. von Schoen, to whom I was the first to communicate Austria-Hungary's intention of sacrificing the Sanjak in the interests of the annexation was astounded at the rashness of the Vienna politicians. Evidently, at Vienna, they simply want to give the old Emperor some satisfaction at the close of his reign. . . . Russia has hitherto supported Serbia, and she will continue this support within the measure of her capacity. Only, you must come to an early understanding with Montenegro. The scandalous divergencies between Belgrade and Cetinje must be swept away as soon as possible. We made the strongest representations to Prince Nicholas in this sense when he was in St. Petersburg. Further, you must come to an understanding with Bulgaria, and in this task also you will have our loyal support. We no longer desire to have a Great Bulgaria. We now look on such an idea as a mistake. Nor is this the only opportunity which Bulgaria will have of feeling the consequences of having disregarded our wishes. Among the other modifications which we will ask for in connection with a revision of the Treaty of Berlin, will be the modification of Article 29. Finally, I cannot understand the excitement in Serbia; in reality you lose nothing, while you gain—our support. Let the Serbian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina continue as hitherto to work towards its intellectual renaissance. A people whose consciousness has been awakened to such a pitch can never be robbed of their nationality.

I asked Mr. Iswolsky whether we had anything to expect from his conversation with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at least in the matter of the Adriatic Railway, since Austria-Hungary, now that she had withdrawn from the Sanjak had lost the territory in which her railway was to have been constructed. He replied that he had spoken to Tittoni on the subject, and that the matter would have to be raised again so soon as the situation in Turkey permitted.

## ANNEX 2

*Conversation between the Serbian Minister Simitch and Prince Urusoff,  
Russian Ambassador at Vienna*

Simitch writing from Vienna on the 27th of September/10th of October, 1908, reported as follows:

I asked Prince Urusoff whether the Russian Government had received previous information as to the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government regarding the annexation. He told me that Baron Ährenthal had certainly, while at Buchlowitz, spoken to Mr. Iswolsky of the possibility of such annexation, but that he had not described it as actually impending. Iswolsky had replied that although Russia would not in principle oppose such a modification of the Treaty of Berlin, for the maintenance of which she had no reason to come forward, he felt that such a modification could not take place without the consent of the Powers signatory to the Berlin Treaty. Ährenthal had not asked for this consent, and to that extent his action was a surprise to Russia.

I asked whether Russia had as yet issued an invitation for a conference to consider the readjustment of the political situation, and whether there was any prospect of summoning such a conference and of the participation of Austria-Hungary. Urusoff replied that the Russian proposal for a conference should have been issued from St. Petersburg the day before yesterday, but that up to yesterday he had not received it. As regards participation in the conference it was so far known that France, Italy and Germany would take part. England had not yet made any definite pronouncement, but it was hoped that she would take part. Baron Ährenthal had told him that Austria-Hungary was in principle prepared to accept the conference, but that he desired that the scope and program of the conference should first be agreed upon—a perfectly reasonable request. In view, however, of the possibility that it would take some little time to agree upon a definite program, he saw small prospect of the conference assembling at an early date.

Prince Urusoff then changed the subject and referred to the excitement which the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had provoked in Serbia. He considered this excitement exaggerated; for practical purposes the annexation had not altered the balance of power in the Balkans. No reasonable man could have supposed that Austria-Hungary would of her own accord give up the occupied provinces or that they would fall to Serbia. If people in Serbia had hoped for such an eventuality as the result of an Austrian defeat in war, or a successful revolution in Bosnia, this possibility still existed in the future. He understood the protest against Austria's action which we had handed to the signatory Powers, which, indeed, we were bound to hand in—but this was all that small States could do in such circum-



stances; it would be unpardonable and disastrous for Serbia to go further and to precipitate an armed conflict with Austria-Hungary. He knew that people in Vienna were extremely ill-disposed towards Serbia, and he felt therefore that it would be very dangerous to allow the demonstrations which were daily taking place in Serbia to continue. This would be wholly to the advantage of Austria-Hungary and of her aims. Already people were pointing to the demonstrations as justifying the necessity of annexation. Moreover, if it came to war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, it would be Serbia's affair entirely, and after the conclusion of peace we should find ourselves saddled with heavy burdens. Prince Urusoff recommended us, therefore, to exert the greatest prudence and to avoid all provocation. He had found Baron Ährenthal, when he last visited him, greatly exasperated against Serbia and against almost everybody.

As regards the compensation which we claim in our note of protest in the event of Europe sanctioning the annexation, Urusoff fails to see where such compensation could be found. In his opinion, Austria-Hungary's renunciation of her rights over the Sanjak constitutes sufficient compensation for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since it affords a prospect for the eventual extension of Serbia in this direction, and removes the danger of a further Austrian advance towards the south. Urusoff cannot see, either, what compensation one could give Turkey for her definite renunciation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the proclamation of Bulgarian independence.

### ANNEX 3

#### *Conversation of Grouitch, the Serbian Minister at London, with Sir Charles Hardinge*

Grouitch reports from London September 27/October 10, 1908:

In my telegram of the day before yesterday, I reported to you the impression made on Sir Charles Hardinge by our protest against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have communicated this protest in a short note addressed to the Minister, handing it to Sir Charles, as Sir Edward Grey was not in London at that time. I wished to read him the text of the protest, but Sir Charles asked me to give him the note, and then he read it himself together with me. On looking at the first sentences he said that he fully agreed with us, but on reading further he remarked: "Here we no longer agree; that is your point of view." I did not want to interrupt him, and he finished reading without further observations, except to say: "What kind of compensations do you ask, and at whose expense?" I answered that I had had no instructions, but Sir Charles insisted that we could discuss these things *entre nous à titre personnel et dans un esprit amical*. I said I was not in a position to enter into this discussion, for without a restoration of the *status quo* any compensation would be of little value to us; therefore, I added,



our Government had probably not yet made up their minds about such reparation as might in the most extreme case be given to us. I then asked Sir Charles to put himself in our position in order to understand how difficult and truly desperate was the situation of the Serbian people and Government, explaining, accordingly, what I had already on former occasions said to Sir Edward Grey. Sir Charles replied that England had always felt for the Serbian people a most lively sympathy, which, on the present occasion as well, was assured to us, and all the more because he fully realized the difficulties of our position. But, he said, Europe was now faced with a great and difficult task, and Serbia must therefore avoid everything which might render it more difficult. "The Austrian Ambassador," he added, "came to me and asked me to use my influence with you, that you should cease your preparations for war; it is not, however, in consequence of that step, but on our own initiative that we earnestly recommend to you to be calm, and to avoid adventures the consequences of which could not be foreseen." I remarked that the idea of war had taken root with us (that is, in the minds of our people) not in consequence of any agitation for the promotion of an adventurous policy, but of the desperate situation in which we found ourselves. But the Government, with whom lay the political responsibility, was bound by its duty, and would do what was necessary to allay the popular excitement and to advise the people to await such decision as the Great Powers would take after considering the protest which had been submitted to them. Before I left, Sir Charles promised to hand our protest to Sir Edward Grey as soon as possible, and again assured me of the sympathy of the British Government.

Today I met Sir Charles again, and informed him of the representations made by the Austrian Government against the calling up of our reserves and of our reply thereto. When I read him the communication, which I gave him as an *aide-mémoire*, he said that he was very pleased with our statement, and considered its last part to be the result of the friendly counsel which he had given me the day before yesterday. As he was so favorably disposed, I profited by it to ask him to permit me to turn to the compensation question. I had no instructions in the matter, but had been thinking it over, and should be grateful if I might ask him, *à titre personnel*, what his views were in general. Sir Charles said he would willingly discuss it, as he had nothing at all against our demands. Thereupon I mentioned, in the first place, the question of the Adriatic Railway, and asked if he thought that any kind of assurance could be given us respecting concessions. I said that I would begin with a matter which was the least contentious, as it could be settled not only at nobody's expense, but even to the advantage of several parties. Sir Charles appreciated this, and asked me to show him exactly, on the map, the line across Serbia and Turkey. We then looked at this together, and Sir Charles said the British Government had, as was known, supported our proposal with the Porte, and he asked how the matter now stood. I replied

that it had made excellent progress, but since the events in Turkey had remained stationary. Was it possible, I asked, to obtain for us guaranties from Austria-Hungary for better economic conditions in the future commercial treaty? He answered that this desire certainly deserved approval, but it was doubtful whether there was any value in promises and guaranties given by Austria. I observed that, unfortunately, we knew this very well, and finally spoke of territorial concessions in Bosnia. Sir Charles met this proposal, too, without any protest; but he said the difficulty was how Austria could be brought to make such concessions. I answered that the Great Powers must, acting in agreement, arrive at a decision about the annexation, and if this decision meant the restoration of the *status quo ante*, Serbia, with all the other Powers, would be quite content. But if it was decided that the annexation was valid, then the result would probably be some sort of compensation for Turkey, for the restoration of the Sanjak could not count as compensation. In that event, the Powers would be of opinion that the annexation ought not to be effected at the cost of Turkey, and as Austria would attain so easily such a large extension of territory, it could not hurt her if a portion of this cheaply-won territory were to fall to us.

My chief task lay in securing that at least the idea of compensation for Serbia should be recognized here. Sir Charles's statements show, if nothing else, that at least no negative answer is given us as yet. Unquestionably the friendly attitude of England will show itself in deed as well as in word. Of course, it is possible that this attention is paid to us only on account of the excitement prevailing in Serbia, and that in the end no practical account will be taken of our wishes. This is the more probable in view of the fact that, as Sir Charles informed me, England only agrees to the conference on condition that its program is strictly defined in advance; and I have reason to believe that the Government here do not desire the inclusion of the compensation question in the program, nor do any other Powers, except Turkey.

#### ANNEX 4

##### *Conversation of the Serbian Minister Grouitch with Iswolsky*

Grouitch reports from London September 30/October 13, 1912 (? 1908):

As I had the honor to report by telegraph, I had a meeting today with Mr. Iswolsky, who acceded very readily to my request for an interview. His first words after greeting me were that he was glad to talk with me as in present circumstances conversations might be of general advantage. Our conversation lasted about forty minutes, and I submit the chief points of it herewith.

Mr. Iswolsky did not conceal his annoyance with Austria and protested most emphatically against the allegation that he had agreed to the annexa-

tion. "Not once but at least ten times," he said, "in the course of the last few years has Austria sounded us in regard to the annexation; but the negotiations on the subject always remained indecisive, and we always replied that this question could not be solved unless the Powers signatory to the Berlin Treaty had first given their consent."

As regards Bulgaria, Iswolsky said she had lost more than she had gained, for she had lost the sympathy of Europe and particularly the sympathy and help of Russia, which she would find very much to her disadvantage in future. "I know," he said, "that it is believed in your country that we are well disposed to the Bulgarians and have treated them with special favor. And I admit that this was at one time the case, and can explain it by the fact that it is we who created Bulgaria and that we felt bound accordingly to promote her development. By her present conduct, however, Bulgaria has absolved us from this obligation and she will have occasion to realize the consequences of our altered attitude."

As regards Austria, Mr. Iswolsky again denounced her proceedings and said he did not understand Baron Ährenthal's policy. From the purely Austrian point of view, the annexation is a grave error, since Austria will find herself exposed on its account to serious difficulties in her own territories, and its effects on foreign relations will be a still closer Entente between Russia, France and England.

As for Serbia, Mr. Iswolsky considers we ought to deal with the annexation problem calmly, regarding it from the point of view not of sentimental considerations but of practical politics. He said he could understand the exasperation of the masses and the manner in which it manifested itself; but he could not understand how some of our statesmen allowed themselves to be carried away by it. He said in this connection that he was astonished when meeting Mr. Vesnitch in Paris, *par ses vues violentes* (at the violence of his attitude). We must surely realize that Bosnia and Herzegovina have been lost to us for a long time; for Austria would never without a war have returned these provinces to Turkey, still less to us. Neither Turkey nor any other Great Power would ever enter into a war against Austria for such an object, and Serbia could surely not even think of going to war. For Serbia, a war would mean *un coup de tête, un suicide* (an act of madness, suicide). Therefore all preparations hitherto made on our side, could profit us nothing, but would only serve to compromise us. "I read in the papers," he said, "that the Skuptchina has placed at the disposal of the Ministry for War a credit of fr. 16,000,000. Such a measure can only still further excite opinion in Serbia and confirm abroad the conviction that you refuse to listen to *les conseils de la raison* (the counsels of reason). For do not imagine that war can be carried on with fr. 16,000,000!"

If the annexation now accomplished were considered calmly, we should have reason to be content, since it is of the utmost importance for us and



our future that Austria has returned the Sanjak of Novibazar to Turkey, thus putting a stop forever to the Austrian advance upon Salonika. So soon as order is reestablished in Turkey and her development assumes a normal course, she will herself become a material obstacle to Austria's advance. Should, however, the hopes which are placed upon Turkey be disappointed, should *le moment du démembrement de la Turquie* (the moment of the dismemberment of Turkey) be at hand, then the Sanjak of which we are the natural heir would fall to us.

The return of the Sanjak is, further, our gain, in so far as Austria has thereby lost her right to the Sanjak Railway, while ours (the Adriatic Railway) is assured to us even though it cannot be spoken of just now. Moreover, the annexation has resulted in giving a fresh impulse to the spirit of nationality with us and with the other Serbs outside the kingdom, and is at least uniting us morally. The annexation has made us forget the petty interests which have divided us from Montenegro, and has brought about our reconciliation. Finally, then, we may look forward to certain other compensations which will assure our economic and political future, and Iswolsky is convinced that great things are in store for us. In any case we may feel confident that he does and will do everything that he can to safeguard our interests and to obtain certain compensations. In this connection he does not altogether exclude the possibility of territorial compensation, but he does not at all agree with our desire for a readjustment of the northern frontier of the Sanjak in favor of Serbia and Montenegro. He gives as his reason that the agitation already existing in Bosnia will undoubtedly continue, and that Austria will throw the whole blame on us all the more in that our frontier will touch hers at these fresh points also. The same thing will happen in Turkey, should disturbances break out in the Sanjak. That is why it is more particularly to our own interest that Turkey and Austria should be coterminous, and not that Montenegro and ourselves should lie between them.

This curious argument I could not, of course, leave unanswered, but in reply to every one of my remarks Mr. Iswolsky merely reiterated the same arguments and said he was convinced that a readjustment of the frontier would in this case do us harm. In the course of the conversation, I did not fail to bring forward everything that could explain our point of view and the reasons why we could not be satisfied. My chief task was to prove to him that the great anxiety of our Government and the apprehensions of our people were due not merely to the fact that the annexation had killed our hopes of territorial expansion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but principally to the conviction that the annexation had jeopardized ultimately, if not immediately, the existence of the Serbian State. For this reason, I said, we hope that the great Powers will take into consideration our protest and our legitimate demands for compensation which would at any rate, if things came



to the worst, afford substantial guaranties for our continued existence and for our independent and normal development. Only in this way, I said, would it be possible to induce our people patiently to await the decision of the Great Powers. But it was not considered probable that this excitement would pass over; on the contrary it would become the more pronounced, if the Powers withheld from us such satisfaction as we were entitled to demand.

Mr. Iswolsky, who would not be moved from his position, repeatedly replied to my arguments that he was doing everything possible to assist us and that he could take up our case all the more sincerely and easily as Russia desired no compensations at all for herself. But, he said, the question of compensation depends on our attitude; we must understand that we shall in this respect obtain the best results if we cease our military preparations and discourage the warlike ferment among the people.

#### ANNEX 5

*Telegram from Milovanovitch, Serbian Minister of State (on extraordinary mission to Berlin), to the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade*

BERLIN, October 12, 25, 1908.

Iswolsky has received here exactly the same answer and gained the same impressions as myself. Germany leaves the decision entirely to Austria-Hungary, without wishing to influence that country by her counsels; the negotiations respecting the program and the convocation of the conference will, accordingly, be conducted between St. Petersburg and Vienna direct. Iswolsky is convinced that Austria-Hungary will have to come to the conference; failing this, he gave me a categorical assurance that Russia would not recognize the annexation. We agreed to maintain to the utmost possible limit the demand for territorial compensation in favor of Serbia and Montenegro; to endeavor, in the second place, to secure that the territory in question is ceded to Turkey, who should hand it over to Serbia; and if, in the last resort, this could not be obtained, to insist all the more strongly that Bosnia and Herzegovina become an autonomous whole, and that Serbia is assured direct communication with the Adriatic and an open territory in respect of the Sanjak of Novibazar. Iswolsky is unremitting in his very severe condemnation of Austria-Hungary, saying that she has entirely lost the confidence of Russia and the Western Powers; he gave expression to his conviction and hope that this attitude on Austria-Hungary's part will soon bring its own bloody revenge. The Austrian question would, in consequence, shortly become more acute than the Turkish. His policy was directed towards bringing back Russia into the path of her European aims while liquidating all Russian extra-European questions. In this policy Serbia constituted an important factor as the center of the southern Slavs.

According to the opinion current in Russia and Western Europe, Bosnia could now even less than before be regarded as lost for Serbia, even if the annexation were to be recognized. Nevertheless, Serbia would direct her first measures for the realization of her national ideals towards the Sanjak of Novibazar and Bosnia. At the present moment a collision must be avoided, as the ground was not prepared either militarily or diplomatically. If Serbia were to provoke a war, Russia would have to abandon her, so that . . .<sup>1</sup> although this would deal the heaviest blow not only to Russian national sentiments, but also to Russia's interests and future plans. We agreed upon what I should say to Grey respecting Germany's attitude. He promised to keep me informed of the progress of affairs, and I expressed my gratitude and gave him a similar promise on my part. Tomorrow he leaves for St. Petersburg. Russia and England are endeavoring to separate Bulgaria from Austria-Hungary, and the Bulgarians are already beginning to see that this offers them greater security. Austria-Hungary is trying to preserve her community of policy with Bulgaria, while asserting the contrary. It is essential for us to continue in our reserved but correct attitude towards Bulgaria and in refusing to allow the Bulgarian to be linked with the Bosnian question.

MILOVANOVITCH.

#### ANNEX 6

*Telegram from Milovanovitch, Serbian Minister of State (on extraordinary mission to London) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade*

LONDON, October 16/29, 1908.

Yesterday afternoon I was first received by Hardinge, with whom I stayed for half an hour. I then went with him to Grey, and we had a conversation lasting over an hour. Both listened most attentively, and expressed the most lively and sympathetic interest in our cause. They said they could assure me without reserve that the national question of Serbia is a topic of the hour, and is most favorably viewed, and gives rise to the liveliest sympathies with the Serbian Government and myself personally, not only in the English press, but as reflected in the definite point of view of English policy. As regards the question of territorial compensation, they doubt whether we shall succeed, as Austria-Hungary absolutely refuses to agree. I pointed out that this was the main problem for Serbia, Montenegro and the future of the whole Balkan peninsula; that it offered the only possible guaranty against a further advance on the part of Austria-Hungary, and that it therefore constituted a barometer for measuring the future aims of Austria-Hungary, who had neither cause nor interest to refuse her consent if she was sincere in

<sup>1</sup> Text incomplete.

repudiating any intention of further conquests in the Balkans. Grey recognized the truth of this, but reverted to the question whether the conference is to be brought to naught on account of Austria-Hungary's refusal, with the prospect that she will insist on the annexation and at the same time retain the Sanjak of Novibazar. I replied that no fear need be felt as to leaving this question open, for Austria-Hungary could not permit the present strained situation to continue, and if it should continue it might well be that she would be left in the lurch by Germany. We must uphold this claim to the end, and so long as England did not cease to support our claim some chance of success still remained. England's attitude would also encourage Turkey, who was not at all disposed to give way, and with whom we could easily and quickly come to a definite agreement on this subject. I explained how Austria-Hungary's resistance might be overcome, and, in such case, how the Bulgarian question might be kept apart and brought to a solution separately, with the result that Austria-Hungary would be left to be dealt with alone. To this Grey nodded assent. I explained that we should have to prepare for war, which would be inevitable in the near future if compensation were denied to us. Finally, as a result of renewed and earnest pressure on my part, Grey and Hardinge gave me their word that they would continue to support our claim for territorial compensation so long as Russia maintained it. I also explained our other demands, especially in regard to a guaranty for the position of Bosnia as an autonomous entity, but with the idea, which they appeared to accept, that for the present these demands would not be brought forward in the discussion, as stress should be exclusively laid on the question of territorial compensation. If that compensation were agreed to, all other matters could be brought into discussion. In case, however, it fell through, we should have to insist unconditionally on all the other points, without, however, deriving satisfaction from such a course. The King is not in London, and it is not certain whether he will return before the end of next week. I cannot, therefore, wait for him. I have begun to call on the Ambassadors, and shall also call on Lansdowne, the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The entire press shows great sympathy towards Serbia and towards myself. I give information to the representatives and reporters of important English and foreign newspapers, and grant them interviews. I leave here on Sunday for Paris. I have telegraphed to Pashitch about this.

MILOVANOVITCH.

## ANNEX 7

*Telegram from Mr. Pashitch (on extraordinary mission to St. Petersburg) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade*

ST. PETERSBURG, *October 30/November 12, 1908.*

Yesterday I had a special audience of the Czar, which lasted half an hour. The Czar expressed his great sympathy for Serbia, counseled a calm attitude, for our cause was just, but our preparedness weak. The question of Bosnia-Herzegovina would only be settled by a war; in his opinion Austria-Hungary would agree neither to autonomy nor to territorial compensation. Russia would not recognize the annexation. He approves of the understanding with Turkey and is displeased at Bugaria having cut herself adrift from Slavdom, but he thinks she will return. He expressed his sympathy for the dynasty, and begged me to send a hearty greeting on his behalf to the King. He does not believe that Austria-Hungary will attack Serbia, but she must not be challenged. He attached no importance to the Serajevo deputations in Vienna, for he knew what the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina wished and thought. Our guiding principles must be: Understanding with Turkey, calm attitude, military preparation and expectancy. I will report more on my return.

PASHITCH.

## ANNEX 8

*Telegram from the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, February 18/March 3, 1909<sup>1</sup>*

The turn in Russian policy has aroused fear and bitterness in parliamentary circles. Anger against France is growing greater and greater. Germany's declaration had an overwhelming effect. Unprepared for war and only able to dispose of a very small part of her forces, Russia fears that Germany, who has attained the highest point of her readiness and strength, will profit by this contingency at any price to surprise and annihilate Russia. Russia therefore advises us to show the greatest possible patience. Gutchkow declared to me: "This must be understood: 'we should only go to war if the existence of Russia were at stake, otherwise on no account, for she would be beaten; once our military preparations are entirely completed, we shall have an explanation with Austria-Hungary.' Do not begin a war now, that would be suicidal to you; keep silence about your intentions and prepare yourselves; the days of your rejoicing are drawing near." Bobrinsky said to me, "We felt no hatred of Austria, but the humiliation which Austria prepared for us has aroused fearful rage and hatred against her, we (corrected to

<sup>1</sup> Dispatched from St. Petersburg, February 18, 1909, at 6.37 p.m.; received at Belgrade, February 19, 1909, at 9.32 a.m.



'she') will pay dearly for it." Khomiakoff speaks in the same strain. The spirit of Russia is undoubtedly broken, for she did not feel even the blow which Japan dealt her so acutely as this inflicted by Austria. Everybody feels that the present policy of Iswolsky involves colossal humiliation for Russia, whose absolute isolation, however, has reduced any stronger protest in the Duma to silence. Everybody admits that no other course was open, and yet on Saturday, on the occasion of the discussion of the supplementary military credits, the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina came up again. I was told that Russia would insist at the conference on the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I doubt whether that autonomy will be placed under an international guaranty. I have induced the *Nowoje Wremja* to defend this point of view as far as possible. In any case the situation is very bad.

KOSUTITCH, m.p.

#### ANNEX 9

*Telegram from the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, February 25/March 10, 1909*<sup>1</sup>

It is feared that the subject of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be raised in the Duma when the supplementary credits come up for discussion. Stolypin summoned certain members of the Duma to a meeting yesterday; Iswolsky, the Minister for Finance, the representatives of the Octobrists and the whole Right were present. Iswolsky declared that Italy was an inactive member of the Triple Alliance, that harmony between England, France and Russia was growing greater and greater, although that harmony was like a string which must not be too tightly drawn, for neither England nor France was ready to sacrifice anything for a piece of land claimed by Serbia. Austria-Hungary found herself, owing to the annexation of Bosnia, in a very difficult position; in order to extricate herself she was endeavoring to involve Serbia in a war on the supposition that by so doing and by dragging in Russia and Germany the European war might be kindled. Germany was inclined to enter upon this course; she was fully prepared and saw the rare opportunity which was offered to trample upon and annihilate Slavdom. An over-zealous intervention of Russia in favor of Serbia might also be a reason for war. Inasmuch as Russia was not fully prepared for war she must refrain from . . . in dealing with the opposition of Austria-Hungary. Russia would not therefore embark on war even if Austria-Hungary were to occupy Serbia—a proceeding from which Austria-Hungary would derive no advantage, for Europe would not allow her to remain in Serbia and annex that country, and Serbia would not be capable of paying any indemnity.

He painted the internal situation of Serbia in the blackest colors, maintain-

<sup>1</sup> Dispatched from St. Petersburg, February 25, at 9.10 p.m.; received at Belgrade, February 26, at 9 a.m.

ing that the country had been ruined by politics and party spirit, and pointed to Bulgaria as an instance of a State which understood how to prepare for the realization of its national aspirations. It was clear from what he said that he believed that no future lay before Serbia unless she were entirely regenerated. Serbia would be condemned to a miserable existence until the moment when the disintegration of Austria-Hungary took place. This moment had been brought closer by the annexation, and when it arrived the Serbian question would be raised and finally settled by Russia. Iswolsky realizes that the struggle with Germanism is unavoidable, though Russia follows a purely Slavophil policy. The Minister for Finance expresses the view that Russia must endeavor to avoid war, if only for the reason that she has no money. Stolypin states that the . . . of the whole Cabinet, which is in agreement with Iswolsky. The Center and Right decided not to touch the Serbian question in the Duma.

KOSUTITCH.

This document bears the following indication:

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,  
Political Department.  
Received February 26, 1909.  
Reg. No. 544/542.

#### ANNEX 10

*Telegram from the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, March 6/19, 1909*<sup>1</sup>

Khomjakoff has informed me very confidentially that the appeal addressed by the members of the Duma to the parliaments of Europe corresponds in all respects with the known views of the Czar in regard to the present situation. At the audience which took place on Monday, the Czar told him that this shock had veiled the political horizon in Serbia with the darkest clouds, the alarming character of the situation lying in the fact that Russia was unprepared for war, and that her defeat would mean the ruin of the Slav cause. The Czar had the impression that a collision with Germanism in the future was unavoidable, and that preparations must be made to meet it. In reply to my question as to what attitude Russia would adopt in the event of Serbia being attacked by Austria-Hungary, the President of the Duma said: "We have done a thing which no State has ever done before—we have announced before the whole world that we are not now in a position to make war: we shall, however, regard any violence done to Serbia as the beginning of a European conflagration in which it would be impossible at present for us to take part. It will, however, blaze up in the future when we shall be in a position to make ourselves heard."

KOSUTITCH.

<sup>1</sup> Dispatched from St. Petersburg, March 6, 1909, at 2.05 p.m.; received in Belgrade, March 6, 1909, at 4.40 p.m.

## ANNEX 11

*Cipher telegram from Dr. Milovanovitch, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, to Dr. Grouitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at London, April 1/14, 1909.*

I request that you will at once inquire at the Foreign Office what news has been received from Constantinople, and what further developments are anticipated. You should at the same time draw the attention of the Secretary of State to the necessity for advice being given in Sofia by Russia, England and France, in as pressing a manner as possible, so as to induce Bulgaria to act in concerted agreement with Serbia in the course of the events which may take place. We are extremely anxious about the attitude which Austria-Hungary may adopt in the event of matters becoming more involved and of our being obliged to protect our national interests. Serbo-Bulgarian solidarity would be the first and indispensable guaranty to us of protection against a surprise on the part of Austria-Hungary. Reply by telegram.

MILOVANOVITCH.

Grouitch replied by a telegram sent from London on the 2d of April, which reached Belgrade on the 3d of April, 1909. It runs as follows:

I have received your telegram of yesterday and took action upon it yesterday. Grey caused me to be informed today that he considered that Serbo-Bulgarian solidarity was absolutely necessary, but that Serbia must herself come to an understanding on this subject direct with Bulgaria without any intervention by other parties; he could not therefore do as we asked, and recommended that Serbia should take no action likely to provoke Austria-Hungary.

The Foreign Office possesses no detailed information from Constantinople, and is inclined to be optimistic.

Grouitch.

This telegram was succeeded by a report from Grouitch (No. 94) of the 3d of April describing his visit to the Foreign Office and referring to a conversation which he had had with Louis Mallet. In general, this report merely consists of a repetition, with further details, of the guarded English reply which had already been reported by telegram. The registry stamp shows that report No. 94 was received in Belgrade on the 7th of April. On the back of this document appears a minute by Milovanovitch directed to Grouitch, which is in direct contradiction with the latter's report. It runs as follows:

The Chargé d'Affaires should be told, for his information, that the necessary action has, nevertheless, been taken by England in Sofia.

Milovanovitch.

April 7, 1909.

In accordance with which the following instructions to Grouitch were drafted on the back of his report:

I have received your dispatch No. 94 of the 3d of April reporting your conversation with Mr. Louis Mallet in regard to intervention by the British Government with a view to bringing about united action by Serbia and Bulgaria. Although Mr. Mallet informed you on this occasion that England did not propose to take any steps in this direction, I have the honor to inform you, for your personal information only, that steps have, notwithstanding, already been taken in this sense by England in Sofia.

I have, etc.

April 7, 1909.

(A study of the documents unfortunately sheds no light on this contradiction; England seems to have changed her views in the interval, and the negotiations on this subject were apparently conducted in Sofia directly between the representatives concerned, whereas Mr. Grouitch, possibly for reasons connected with his personality, was merely informed of the already accomplished fact of England's intervention in Bulgaria in favor of Serbia.

However this may be, the reply of the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs to his Minister in London is perhaps not devoid of value as a documentary proof that as early as April, 1909, the British Government took official action in Sofia directed against Austria-Hungary (and thus also against Germany)—action which was intended to prepare the way for the future Balkan League.)

#### ANNEX 12

*Telegram from the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, March 5/18, 1909*

Grey has informed the Russian Ambassador that England will continue to give Russian policy her decided support.

POPOVITCH.

#### ANNEX 13

##### *Note*

On the 22d of June (5th of July), 1909, very confidential instructions (numbered 1689), dealing with Serbo-Bulgarian relations, were issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade to all the Serbian diplomatic representatives (exclusive of those at Sofia) as well as the Serbian consulates in Turkey. The exception made in the case of Sofia suggests that the material for these instructions emanated from the Serbian Minister at that capital, Sweta Simitch. The object of the instructions is to bring about a change in the attitude of Serbia towards Bulgaria. They direct the Serbian representa-



tives to abandon their old methods of attempting to bring about a *rapprochement* between Serbia and Bulgaria by moving in the matter themselves, and recommend them rather to wait until they are approached with an inquiry on the subject, in which case, however, they are to declare that Serbia has always done her utmost to realize a *rapprochement* of this kind. The dispatch states that it would be inexpedient to follow the former practice of taking the initiative themselves, as Bulgaria would regard this as an impertinence and also as a sign of weakness on the part of Serbia and would accordingly pitch her demands higher. This very comprehensive statement (the draft comprises fifteen closely written folio pages) observes that the main point of difference between Serbia and Bulgaria has always been the Macedonian question, on which Bulgaria inclined towards the side of the Central Powers, as was shown on the occasion of the visit of King Ferdinand and in other instances. In the meantime there was at the moment one bright spot in the Bulgarian political attitude, namely, the formation of two groups in the country, one of which pursued a shifting opportunist policy, while the other was on the side of the Entente. The following is the actual text of the document in connection with this topic:

The development and termination of the recent crisis have clearly shown that force, which is the only factor of any value in the conduct of *Realpolitik*, is on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, who were able to impose their will on Europe. So long as this balance of power in Europe continues, it is dangerous for the small Balkan nations to range themselves openly and definitely on the side of Powers which, not having the necessary force available, are bound to give way at the decisive moment at the price of concessions at the expense of the small Balkan States. Serbia and her experiences in the recent crisis are an example of this.

Another group maintains in contradiction with this group that Bulgaria has no interest in pursuing a seesaw policy, but could permanently safeguard not only her present conquests but also her future interests by attaching herself closely to Russia and the Western Powers. This group bases the safeguarding of Bulgaria's future interests on the hope that, in the event of a victory of the Triple Entente, the Serbian question would be settled by the union of Serbia and Montenegro with Bosnia, Herzegovina and Old Serbia, with an eventual concession of an ample outlet on the Adriatic, and that Bulgaria might then achieve union with Macedonia, even against our wishes, as her reward for such an attitude.

In the view of this group it is especially necessary to bring about the solidarity of the Balkan States with the Powers of the Triple Entente, for the interest of the former cannot be served by the victory of Germanism, for which the Central Powers are striving in the crisis now shaking the equilibrium of Europe. This victory would not be in their interest because it would not mean a victory for civilization in general, for it does not aim at equality based on respect for right, but at a hegemony first and foremost of force.

Besides this, the victory of Germanic hegemony in Europe would inevitably lead to the final subjection of Serbia to Austria-Hungary and her entrance into the sphere of the great Danubian monarchy, which, in the pursuance of its policy of *Drang*, would end by dominating the valley of the Vardar as a sequel to its domination of the Morava valley, and would not even spare the possessions of Bulgaria as she is today. Serbia would then at least have the consolation of having solved the question of her unification as compensation for her restricted political independence, while the Bulgarian achievements in Macedonia would be annulled.

## ANNEX 14

*Report from Dr. Grouitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at London, to Dr. Milovanovitch, President of the Council of Ministers at Belgrade, of September 8/21, 1911*

(No. 144.)

LONDON, September 8/21, 1911.

SIR:

The French Ambassador here, Paul Cambon, has recently returned from Paris, where he has frequently gone during the last two months to report and to attend conferences upon Morocco. Two days ago he explained his views on the present situation and its future development in conversation with a personage here. I have the honor to inform you of his utterances, which have been communicated to me confidentially from a very trustworthy quarter.

Mr. Cambon thinks that the present negotiations will prove conclusive, and that an understanding with Germany will be reached, but this understanding neither will, nor can, remove for any considerable time the dangers resulting from the reckless policy of Germany. The result of this understanding will only be the postponement of war for three or four years.

If, however, contrary to expectation, the present negotiations are broken off, France will propose a conference, which Germany will decline. Thereupon strained relations will ensue between Germany and France, which will inevitably lead to war next spring.

France is well aware that in any case war will be forced on her, but she, like her allies, is of the opinion that even at the price of greater sacrifices war must be postponed till a later date, that is, till 1914-15. It is not so much the state of French military preparedness (which is excellent) which makes this postponement necessary, as the reorganization of the higher command, which has not yet been carried out. Russia also needs this respite. Only England would derive no advantage from it, for every year the superiority of her fleet to the German diminishes; but nevertheless, in view of the need for preparations, England advises her ally, France, to come to an understanding with Germany for the present.

Accept, etc.

GROUITCH.

## ANNEX 15

*Report of Grouitch, at London, to Milovanovitch, President of the Council of Ministers at Belgrade, of November 9/22, 1911*

No. 179.

SIR:

The debate in the House of Commons on foreign policy, which is fixed for next Monday, is awaited with great curiosity and manifest impatience. The significance ascribed to it in advance is due to the fact that the general public, as also members of Parliament themselves, are only just beginning to recognize the gravity of the situation which has arisen during the Franco-German negotiations, and the readiness of the Government to place itself immediately, in case of a conflict, without any reservations on the side of France. Knowledge of the conflict of which there was an immediate prospect and of the measures taken here has spread through various indiscretions, which have lately become increasingly numerous. It has excited not only surprise, but also resentment, against the Government even in the ranks of its own adherents. The great majority of them reproach the Government less for the attitude which it has assumed and the measures which it has contrived than for the mystery in which this attitude and these measures were wrapped by making no communication to Parliament and repeatedly refusing to answer questions addressed to it. . . .

(The report then mentions the censures passed upon the Government in different quarters. One group, for example, states that the fleet is not prepared for war.)

The First Lord of the Admiralty (the former Home Secretary, Winston Churchill), continues the *Chargé d'Affaires* in his report, must answer these last critics. He then offers the following observations:

In connection with his (Churchill's) appointment to this post, it is interesting to mention that he, like his colleague, Lloyd George, passed till lately as a recognized friend of Germany and as one who thought that the great social questions demanded the avoidance of a war with Germany even at the price of certain sacrifices. As I had the honor to inform you in my report of the 21st of June, the Premier and Sir Edward Grey feared that these two most radical members of the Cabinet would prevent them from assuming a sufficiently energetic attitude in the Morocco question. This fear was, however, unfounded, for the action of Germany has gradually brought about a complete change in the views of both Ministers, so that Lloyd George made the significant speech which attracted so much attention at the time, whilst Winston Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, with the task, to which he had given prominence a few days before in a public speech, of upholding England's indisputable superiority at sea. As I know, this change of view produced the singular effect that the French Government,

which had at first received counsels of moderation and coolness from this side, later considered it necessary to give similar advice to the English Government. . . . (a few more paragraphs of no interest follow).

Accept, etc.

GROUITCH.

## ANNEX 16

### *Note*

*Report of Popovitch, Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg, to Milovanovitch, President of the Council of Ministers at Belgrade, December 4/17, 1911*

No. 392.

SIR:

I waited two or three days until M. Sazonoff had rested after his return to St. Petersburg, and until he had again taken over control of affairs after such a long absence. I saw him yesterday and took pains to learn his views upon the matters which are of interest to us. The following is the substance of his opinion:

He feared that disorderly conditions would again arise in Albania and Macedonia by the spring. He feared the "small intriguers," like Montenegro, who out of jealousy of Serbia and from a desire to supplant her was already on the lookout for the possibility of an advantage, and might for this purpose bring about complications in Albania. Of course Russia has ways and means of giving King Nicholas a distaste for pleasures of that kind, but it is not impossible that a bait may be held out to Montenegro from another source. In this connection the Minister was thinking not of Italy, but of Austria-Hungary; however, he did not think that the latter would undertake anything in Albania, at least not openly. As is known there exists an agreement between Italy and Austria-Hungary as to their *désintéressement* in Albania, and should Austria-Hungary act contrary to this agreement, it might mean a conflict with Italy, who could not contemplate such action on the part of Austria-Hungary and its effects in Albania with indifference. A collision between these two countries would mean, however, the dissolution of the Triple Alliance, and consequently also the collapse of the whole political system in Europe. But this would be too difficult and dangerous a question, in view of the risks involved, for anyone to broach without important reasons. This is the state of affairs at present, and we cannot tell what they will be like in the spring; we do not know in what position Italy will then be; should she be in an unfavorable position and weakened after a long war with Turkey, Austria-Hungary might take advantage of this in the hope that Italy would not be able to oppose her.

The Italian Minister with whom I lately discussed the matter held roughly



the same view. Personally, he had no confidence in Count Ährenthal, although he gathered from statements of the Marquis di San Giuliano that the latter trusted him. Count Ährenthal, as he (the Italian Ambassador) said, does not enjoy any confidence here and is a restless politician who would himself be willing to incur a risk. As he took advantage of Russia's weakness at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so also might he set his hopes on the weakness of Italy, who would be engaged by the Tripoli question, and, finally, he might again set his hopes on the weakness of Russia, who is not yet strong enough to guide her foreign policy into the proper channels. Furthermore, the Ambassador believes Count Ährenthal's action in the Balkans need not be open and straightforward. He could find means and opportunities for intervention with the aid of by-paths and secret agitations, and thus justify his proceedings. The Ambassador also told me that trouble was to be expected here in the spring.

I had the honor to report to you what Mr. Neratoff told me on the occasion of the rumors in the Viennese press, and, further, that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who has returned to St. Petersburg from leave, had been given a special mission to work for a *rapprochement* between Russia and Austria-Hungary, and that he perhaps actually brought with him an autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph. Mr. Sazonoff also confirmed what Mr. Neratoff told me, namely, that Count Thurn had confined himself in conversation to commonplace topics and had done or told him nothing of special interest. Mr. Sazonoff was equally ignorant of any autograph letter from the Emperor. I asked him further whether the journey to Russia of the former Ambassador, Count Berchtold had a political significance, whereupon Sazonoff said that Count Berchtold only came here to shoot, that his journey was of a purely private nature, and that he never saw him once.

Regarding King Ferdinand's stay in Vienna, I heard for certain that he came to Vienna on the invitation of Austria-Hungary. Mr. Sazonoff told me this, as did also another thoroughly reliable political personality. Mr. Sazonoff understood that Count Ährenthal wished to win the King over to his side, particularly in view of a tendency towards reconciliation recently manifested between Serbia and Bulgaria. In order to avoid a stir he had taken pains to gain his object by an indirect method, namely, to bring Bulgaria into closer relations with Roumania, the friend of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Mr. Sazonoff could not tell me how far Count Ährenthal had been successful or what were the material results of King Ferdinand's visit. But I noticed that the mere fact of the King's invitation to Vienna displeased him, particularly in view of the King's known inclinations and opportunist policy. Mr. Sazonoff certainly rests his hopes on the Slavonic sentiments of the Bulgarian people. But does not each Slav people possess, in addition to the general interests of Slavdom, special interests which are not always in conformity with the general and which can be furthered by

occasional support from a non-Slavonic quarter, and did not Bulgaria prove this three years ago?

According to my information and in my judgment, the position of the Dardanelles question is as follows: Mr. Tscharykoff, whom many consider a somewhat muddle-headed politician, knows that this question is of great importance to Russia, and that the politician who could deal with it successfully would cover himself with glory. As Mr. Neratoff was at the head of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs until a few days ago, Mr. Tscharykoff profited by the relaxation of authority during the interim to win laurels for his own brow by personally bringing the question up in Constantinople. But with the return of Sazonoff the matter assumed a different appearance, perhaps because Sazonoff, during his stay in Paris, was able to note that the time was not ripe, or perhaps because he was of that opinion before. The main point is that Sazonoff at once categorically denied that Russia had brought this matter forward, and said that it was a personal step taken by Tscharykoff without instructions from St. Petersburg. Mr. Sazonoff also told me personally that Russia's enemies had enlarged upon the matter, because Tscharykoff lacked the prudence to say that he was bringing the question forward on his own initiative and not at the instigation of the Ministry.

Accept, etc.,

POPOVITCH.

#### ANNEX 17

*Report of the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, February 17/March 2, 1912*

ST. PETERSBURG, February 17, 1912.

SIR:

Mr. Nelidoff was here today. I took advantage of his visit to gain information on two matters which are of interest to me: the visit of the Montenegrin King Nicholas and the relations between Russia and Austria. Below are the principal facts which he told me.

As was intended King Nicholas was strongly advised to remain quiet and not to allow himself to be drawn into any sort of adventure. The King promised to follow the advice and gave an assurance not to do anything contrary to the interests of Russia. He told Mr. Sazonoff that his attitude to Russia was that of a soldier to his superior, and repeated several times in Russian the words "I understand." I am, he said, King in Montenegro, but in my relations to Russia I am the executor of her commands.

Accept, etc.

D. POPOVITCH.

The document bears the following indication: <sup>1</sup>

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.  
Political Department.  
Received February 23, 1912.  
Registered No. 262/268.

To the President of the Council of Ministers, Dr. M. Gj. Milovanovitch, Minister for Foreign Affairs, etc.

#### ANNEX 18

*Telegram from Grouitch at London to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, October 14/27, 1912*

In diplomatic circles here the view is expressed that owing to the successes of the Balkan States the negotiations of the Great Powers up to date . . . for these were based upon the theory of a Turkish victory or of an inconclusive result, but never on the theory of a victory of the Balkan States, which, in the words of the French Ambassador, cannot now be "set aside" by the Great Powers.

I have informed Nicolson of the Austro-Hungarian mobilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina; he carefully noted my remarks and thanked me sincerely.

I declared that personally it was my conviction that if Austria-Hungary entered the Sanjak of Novibazar, Serbia would immediately resist her by force.

On the same day the British Government ordered the naval reserves, Class A (30,000), to hold themselves in readiness.

GROUITCH.

#### ANNEX 19

*Telegram from the Serbian Minister at Bucharest (Ristitch) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, November 13/26, 1912*

The Russian and French Ambassadors, as friends of Serbia, advise that the question of an outlet to the Adriatic should not be pressed to its utmost limits, for, if European complications should ensue, we should jeopardize the enormous gains hitherto acquired. They are of opinion that we should be satisfied with guaranties for the unrestricted and free use of a port on the Adriatic, and the time would soon come when we should receive a port of our own. It would be better, they told me, to bide our time until Serbia, who was at least twice as large as before, became stronger and collected her forces in order to await in the best possible state of preparation the important events which must occur between the Great Powers. Otherwise if a

<sup>1</sup> This indication does not appear in the German original, but only in the French text.

European war breaks out Europe will make us (Serbia) responsible for the catastrophe which will result. It appears to the Russian Ambassador that Italy, rather than Austria-Hungary, is opposing our demands, for she counts upon being able at a favorable moment to wrest possession from Austria-Hungary rather than from us.

This evening at the diplomatic reception the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me in a similar strain, while repeating his earlier remarks to the effect that we ought not to run the risk of losing our present great gains, which would make Serbia a factor with which even Austria-Hungary would have to reckon in a different spirit.

From a trustworthy source I learned that Nisami Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, who has been charged with the peace negotiations, attempted to win over Roumania in the course of his journey through this place. He received the answer that efforts were being made to conclude peace as soon as possible, that the attitude of Roumania was definite and clear, that Turkey must never even think of being able to regain what the Balkan Allies had won, and that she should aim at strengthening her position in Asia.

The same words were said to Nisami Pasha in Berlin, which he left dissatisfied.

The Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs said to one Ambassador that he would be pleased to see Hartwig go on leave.

RISTITCH.

On the back of this telegram Pashitch, under date the 14th of November, 1912 (old style), wrote the following instructions:

For information.

November 14, 1912.

Our envoys in foreign countries should be informed that Hartwig had not seen the King, and that he comes to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs more rarely than any of the other Ambassadors. There is every sign that malicious intrigues are on foot against Hartwig, as though he were mixing himself up in Serbian politics. This idea must be combated if a favorable opportunity occurs in conversation.

Pashitch.

## ANNEX 20

*Telegram from the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg (Popovitch) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, December 14/27, 1912*

(The Minister reports a conversation with the colleague [not named] of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs about the Serbo-Albanian frontier on the lines which Russia intends to propose at the Ambassadors' conference in London, and concludes with the following passage:)

I remarked to him also, as I did yesterday to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that any further yielding might be fatal, in view of the dissatisfac-



tion reigning amongst the people and in the army. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that after our great successes he felt confidence in our strength and believed that we should shatter Austria-Hungary. Accordingly, we must be satisfied with what we shall get and regard this as a stage upon our way because the future is ours. The principal thing was for us to reach an agreement with Montenegro. Bulgaria, in the meanwhile, would bring her racial mission to a close.

POPOVITCH.

#### ANNEX 21

*Telegram from Popovitch, the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, April 29/May 12, 1913*

(The Minister reports a conversation with Sazonoff, who counsels Serbia to make concessions in her dispute with Bulgaria. Amongst other observations the telegram closes with the following words:)

He (Sazonoff) again told me that we must work for a future time when we should acquire much territory from Austria-Hungary. I replied to him that we would make the Bulgars a present of Bitolia if we could acquire Bosnia and other territory.

POPOVITCH.

#### ANNEX 22

*Telegram from Popovitch, the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, July 20/August 2, 1913*

No. 211.

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that peace must be made as quickly as possible, for Austria-Hungary is screwing up her demands higher than ever. He begged me to inform you that he has received a report from Vienna to the effect that Austria-Hungary declares that Bulgaria must also be given the territory on the right bank of the Vardar up to a point east of Monastir—as far as he remembered to Morichovo—and to the north of Istip. The Minister for Foreign Affairs reminds us that Austria-Hungary is provisionally only taking diplomatic action, but he does not know what she may attempt later on. He will demand for us as a frontier the watershed between the Vardar and the Struma. I do not (yet) know our demands, and confine myself to explaining that before the war the Vardar was our minimum demand, but that now after such great sacrifices our claims must correspond to the sacrifices. As regards this new demand of Austria-Hungary, I explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs very definitely that it could not be seriously entertained, and that he for his part should deal with it accordingly. He told me that he would, of course, defend us, but that he

wished to warn us as a measure of precaution that Austria-Hungary was altogether on the side of Bulgaria. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs does not know for what reason Geschoff has come to St. Petersburg. He will see him to-morrow. The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Russia will consent to Greece receiving Eski-Kavalla, Drama and Seres. He advises us to be careful to maintain the friendship of Roumania. Roumania's help will be necessary to us in the future, on account of our aspirations in Austria-Hungary. He says that Austria-Hungary fears any expansion of Serbia on the east, because the opinion there is that if she becomes still stronger she will then turn towards the west.

POPOVITCH.

### ANNEX 23

*Report from Dr. Vesnitch, the Serbian Minister at Paris, to Pashitch, President of the Council at Belgrade, March 27/April 9, 1913*

No. 177.

SIR:

Following on my last report from London, I have the honor to report that according to information which I received subsequently from trustworthy sources here, Sir Edward Grey was, so to speak, compelled to make his speech, of which you know already, in the House of Commons, because Germany had intervened energetically in London (and also in the capitals of Russia and France). Germany declared, almost in the same terms as at St. Petersburg in March, 1909, that she stood firmly by Austria, and could not permit that the latter's position in Europe should be still further weakened! As you have already been able to ascertain, Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg repeated this declaration yesterday in the Reichstag at Berlin, although perhaps in somewhat different form.

A competent person with whom I have conversed here in confidence during the last few days told me that about the middle of last week we were face to face with the danger of a European war, and that one of the reasons why this war had for the present been avoided at the price of certain moral sacrifices lay in the desire to give the Balkan Allies an opportunity to recuperate, rally their forces and prepare for eventualities which may occur in a not distant future.

Moreover, I have learnt also from a very trustworthy source that the effect which the presence of the English sovereigns at the marriage of the German Emperor's daughter will have on public opinion will be speedily neutralized by another manifestation in favor of the Triple Entente, which will have a much greater political significance.

Accept, etc.,

MIL. VESNITCH.

## ANNEX 24

*Telegram from Ristitch, the Serbian Minister at Bucharest, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, June 10/23, 1913*

The Russian Minister here is of opinion that we on our side should accept an award subject to no reservations and based upon reasonably broad foundations as the Bulgarians have done, and he advised us to yield to some extent in view of the fact that all this can only be temporary, lasting for a few years until such time as, even if no other question crops up, that of Albania can (again) be brought forward. I replied that if there was any question of a provisional arrangement it would be natural that the Bulgarians should give way, in order that if the question of Albania or Austria-Hungary was brought up they might be able, for their help or neutrality, to demand Bulgarian territory from us. Those, I said, are moments which do not occur in years, but in centuries. We have been waiting for such a moment for nearly 600 years.

The Minister is further of opinion that St. Petersburg has engaged itself too deeply in our conflicts with the Bulgars, and with reference to our attitude he thinks that the Czar should refuse the offer of arbitration, and allow the Bulgars and ourselves entire freedom of action. He even mentions the possibility of a joint arbitration.

RISTITCH.

## ANNEX 25

*Telegram from Popovitch, Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, November 4/17, 1913*<sup>1</sup>

On this occasion he (the Minister for Foreign Affairs) said that Serbia was the only State in the Balkans in which Russia had confidence, and that Russia would do everything for Serbia. . . .

POPOVITCH.

## ANNEX 26

*Report of Pashitch, President of the Council, from St. Petersburg*

REMARKS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE IN THE COURSE OF CONVERSATION  
WITH THE CZAR DURING MY AUDIENCE

ST. PETERSBURG, *January 20/February 2, 1914.*

The audience lasted a whole hour. The Czar received me in his study. He was already there when I came in, and as I entered he came to meet me at the door and gave me his hand without waiting for my salutation, asked me to be seated and himself sat down at a table.

<sup>1</sup> Dispatched from St. Petersburg, November 4, 6.55 p.m., 1913.

First of all I expressed my thanks for my good fortune in securing an audience for the purpose of conveying in person the gratitude of the King and people of Serbia for the support given to us by Russia throughout the Balkan crisis and for the watch which she had kept to prevent the intervention of Austria in the Balkan war. The Czar replied that Russia had only fulfilled her duty as a Slav Power by retaining her army on the Austrian frontier, since she did not wish to allow Austria to impede the liberation of the Balkan States. I then thanked the Czar for his recent expression of good-will in conferring on me the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky, set in brilliants.

I next expounded to the Czar Serbia's policy, which is devoted to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans and the avoidance of fresh complications, as Serbia needs peace in order to recover her strength and to arm herself anew for the protection of her political interests. I also set forth the difficulties which Serbia was encountering in the pursuit of her peaceful policy. Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria were dissatisfied: Turkey, because she had lost the war with the Balkan States; Bulgaria, because she had not retained or received all that she wished; and Austria, because she had lost the prospect of pushing forward to Salonica. For this reason Turkey would not conclude peace with Serbia, was threatening the Greeks, demanding the Islands, supporting the Albanian movement in favor of a Mussulman prince, and concluding a treaty with Bulgaria. In all this she (Turkey) was supported by Austria; the Czar added "by Germany too." If peace could be brought about, we thought that we should work to the following ends:

1. Greece must avoid a conflict with Turkey in the following manner: Turkey should leave the question of the Islands and that of the frontiers of Southern Albania to the Great Powers, as had been decided by the conference of Ambassadors in London. We must accept the frontiers laid down in London and withdraw from Albania; Montenegro must likewise accept the decisions of the London Conference and withdraw from Scutari. The same holds good as regards Turkey. If she will not accept the conclusions reached in London, the Great Powers should take the matter into their own hands, compel Turkey to accept them, as they had compelled Montenegro to agree to give up Scutari and ourselves to withdraw behind the frontiers drawn by the Conference of London. If all the Great Powers would not undertake to carry this out, let the Powers of the Triple Entente or one of them do so, just as Austria had compelled Montenegro and ourselves to adopt the conclusions of the Great Powers. In this way the matter in dispute will be taken out of the hands of Greece and Turkey and placed in those of the Great Powers. We have advised our Allies the Greeks upon this point and they have accepted our advice; even if they now wish to obtain more in Epirus, they will not let matters go so far as a conflict.

2. The second means of preserving peace is that no loans should be granted



to Turkey and Bulgaria until all questions arising out of the war have been solved.

3. Thirdly, that all the Great Powers should occupy Albania with small contingents of troops, restore order and maintain peace. In this way the Young-Turkish elements and the Macedonian Comitadjis will be prevented from stirring up disorders or agitation against Serbia and Greece from the Albanian side. Joint occupation by Austria and Italy would thus also be averted; for peace would only be more acutely compromised thereby, as both of these Powers would agitate against Serbia and Greece; on the one hand, in order to compel us to seek their friendship, and, on the other, in order to rouse the disorderly elements against Serbia and Greece, and to show that they are on the side of the Albanian Irredentists.

4. The fourth means would be to move Roumania to throw herself more decisively upon our side, and declare to Turkey and Bulgaria that she could not remain neutral if the peace were disturbed and the conditions of the Treaty of Bucharest were called in question.

These were the aims which should be pursued with energy and which might contribute greatly to the maintenance of peace.

To this the Czar replied that the new Roumanian Government could be relied on to attach itself as closely as possible to Russia; he believed things would not come to the point of the Treaty of Bucharest being called in question, but he, too, admitted that there was need for activity in this direction. In connection with this matter, I mentioned that I had had an interview with Bratianu at the time of my visit to Bucharest, and that on that occasion Bratianu was quite enthusiastic about the idea of an alliance with Greece and Serbia. I intended to return home by way of Bucharest in order to see whether Bratianu still displayed the same willingness and held the same views as those which he disclosed to me when I was in Bucharest. The Czar said this would be an excellent thing; there were three and one-half million Roumanians in Austria-Hungary who wish for union with Roumania. I thereupon said to him that the Roumanians of Transylvania were more strongly nationalist than those of Roumania herself. King Carol had declared to me that public opinion in Roumania had changed and was now in favor of a *rapprochement* between Roumania and the Balkan States; he had to reckon with this factor, and had ordered the Roumanian army to mobilize and act, with a view to securing the balance of power in the Balkans and better frontiers in the Dobrudja.

I then observed that information had reached us from various quarters to the effect that Turkey had concluded an alliance with Bulgaria, whereby the latter was to permit the Turkish army to make an attack on Greece through Bulgarian territory, and Turkey in return for this was to cede to Bulgaria what she received from Greece for the surrender of Thrace. The Czar said that they (the Russians?) also had heard rumors of this, but he did

not yet believe them. Nevertheless there might be something in it, as the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey in Thrace was not determined. He could not, however, believe that Bulgaria would take an active part in the fighting as she was too much exhausted, and the people were averse to any military action.

As regards the occupation of Albania by an international force, he said this was possible if the other Powers agreed to it. He was surprised at Prince Wied having let himself be chosen as Prince of Albania, as Albania in his view had no sources of life in her and should be divided between Serbia and Greece. Perhaps Albania would become an apple of discord between Austria and Italy. At this point I expressed my view that Italy and Austria had been at variance for a long time past, and had only concluded the alliance through fear of armed conflict, and that they must even now have determined upon a joint occupation of Valona solely out of apprehension lest a war should break out.

I then turned the conversation to the supply of arms by Austria to Bulgaria, saying that Austria had furnished rifles and ammunition from her own magazines and that Bulgaria had also received cannon. The Czar again affirmed that Germany also had supported Bulgaria. I asked him that Russia might support us in like manner, that she might deliver to us 120,000 rifles, and ammunition from her magazines and a few guns which could be spared, particularly howitzers, which Turkey had kept back from us when they were being transported with a view to the war. We would pay for all this material which we needed and return it as soon as we received the material we had ordered. The Czar asked me whether I had spoken of this matter to one of the Russian Ministers. I replied that I had spoken about it to Suchomlinoff, the War Minister, and Sazonoff, and the War Minister had said to me that the thing could be done if policy permitted. In this connection I said to the Czar how glad we were that Russia had armed herself so well; this inspired us with calm and with hopes for a better future. The Czar said that enough had been and still was being done. For that reason her (Russia's) establishments could not undertake to provide rifles for us.

*À propos* of this I said to the Czar that I would give to Sazonoff immediately after my return from Tsarskoye-Selo a list of our requirements. He said this was well, as he was to receive Sazonoff the next day and would see what we needed. They would do everything to ease our situation. He asked what we wanted; I said, that which I had indicated in the memorandum prepared by me for Sazonoff.

The conversation then turned to Montenegro, Bulgaria and Austria.

Regarding Montenegro, he said to me that he knew that the entire population of that country was on our side and wished for union with us. I related to him what had been done at the time of the war and later, and

what the Montenegrin Minister at Belgrade, Mijuskovitch, said about it, adding that Mijuskovitch was going to speak about the matter to the King and advise him to raise the question of personal union with Serbia himself while there was still time, as after his (King Nicholas') death the problem might become difficult and dangerous for the whole dynasty.

The Czar criticized the attitude of Montenegro with great vehemence, and said she was not acting honestly; for even now she had an understanding with Austria, and only yesterday he had by chance heard from his Minister that Montenegro had in mind some sort of intrigues against Serbia and the Serbian dynasty; care must therefore be taken that she should not contrive mischief. He also thinks that the union of Serbia and Montenegro is only a question of time, and that the matter should be settled with as little disturbance and commotion as possible. I said to him that we too were in favor of union, but we had declared to Mijuskovitch that we could not raise this question ourselves as we were the stronger party, and it might be said that we had intimidated Mijuskovitch; we were therefore waiting until they made the proposal and would then accept it and decide the matter in such a way that the existence of the Montenegrin dynasty would be made secure.

Hereupon the subject of the Montenegrin army came under discussion, its unpreparedness and lack of success, and its undoubted influence upon the Montenegrin people in favor of the union because it saw the enormous difference between the Montenegrin and Serbian armies, and felt that we had given them more territory than they had deserved.

Our conversation then turned upon Bulgaria and her King. The Czar strongly condemned King Ferdinand for having succumbed to the policy of Austria and for having begun the war against Serbia. But God had punished him. The Czar believed that he would have difficulty in retaining his throne, for the people were against him; but so long as the present Government was at the helm he could hold on by main force. I related to the Czar what the Bulgarian prisoners had said when they were asked why they were waging war against their brothers and allies—that it was not they who had wished for the war, but their King, who was not orthodox and not a Slav. The Czar said that opinion was quite correct. I thereupon added that we for our part must not be indignant with them, but must consider how valuable the union of Serbia and Bulgaria would be to both, and that perhaps the time would come when some concession could be made to Bulgaria if she were willing to help in the solution of the Serbo-Croatian question. The Czar thereupon enquired how many Serbo-Croats were living in Austria-Hungary and what they now think and desire. I replied that there were over 6,000,000, and told him where they lived. I also told him, in regard to the Slovenes, that they would gravitate to the Serbo-Croats and adopt the Serbo-Croatian language, because their own dialect is



bad and they have long lost their national independence. I then told him that at that very time there was a Slovene staying in St. Petersburg, who was working upon the foundation of a Southern-Slav bank and wished to interest the Russian banks in this project. The Czar was very pleased at that and remarked how necessary it was that Russian banks should take more interest in the Slav countries and added that it would be a good thing if Hribar were successful in his mission.

I described to the Czar the revulsion of feeling which had taken place among the Austro-Hungarian Slavs, and how numerous followers of Startchevitch, who had formerly looked to Austria for salvation, now realized that such salvation could come only from Russia or Serbia, and could hardly await in patience the opportunity for the realization of their hopes. I then said to him that we would raise as many soldiers from these countries as we should have rifles to equip them.

The Czar himself declared that the Slavs were badly treated by Austria, and cited the Hungarian-Russian dispute, expressing pity for that unhappy branch of the Russian people, which was subject to persecution for the sake of its faith. The situation would become serious unless Austria abandoned her anti-Slav policy. He then asked what forces Serbia could place in the field. "Serbia," said the Czar, "has surprised the world by being able to put 400,000 men into the field." I replied, "We think we can equip an army of half a million properly clothed and armed men." "That is enough, that is no trifle, much can be done with that."

We then passed to the following topic: We ought to cherish our alliance with Greece since, apart from anything else, it assures our exports and imports. We ought also to seek to effect an alliance on a broader basis with Roumania, and not merely on the security of the peace of Bucharest, etc.

Thereupon I broached the subject of the marriage of our heir to the throne in the following words: "I beg your Majesty graciously to allow me to lay before you our King's desire and request and not to be angry at my doing so. Our King wishes his son to marry one of the Grand Duchesses. The duty which he owes to his country and to his successor urges him to make this desire known to Your Majesty through me for he is convinced that nobody will know or hear of it. Should Your Majesty find for any reason this cannot be, the King would still retain his Russian sympathies and his loyalty to the Slav policy, and would be conscious of having been true to his duty towards Serbia and Russia."

The Czar answered with a smile that he was not at all displeased at the King's request and that it was quite suitable, but that he believed in leaving his children to decide according to their own inclinations and did not wish to influence them in the choice of their future partner through life. He himself thought that nobody need know anything about it. He had noticed that when the Crown Prince was at dinner with the Imperial family



he had often looked at the Grand Duchess, and had tried to prevent the others from noticing it. He thought the Crown Prince very dashing. He remarked that he did not boast of his experiences during the war, and that he was brave and smart. I then thanked him and promised to tell nobody, not even the King, what the Czar had told me, adding that only the Crown Prince was to know of it. The Czar said to me that when the Crown Prince was with him he had not mentioned the matter, whereupon I said that he had feared a refusal.

We then spoke of other things, after I had said: "If it is our fortune to have a daughter of the Emperor of Russia as our Queen, she will enjoy the sympathy of the whole Serbian nation and, God and circumstances permitting, she may become the Empress of the Yugoslav Serbo-Croatian nation. Her influence and glory will extend over the whole Balkan Peninsula."

The Czar listened to these words with manifest pleasure, and I thought the impression created was good. I noticed nothing to indicate that the Czar had been unfavorably impressed, and I added: "The Crown Prince can stay here a few days longer. No urgent business awaits him—but I shall be obliged to leave next Friday."

The Czar replied: "He can, yes, he can certainly continue to stay here. He has lots of friends and will find plenty to amuse him." I made this remark, in order that the Crown Prince might still have the opportunity of meeting the Czar and his daughters once or twice. I did not ask when we might expect to receive the Czar's reply—I thought it superfluous to try and find out in what manner the Czar would reply. If he received a satisfactory answer from his daughter, he would not be at a loss to find means to reply; he might, moreover, easily send for the Crown Prince and state his views on the subject. When I left, the Emperor accompanied me to the door, and repeatedly asked me to convey special greetings to the King, not only from himself, but on behalf of the Czarina and his family, and wished him good health. "We will do everything for Serbia. Convey my greetings to the King and tell him (in Russian): We will do everything for Serbia."

## SUPPLEMENT VII

### THE BALKAN LEAGUE

Mention has already been made of the attitude taken by the Powers of the Triple Entente in regard to the Balkan League. The three attached documents furnish all that is essential in the matter. The grave crisis to which the Balkan war gave rise is well known. The following diplomatic proceedings are closely connected therewith.

## ANNEX 1

*Secret clauses in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912*

## I

If internal disorders break out in Turkey which threaten the political and national interests of both contracting parties or of one of them, and in case the *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula is disturbed through the occurrence of internal or external difficulties in Turkey, that party which first becomes convinced of the necessity for armed intervention shall present a reasoned proposal to the other party, which, on its side, shall be bound to proceed to an immediate exchange of views, and, in case of disagreement with the first party, shall furnish the latter with a detailed reply.

If an agreement should be reached in regard to a resort to arms, Russia is to be informed thereof, and if she places no obstacles in the way, the Allies shall proceed to undertake the military operations agreed upon, wherein they shall throughout be guided by a sense of solidarity, and protect mutual interests. In the opposite case, *i. e.*, if an agreement is not reached, the matter shall be referred to Russia for an expression of opinion, and Russia's decision shall be binding on both parties to the treaty. In case Russia should not wish to express her opinion, and consequently an agreement between the parties to the treaty is not reached, and if in that case that party which had decided to resort to armed intervention shall nevertheless open hostilities alone against Turkey, the other party is bound to preserve benevolent neutrality towards her ally, to proceed at once to mobilize as provided in the military convention, and, if a third Power should range itself on Turkey's side, hasten to the assistance of her ally with all her forces.

## II

The whole territory mentioned as affected by the joint operations alluded to in §§ 1 and 2 of the treaty and in § 1 of this secret annex shall, in case it is conquered, be administered jointly by the officials of both allies (*condominium*) and shall be liquidated forthwith, in no case, however, later than three months after the reestablishment of a state of peace, on the following principles:

Serbia recognizes Bulgaria's rights over the territory east of Rhodope and the River Struma, and Bulgaria recognizes Serbia's rights over the territory to the north and west of Schar-Planina.

The territory between Schar-Planina, Rhodope, the Archipelago, and the Lake of Ochrida shall be disposed of in the following manner in the event of the contracting parties becoming convinced of the impossibility (whether because of the interests of the Serbian or Bulgarian population or on account

of internal or external unrest) of organizing this territory as an autonomous district:

Serbia undertakes to claim no land lying outside the line drawn on the attached map; this line begins on the Turco-Bulgarian frontier at Golem Wrch (north of Kriwe Palánka) and continues thence as follows: In a south-westerly direction as far as Lake Ochrida, over the height of Kitke between the villages of Meteshew and Podrshikony, over the height to the east of the village of Nerew and the watershed as far as height 1000 north of Baschtevo (Gradatz-Planina),—through the village of Baschtevo between the villages of Ljubentzki and Petralitze, through the height of Ostritz 1000 (Lisatz-Planina), to the height 1050 between the villages of Dratsch and Opile, through the village of Talschimanzy and Shiwalewo, to the heights 1050 and 1000, through the village of Keschany, along the chief watershed of Gradische-Planina to the height Gorischte, over the height 1023, along the watershed between Iwankowatz and Loginaz, through Weterskog and Sopot to the Vardar, over the Vardar, along the mountain chains to height 2550, then up to the mountains of Perepol, along their watershed between the villages of Krape and Barbarasa, up to height 1200 between the villages of Jakrenow and Dranow, up to the height of Tschesma (1254), along the watershed of Baba-Planina and Kruschkatepesi between the villages of Sopa and Zrske, up to the summit of the mountains of Protaj east of the village of Belitze, through Breshana up to the height 1200 (Jlinska-Planina), along the watershed over height 1330 up to height 1217 and between the villages of Liwanischta and Gorenzy to Lake Ochrida at the monastery of Gubowzy.

Bulgaria undertakes to accept this boundary if His Imperial Majesty the Czar, to whom the request shall be made to act as supreme arbitrator in this matter, pronounces in favor of the line so drawn. It is of course understood that both parties engage themselves to accept as the final boundary that line which His Imperial Majesty the Czar may consider it right to establish, among the boundaries named above, as best corresponding to the rights and interests of both sides.

### III

A copy of this treaty with the secret annex, and also the military convention, shall be communicated to the Imperial Russian Government jointly by the parties to the treaty, together with a request to take note thereof, to adopt a benevolent attitude towards the aims set forth therein, and to beg of the Emperor that His Imperial Majesty may be pleased to accept and sanction the functions attributed to him and his Government by the present treaty.

## IV

Any dispute which may arise from the interpretation and execution of any article of this treaty, of the secret annex and of the military convention shall be left to Russia for final decision whenever one or other of the contracting parties may declare that it is impossible to reach an agreement by means of direct negotiations.

## V

No article of this secret treaty shall be published or communicated to another Power without previous understanding between the two contracting parties and without the consent of Russia.

Done at Belgrade, 29th of February/13th of March, 1912.

## ANNEX 2

*Report from Iswolsky to Sazonoff*

PARIS, February 16/29, 1912.

Mr. Poincaré has several times inquired of me what I knew about the exchange of views on Balkan affairs which, according to news emanating from journalistic and other sources, has taken place between you and the Vienna Cabinet; in this connection he again reminded me of his willingness to enter into negotiations with us regarding these affairs at almost any moment, and he gave me to understand that he expected us on our side to keep him informed regarding our negotiations with Vienna in exactly the same way as the London Cabinet had kept him informed after Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin. I write all this to you with the utmost candor, as it seems to me to be of the greatest importance to you to uphold and show readiness to comply with the purposes announced by Mr. Poincaré at the time when he took office. The present Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs is an exceedingly powerful personality, and his Cabinet is proving the strongest combination known for many years. . . .

## ANNEX 3

*Telegram from Sazonoff to Iswolsky (Paris)*

ST. PETERSBURG, March 17/30, 1912.

A treaty has been concluded between Serbia and Bulgaria, with our knowledge, for mutual defense and protection of the interests of both parties in case the *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula is modified, or in case a third Power undertakes an attack upon one of the contracting parties. Geshoff and Spalaikovitch, the Serbian Minister at Sofia, have made a confidential



communication on the subject to Ironside, the British Minister at Sofia. In view of the above, I request you to make a personal communication on the subject to Mr. Poincaré, for his information at such time as you may consider appropriate. Special stress should, however, beforehand, be laid on the point that the existence of this treaty is a matter of the strictest secrecy; and you must add that as a special secret annex binds both States to obtain the views of Russia before taking any active measures whatever, we consider that we have acquired a means of exercising influence on both Powers, and have at the same time created a guaranty against stronger Powers extending their influence in the Balkan peninsula.

(Telegraphed simultaneously to Benckendorff in London.)

## SUPPLEMENT VIII

### THE BALKAN CRISIS OF 1912

On the 8th of July, 1912, that is, during the Balkan crisis, a secret treaty was concluded between Russia and Japan. This agreement, which has never been published, though its authenticity has been confirmed by the Russian People's Commissioner Radek, stipulated that Russia, in the event of her being involved in an European war, would withdraw troops to the extent of two army corps from Siberia and China, and that in such an eventuality Japan would assume the protection of Russian interests in China. Furthermore, Japan undertook not to occupy Russian territory, especially Vladivostok, during Russia's participation in an European war. In return Russia declared that she would refrain from raising any objections in the event of Japan taking possession of Kiaochow in case of war. This last provision of the agreement removes all doubt in regard to the nature of the European complications which Russia had in view.

Simultaneously with the negotiations between Russia and Japan the Franco-Russian negotiations took place, the object of which was to complete by a naval convention<sup>1</sup> the military arrangements which had already existed for the last twenty years. The naval convention was concluded on the 16th of July, 1912. Article 2 stipulated that the chiefs of the naval staff on either side would be empowered to communicate direct with each other, to exchange all information, to work out all possible war contingencies and jointly to draw up all strategical plans. The agreement itself, however, merely set forth the formal outlines for the measures agreed on, and these were laid down in the form of protocols which have not yet been published. The outcome of the conversations between the French and Russian naval experts was completely satisfactory to Russia. It was agreed to have a

<sup>1</sup>Annex 1.

monthly exchange of information, beginning with September 1/14, 1912. The Western Mediterranean as far as the longitude of Malta was recognized as the French sphere. France undertook, in the event of complications between Russia and Turkey, to keep the Austrian and Italian fleets inactive, and recognized the absolute supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea. Mr. Iswolsky reported on the 5th/18th of July, 1912,<sup>1</sup> that France was prepared, without demanding anything in return, to transfer the bulk of her Mediterranean naval forces, even in time of peace, further to the East. The chief of the French Naval Staff had fully grasped the necessity of facilitating Russia's task of securing the command of the Black Sea by using the French fleet to exercise pressure on possible adversaries. In order to render this possible the third French squadron was transferred from Brest to Toulon, after first reaching an understanding with England.

Thereafter the Anglo-French arrangements for common operations by sea and land were further elaborated. Through the well-known exchange of notes between Grey and Cambon of the 22d and 23d of November, 1912, these arrangements acquired for the first time a diplomatic basis, which invested them with the character of a treaty.

Russia went furthest in taking military measures by making at the same time with the Balkan States extensive military preparations. These measures led to negotiations between Berlin and St. Petersburg which are of especial significance as a parallel to the events of July, 1914. On the 15th of October, 1912, the Chief of the German General Staff asked to be informed whether the great test mobilizations which had recently been undertaken on our frontier had been notified to us by the Russians, as had been done in previous years. The answer was in the negative. Thereupon on the 12th of November, 1912, the Chief of the General Staff emphasized the grave military objections which he entertained in regard to this proceeding.

Count Pourtalès was therefore instructed to draw Sazonoff's attention both to these objections and to the uneasiness caused by the test-mobilization in the neighboring State, and to request that in future, as in former years, a notification should be issued beforehand. Sazonoff, as was reported by Pourtalès on the 23d of November, 1912, admitted the justice of the German point of view, and promised to mention the matter to the competent authorities. Moreover, remarks had already been addressed to Sazonoff during his stay in Berlin (on the 8th of October, 1912) on the subject of the Russian test-mobilizations, and his attention was likewise drawn on that occasion to the amazement created by the inspection of the French frontier fortresses by the Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaïevitch and the anti-German demonstrations which had accompanied it. In order to illustrate the character of such manifestations Sazonoff was asked to imagine what the effect would be on the Dual Alliance if, simultaneously with a test-mobiliza-

<sup>1</sup> Annex 2.

tion of the German corps in Allenstein, an Austrian archduke were to undertake an ostentatious inspection of Metz.

Meanwhile, in the late autumn of 1912, and under the patronage of Russia, the Balkan Alliance, which included not only Serbia and Bulgaria but also Montenegro and Greece, had engaged in warlike operations against Turkey to which Montenegro had notoriously given the impetus. In this way the danger of European complications arising in the event of Serbia occupying the Sanjak and barring Austria-Hungary's commercial road to Salonica became most acute. In view of the existing systems of the Alliance and the Entente the appearance of complications between the Great Powers confronted each individual party with the question either of a *casus fœderis* or of rendering armed assistance. At this time feelers were put forth from Russia both in Paris and London in order to ascertain what attitude the two other Powers of the Triple Entente would adopt in the event of the conflict spreading. France was apparently in possession of the most detailed information as regards Russian intentions. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs insisted that Sir E. Grey must be initiated into these plans. Sazonoff therefore instructed the Russian Ambassador in London by a dispatch, dated the 18th/31st of October, 1912, to apprise the British Government immediately and in detail of the agreements of the Balkan States.<sup>1</sup> Reference is made in this dispatch to the confidential communication which the British Minister in Sofia had already received through Geshoff. Sir Edward Grey, however, was now to receive even more complete information in regard to the contents of the treaties concluded under Russia's patronage. The plan for the partition of Turkey was communicated to him in all its details, and it was emphasized that the march of events in the Balkans necessitated the closest possible accord and exchange of views between St. Petersburg, London and Paris. Benckendorff was instructed to resume the conversations which he had started earlier in the year with Grey, and to give the British Minister an account of the history of the Balkan Alliance, which differed from the true state of affairs on several material points.

A fortnight later Sazonoff wrote to Benckendorff that the situation was becoming increasingly acute on account of the conflict of interests between Russia and Austria, and that in these circumstances a war might well seem to be the best, and perhaps even the most desirable way out. Benckendorff, however, relying on his knowledge of British opinion, took a different point of view. He thought the situation unfavorable for a war, and that England's attitude towards an Austro-Russian conflict was doubtful; but that England would take up arms in the event of France being directly provoked.

To this period belongs the well-known exchange of letters between Grey and Cambon, which removes all doubt that France, in the expectation of an unprovoked attack from a third Power or of "something that threatened the

<sup>1</sup> Annex 3.



general peace," would find England on her side. An eventuality of the latter kind was, of course, the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; and Russia had given undertakings to Serbia. Therefore England was likewise pledged to armed assistance in that event.

France for her part had decided to regard the *casus fœderis* as having arisen if Russia became involved in the war. Already before the beginning of the Balkan war Poincaré had discussed this question with Sazonoff during the latter's stay in Paris. He had then stated that "French public opinion did not permit the Government of the Republic to undertake warlike action on account of purely Balkan questions, so long as Germany abstained from intervening and did not provoke the *casus fœderis* on her own initiative. In the latter eventuality Russia could, of course, count on the complete and precise fulfilment of the obligations by which France had bound herself to her." Mr. Iswolsky had already reported in a like sense on August 30/September 12, 1912:

Mr. Poincaré told me that the French Government had primarily considered the question of possible international contingencies, and felt no doubt whatever that such eventualities as, for instance, the destruction of Bulgaria by Turkey or a sudden attack by Austria upon Serbia, might compel Russia to abandon her passive attitude and to proceed, in the first place to diplomatic action, and thereafter to military measures against Turkey or Austria. According to the declarations which have reached us from the French Government we are assured, in such eventuality, of the most sincere and energetic diplomatic support on the part of France. At this stage of events the Government of the Republic is not, however, in a position to obtain the sanction of Parliament or of public opinion for any sort of active military measures. If, however, the collision with Austria were to bring in its train an armed intervention on the part of Germany, France recognizes in advance such action as a *casus fœderis*, and will not hesitate a minute in carrying out her engagements towards Russia.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, however, Poincaré informed the Russian Ambassador that preparation had been made for every eventuality, and that the prospects of a European war were regarded as favorable.

In November, 1912, Sazonoff inquired once more in Paris what opinion was held in regard to the possible consequences of the Austro-Serbian conflict. Poincaré stated that he left the initiative to Russia. If Russia decided on war then France would join her.<sup>2</sup> On the following day, however, he did indeed make his promise somewhat less comprehensive:

"It must be clearly understood," he stated to Iswolsky, "that France will take action in the precise event of a *casus fœderis* as contemplated by the alliance, that is to say, if Germany were to support Austria by force of arms against Russia."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Annex 4.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram from Iswolsky of November 4/17, Annex 5.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram from Iswolsky of November 5/18, Annex 6.



This same declaration, namely, "that Russia, if the Austro-Serbian conflict led to a general war, could count completely and absolutely on the armed support of France" was likewise made to the Italian Ambassador, Tittoni, by Poincaré who, at the same time, made an allusion to the Franco-Italian agreements of 1902, in virtue of which France was entitled, in the event of war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, to count on the neutrality of Italy.<sup>1</sup> The declaration thus made by Poincaré to Tittoni was received with the utmost gratitude at St. Petersburg.<sup>2</sup>

As regards the attitude of France in this crisis, Benckendorff, in a report on the situation, dated February 12/25, 1913, reaches the following conclusion:

If I recall briefly Cambon's conversations with me and the actual words exchanged, and connect them with Poincaré's attitude, the impression, amounting almost to a conviction, forms itself in my mind that, among all the Powers, France is the only one which, I do not go so far as to say, desires war, but would, nevertheless, regard it without great regret. In any case, there has been nothing to show me that France is taking any active part in working for a compromise. Now, a compromise means peace; beyond that compromise lies war. . . .

The situation, so far as I can discern it, appears to me to be such that all the Powers are sincerely endeavoring to maintain peace; but of all of them France is the one which would accept war with the relatively greatest equanimity.<sup>3</sup>

## ANNEX 1

### *Naval Convention*<sup>4</sup>

ARTICLE 1. The naval forces of France and Russia shall cooperate in all cases where combined action by the armies is provided for and stipulated by the alliance.

ART. 2. Preparations for the cooperation of the naval forces shall proceed in time of peace.

With this object, the chiefs of the General Staffs of both navies are authorized henceforth to correspond directly, to exchange information of any kind, to study any hypothesis in regard to war and to cooperate in the preparation of strategical programs.

ART. 3. The chiefs of the General Staffs of both navies shall confer in person at least once a year, and shall draw up minutes of their meetings.

ART. 4. The present convention is assimilated, so far as its duration, operation and secrecy are concerned, to the military convention of the 17th of August, 1892, and to the subsequent agreements.

PARIS, *July 16, 1912.*

<sup>1</sup> Annex 7.

<sup>2</sup> Annex 8.

<sup>3</sup> Annex 10.

<sup>4</sup> [Translated from the original French.]

## ANNEX 2

*Report by Iswolsky to Sazonoff*

PARIS, July 5/18, 1912.

Prince Lieven<sup>1</sup> informs me that he is convinced that the exchange of views has led to results entirely favorable to us, that is to say, the chief of the French Naval Staff has entirely realized the necessity of assisting us in the interests of the Allies, in the task of maintaining our supremacy in the Black Sea by exercising the necessary pressure on the fleets of our possible opponents, that is, of Austria in the first instance and perhaps also of Germany and Italy.

With this object France declares herself ready even in peace time to transfer the concentration of her naval forces in the Mediterranean further eastwards (*i.e.*, to Bizerta). This decision, which is expressed quite clearly in the protocol, constitutes in Prince Lieven's eyes a success all the greater for us in that it is not conditioned by any kind of obligations on our part.

Altogether Prince Lieven speaks in very laudatory terms of the cordiality, straightforwardness and sincerity shown him by his French colleagues. . . .

## ANNEX 3

*Very secret dispatch from Sazonoff to Benckendorff*

No. 675.

ST. PETERSBURG, October 18/31, 1912.

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his conversations with our Ambassador in Paris, has of late frequently referred to the question of the necessity of acquainting Sir Edward Grey more precisely with the contents of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement and with Russia's attitude thereto.

In view of the fact that the intervention contemplated in the near future by the Powers makes it desirable to establish the closest possible accord and exchange of views between St. Petersburg, London and Paris, we consider it advisable for you to take the next opportunity again to approach Grey in regard to this question, which you have already discussed with him in the spring.

You may state that the Imperial Government, having learnt that the British Minister at Sofia had been acquainted by Geshoff with the contents of the above-mentioned agreement, did not consider it necessary to speak to Grey, particularly as the confidential character of the communication made to us by the Powers concerned had to be taken into account.

<sup>1</sup> The Russian Admiral and Chief of the Russian Naval Staff.

In referring to the question of the agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia I desire particularly to draw your attention to the attitude which we have adopted in this affair from the beginning. The Imperial Government was kept acquainted at the time with the course of the negotiations proceeding between Sofia and Belgrade which took their rise out of the conviction that the quarrels which separated two sister nations must be terminated by a precise delimitation of their respective interests and by establishing definite spheres of influence in European Turkey.

Within these limits we sympathized with the understanding between the two States, for their quarrels were a serious obstacle to the tranquillity of the Balkans. Mutual distrust and constant conflicts had produced an oppressive and unwholesome atmosphere of political intrigue which precluded any real comprehension of national interests. We joyfully welcomed anything likely to contribute towards clearing the atmosphere. We did not interfere in the negotiations between the Cabinets of Sofia and Belgrade, as we were of opinion that the less the new relations were affected by extraneous influences, the stronger would they become.

After the understanding between the two countries had been signed and communicated to us, we saw that it contained much that went beyond the limits laid down by us and aroused serious misgivings in our minds. The principal aim—the cessation of abnormal relations between two neighboring States united by racial ties—was however attained. We did not wish to imperil or possibly even to destroy this result by objections or protests.

This treaty gave Russia the position of ultimate arbitrator in any differences of opinion. We had not been previously asked whether we were prepared to become a party to an instrument concerning Bulgaria and Serbia; but we were of opinion that to refuse this condition might conduct the policy of the two States in a new and undesirable direction. We were led by this consideration to refrain from raising objections. This was our original view of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty.

At the present moment the greatest practical significance attaches to that portion of the treaty which deals with definite delimitation in the event of a victorious war against Turkey. It is to this point that I would draw your attention.

The treaty states that all territory acquired by common action is to be placed under the condominium of the Allied Powers and that such acquisitions must at once be liquidated—not later than three months after the conclusion of peace—in the following manner:

Serbia recognizes Bulgaria's rights over the territory east of Rhodope and the River Struma, while Bulgaria recognizes Serbia's rights over the territory to the north and west of Schar-Planina. The territory between Schar-Planina, Rhodope and the Lake of Ochrida shall be disposed of in the following manner in the event of the contracting parties becoming convinced

of the impossibility of organizing this territory as an autonomous district, whether because of the interest of the Serbian or Bulgarian population, or on grounds of internal or external policy.

Serbia engages herself not to claim any territory outside a line beginning to the west of the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey near Golem Verkh (north of Kriwe Palánka) and proceeding in a general southwesterly direction to the Lake of Ochrida, over the height of Kitke, between the villages of Meteschewo and Podrshikonj, over the height east of the village of Neraw, the watershed as far as height 1000 north of the village of Baschtewo (Gradatz-Planina), the village of Baschtewo, between the villages of Ljubentzy and Petralitze, the height of Ostritzzy 1000 (Lisatz-Planina), height 1050 between the villages of Dratsch and Opile, the villages of Talschimanzy and Schiwaljewo, heights 1050 and 1000, the village of Keschany, the chief watershed of Gradischte-Planina, the height of Gorischte, height 1023, the watershed between Iwankowaz and Loginaz, through Weterskog and Sopot to the Vardar, across the Vardar along the crest to height 2550, then to the Perepol-Planina, along the watershed of the Perepol-Planina between the villages of Krape and Barberasa, height 1200 between the villages of Jakrenowo and Dranowo, over the height of Tschesma (1254), the watershed of Baba-Planina and Kruschkatepsi, between the villages of Sopa and Zwerske, the summit of the Pretapsica-Planina, east of the village of Belitze, through Breschana to height 1200 (Illinska-Planina) along the watershed over height 1217 and between the villages of Liwanischta and Gorentzy to the Lake of Ochrida near the Monastery of Gubowzy.

Bulgaria engages herself to accept this frontier if His Majesty the Russian Emperor, who will be asked to be arbitrator, gives his decision in favor of this line. Both parties of course engage themselves to accept as a definite frontier the line laid down by the Russian Emperor as corresponding to the interests of both parties.

I communicate this information to you as the basis of a conversation with Grey, but would draw your attention to the fact that this precise delimitation of territory is not regarded by us in the light of an unalterable arrangement, but merely as an index of the interests of the two States which might find a corresponding expression in the frontiers which we should favor as a means of reaching a balance, while at the same time the possibility of offering compensations would remain.



## ANNEX 4

*Report from Iswolsky to Sazonoff*

PARIS, August 30/September 12, 1912.

Mr. Poincaré told me that the French Government had considered first and foremost the question of the contingencies which might arise in the sphere of international politics, and that they were absolutely clear in their own minds that such an eventuality as, for instance, the destruction of Bulgaria by Turkey, or a sudden attack by Austria on Serbia, might compel Russia to abandon her passive attitude and proceed in the first place to a diplomatic action, and thereafter to military measures against Turkey or Austria. According to the declarations which have reached us from the French Government, we are assured, in that case, of the most sincere and energetic diplomatic support on the part of France. At this stage of events the Government of the Republic is not, however, in a position to obtain the sanction of Parliament or of public opinion for any sort of active military measures. If, however, the collision with Austria were to bring in its train an armed intervention on the part of Germany, France recognizes in advance such action as a *casus fœderis*, and will not hesitate a minute in carrying out her engagements towards Russia.

"France," Mr. Poincaré added, "is unquestionably peaceably disposed; she neither seeks nor desires war; nevertheless, if Germany should adopt an attitude of hostility towards Russia, this disposition will at once undergo a change, and it is certain that in that case Parliament and public opinion will, without exception, approve the resolute attitude of the Government in rendering armed support to Russia."

Mr. Poincaré told me further that, in view of the critical situation in the Balkans, the higher organs of the French Army Command were studying with increased attention all possible military contingencies, and that he was aware that expert and responsible persons held extremely optimistic views in regard to the chances of Russia and France in the event of a general collision; this optimistic opinion is based, among other things, on the value to be attached to the diversion which the united forces of the Balkan States (except Roumania) would effect, in so far as they drew off a corresponding portion of the Austro-Hungarian military forces. Moreover, the inactivity of Italy, who was tied down both by her African war and by a special agreement with France, constituted a factor which was favorable to France and Russia. So far as particularly concerned the situation in the Mediterranean, the supremacy of the French fleet in those waters was strengthened by the decision which had just been taken to transfer the third French squadron from Brest to Toulon. "This decision," Mr. Poincaré added, "has been taken in agreement with England, and constitutes the further development

and fulfilment of the earlier agreements reached between the French and British Naval Staffs."

## ANNEX 5

*Secret telegram from the Ambassador at Paris*<sup>1</sup>

No. 369.

November 4/17, 1912.

In continuation of my No. 368.

In the course of a conversation about the French reply to my communications on the subject of the Austro-Serbian dispute, Mr. Poincaré replied that it was impossible for him to state, even privately, the line which would be taken by France in the event of an active intervention by Austria, before the Imperial Government had acquainted him with its own intentions. It was, he said, for Russia to take the initiative in a question in which she was principally interested; France's rôle lay in giving Russia her most energetic support. If the French Government were to take the initiative, it would run the risk either of stopping short of the intentions of its ally or of outstripping them. In order that there may be no kind of doubt as to the extent of our assistance, it may be well to refer to a passage in the instructions sent by Mr. Sazonoff to the Russian Minister at Belgrade, stating that France and England had openly declared that they were emphatically not disposed to permit an aggravation of the dispute with the Triple Alliance.

Mr. Poincaré added that all this amounted to saying that if Russia made war, France would do the same, since we knew that Germany would be behind Austria on this question.

Mr. Poincaré, in reply to my question whether he knew the British standpoint towards the matter, said that, according to his information, the Cabinet of London would confine itself for the moment to promising Russia all its diplomatic support, but that this did not exclude more effective cooperation if the need for it arose.

ISWOLSKY.

## ANNEX 6

*Telegram from the Ambassador at Paris*<sup>1</sup>

Continuation of telegram No. 369.

November 5/18, 1912.

In order to obviate all misunderstanding, and in view of the gravity of the question, I thought it my duty to read my telegram No. 369 to Mr. Poincaré, who entirely approved of its wording. He only asked me to give a clearer

<sup>1</sup>[Translated from the original French.]

expression of his view on one point, namely, that of the circumstances in which France would go to war. "It must be clearly understood," he said, "that France will take action in the precise event of a *casus fœderis* as contemplated by the alliance, that is to say, if Germany were to support Austria by force of arms against Russia."

ISWOLSKY.

## ANNEX 7

### *Telegram from the Ambassador at Paris*

No. 376.

November 8/21, 1912.

I communicated the contents to Poincaré, who had a conversation on the same subject with the Italian, Austrian and German Ambassadors. Tittoni confirmed the proposal set forth in my telegrams Nos. 374 and 375, and completed it by indicating that Djakovo, Ipek and Prisren must become Serbian. Tittoni also told him that you had informed the Italian Chargé d'Affaires that, in view of the excited state of public opinion in Russia, you were obliged to alter your original attitude and to support Serbia's demands for a territorial outlet to the Adriatic. Tittoni is extremely anxious about this as the Italian Government is bound to defend the principle of the integrity of Albania and will, in the event of an outbreak of war on this question, be obliged to give armed support to Austria.

Poincaré observed that it was difficult to reconcile this with what he knew of the Russo-Italian agreement of Racconigi and that it was in direct contradiction with the Franco-Italian agreement of 1902, in virtue of which France was entitled, in the event of a war with Germany and Austria, to count on Italy's neutrality. Tittoni replied that Italy's treaty with Austria about Albania had preceded the treaties with France and Russia and was unconditionally binding on the Italian Government. This, undeniably, placed Italy in a very embarrassing position, and she would use every endeavor to find a peaceful solution of this question. In the course of conversation, Poincaré said to Tittoni that, if the Austro-Serbian conflict led to a general war, Russia could count absolutely on the armed support of France. Poincaré observed that this declaration made a manifest impression on Tittoni. In view of the importance of the above-mentioned declaration by Tittoni, Poincaré asks that you will inform him, through me, whether it is true that your attitude as described in previous communications has changed, and whether you now find it necessary to insist on a territorial outlet to the Adriatic Sea for Serbia.

ISWOLSKY.

## ANNEX 8

*Secret telegram from Sazonoff to Paris*

No. 2687.

ST. PETERSBURG, *November 9/22, 1912.*Your telegram No. 376.<sup>1</sup>

We have never refused to give diplomatic support to the Serbs in the question of the Adriatic port. We consider that Poincaré's idea of satisfying the Serbs by assigning them under certain conditions one of the ports of Northern Albania is worthy of serious consideration and might be made the subject of deliberation. We are very grateful to Poincaré for declaring to the Italian Ambassador that France is ready to support us.

SAZONOFF.

## ANNEX 9

*Telegram from the Ambassador at London<sup>2</sup>*

No. 465.

Personal.

*December 22/January 3, 1913.*

Grey had informed me that he would telegraph to Buchanan about British support offering the prospect of diplomatic backing. He has sent me a copy of his telegram. I have shown it to Cambon and have asked for his opinion. In Cambon's opinion there will be no occasion to generalize until special points are raised which interest England. The Cabinet of London makes the same reserve which it made to him during the Agadir affair and before it. You will see by my dispatch that Grey has expressed himself to me rather differently, which would seem to confirm Cambon's personal opinion. I retain my opinion that British military support will depend on general circumstances impossible to define beforehand.

## ANNEX 10

*Report by the Ambassador at London<sup>2</sup>**February 12/25, 1913.*

I wish to revert to a point which I consider of the highest importance, as it throws more light than any other on the present political situation. I refer to the diplomatic support extended to each other by France and England at the Conference of London. You entertain doubts on this subject. It is, perhaps, my fault that I have not given an adequate description of this aspect of the question.

To begin with France. Although it was agreed (I will return to this later)

<sup>1</sup> See *post* p. 119.<sup>2</sup> [Translated from the original French.]



that British support was to be of a purely diplomatic character, without prejudice to what it might eventually become, no such reserve has been formulated by France. So far was this from being the case—no mistake must be made on this point—that Mr. Cambon, in spite of his wise and moderate, though never enigmatic attitude at the meetings, in reality regulated his conduct in accordance with mine rather than at the bidding of his own intuitions. On the contrary, if I recall briefly Mr. Cambon's conversations with me and the actual words exchanged, and connect them with Poincaré's attitude, the impression, amounting almost to a conviction, forms itself in my mind that, among all the Powers, France is the only one which, I do not go so far as to say, desires war, but would, nevertheless, regard it without great regret. In any case, there has been nothing to show me that France is taking any active part in working for a compromise. Now, a compromise means peace; beyond that compromise lies war.

With England the reverse is true. She wishes for peace—but only as long as peace remains possible—and is obviously making efforts to reach a compromise. I am aware that an attitude like that adopted in the Agadir affair might, perhaps, have had the same result—this is possible but not certain, and in any case it was not so at the beginning. The system of "bluffing" will never become fashionable in English politics whatever happens; England revolts against it. She met Germany on this ground of compromise. This is the origin of the cooperation of the two Powers—with this one difference; that England, in giving her diplomatic support, used her utmost efforts to insure that the compromise should be in favor of Russia and the Balkan States, whereas Germany has thrown her weight on the side of Austria, but hitherto at least in a less marked degree. I see a proof of this in the most recent Austrian concessions of Dibra and the valley of the Reka, mainly ascribable to German pressure brought to bear upon the extravagant demands of the Austrian Government. If Germany had wished for war, she would not have gone so far. Germany sees in this concession the basis of the compromise which she desires. She is of opinion that Scutari should suffice for Austria, and remains unconvinced that Djakovo is of sufficient importance to bring about a crisis. As we are practically in agreement—thanks to the mutual concessions—in regard to the frontier lines, England also realizes that the only question which remains to be settled is that of Djakovo. In precisely the same way as Germany, England sees that the moment for the compromise has come. This compromise is based on the liberation of the Balkan States, Turkey is to be pressed right back to Constantinople, while Austria is compelled to accept this situation and this solution. It is, taking everything into consideration, the most remarkable political result which Russia has achieved for nearly a century.

Sir Edward Grey expressed himself again in this sense yesterday to Vesnitch.

A political triumph cannot be quite complete without war. What we have achieved resembles such a triumph. To secure more, war is necessary. Such a war would put everything into the melting pot and would not be justified, for the successes still to be attained stand in no relation to the stupendous means to which we should have to resort.

In order to illustrate simply the relative situations of all the Great Powers, I will, with your permission, begin by leaving Russia and Austria quite frankly out of account. We have a weak side in common with Austria. Public opinion in both countries upholds, from different motives, it is true, the erroneous belief that diplomatic means, cleverly applied, are enough in themselves for the complete attainment of results entirely in harmony with the traditions of both countries. The difference, so far as I am able to judge, consists, however, in the fact that we in Russia should embark on war out of a feeling of national dignity, whereas in Austria there exists avowedly a genuine war party. However, on the whole, it would seem that both countries are behaving in a manner which must lead to war, though they both hope to avoid it.

England does not wish for war, and therefore casts her vote in favor of a compromise, which will secure a tangible success for Russia, that is to say, for the Triple Entente. Germany's view is that Austrian interests are secured precisely up to the point which suits her; she would hardly have welcomed any change in the respective rôles which would have created a situation likely to assign to Austria a preponderance inconvenient to German interests.

There remains France. Here I must admit that I am entering on the realm of conjecture, but of conjectures which appear at all events to me adequate. I must now digress. My relations with Mr. Cambon are marked by a degree of confidence practically unique in the relations between ambassadors. He shows me almost everything—more, indeed, than I show him. Nevertheless I do not know exactly how matters stand between England and France. Taking everything into consideration, he gives me the impression of entertaining a certain confidence in the armed cooperation of England. I do not know whether this rests on agreements which he is compelled to keep secret, or is merely based on the measures taken with regard to the British fleet, which, as Mr. Winston Churchill again repeated to him yesterday, is absolutely ready and completely mobilized, not ostentatiously, it is true, but yet in such manner that the Admiralty has incurred heavy expenses thereby. As all this information has only reached me second-hand, I must be cautious in drawing conclusions from it. I am merely of opinion that public feeling in England is also prepared for a compromise, so much so, indeed, that the more our respective differences tend to disappear in the course of the negotiations, the more this feeling will predominate.

In any case, Mr. Cambon appears to me convinced—and I think that in

this respect he is right—that England would certainly rather make war than allow the power of France to be endangered. This is one reason which would cause her to take up arms. The other reason would be an ultimatum or a brutal attack on the part of Germany either against France or Russia. In this case, as the King has said, the honor and national dignity of England would be affected. It is an error to believe that this point of view does not exist in England.

What I have said suffices, I think, to characterize the rôles of the various members of the conference of ambassadors in London. Italy, too, who wobbles first in one direction and then in the other, is also inclined to a peace of compromise, and I should be astonished if she were to decide at a given moment to play a very pronounced military rôle.

The situation, so far as I can discern it, appears to me to be such that all the Powers are sincerely endeavoring to maintain peace. But of all of them France is the one which would accept war with the relatively greatest equanimity.

France has, to use a well-known expression, "recovered herself." Rightly or wrongly, she has complete confidence in her army; the ancient grudge ever rankling has reappeared in all its bitterness, and France might very well suppose that circumstances are more favorable to her today than they will ever be again. I will not prolong this report by an inquiry into the truth of this. It is possible, however, that France, from her point of view, may be right in her estimate of the situation.

On the one hand, the fact that this state of mind prevails in France provides us with a guaranty; but on the other hand war must not be allowed to break out in obedience to interests which are more French than Russian, and certainly not in circumstances which might be more favorable to France than to Russia.

France has only one single hostile army against her, and this army is far from being aimed exclusively against France. Russia would have to face, on an immense front, two hostile Powers, or even three, counting Roumania. Roumania must, I consider, be won over at any price; the present as well as the future demands this.

The present crisis contains the germs of so many different possibilities that I hesitate to calculate the consequences. The only remark which I would venture to make is that if the success of the French armies were greater than that of our own, we should be placed at the conclusion of peace in a situation which could not be regarded as favorable if Russia's gigantic efforts be taken into consideration. That is a point upon which we must deliberate today, at a moment when the consolidation of the completed work lies in great part in our hands, at least so far as concerns the most difficult of all questions, that of Albania.

BENCKENDORFF.

## SUPPLEMENT IX

## THE LIMAN VON SANDERS INCIDENT

The Emperor William had already in June, 1913, communicated the scheme for sending military instructors to Turkey to the Czar Nicholas and King George of England, when both sovereigns were in Berlin on the occasion of the wedding of Princess Victoria Louise. The Russian Government, however, at the beginning of November expressed its utter surprise at the contemplated appointment of General Liman von Sanders to the Command of a Turkish corps in Constantinople, and maintained that it had been taken unawares. It appears to have been particularly disturbed by the fact that, precisely in Constantinople, a model division was to be placed under the command of a German general. On the other hand, it took no exception to the fact that the Turkish Government had at the same time entrusted the reorganization of the Turkish fleet to an English admiral, and that the latter had under his command not only the Turkish fleet, but also all persons holding positions in the navy throughout Turkey; so that the authority thus conferred enabled the admiral, whose official residence was also in Constantinople, to wield a far greater political influence than the German general commanding a Turkish corps.

Simultaneously with the representations made to the German Government in this connection, Sazonoff submitted a memorandum to the Czar, in which he expounded the necessity "of proceeding with the immediate elaboration of a comprehensive plan of action to insure a favorable solution of the question of the Straits, in case events compelled Russia to protect her interests in the Bosphorus and in the Dardanelles."<sup>1</sup>

The German Government, in answer to the demands of the Russian Government, immediately declared its readiness to settle the question in a friendly way, but left no room for doubt in regard to its opinion of the Russian attitude, which seemed excessively peremptory, all the more so in that Sazonoff had threatened, on the 28th of November, that in certain circumstances Russia might be compelled radically to reconsider the question of her relations with Turkey. The situation was considerably aggravated by the indiscretions and threatening articles of the Russian and French newspapers which were aware of the circumstances, and by the discussions in the press to which they gave rise. The collective representation made to the Porte in the middle of December by the Triple Entente in connection with the Liman von Sanders' question was regarded by Turkey as an interference in her domestic affairs, and by the German press as a hostile move on the part of those Powers.

<sup>1</sup>Cf. Sazonoff's report to the Czar of the 5th of March, 1914.



Although the German Government made every effort to compose the difference, Sazonoff, without awaiting the issue of the negotiations, submitted to the Czar on the 7th of January, 1914, a memorandum pointing out that Germany's policy in the matter of the military mission was not straightforward and aimed at undermining the unity of the Triple Entente.

In principle, it was stated, Russia could not oppose a German military mission, but it was against her interests to acquiesce in the establishment of a German command in Constantinople. He therefore proposed to make sure of the support of France and England, to prepare for the eventuality of serious military action, and to use the occupation of Turkish ports by the Triple Entente as a means of pressure. The possibility that Germany might actively support Turkey must, however, not be overlooked. In that case the decisive point would be shifted from Turkey to the western frontier of Russia, involving all the consequences of a great war. The Czar therefore had a grave and responsible decision to make. Sazonoff was of opinion that Russia should not give way on any point in order not to endanger the solidarity of the Triple Entente, and he therefore sought authority to summon a special Council of Ministers to determine whether Russia was prepared for the eventuality of military action on the assumption that she would be supported by France with her entire strength and vigorously assisted by England. If Russia were certain of the support of her Allies and friends, she must insist on the fulfilment of her demands.

In the meantime a solution of the question in dispute had been found in Berlin, which consisted in promoting General Liman, and thus removing him from his command at Constantinople. This solution was communicated to St. Petersburg on the 6th of January, 1914.<sup>1</sup> General Liman von Sanders' promotion took place on the 10th of January, 1914, but met with an unfavorable reception from Sazonoff, who evidently saw therein the frustration of his far-reaching plan.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, at the New Year's reception on the 14th of January, 1914, the Czar expressed his satisfaction at the "smoothing-over" of the incident.

#### ANNEX 1

*Instructions issued by Secretary of State von Jagow to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg*

No. 14.

For Your Excellency's confidential information.

BERLIN, *January 6, 1914.*

In accordance with the opinion of the German Ambassador in Constantinople, who was here on leave a few days ago, and used that opportunity to consult with Mr. Swerbejew, we believe that a solution of the question of

<sup>1</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>2</sup> Annex 2.

the military mission in Constantinople might possibly be found in the following form:

The position of a corps commander in Turkey does not properly correspond in rank with that of a Prussian lieutenant general; the predecessor of General von Liman, for instance, was only a colonel. From our point of view, therefore, it would seem quite appropriate that General von Liman should in course of time receive a promotion in rank, whereby he would be compelled in any case to relinquish his command of the corps, and could devote himself to his more important and special task of reorganizing the whole of the Turkish army. It is, however, necessary in the first place that General von Liman should place himself, by means of his command of the corps, in direct contact for a certain time with the troops, and should thus from personal observation become acquainted with all the details of the working of the Turkish military machine, as well as with its defects. For the moment it is not possible to fix a definite period within which the above-mentioned change should be carried out; however, in order to facilitate Mr. Sazonoff's task in representing the matter to Russian public opinion it might be possible to allow an announcement to this effect to appear in the Russian press. Mr. Swerbejew, after consultation with Mr. von Wangenheim and myself, has prepared a draft approximately to the following effect:

We learn from Constantinople that it has never been sought to invest the German mission with a political character. This emerges from the facts that the division commanded by a German colonel is doing garrison duty on the Asiatic coast, at Scutari and Ismid, and that the division at Constantinople is commanded by a Turkish general who is also at the head of the whole police force and the Criminal Investigation Department. It is evident that an instructor who undertakes so great a task as the reorganization of the whole Ottoman army must, for his own instruction, remain in direct contact with the troops for a certain time. When, however, he has made himself adequately acquainted with all details, the command of the army corps will be transferred to a Turkish general, and General von Liman will devote himself to his more important task, that is, to the reorganization of the whole army. The command of the army corps, therefore, only represents a stage in the work of reorganizing the Ottoman army.<sup>1</sup>

I have only repeated this text from memory, and am therefore unable to vouch for each particular phrase or turn of expression. I told Mr. Swerbejew that a public communication of this nature would of course not be possible before the Porte had expressed its concurrence in the proposed change in the command. The Porte, moreover, must give its assent to the publication, as the communication must of course not appear in the Russian press as one drawn up in agreement between ourselves, but as based on intelligence re-

<sup>1</sup>[This paragraph translated from original French.]

ceived from Constantinople. For as the original contract was concluded between the Porte and the German officers, the change would of course also be a Turkish matter.

The Imperial Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to discuss the matter with the Grand Vizier and General von Liman in the foregoing sense, and to endeavor to win them over to this solution.

According to a telegram from Mr. von Mutius, General von Liman is on a tour of inspection lasting until the 9th of January, and the Chargé d'Affaires therefore considers it expedient to await his return before beginning the negotiations. For, as I will add, for Your Excellency's purely personal information, when Baron Wangenheim, before his departure, had raised the question of some such solution with General von Liman, after consultation with the Grand Vizier, he had encountered difficulties on the part of the general. I nevertheless suppose that Mr. von Mutius will be successful in convincing the general of the expediency of the solution, and it is to be hoped that the Turkish Government will not take up too uncompromising an attitude, but will perceive that the suggested solution likewise accords with Turkey's own interests.

Although up till now we have given proof of the utmost good-will in complying with the wishes of Russia, such endeavor to meet them must not bear the appearance of yielding in the face of Russian exigency. Mr. Sazonoff must therefore give us time, and should especially avoid any action likely to transform the incident into a European question. It has already threatened to assume such a character, thanks to the indiscretions in the press and to the collective *démarche* of the Entente Powers in Constantinople. Mr. Sazonoff, for his part has caused me to be informed by Mr. Swerbejew that he likewise had contemplated making representations at Constantinople against the authoritative command in the capital. As the matter is first and foremost a Turkish domestic concern, and is regarded as such by the Porte, I had no kind of grounds for taking exception to this intention of Mr. Sazonoff. It is one thing for the Russian Ambassador to make representations to the Porte and another for the Triple Entente to undertake a collective *démarche* against our mission, which is afterwards commented on in the press. I therefore did not conceal from Mr. Swerbejew my surprise at such a proceeding on the part of the Triple Entente Powers, and I trust that Mr. Sazonoff will not fail to recognize that any renewal of collective steps by the three Powers would only serve to prejudice the chances of reaching a solution of the incident satisfactory to himself.

JAGOW.

## ANNEX 2

*Report of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Imperial Chancellor*

No. 4.

ST. PETERSBURG, *January 10, 1914.*

Contrary to my usual custom, as I have recently had no particularly urgent messages for Mr. Sazonoff, I have allowed more than a week to elapse without calling on the Minister. I wished thereby to show him that I was not willing again to provide the *Nowoje Wremja* with material for every kind of indiscretion. When, therefore, I called on Mr. Sazonoff yesterday in order to discuss some other affairs, I thought it better to avoid touching upon the question of the German military mission. After a few other matters had been settled, however, Mr. Sazonoff very soon began of his own accord to speak of this question, and a discussion of some length again took place on the subject.

The Minister complained "that the affair was not making satisfactory progress." I could not help expressing astonishment at this observation, since according to the information which had reached me the friendly conversations, marked on the German side at any rate by great good-will between the Secretary of State and Mr. Swerbejew, had laid the broad outlines of a basis upon which, so it seemed to me, a satisfactory settlement could be found.

Mr. Sazonoff thereupon declared that the form of the proposed *communiqué* could not possibly satisfy him, as it would not help to calm public opinion here. The Minister above all objected to the news of the approaching change in General von Liman's position coming from Constantinople. A *communiqué* of this kind emanating from the Turkish Government would not make the slightest impression here. The Minister further observed that, unless a term, and indeed a fairly near one, were fixed in the proposed *communiqué*, it would have little value for him. Moreover, the Imperial Government seemed to be in no hurry about the proposed changes at Constantinople, since the Secretary of State had given the Russian Ambassador at Berlin to understand that the changes would come into force some time "in the course of the year," which might quite well mean not before the end of December.

I tried to explain to the Minister that, in the circumstances, the news in question could only emanate from Constantinople, since it was for the Turkish Government to make a final decision regarding changes in the appointments of officers who had entered the Turkish service. I had, moreover, no doubt that the news would be immediately dealt with in the German press in a form which would leave no doubt that the proposed use of General von Liman's services in a higher position had been brought about in agreement with the Imperial Government.



Mr. Sazonoff then restated in a lengthy disquisition his well-known point of view and his astonishment at the small degree of comprehension displayed by us for the justifiable excitement which the affair must arouse here. I declared to the Minister that such a comprehension was, indeed, absent because, in our conception, it was simply illogical to make no objection to the actual presence of a German military mission in Turkey, but to display indignation at the way in which that mission thought proper to fulfil its task.

The Minister then raised the question of how the military mission would act if Turkey became involved in warlike complications with any of the Powers. I replied that there was at present no need for further anxiety in this connection. It seemed to me unlikely that Turkey would think of warlike enterprises within any measurable time, and that the eventuality of General von Liman's taking the field against Russia at the head of his Turkish army did not, I was convinced, deserve to be seriously contemplated in our discussions.

I then observed that, if the Minister reproached us with lack of comprehension of the Russian point of view, I could not but reproach him in my turn. In Germany we should never be able to understand why General von Liman's active command over the Constantinople army corps should constitute an unfriendly act against Russia, while nothing was said about the submission to English command of the whole Turkish fleet and all the Turkish naval establishments, or about the purchase for Turkey of one of the biggest dreadnoughts in the world, and that, too, with French money. The Minister tried, as on a recent occasion, to evade this inconvenient argument in true Russian style, by making a few disparaging remarks about the Turkish navy. Turkey, he said, had as a matter of fact no fleet and never would have one, because she lacked the proper material for manning ships. In answer to this, I alluded to the activity of the Turkish cruiser *Hamidié* during the last war, which proved that even a relatively small battleship with a Turkish crew was by no means a *quantité négligeable* if only it were properly commanded.

Moreover, the question of prestige at Constantinople was always prominent here. Nobody in Germany and no impartial judge could, however, admit that the exercise by a German general of the active command of a Turkish army corps could confer greater prestige upon the German representative at the Golden Horn than that enjoyed by the English Ambassador, who had the Turkish fleet behind him.

I then alluded to the fact that, despite our lack of comprehension of the Russian point of view, which I had admitted, Your Excellency had nevertheless declared your readiness, in the interests of good relations with Russia, to sanction immediate inquiries at Constantinople, to see what could be done to allay the anxiety which had shown itself here. Mr. Sazonoff must recognize our good-will from that fact. I would, however, earnestly beg

him not to press the question and not to insist that a short and definite term be fixed for the change in General von Liman's position. Such pressure would only do harm. I thought it quite out of the question that my Government would consent to fixing such a term. If the Secretary of State had said "in the course of the year" that ought to be enough. Finally, it made no difference whether General von Liman laid down his command in April or in December. The main point was that, in principle, the views of Russia had been taken into account.

The Minister should not forget the difficult position in which the conduct of Russia had placed the Imperial Government. If the negotiations had been confined to a confidential and friendly exchange of views between the Cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburg, it would have been far easier to make a few concessions to the Russian point of view. Since then, however, the press in St. Petersburg and the French press had enlarged upon the matter in a preposterous manner, and, particularly after the step taken by the Triple Entente in Constantinople, the question had, quite unnecessarily, become one of prestige. Under the circumstances, it was quite impossible for the Imperial Government, as Mr. Sazonoff must himself realize, to take a course which might make it appear that Germany was yielding to pressure from the Triple Entente and the campaign in the press. No leader of German policy could be responsible to His Majesty the Emperor for such a retreat or uphold it before German public opinion. Therefore the only possible solution was that proposed by the Secretary of State, and it was of no importance whether it were put into practice a few months earlier or later.

Towards the end of the interview Mr. Sazonoff became a little more conciliatory. He depicted to me the difficulties of his position, and asked me to bear them in mind. The policy which he had hitherto pursued met, he said, with opposition from a very high and influential quarter. It was represented to him that gratitude for the Emperor Nicholas' visit to our Court, and Mr. Kokowtzw's visit and his own to Berlin took the form of the German military mission, and that his pro-German policy was leading Russia from one diplomatic defeat to another.

These remarks appear to me to be particularly worthy of note since they confirm suppositions which I have expressed elsewhere, and prove that Mr. Sazonoff is being strongly influenced by anti-German circles here in his attitude to the question of the military mission. I do not know whom the Minister meant as the very high and influential quarter, since I have not yet succeeded in determining whether the Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaievitch, who, as is known, fell into considerable disfavor during the winter, has been able to regain his influence with the Czar. Possibly Mr. Sazonoff in his remarks was thinking of influential circles in the Council of Empire. I consider a remark which Count Witte lately made as characteristic of the views apparently widely held in these circles: "He could not blame the

Germans for their action, with their military mission they had once again brought off a brilliant coup. For Russia, however, General von Liman's military mission denotes a new and serious reverse, which she owes to her incapable diplomacy."

Finally, the Minister again pointed out how valuable it would be if he could publish an official *communiqué* here in which he could say that the question of the military mission did not by any means possess that quality of acuteness which was so widely attributed to it. It forms the subject of friendly negotiations between the two Cabinets, which one may hope will soon lead to a satisfactory result.

I told the Minister that I did not know whether your Excellency would consider such a publication as desirable during the present stage of the question, and that I could not help doubting whether it would satisfy and calm the agitators here.

POURTALES.

### ANNEX 3

*Telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

No. 9.

ST. PETERSBURG, *January 15, 1914.*

At yesterday's New Year reception, His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas made a brief allusion to the affair of General von Liman, and remarked that the fact that this had been "smoothed over" was a good beginning for the New Year. Mr. Sazonoff observed that he had not yet received official confirmation of an alteration in the General's position. I replied that from reports in the newspapers it seemed to me that no doubt existed upon this point. I should be glad to be informed how this matter stands.

POURTALES.

### SUPPLEMENT X

#### RUSSIA AND TURKEY, 1914

It is not known what was decided by the Ministerial Council proposed to the Czar in Sazonoff's memorandum of the 7th of January, 1914, to discuss the Liman von Sanders' crisis. According to the protocol of a discussion held on the 21st of February, 1914, which was published by the Maximalist Government, Sazonoff at that meeting said: "It was not to be assumed that action against the Straits could be undertaken except in the event of a European war." The Chief of the General Staff also declared that the fight for Constantinople was impossible save in the event of a European war.

The plans for "seizure of the Straits in a not remote future," as the protocol expressed it, were, however, discussed in all their details. The comprehensive preparations resolved upon were approved by the Czar.

In the minutes of the discussions of the 21st of February, 1914, which Sazonoff submitted, together with a personal report<sup>1</sup> to the Czar on the 5th of March, 1914, in which the measures and preparations to be undertaken for the occupation of the Straits are discussed, reference is made to "the expected crisis" which ("possibly very soon") is to furnish opportunity for the solution of the question of the Straits. The historic task of Russia in regard to the Straits is stated to consist in the establishment of her sovereignty over them. It is said to be highly probable that Russia has before her the prospect of solving the question of the Straits during a European war. In such a war, the English and French fleets would hold the fleets of the Triple Alliance in check. No reliance, however, must be placed upon more extensive support in the operations against the Straits. The success of the operations is of course closely bound up with the international situation. "To prepare the ground politically so as to secure favorable conditions for this purpose is the task which at present engages the systematic efforts of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in this question."

In the interval the guerilla warfare carried on by the press, which had for some time been relaxed, was fanned into flame once more by an article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* of the 2d of March, 1914. A semiofficial character seems to have been wrongly attributed to this article. It discussed the Russian armaments. The Russian Minister for War, Suchomlinoff, intervened in this press dispute with a semiofficial declaration in the *Birshewija Wjedomosti* of the 12th of March on the readiness for war of Russia and France.<sup>2</sup> What is known of the origin of this article (see report of Wolff's representative in St. Petersburg, dated the 13th of March, 1914,<sup>3</sup> and report of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, dated the 16th of March, 1914<sup>4</sup>) shows that, if great importance was attached to it, there was certainly some reason for this.

As was subsequently discovered, Siberian troops were moved to the west of Russia as early as the spring of 1914. At the same time publicists clamored for the full execution of the three years military service in France. In this connection must also be considered the semiofficial article published at the instance of the Russian War Ministry in the *Birshewija Wjedomosti* on the 13th of June, 1914.<sup>5</sup>

In June the Czar went to Constantza to consolidate the connection with Roumania. In April there began in London the negotiations for the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian naval convention.

<sup>1</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>4</sup> Annex 4.

<sup>2</sup> Annex 2.

<sup>5</sup> Annex 5.

<sup>3</sup> Annex 3.



## ANNEX 1

*Sazonoff's report to the Czar*

In the memorandum very respectfully presented in November of last year I had the good fortune to submit to Your Imperial Majesty considerations upon the necessity of proceeding without delay to the preparation of a comprehensive program of action conceived to bring about a solution of the question of the Straits in our favor, in case events should compel us to protect our interests in the Bosphorus and in the Dardanelles.

Your Imperial Majesty was so good as to approve that these considerations and the questions connected therewith should be made the subject of a special conference between the authorities chiefly interested. The conference convoked by me for this purpose was held on the 8th/21st of February.

I beg to submit for your All-highest consideration the minutes of the said conference and, in agreement with the members of the conference, to request at the same time Your Imperial Majesty's instructions as regards the plan of action laid down at the end of the minutes.

SAZONOFF.

ST. PETERSBURG, *March 23/April 5, 1914.*

## BASILI'S MEMORANDUM ON THE STRAITS

*Preliminary considerations for the elucidation of the naval measures to be undertaken by Russia in the Black Sea area*

The present political situation in the Near East, which in the nearer or more remote future may lead to the break-up of Turkey, renders it incumbent upon us, firstly, to take into consideration today the possibility that the question of the Straits will be raised, and, secondly, to determine our attitude towards this question.

## I

The first inference is the necessity for proceeding immediately to a substantial strengthening of our military forces, and more particularly of our naval forces in the Black Sea area, in order that at the very commencement of the expected crisis we may be able to direct the question of the Straits to a solution in the sense which we desire. As, however, it is not possible to determine in advance the date of this crisis, which may possibly occur very soon, it is desirable to strengthen our forces in the Black Sea area as far as possible without delay in such a manner that the strengthening shall be consistent and not designed with a view to any fixed date.

As regards the method of reinforcing our naval forces in the Black Sea, it must above all be ascertained whether it is possible within a sufficiently short period to build a powerful fleet in the Black Sea itself, or whether to meet this purpose large units must be brought there from elsewhere. For the latter purpose we might make use of the dreadnoughts which are at present being built in the Baltic yards and those planned in accordance with our naval program. In order to reinforce the Black Sea squadron by means of these units, it is obviously necessary to secure the modification of the existing international agreements, which forbid the passage of war-ships through the Turkish Straits. As the Great Powers are traditionally opposed to the opening of the Straits, the attainment of this end is even today very questionable, and the possibility of reinforcing the Black Sea Fleet from without is therefore also doubtful. This method of reinforcing our naval forces in the Black Sea has the further disadvantage that if events were to develop rapidly, we should never be able to bring dreadnoughts from the Baltic to the Black Sea so rapidly as we should require to use them there.

Even if we assume the possibility of executing the above plan, it must be borne in mind that Europe would never agree to open the Straits merely to States bordering upon the Black Sea, as we assumed for some time, and that even if there were some prospect of an opening of the Straits in consequence of diplomatic negotiations, all that could be attained would be free access to the Black Sea for the war-ships of all nations. Such an alteration of the present position is, however, contrary to our traditional standpoint, which is that so long as the Straits are not in our hands, our strategic interests require that no foreign squadron should be admitted to the Black Sea, and that the advantage which we derive from the closing of the Straits consists in depriving foreign Powers of the possibility of preparing in the Black Sea in peace time for a surprise attack upon us. Objections have recently been raised against this standpoint. It is said that the closing of the Straits operates rather negatively than positively for our benefit. It is pointed out, firstly, that the principle of the closing of the Straits does not in fact protect us from the incursion of an enemy fleet into the Black Sea in war time, if the enemy has a previous understanding with Turkey and if Turkish harbors are made the base of the fleet, and, secondly, that the principle merely gives us the assurance that the only opponent with whom we must reckon in this sea is Turkey. The theory that we should prefer the closing of the Straits to free ingress through the Straits is hallowed by antiquity and can obviously be overthrown only by convincing proof of its falsity. But even if it should be recognized in theory that the Straits must be opened, it would still further require to be determined how far our defensive system is in a position to adapt itself practically to that situation.

## II

Our historic task in connection with the Straits consists in the establishment of our sovereignty over them. It would be superfluous to repeat here all the important strategic, economic and general practical grounds upon which this principal rests. Renunciation of a solution of the question of the Straits in the sense which we desire can only be justified if it were to be demonstrated that every possible form of the establishment of our sovereignty over the Straits must have as its consequence such a loss of strength for us as would produce an unfavorable effect upon the development of the State.<sup>1</sup> The establishment of our sovereignty over the Straits may be conceived in various ways. In the first place our sovereignty might extend over both Straits—the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles—and only in this case is free egress to the Mediterranean assured to us. Limitation of our sovereignty to the Bosphorus alone is therefore a very unsatisfactory solution of the question, as it would merely secure our defense in the Black Sea. Moreover, our sovereignty over the Straits may be organized in various ways. It may include occupation of the shores of the Straits, together with a more or less extensive hinterland, or it might possibly be limited to the occupation of a few of the most important strategic points, which would guarantee our sovereignty over the Straits from the military point of view.

Thus, one can imagine a whole series of degrees of more or less complete achievement of the end. In order properly to appreciate the various forms in which our sovereignty over the Straits might be established, it is necessary that all these forms should be considered from the military as well as from the naval point of view, and that the War Ministry and the Admiralty should form a clear opinion as to which solution is most in harmony with our strategic interests. At the same time it must be exactly ascertained what cost in men and materials would fall upon the State under each alternative. Only on the basis of such information can a final plan be prepared.

In this connection it is to be noticed that the plan must be drawn up with the necessary elasticity, so as to make it possible to reach the proposed end more or less completely with due regard for the external circumstances existing at the time when the solution of the question of the Straits takes place.

## III

The operations for the occupation of the Straits must be based solely upon our own forces, and must not assume the presence of assistance from without. It is highly probable that we have before us the prospect of solving the question of the Straits during a European war. In this event we

<sup>1</sup> Only in this case could we be satisfied with neutralization of the Straits, as owing to the absence of security against its violation, neutralization does not fully guarantee us either egress from the Black Sea or certainty that access to that sea is closed to our enemies.

are entitled to assume that the fleet of the Triple Alliance will be held in check by the fleets of England and France, but only so long as the naval forces of our Allies have suffered no defeat. We have no more to hope from this quarter. Support from Greece in the shape of the concession of a naval base to us in the Ægean for our naval operations against the Straits seems so little probable that no plans can be built upon it. Greece has emerged from the last crisis substantially strengthened, and her national ideals have undergone a corresponding expansion. The dream of Constantinople will probably henceforth form an obstacle to a further *rapprochement* between Greece and ourselves. Moreover, we cannot hope to create a naval base in the Ægean without thereby producing the most serious international complications.

The possibility of proceeding to the execution of operations for the occupation of the Straits, and the success of such operations are, however, of course closely bound up with the international situation. To prepare the ground politically in advance, so as to secure favorable conditions for this purpose, is the task which now engages the systematic efforts of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in this question.

On the practical side, occupation of the Straits requires preparation in advance for the action both of the fleet and of the landing troops; and in this connection we must avoid repeating the mistakes made in 1896 in the preparation of the plan for the occupation of the Straits then projected, in which insufficient attention was bestowed upon the landing operations.

Rapid transport of a considerable number of troops to the Straits is only possible if such troops have previously been formed into appropriate small units, if the methods of embarkation on the steamers have been worked out, and if an adequate quantity of transport has been made ready in advance. The last requirement, again, necessitates a definite economic policy.

The financial side of the subject must also not be overlooked.

Deliberate preparation for a solution of the question of the Straits in the sense desired by us must, therefore, call for close and continued cooperation among a large number of authorities and, first and foremost, for complete harmony between the work of the War Ministry and that of the Admiralty.

#### PROTOCOL OF THE SPECIAL CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 21, 1914

Chairman: Minister for Foreign Affairs, Court Chamberlain Sazonoff.  
Present: the Minister for Marine, General Adjutant Grigorovitch; the Chief of the General Staff, General of Cavalry Jilinsky; the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople, Court Chamberlain de Giers; the Assistant of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Court Chamberlain Neratoff; the Quartermaster General of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Daniloff; the Second Chief Quartermaster of the General Staff, Major General Averjanoff; the Temporary Adviser of the Naval Staff, 1st class Captain



Reniukoff; the Chief of the Section for the Near East of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Chamberlain Prince Troubetskoy; the Chief of the Second Executive Section of the Naval Staff, 2d class Captain Njemitz. Present and charged with the duty of drawing up the minutes: the Assistant of the Chief of the Section for the Near East, Chamberlain Bützow; and the Vice Director of the Chancelry of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chamberlain Basili.

After opening the sitting, the Minister for Foreign Affairs reminded the members of the conference that in the memorandum which, as they were aware, had been submitted to His Imperial Majesty in November, he, the Minister, had considered it his duty to submit the following considerations to the Emperor. In connection with the alteration in the political situation the possibility must be reckoned with, perhaps in the immediate future, that events might occur which would fundamentally alter the international situation of the Straits of Constantinople. It was therefore necessary to proceed by cooperation among the appropriate authorities to an immediate preparation of a comprehensive plan of action to secure a solution favorable to us (*i.e.*, Russia) of the historical question of the Straits. His Excellency Sazonoff then stated that the Emperor had been pleased to approve the considerations set forth in this memorandum and to consent to their being discussed by a special committee.

Although the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not regard serious political complications as very probable at the moment, he felt that none the less the maintenance of the present situation in the Near East could not be guaranteed, even for the immediate future. His Excellency Sazonoff expressed his firm conviction that if by the force of events the Straits should be withdrawn from the sovereignty of Turkey, Russia could not tolerate the establishment of any other Power on their shores, and would, therefore, perhaps be compelled to occupy the Straits in order thereafter to carry through, in one form or another, a regulation of affairs on the Bosphorus and in the Dardanelles corresponding to her interests. As the success of this operation was dependent to a great degree upon the rapidity of its execution, the Minister pointed out the necessity of contemplating landing operations for the solution of the question, as well as action by the fleet. His Excellency Sazonoff, therefore, asked the members of the conference to determine what had already been done by way of preparation for our (the Russian) operations against the Straits and what still could be done and must be done.

On the proposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the conference proceeded to discuss the questions of a landing army and of its composition and mobilization.

The Chief of the General Staff pointed out in the first place that a considerable number of troops would be required to obtain possession of the Straits. The number was dependent upon the political and strategic situation during

the execution of the operation. General of Cavalry Jilinsky explained that the question what units could be used for a landing must be answered by pointing out that the contingents which lay nearest to the place of landing were detailed for the purpose, namely those in the area of Sebastopol and Odessa, *i.e.*, the 7th and 8th Corps. In order to carry the undertaking through with sufficient forces, it would probably be necessary to take a further two corps from the military districts in the interior. The Chief of the General Staff then pointed out that the first echelon of the landing army, of which all units must land simultaneously, must comprise not less than one corps, *i.e.*, 30,000 to 50,000 men, as a small number of troops might easily be repulsed. Upon this Jilinsky made the reservation that a single corps would suffice for the first echelon only on the favorable condition that serious opposition need not be expected. The first group of the landing army should consist of a combined corps, formed from the head formations of the 7th and 8th Corps, *i.e.*, from the 13th Division garrisoning Sebastopol and Simferopol, the 15th Division stationed at Odessa and the 4th Rifle Brigade.

Referring to the already-mentioned connection between the strength of the forces required to take possession of the Straits and the political and strategic conditions governing this undertaking, the Chief of the General Staff examined the question what opponents must be kept in view in executing this operation. First must be mentioned the Turks, who at the moment had seven corps at their disposal in the neighborhood of Constantinople. According to Enver Pasha's new plan, of which the realization, however, was highly problematic, the Turks proposed to leave three corps on the European shores of the Straits.

In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that neither Greece nor Bulgaria could resist our policy of taking possession of the Straits. Having regard, however, to their historic enmity and the opposition between their respective interests, the chances were considerable that if either of these States turned against us, the other would then range itself on our side, and that they would thus reciprocally paralyze one another. To the question whether in that case we could not count upon the support of Serbia, his Excellency Sazonoff replied that it was not to be assumed that our action against the Straits could be undertaken except during a European war. It must be assumed that in such circumstances Serbia would be compelled to throw her whole strength against Austria-Hungary.

The Chief of the General Staff emphasized the great importance for Russia of a Serbian attack upon Austria-Hungary if Russia and Austria-Hungary took up arms against one another. According to the information which he had received, Austria-Hungary would be compelled to detach four or five corps for the struggle against Serbia. General Jilinsky then called attention to the military value of the position which Roumania would occupy in the event of a general European war.

His Excellency Sazonoff replied that although Roumania had not formally joined the Triple Alliance, she had undoubtedly concluded a military convention with Austria-Hungary which was directed against us; this statement would be confirmed by the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople, who, owing to his former activity in Roumania, was well acquainted with the circumstances there. The change which was now appearing in favor of Russia in Roumanian policy and public opinion, however, in the view of the Minister, made it possible to express a certain degree of doubt as to whether Roumania would actually take the field against us in the event of a war between Austria and ourselves. Positive reliance could not, however, be placed upon her abstention.

Returning to the question as to our possible opponents at the Straits, his Excellency Sazonoff pointed out that in the event of a collision between us and the Triple Alliance, Germany and Austria would send no troops to the Straits, and that in the most unfavorable event Italy alone might send landing troops there, although it would be dangerous for Italy to denude her French frontiers. Relying upon the opinion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the general conditions under which the solution of the question of the Straits might take place, the Chief of the General Staff gave expression to his conviction that the fight for Constantinople was impossible except during a European war. In consequence of this the General of Cavalry Jilinsky considered it his duty to point out that the detailing of troops for a landing operation in the neighborhood of the Straits, and even the possibility of such an operation, depended upon the general situation at the outbreak of war. The corps provided for an expedition could, in Jilinsky's opinion, only be sent to Constantinople if a struggle were not impending upon the western front, or if the situation on this front were favorable. In the contrary case, these troops must be sent to the western front, for a favorable issue of the struggle on this front would carry with it a favorable solution of the question of the Straits.

As under the plan framed for the event of a war on the western front, all troops from the military districts in the interior must be used to form armies for this front, it was unfortunately not possible to replace the southern corps destined for use in a landing operation by other formations from the interior of the Empire, and thus make it possible that the southern corps should be sent against Constantinople in all events.

From what had been said by the Chief of the General Staff, the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople drew the conclusion that, if operations on our western front were necessary from the commencement of the war onwards, it was impossible to be certain that the landing armies necessary for seizing the Straits would be available, and consequently that this expedition could only be effected when the moment was ripe for it. Mr. de Giers laid stress on the desirability of expressly determining in advance the troops required



for a landing operation, and of thereby laying it down that they must not be diverted from this task and employed for any other purpose. He at the same time suggested that it might be possible to employ the troops stationed in the Caucasus for the operations against Constantinople.

General Jilinsky thought that the idea proposed by de Giers could not be carried out, as in the opinion of the military authorities an expedition against Constantinople would not prevent us from having a war on the Caucasus frontier. The greater part of the Turkish forces was stationed in Asia Minor. According to Enver Pasha's plan, only three corps were to remain in European Turkey. In the event of a landing operation in the neighborhood of the Straits, it must be our task to prevent the concentration of the remaining corps at Constantinople and to divert them to the Caucasus frontier.

Quartermaster General of the General Staff Daniloff added that the Caucasus troops could not be employed for a landing operation against the Straits because mobilization in the Caucasus could only take place very slowly owing to the local conditions. The Quartermaster General also expressed himself energetically against the detailing in advance of particular units exclusively for the operations against Constantinople. Apart from the difficulty of obtaining possession of Constantinople, which lay well in the heart of the Bosphorus, we must, so he was convinced, of necessity throw all our troops, even if we had more than we have at present, against Germany and Austria in the west. Our endeavor must be to make success certain upon the chief theater of war. Victory upon this theater automatically involved the favorable solution of all subsidiary questions.

This attitude was not shared by the Chief of the Second Executive Section of the Naval Staff, 2d Class Captain Njemitz. Captain Njemitz thought that we must occupy Constantinople and the Straits with our forces simultaneously with the operations on the western front, in order that their possession by us might be a factor to be reckoned with at the beginning of the peace negotiations. Only in that case would Europe accord to us the solution of the question of the Straits which we needed. If it were impossible to detail in advance from the effectives of our army the number of troops necessary for this task, Captain Njemitz considered that three new corps must be formed. This fresh sacrifice for armaments could not be considered as exceeding the capacity of Russia, if it insured the fulfilment of our historic task. In his reply to Captain Njemitz, the Chief of the General Staff pointed out that the idea of specially forming new corps for the expedition against Constantinople could not be carried out at present. The Straits possessed such an enormous importance in the eyes of every Russian that if the danger of their passing from the sovereignty of Turkey into other hands should approach, we could not renounce the idea of seizing them, and must, in consequence, send a landing army to Constantinople at once. It was to



be supposed that such circumstances would occur only in the course of a European war. A struggle in the Straits for the possession of Constantinople might, none the less, be preceded by a conflict upon our western front.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the General Staff then examined the question within what period the troops proposed for the landing operation could be mobilized. The 13th and 15th Divisions and the 4th Rifle Brigade, *i.e.*, the units proposed for the formation of the 1st echelon of the landing army, had a company strength of 60 files, and their mobilization without artillery would be effected within five days. The other units which belonged to the establishment of the 7th and 8th corps had at the moment only 48 files in the companies and could, therefore, not be mobilized in less than eight or nine days; if, however, it were desirable, the troops proposed for the expedition could be brought to a state of greater readiness for war by raising their company strength to 84 or even 100 files. This applied only to the infantry. In regard to the artillery, the Chief of the General Staff made the following observations: Hitherto, our artillery in peace time had had only teams for four guns and two munition wagons, and its mobilization therefore required eighteen days. In all frontier military districts, however, there were enough teams for six guns and twelve munition wagons. With this establishment the artillery could take the field on the second or third day of mobilization. The Odessa district was counted as an interior district; if, therefore, it should be regarded as necessary to keep that district in greater readiness for war, His Imperial Majesty's sanction must be obtained for securing for the artillery of the Odessa district such superior equipment of teams as was provided for the border districts. The cavalry was always on a mobilization footing. For a landing army, however, the cavalry came into account only in the proportion of one regiment per corps.

The conference proceeded to the question of the roads and railways required to take the landing army to the ports of embarkation. As regards railway communications, the situation was described as satisfactory from the point of view of landing operations against Constantinople.

The conference proceeded to the question of the means of transport required to carry a landing army to the Straits. The Minister for Marine pointed out that the principal difficulty lay in the total inadequacy of the means of transport then in the Black Sea. On the proposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the meeting expressed the desire that the Government should, at once undertake measures to develop our Black Sea fleet. De Giers then turned to the question how long the process of transport would take. The suggestion by Captain Njemitz, that two weeks should be allowed for the arrival of the landing troops in Constantinople, was considered by the Imperial Ambassador to Turkey as likely to be highly dangerous in certain circumstances. Thus an expedition to Constantinople might be

necessitated by anarchy in the Turkish capital and the danger of a general massacre. De Giers therefore asked to be informed to what extent the time required for the operation could be reduced by appropriate preparation. Njemitz replied that everything depended upon the degree of preparedness of the mercantile fleet for transport operations and its readiness for mobilization. If the ships of the volunteer fleet were subjected to appropriate measures of militarization, a division on a war footing could be sent to Constantinople in a week.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the desire that the first echelon of the landing army, *i.e.*, the composite corps, which was to be mobilized within three to four days, should at once be embarked and thus sent to the Bosphorus within four to five days after mobilization had been decreed.

After advising measures for the increase of the mercantile fleet in the Black Sea to a degree corresponding to the requirements of a landing operation for the seizure of the States, the conference proceeded to the question of placing our Black Sea forces in a condition which would assure their superiority over the Ottoman fleet and enable them to discharge the task of breaking through the Straits in order to occupy them in cooperation with the army.

The Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff stated the comparative strength of our Black Sea fleet and of the Turkish navy. In consequence of the exceptional measures taken by the naval authorities, building in our Black Sea yards had been so far expedited that the ships *Imperatriza Maria* and *Alexander III* might be expected to be fully ready on the 1st of July, 1915, and 1st of September, 1915, although the contracts provided for completion of their building in 1916 at the earliest. At the end of 1915 our Black Sea fleet would be reinforced by a third dreadnought of the same type, *Jekaterina II*, and in 1916 by two cruisers.

The Minister for Marine then explained why it had not been possible to prevent the cession of the ship *Rio de Janeiro* by Brazil to Turkey, which was so disadvantageous for us. The naval authorities had at the time raised the question of the purchase of this ship by Russia. Immediately afterwards came the news from English sources that the ship would not be sold. The naval authorities were now making every effort to prevent the sale of other dreadnoughts to Turkey. His Imperial Majesty had been pleased to approve their arguments, and to order that the dreadnoughts which were to be found abroad should be bought. The naval authorities were at the moment considering what ships could be bought and upon what conditions.

The conference proceeded to the last item of the agenda, namely, to the question of railways in the Caucasus, in particular, the so-called Transversal Mountain Railway.

The Chief of the General Staff pointed out that until such a railway was built, our army would have no proper communications with the hinterland, should fighting break out on the Turkish border.

The building of such a railway was also necessary to improve the conditions of mobilization in the Caucasus. Apart from this railway, some other strategic railways were needed in Trans-Caucasia: a through double track from Tiflis over Kars and Sarakamysch to Karaorgan on the Turkish border. This railway extension had already been taken in hand.

After the conclusion of the discussion of the principal questions which were found to be necessarily involved in any systematic preparation for the seizure of the Straits in a not distant future, on the proposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs the conference expressed the general desire that the Government, in all the departments concerned, would undertake all measures required from a technical point of view for the execution of this task. The conference singled out the following concrete measures, the execution of which it held to be desirable:

1. That the contingent intended as the first echelon for the Constantinople expedition, and consisting of the 13th and 15th Divisions and the 4th Rifle Brigade be brought up to a strength of 84 files per company;

2. That the artillery parks of the Odessa military district be provided with the larger peace establishment of teams which is assigned to the frontier districts, *i.e.*, with teams for 6 guns and 12 munition wagons;

3. That the Ministries for Finance, Trade and Industry and Marine at once cooperate to take energetic measures for the strengthening of our means of transport in the Black Sea, and, in particular, that the Government at once enter into arrangements with the subsidized steamship companies, requiring the latter to increase their fleet by adding ships suitable both in respect of type and armament for the special requirements of the transport of troops;

4. That the naval authorities forthwith discover means of reducing to four or five days after receipt of the order the period required for the transport to the Straits of the 1st echelon of the landing army consisting of one corps;

5. That our Black Sea fleet be as soon as possible reinforced by a second squadron of modern dreadnoughts of the greatest possible strength;

6. That the laying down of a through double track from Tiflis over Kars and Sarakamysch to Karaorgan be completed as soon as possible, and that the Transversal Mountain Railway across the Caucasus be built with all speed. It is further necessary to construct a railway line from the station Michailowo over Börshom to Kars, with a branch line to Olta. It is also desirable to permit the line Batoum-Kars to be constructed by private enterprise. The Conference requests the Minister for Foreign Affairs to submit these observations for the consideration of His Imperial Majesty.

SAZONOFF.

J. GRIGOROVITCH.

J. JILINSKY.

## ANNEX 2

*Dispatch from the Central Telegraph Bureau Louis Hirsch to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*

BERLIN, March 12, 1914.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

I beg leave to enclose herein a report published by the *Birshewija Wjedomosti* in St. Petersburg, which should not be devoid of interest to Your Excellency.

I likewise permit myself to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact—though I beg that this communication may be treated discreetly—that the *Birshewija Wjedomosti* notified us this afternoon of this article by telegram and described it as a semi-official pronouncement.

Curiously enough, the evening newspapers appearing in Paris at 5 p.m. were already in a position to publish the article *in extenso*.

Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

ERNST HIRSCH.

(Enclosure to the Dispatch of March 12, 1914)

RUSSIA IS READY FOR WAR!

A WARLIKE DECLARATION BY THE ST. PETERSBURG "BOURSE GAZETTE"

St. Petersburg, March 12. The St. Petersburg *Bourse Gazette* publishes the following sensational statements of a highly-placed military authority, behind whom the hand of the War Minister is suspected:

We are proud to be able to announce that the period of menaces is past, that Russia no longer fears the threats of any foreign State and that Russian public opinion has no longer any grounds for uneasiness. We now positively affirm, in full consciousness of the power of our country, which has been the target of abuse from the foreign press, that the principal aim of our country's defense has been attained. Hitherto the Russian plan of military operations has been defensive in character; today we know that the Russian army will, on the contrary, play an active part. Well-fortified defensive lines have taken the place of a series of forts, and the former system of defense has been abandoned. Our corps of officers has been considerably increased and forms a homogeneous whole. Our artillery possesses guns which are in no respect inferior to foreign models. Our coast and fortress guns are even superior to those of other States. Our artillery will no longer be able to complain of the lack of ammunition. The teachings of the past have fallen on fruitful soil. Military motor transport has reached a high level of perfection. All our units possess telephonic installations. Our soldiers could, in case of need, replace the railway personnel.



Our air-dreadnoughts of the Sikorsky type are well known. We may therefore hope that, if circumstances require, our Russian army will prove to be not only strong, but also well trained, well armed and supplied with every new technical device. Our army, which has hitherto been accustomed to fight on enemy soil, will not forget the principles of the system of defense in which it has been trained. With its effective strength recently increased by a third and consisting in homogeneous regiments, our army has stepped into the first place in virtue of the strength of its cavalry and the excellence of its equipment. It is of importance that Russian public opinion should be conscious of the fact that the Fatherland is prepared for every possibility. However, the military power of a country whose ruler took the initiative in the question of the Peace Conference at The Hague can only be unwelcome to States which harbor aggressive intentions. No one shall covet any portion of the Russian Empire. Russia, no less than her ruler, desires peace, but in case of need she is prepared.

### ANNEX 3

*Dispatch from the St. Petersburg correspondent of Wolff's telegraphic agency*

ST. PETERSBURG, *March 13, 1914.*

The history of the *Birshewija Wjedomosti* article, which has naturally attracted such attention both here and abroad, is of some interest. Suchomlinoff had received the Emperor's sanction assenting to the publication of such an article in the *Russkoye Slovo*. The draft submitted to the Emperor contained 300 lines and was sharper in tone than the article which astonished the readers of the *Birshewija Wjedomosti*. The Minister for War discussed this article with Mr. Bogaski, the St. Petersburg foreign news editor of the *Russkoye Slovo*. The latter, being a reasonable and clear-headed man, who is in other respects very superior to his Russian colleagues, refused to accept this article for his paper, since the *Russkoye Slovo* has from the outset adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Russo-German dispute, with which attitude the article in question was not in accord. The *Russkoye Slovo* did not wish to pour oil on the fire. Thereupon the article was redrafted and cut down, and then offered to the *Birshewija Wjedomosti*, which, of course, accepted it; it was easy for this paper to do so, since it has never maintained any definite line in its policy and can never miss the chance of a sensation. In view of the military nature of the article and the repeated allusions to the Emperor, it could never have been printed without the written consent of the War Minister. It does, in fact, bear the signature of the War Minister, and in two places, since after the first proof certain corrections were inserted. I have this from the political editors of the said papers, who have had the original in their hands.

Owing to the fact that the article appeared only in the St. Petersburg

Liberal press and not in the *Russkoye Slovo*, which has a large circulation especially in the provinces, the publicity given to it has been considerably curtailed. Without a doubt the credit for this rests with the foreign editor of the *Russkoye Slovo*, who, together with his whole editorial staff, has from the very beginning regretted this press campaign. Suchomlinoff evidently intended in the first place to work upon Russian Nationalist circles, but hoped also to influence the rest of Russian society, who were showing signs not, it is true, of any acute nervousness, but at least of some degree of anxiety, since they were inwardly full of uncertainty respecting the condition of their army. The Minister for War had also an eye on France, and wished to impress French public opinion with the extent of his own self-confidence. The German press, as can be seen from the rare telegrams which have reached us, has, thanks to our wider knowledge of military questions, been able at once to detect the weak points in this self-adulation in which the Russians have been indulging. It is almost comic that the Sikorsky aerial omnibus, a fine achievement, but not an instrument of war in the modern sense, should be cited as a proof of Russian preparedness, or that it should be contended that the Russian army was always victorious. The anxiety felt by the Minister, who was, of course, acting in agreement with Sazonoff (the latter, it is true, appears to have expected a somewhat more restrained article) that his tones should reach French ears, is shown by the fact that tonight the representative of the *Agence Havas* received a telegram from Paris asking about an "interview" in the *Russkoye Slovo*—meaning thereby, of course, the article which had been given to this paper. It was thus known in Paris that such an article was to appear, and in what paper.

People here feel that the press agitation is now over, and I am told that the *Russkoye Slovo* this morning published a telegram from Berlin, which originates from the Berlin Foreign Office, and which will not fail to exercise a soothing influence. At the Embassy and in St. Petersburg editorial circles something was expected to appear in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*; the latter had probably heard of this from the Foreign Office.

Accept, etc.

HEY.

#### ANNEX 4

*Report of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Imperial Chancellor*

ST. PETERSBURG, March 16, 1914.

When I visited Mr. Sazonoff on the day after the publication of the article in the *Birshewija Wjedomosti* about the readiness of the Russian army for war, I opened the conversation by speaking of some other incident, and the Minister referred to the above-mentioned article of his own accord, saying

that this was not the *communiqué* inspired by the War Minister, of which he had informed me a few days before, and which was to have appeared in some other newspaper.

I replied that I could not do otherwise than take note of this communication with satisfaction. I had, moreover, not considered it possible that the remarks of the *Birshewija Wjedomosti* could be attributed to General Suchomlinoff. If the War Minister had been the author of the article, there would have been no choice but to regard it as a kind of flourish of trumpets. Fortunately it seemed only to be a question of blustering, the probable intention of which was to please the French chauvinists. That such was the intention might also be inferred from the fact that the services of a gasconading leader-writer had evidently been secured in order to hit off just the right tone for the Paris boulevards.

Mr. Sazonoff was visibly embarrassed as to what course he should take in view of the attitude which I had adopted. He denied that the article had been written for the Paris public, and indicated that its tendency was rather solely to reassure public opinion in Russia upon the preparedness of Russia for war.

I replied that in any case there was no ground for surprise here if the article rekindled the press controversy which had to some extent begun to die down, and if, in Germany, people were heard to voice the opinion that perhaps the correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* was not so inaccurate after all.

The right attitude towards the Russians is, I think, not to take the article too seriously, and to adopt the standpoint that it could not have originated with the War Minister. In reality there is not the slightest doubt about it. From a very well-informed journalistic source I learn that General Suchomlinoff wished to publish the article couched even in a somewhat sharper tone in the widely-read Russian paper *Russkoye Slovo*. That newspaper refused the article, however, as being too drastic. Thereupon the article was given in a somewhat watered-down form to the *Birshewija Wjedomosti*.

As Mr. Sazonoff had called my attention to the article with the comment that it was merely a reassuring statement of Russia's preparations, I can scarcely believe that he had previously read it, for its tone stands in sharp contradiction with the reassuring remarks of the *Rossiya*. I do not think I am deceiving myself in observing that the article places the Minister in a very awkward position. If this observation is correct, the whole proceeding indicates once more the thoughtlessness at present reigning here, and the lack of homogeneity in the Ministry. The absence of a strong and united lead enables the elements of unrest to make their influence felt at various points, and it cannot be denied that in this respect the present situation conceals many dangers.

POURTALÈS.

## ANNEX 5

*Report of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Imperial Chancellor*

ST. PETERSBURG, June 13, 1914.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of a remarkable article which has just appeared in the *Birshewija Wjedomosti*. It emanates so I hear from the War Minister here, and is manifestly intended to put pressure upon France to secure the introduction of the three years' military service plan.

The article begins with the title, "Russia is prepared. France must be so too," and continues to the effect that Russia, who has made efforts for strengthening her military power such as no other State has put forth before, is justified in expecting France to strengthen her army in her turn, which can only be done by the introduction of the three years' military service.

COUNT POURTALÈS.

Enclosure in the Report of June 13, 1914

Today's evening paper, the *Birshewija Wjedomosti*, published what is clearly a semi-official article entitled, "Russia is prepared; France must also be so."

France (says the paper) is again in the throes of a ministerial crisis. The Ribot Ministry has not secured the confidence of the Chamber, and after its first declaration of policy has been obliged to tender its resignation to Mr. Poincaré.

Russia will never permit herself to meddle in the domestic affairs of foreign countries, but she cannot remain completely indifferent to the prolonged crisis through which the Government of her friend and ally is passing. If the French Parliament considers itself justified in giving vent to its opinions upon such an eminently domestic question as the commissions given in Russia to meet the event of war in connection with the economic advantages accruing therefrom for the country with which such orders are placed, Russia, on her side, cannot remain indifferent to a purely political question which forms unfortunately the subject of the contest between the parties in the French Chamber. This question deals with the three years' military service proposal, which has just been introduced in France.

We have received intelligence from an unquestionable source which admits of no doubt that in this question there is but one attitude which Russia can take up. Russia has carried out everything to which she is bound by the alliance with France, and must naturally expect that our allies will also fulfil their obligations.

Opinion abroad is already fully aware of the enormous sacrifices which we have made in order to confer a really considerable strength upon the Franco-Russian alliance. The reforms introduced by the Ministry for



War into the organization of the armed forces of Russia surpass everything which has ever been done in this direction in any other country. Our annual contingent of recruits has, by the latest Imperial order, been raised from 450,000 to 580,000 men. We have accordingly an annual increase in the army amounting to 130,000 men. Simultaneously the period of service has been increased by six months, so that during each winter four contingents of recruits will be with the colors.

With the aid of a simple mathematical calculation it is possible to fix the numbers of our army, which are greater than any State has ever been able to show:  $580,000 \times 4 = 2,320,000$ .

These figures need no comment.

Only the great and mighty Russia can permit herself such a luxury.

For purposes of comparison we may mention that the German Army, according to the latest military law, numbers 880,000, Austria about 500,000, and Italy approximately 400,000 men.

It is, therefore, quite natural that we should expect France to raise 770,000 men, which can only be achieved by the retention of the three years' military service.

It must be noted that all these army increases in peace time are solely designed with a view to placing the army on a war footing in the shortest possible time, in other words, to promote the quickest possible mobilization.

In this respect also we have brought about a great reform, by projecting and beginning the construction of a whole network of strategic railways. In this way we have done everything to forestall our opponent in mobilization, and to secure the concentration of our army with the greatest possible speed in the early days of war.

We desire the same from France. The larger the numbers of soldiers she maintains during peace time the more rapidly can she complete her preparations.

We therefore hope that the French Government will succeed in maintaining for France so essential a law as that providing for three years' military service. With one slight modification we can repeat what we said last spring:

"Russia and France do not wish for a war, but Russia is prepared and hopes that France also will be prepared."

## SUPPLEMENT XI

### CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WORLD WAR

BY MR. POKROVSKY (MOSCOW)

#### I

The Allies have beaten Germany and are getting ready to "try" her as guilty of the war. They want not only to be stronger, but also to be more in the right than the beaten enemy. Wireless telegrams are buzzing round

the world in which the simple-minded newspaper-reading public are informed that the truth about the Austro-German conspiracy against the peace of the world has been discovered and unveiled, and that even the month and the day when it started have been fixed, namely, the 5th of July, 1914. The "revolutionaries"—if the term be permissible—are beginning to lend their support to the Imperialists intoxicated by the fumes of their own virtue. Only lately that well-known advocate of compromise, Kurt Eisner, set up a howl about the undoubted guilt of the Emperor and his Government for the unexampled butchery which has dishonored Europe for four years.

To whitewash the Emperor William would be a thankless task. Germany's imperialistic rabble sought this slaughter no less eagerly than any other, but at the same time with no greater eagerness. All those worthy persons who will be admitted to the Tribunal should reflect upon this fact. Neither the one Imperialism nor the other is "guilty" of the bloodshed, but Imperialism in general—French or Russian in no less a degree than German or Austrian. In the following pages it is sought to recall this elementary truth to our readers.

The upheaval of October has placed in the hands of the proletarian revolution documents which compromise most seriously the *bourgeois* régime in every sphere, among others in that of international relations. \* Some of these documents are already printed, but not nearly all of them, and perhaps not those which are of the most supreme interest. It is chiefly secret treaties which have been published; these are certainly important, but still more so is the correspondence by which the way is prepared for such secret treaties in the *bourgeois* world. A lucky chance has preserved for us the originals of confidential letters which the Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London exchanged with their chief, the official director of the foreign policy of the Empire of the Romanoffs, the Minister Sazonoff. The secret telegrams have also, at least in part, been preserved, as well as Sazonoff's no less confidential reports to the Czar. All these documents throw an exceedingly clear light on the preparations for the war made by the Entente, and irrefutably prove that a place in the dock before impartial history is reserved not only for the Williams and Bethmann-Hollwegs, but also for the Georges, Greys, Poincarés and Sazonoffs.

"The conspiracy against the world's peace" emphatically does not date from the 5th of July, 1914, as a wireless message recently sent out from Lyons would announce to the whole world, but from a far earlier period. Its initiation reaches back to the year 1908 when the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary was preceded by a kind of agreement between Iswolsky, who was then Russian Foreign Minister, and Ährenthal on the part of Austria-Hungary regarding the Straits which connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean.

The text of the agreement is missing from Iswolsky's papers, but his letter

to the Czar was found in which it is seen that Ährenthal threatened his Russian colleague with publication of this text. So appalling was this threat that Iswolsky in order to avoid a scandal preferred to retire, and from being a Minister became Russian Ambassador in Paris, yet from there he still remained the actual director of Russian foreign policy before the war.

Two years afterwards the question of the Straits appeared again still more distinctly on the diplomatic stage. An agreement was concluded on the 24th of October, 1909, at Racconigi, in connection with Nicholas' visit to Victor Emanuel. The last paragraph of this agreement runs:

Italy and Russia agree to maintain a benevolent attitude, the former to Russia's interests in the Straits and the latter to the interests of Italy in Tripoli and in the Cyrenaika.

The significance of this is clear when we remember that the war with Turkey over Tripoli broke out a year after Racconigi. Since peace in Europe was first disturbed by the Turco-Italian War (the preceding wars, the Spanish-American War, the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, took place outside Europe), and since subsequent disturbances extended over an ever-growing area and form an unbroken chain, the importance of the treaty can scarcely be underestimated. Yet whilst Italy's activity was apparent to all the world, the proceedings of Iswolsky in Paris, obscure though they were, were of far greater importance when judged by their effects.

At the very beginning of the Turco-Italian War Iswolsky wrote:

We must consider even now not only how best to maintain peace and order in the Balkan peninsula, but also how to extract the fullest possible advantages from coming events.

Furthermore, I venture to remark that in any case we must make certain that Italy declares in one form or another that while she now realizes her claims to Tripoli, as laid down in the agreement with us, she will also consider herself as bound in future to our interests in the question of the Straits.<sup>1</sup>

In the St. Petersburg Cabinet there was no need to mention that twice.

"I am very glad you agree with my idea of strengthening the obligations of Italy as regards the Straits" we read in one of the following letters from Iswolsky (25th of September/8th of October). Yet already in the very next letter, the 29th of September/12th of October, we find anxiety upon certain practical issues in connection with the technique of the matter:

If we are really determined to raise the question of the Straits now, it is most important to take every precaution to have a good press here. Unfortunately I have been robbed of my main instrument for this purpose, since all my persistent demands to be provided with funds for the press have resulted in nothing. I will, of course, do everything in

<sup>1</sup> 13th/26th of September, 1911.



my power, but this is just one of those questions in which public opinion under the influence of deeply-rooted traditions works against us. The Tripoli affair may serve as an example of the importance here of laying out money upon the press. I am aware that Tittoni has worked upon the chief French newspapers thoroughly and with a generous hand. The results are clear for all to see.

The preparation of "public opinion" began, as we see, long before the Austro-German "conspiracy."

But to gain sole possession of the Straits was not so easy an affair as that of Tripoli. The Straits mean "Constantinople" and "Constantinople is the domination over the world," Napoleon once said. To snatch such a large mouthful, allies were needed. The question of the latter soon presented itself to the initiators of the undertaking. France, of course, was the first to come into consideration as an ally, since she had been bound to Russia for a long time by all kinds of engagements and conventions. Yet, will France feel herself bound to Russia in the question of taking possession of Constantinople? At the first glance Iswolsky could not decide to reply in the affirmative.

I consider it probable that the French Government will experience some alarm at the idea of affording us an absolute guaranty amounting to a recognition of our complete freedom of action in the Straits and will ask us to define our wishes more specifically, restricting itself in the first instance within the limits of some vague formula.

The above words occur in a letter of November 10/23 of the same year. At that time Caillaux, who was not inclined for warlike adventures, stood at the head of the French Government, and the Foreign Minister was de Selves, who was engaged on the Moroccan question and under whom "discussions of general policy with France were fruitless."

The picture abruptly changed as soon as the two offices of Premier and Foreign Minister were welded into one in the person of Poincaré, the present President of the French Republic. The tone of Iswolsky's letters underwent a sudden alteration directly this change had taken place.

Mr. Poincaré has several times questioned me as to what I knew of the exchange of opinion on Balkan matters which, according to reports from newspapers and other sources, has taken place between you and the Cabinet of Vienna; he once again reminded me of his readiness to enter into negotiations with us upon these matters at almost any moment, and he gave me to understand that he expected to be informed about our negotiations with Vienna in the same way as he had been informed by the London Cabinet after Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin. I am writing all this to you with the most complete frankness since it appears to me that it is exceedingly important for you to bear in mind the principles to which Mr. Poincaré gave expression on assuming office, and to treat them in an accommodating spirit. The present



Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs is a very great personality, and his Cabinet shows itself to be the strongest coalition for a long series of years.<sup>1</sup>

A few months went by and in a letter of 5th/18th of July we read: "This year the customary conference between the Chiefs of Staff of all the Russian and French armies was, for the first time, supplemented by similar discussions between the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs." Brilliant results were immediately obtained from these conferences.

Prince Lieven (Russian Admiral and Chief of the Russian Naval Staff) told me (Iswolsky reports in the same letter) that he was convinced that the exchange of views had led to results which were in all respects favorable to us, and that the Chief of the French Naval Staff had fully realized the necessity of facilitating for us, in the interests of both Allies, our task of dominating the Black Sea by bringing corresponding pressure to bear on the fleets of our possible opponents, *e.g.*, chiefly Austria, and perhaps also Germany and Italy. To this end France declares herself ready, even in peace time, to transfer the concentration of her naval forces in the Mediterranean further east, *i.e.*, to Biserta. Prince Lieven considers that this decision, which is clearly expressed in the protocol, denotes so much the greater success for us as it is absolutely independent of any reciprocal engagement on our part. Prince Lieven speaks most highly of the courtesy, frankness and sincerity which he encountered on the part of his French colleague.

As a matter of fact the Russians had nearly wrecked everything by premature haste. The Czarist diplomacy was like a young full-blooded horse ready at any moment to bolt, and it was only with the greatest trouble that the old and experienced diplomats were able to coax it back into control. A rising of the Balkan Slavs, Bulgars and Serbs was to serve as a prologue to the war for Constantinople. To this end a secret treaty, which is now known to everyone, was drafted, with the cooperation of Russian diplomacy, between Bulgaria and Serbia. Poincaré defined this treaty, after scarcely a glance at it, as an "instrument of war." (*C'est un instrument de guerre!*) Yet the fears of the French Premier of that day were no doubt chiefly due to the statement of the English Government announcing categorically that England would in no case acquiesce in bringing pressure to bear on Turkey.<sup>2</sup> As regards Poincaré himself, he contemplated the matter with the utmost serenity and was quite free from irresolution. The following page of a letter from Iswolsky, setting forth the French Prime Minister's opinion, recalls Machiavelli in its clearness and precision.

Mr. Poincaré informed me that the French Government was primarily considering the question of possible international contingencies, and is fully aware that this or that event, as for example the destruction of

<sup>1</sup> Letter of 16th/29th of February, 1912.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Iswolsky, 30th of August/12th of September, 1912.

Bulgaria by Turkey, or an invasion of Serbia by Austria, might compel Russia to depart from her passive attitude, and, first, to undertake diplomatic and, later, military measures against Turkey or Austria. Judging from the utterances of the French Government we are sure of France's most sincere and energetic diplomatic support in such an event. At the present stage the Government of the Republic would, however, not be in a position to obtain the sanction of Parliament or public opinion for any form of active military measures. Should, however, the collision with Austria result in armed intervention by Germany, France recognizes this in advance as a *casus fœderis* and would not hesitate a moment in fulfilling her engagements to Russia. "The intentions of France," Mr. Poincaré added, "are undoubtedly peaceful. She does not seek or wish for war, yet if Germany were to range herself against Russia this feeling would immediately undergo a change," and he is convinced that in this case Parliament and public opinion will unanimously approve a resolute demeanor on the part of the Government in affording Russia armed support. Mr. Poincaré further told me that in view of the critical position in the Balkans the supreme authorities of the French General Staff were studying all possible military contingencies with increased attention and that he was aware that the experts and responsible leaders were thoroughly optimistic in their judgment of the Franco-Russian prospects in the event of a general outbreak of hostilities. This optimistic opinion is based amongst other things on the value set on that diversion which the united forces of the Balkan States (with the exception of Roumania) would occasion by drawing off a corresponding portion of the Austro-Hungarian troops. Another favorable element for Russia and France is the inactivity of Italy, whose hands are tied by the African war and also by a special agreement with France. As regards the situation in the Mediterranean in particular, the decision, which has just been taken to transfer the third French squadron from Brest to Toulon, strengthens the predominance of the French fleet in these waters. "This decision," added Mr. Poincaré, "has been taken with the concurrence of England and forms the development and completion of agreements already reached between the French and English naval staffs."<sup>1</sup>

## II<sup>2</sup>

Two obstacles blocked the way to the Straits. The first was the attitude of reserve adopted by England in the matter, and the second was the anxious demeanor of French "public opinion," that is to say, of the French *bourgeoisie*, in the face of warlike enterprises. There was one means of removing the second obstacle: that means was war with Germany. So soon as the latter was involved in the strife, Russian diplomacy would obtain a sure and infallible means of allaying the fears of Parisian bankers.

And now one can imagine the pleasure of Czarist diplomats when they discovered almost at the same time that war with Germany was also the

<sup>1</sup> The same letter.

<sup>2</sup> Translation of the second part of a series of articles by Mr. Pokrovsky in the weekly newspaper *Pravda*, No. 6 of the 2d of March, 1919.

best means of causing the English ice to melt. England, that is to say of course official England, turned a deaf ear when it was a question of war between Russia and Turkey, but proved very sensitive when there began to be talk of war between Russia and Germany. The actual relevant text is, however, so important and interesting in this connection that it must be quoted in full.

In September of the same year 1912, that is to say, again on the eve of the first Balkan war, Sazonoff went to England to test the ground there. The Czarist Minister was received "with unusual pleasure" in the home of Parliamentary institutions, as he hastened to inform his Imperial master. He was invited to Balmoral. There he had a number of conversations, which we will reproduce in his own words:

When speaking of the general characteristics of the attitude which I observed in England with regard to Russia, I must mention that during my visit to Balmoral, Mr. Bonar Law, the leader of the Opposition, was also a guest there for a few days, and amongst other remarks I expressed to him my satisfaction at a speech which he had made in the House of Commons in the name of the Opposition, in which he approved Sir E. Grey's policy of closer relations with Russia. Bonar Law corroborated the words in question to me in the presence of Grey, and even stated that this was the only question on which no difference of opinion existed between Conservatives and Liberals in England.

Availing myself of these favorable circumstances, I thought it well, in one of my conversations with Grey, to inquire amongst other things, what we had to expect from England in the event of an armed conflict with Germany. The statements which I thereupon received from the responsible leader of English foreign policy and also later from the mouth of King George himself, appear to me extremely worthy of note.

Your Imperial Majesty is aware that during Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg last summer he expressed to me the wish to ascertain to what extent we could count on the help of the English fleet in the event of such a war.

After I had informed Grey in confidence of the contents of our naval convention with France, and had pointed out that in accordance with the agreement which we had concluded, the French fleet would endeavor to protect our interests in the southern theater of war, by preventing the Austrian fleet from forcing its way through to the Black Sea, I enquired of the Secretary of State whether England, for her part, would not do us the same service in the north by diverting the German squadron from our shores on the Baltic.

Grey declared without hesitation, that if the circumstances in question were to arise, England would make every effort to aim the most serious possible blow at German ascendancy. The question of naval operations in the Baltic had already been discussed by the responsible departments, but the conclusion had been arrived at that the English fleet, although it would not have much difficulty in entering the Baltic, would be exposed to considerable danger there, as it might be caught as in a mousetrap, because it was possible for Germany to lay hands on



Denmark and bar the issue through the Belt. England would probably have to restrict herself to operations in the North Sea.

In this connection Grey corroborated of his own accord what I had already learnt from Poincaré, namely, the existence of a treaty between France and Great Britain, by which England undertook, in the event of war with Germany, to come to the assistance of France, not only at sea, but also on the continent, by landing troops.

The King, who touched upon the same subject in one of his conversations with me, expressed himself still more decidedly than his Minister. His Majesty mentioned with visible excitement Germany's efforts to achieve equality with Great Britain with regard to naval forces, and explained that in the event of conflict this fact must have fatal results not only for Germany's Fleet but also for her trade, for the English would sink every single German merchant ship they got hold of.

These last words probably reflect not only His Majesty's personal sentiments, but also the feeling prevailing in England towards Germany.

Even before the beginning of the first Balkan war, *i.e.*, before all other more or less fortuitous causes which led up to the crisis of 1914, the feeling of the leaders of the English *bourgeoisie* left nothing to be desired on the score of distinctness. If France and Russia were to fight Germany, England would certainly take part in the *mêlée* on the side of Russia and France. But the latter were not content with sentiment alone. Sentiment is liable to change. They required something more definite, and Russia in particular wished to receive the same formal undertaking from England that she had already obtained from France. But the English imperialists were by no means inclined to bind themselves. They understood perfectly well that the Czarist diplomats were people who, if you gave them an inch, would take an ell. For this reason they did not dare do more than offer them one inch, after very mature consideration. In St. Petersburg this course reduced people to a state of nervousness which bordered on hysteria. Among our papers we have the following interesting document, which we quote in full, because it is in many respects very characteristic:

Note in Nicholas Romanoff's handwriting, written in blue pencil: "Said to have happened. Buchanan reported my conversation with him to Paléologue." Further, in Sazonoff's handwriting is the note (in ink): "Livadia, 11th of April, 1914. Messrs. Paléologue, Doumergue in Paris. St. P., April 1914, Nos. 154, 155."

(IN CIPHER)

Confidential.

I learn from a private and reliable source (the words "from a private source" are underlined twice in blue) that the whole of the Emperor's last conversation with his Minister for Foreign Affairs, before his journey to the Crimea, was devoted exclusively to the question of an Anglo-Russian alliance (in the margin there is a mark of interrogation in ordinary pencil). In discussing the more or less imminent danger of a conflict between Russia and Germany, His Majesty also contemplated the possibility of the renewal of hostilities between Greece and Turkey.



In that case the Ottoman Government would close the Straits. Russia could not remain indifferent in the face of such a measure, which would be so prejudicial to her trade and prestige.

"I shall use force," said His Majesty, "to open the Straits again."

But would not Germany in that case be on the Turkish side? The Emperor Nicholas considered that the danger of new complications threatening the east lay principally in this possibility of German intervention. And now he hopes for the speedy conclusion of an agreement with England to prevent Turkey from obtaining German help, and specially to guarantee (here is a gap in the original) for himself.

I venture to remind Your Excellency that the Emperor Nicholas declared to me that he would be very grateful to the President if the latter, when in conversation with King George, would bring forward the arguments required, in his opinion, for the promotion of closer relations between England and Russia.

Would the President not consider it necessary to inform the Emperor personally of the result of that conversation?

I know that Sazonoff also will be pleased to receive all information derived from our conversations with Sir Edward Grey.

The diplomatic customs of the old régime are here portrayed as in a mirror. One man gossiped in front of another, who hastens to telegraph the secret which he has discovered to his Government, but on the way his telegram is intercepted (and this is done by Allies!) and the telegram falls into the hands of the man who formed the subject of the gossip. In any case, the latter could not really be seriously displeased; from his point of view it was mainly a question of stimulating the feelings of his friend on the banks of the Seine, and of extracting more definite proofs of the sympathy of the other friend. Paléologue's telegram had the result of at last "drawing Poincaré's attention" to Russia's attack of hysteria. In the same month of April, King George and Edward Grey honored the capital of the French Republic with their presence. It had been decided to take advantage of this opportunity, and on the 16th (29th) of April, Iswolsky was able to transmit to his superiors the following "highly confidential" report concerning the English visit:

The discussion which took place between the French and English statesmen dealt chiefly with the relations between France and England. Before opening the discussion, both parties were agreed in recognizing the absence of any necessity for a formal modification of or addition to the existing agreements between the two countries, and in admitting that the continued prosecution of a consistent and legal application of the so-called *Entente cordiale* with regard to all political questions, could not fail to result in the development and consolidation of the bonds uniting France and England. It was further admitted that Russian policy was closely connected with the common policy pursued by France and England. This view is, as you have no doubt observed, fully confirmed by the statements which appeared in the press, both here and in London, immediately after the conference referred to above.

Mr. Doumergue assured me that every word of this report, which was drawn up by Cambon, was carefully weighed and revised, not by Cambon alone, but also by Sir Edward Grey, who fully endorsed the reference to Russia contained in the communication, and the statement that the object of the three Powers consisted in the preservation not only of "peace," but also of the "balance of power."

After the discussion of various questions of current politics on the agenda, Mr. Doumergue proceeded to inquire into the relations subsisting between France and Russia, and informed Sir Edward Grey of what Mr. Doumergue and myself had agreed in regarding as desirable. In the course of his observations he put forward the following as the principal arguments in favor of a closer understanding between England and Russia: (1) the efforts made by Germany to detach us from the Triple Entente, on the pretext of its being a weak and unstable political combination; (2) the possibility of the conclusion of a naval agreement between England and ourselves, which would have the effect of releasing a part of the English fleet for active operations not only in the Baltic and the North Sea, but in the Mediterranean. (Mr. Doumergue pointed out to Sir Edward Grey, *inter alia*, that in two years we should dispose of a powerful fleet of dreadnoughts in the Baltic.) Sir Edward Grey replied that he personally fully sympathized with the views expressed by Mr. Doumergue and was fully prepared to enter into an agreement with Russia, similar to that existing between France and England. He did not, however, conceal from Mr. Doumergue that certain members not only of the Government party, but also of the Cabinet itself, were prejudiced against Russia and would oppose any further *rapprochement* between the two countries. He, however, expressed the hope of converting Mr. Asquith and other members of the Cabinet to his point of view, and suggested the following procedure: In the first place, the Cabinets of Paris and London might mutually agree to inform the St. Petersburg Cabinet of the terms of the existing agreements between England and France, viz.: (1) the military and naval conventions drawn up by the War Office and Admiralty, which, as you already know, are of a so-called conditional nature; (2) the political understanding, which was formally endorsed by the correspondence between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador in London. In the course of this correspondence it is expressly stated that in the event of circumstances arising which should lead to united action on the part of England and France, these Powers would take the agreements in question into account. At the same time, the Cabinets of London and Paris could ask us what our attitude would be with regard to questions affected by such action, which in its turn might lead to an exchange of views with England concerning the conclusion of an appropriate Anglo-Russian agreement. In the opinion of Sir Edward Grey, it was only possible for a naval, not a military, agreement to be concluded between Russia and England, for England's available military forces were already allocated, and obviously could not act in cooperation with Russian forces. Sir Edward Grey added that immediately after his return to London he would lay the proposed scheme before Mr. Asquith and his other colleagues. In reply to a question put by Mr. Doumergue as to whether he did not consider it desirable that the agreement between France, Russia and England should take the

form of a single "Triple Entente" instead of consisting of three parallel agreements, Sir Edward Grey said that he personally would not be opposed to this possibility, but that the question could only be discussed later in connection with the drafting of the proposed Anglo-Russian agreement.

All three who were present at the Conference, Messrs. Doumergue, Cambon and de Margerie, told me that they were astonished at the unequivocal and decided readiness expressed by Sir E. Grey to enter upon a closer connection with Russia. They were convinced that the reservations made by him with regard to Mr. Asquith and the other members of the Cabinet were only of a formal nature, and that if he had not been assured of their approval beforehand he would have abstained from such concrete proposals.

We see what a small rôle was played in bringing about the World War by the circumstance regarding which the Imperialistic press of the Entente countries has raised the greatest outcry. In April, 1914, no question of the violation of Belgian neutrality had yet arisen; Sir Edward Grey, however, evinced a clearly expressed and decided readiness "to organize joint operations between the English forces, and not only France, but also Russia." We shall see below that the violation of the principles of international law by the Germans with regard to Belgium, which horrified all honorable people, was regarded by Franco-Russian diplomacy as a highly desirable contingency for both Allies, which, moreover, was as clear as the day from the very outset to everyone who was not only honorable, but also ordinarily intelligent. But more of this later. In the meantime we will conclude our account of the fate of the naval convention between Russia and England. Negotiations on the matter were immediately begun on the reception by Nicholas Romanoff of the following very short, but nevertheless "very important communication" from Sazonoff:

The French Ambassador has informed me that, according to a secret telegram received by him from Paris, the Government of Great Britain had decided to authorize the British Admiralty Staff to enter into negotiations with the French and Russian naval agents in London with the object of working out the technical conditions of a possible cooperation of the naval forces of England, Russia and France.

Mr. Paléologue added that, according to an agreement between the English and French Governments, we must be informed of the contents of the conventions hitherto concluded between England and France for the event of joint operations by land and sea.

I venture very respectfully to inform Your Imperial Majesty of the above, in view of the special importance attaching to the intelligence repeated in this communication.

SAZONOFF.

In order not to attract the attention of the persons interested, and especially of German diplomats, it was decided, contrary to the procedure followed on the conclusion of the Franco-Russian naval convention (which was



really a *secret de Polichinelle*, whereas, in this case, a real secret was involved), not to send any "big wigs" in the naval world, but to detail less prominent persons, whose movement from town to town would not be noticed by the press. The conduct of the negotiations was entrusted to the Russian naval agent in England, Captain Volkoff. The instructions with which he was provided by the Admiralty Staff contain *inter alia* the following:

In the northern theater of war our interests demand that England should hold the largest possible portion of the German Navy in the North Sea. That would counterbalance the overwhelming superiority of the German Fleet over our own, and, in the most favorable event, perhaps permit of a landing operation in Pomerania. If it should prove to be possible to undertake this operation its execution would involve considerable difficulty in consequence of the weakness of our means of transport in the Baltic. The English Government might render us a great service in this respect, if, before the commencement of warlike operations, it consented to transfer a sufficient number of merchant vessels to our Baltic ports to supplement our deficient supply of transports.

But although the London Cabinet "hastened to consider" the proposals laid before it in Paris, and did so in recognition "not only of the practical utility of the matter, but also of the necessity of giving emphatic expression to intentions which, although they always existed in fact, had not been made sufficiently clear" (letter of the 20th of May/2d of June, 1914, from the Russian Ambassador in London), it was nevertheless shocked by the downrightness of the Russian naval staff, and the same Russian Ambassador in London pointed out to Captain Volkoff that the landing in Pomerania and dispatch of English transport ships to the Baltic Sea to effect this before the outbreak of war must only be mentioned with great caution "so as not to endanger the rest" (the same letter), and then only, when complete agreement had been reached on all other points.

Defective training on the Russian side was also clearly shown in another direction; for in St. Petersburg not only was an excessive haste displayed, but, as usual, they chattered more than was necessary. As a result of this some details of the secret leaked out in the European press, though the form given to them was inexact. On the 13th/26th of June, just a month before the beginning of the crisis, the same Russian Ambassador telegraphed from London:

Grey told me today that he was very anxious at the false reports circulating in the German press with respect to the conclusion of a so-called Anglo-Russian naval convention concerning the Straits. He felt it his duty to talk confidentially on this subject to the German Ambassador, who was going to Kiel, where he would see the German Emperor. Grey declared categorically to the Ambassador that it was more than five years since England and Russia had discussed the Straits in their nego-



tiations. He asserted that no alliance and no convention existed between England, France and Russia. He, nevertheless, added that he did not in the least wish to hide the fact that the close relations subsisting between the three Governments had in recent years reached such a point that they conferred together constantly on every subject and in every case, as though they were allies. On the other hand, he explained that these negotiations had never, during the course of those years, in any case, been of a nature which would constitute a menace to Germany, and that they pursued no so-called policy of encirclement.

Never was there so ideal an illustration of Schtschedrin's epigram "outside it, yet, as it were, in it." Schtschedrin does not go so far as the diplomats. If readers will compare this declaration of Grey's with all that is reproduced above they will understand why diplomacy cannot be anything but secret under a *bourgeois* order of society.

The program was thus decided that England would not allow Russia to attack Turkey. But if Germany was drawn into the struggle on account of the Straits the cooperation of England was assured. In order to obtain possession of "one's own front door," a war must consequently be provoked, in which the Germans must unquestionably be involved. It only remains for us to see how this program was carried out.

### III<sup>1</sup>

When the crisis of July, 1914, arose the position became in all respects clear. It is quite possible that, up to the last moment, even the persons concerned were not sure whether the fateful hour had really come. But since about April or May of that year there could be no two opinions as to whether it was approaching or not. It is characteristic that a distinct presentiment of its approach was noticeable several days before the Austrian ultimatum had revealed the crisis to the eyes of the general public. Already on 9th/22d of July, the Russian Ambassador in London reported that Grey "was gravely disquieted, as before," by Austria's plans regarding Serbia ("as before" meaning that his anxiety had begun even before that date). The reasons underlying Grey's anxiety are of so interesting a nature that it is worth while to enumerate them. They were expressed in a telegram which Grey sent to Buchanan the same day.

It is possible (it reads), that as a result of the judicial inquiry at Serajevo the fact will be revealed that the planning of the murder on Serbian territory was attributable to negligence on the part of the Serbian Government.

"What clever people diplomats are!" one cannot help exclaiming. They can see so well through a brick wall. Judicial proceedings had not even

<sup>1</sup> Translation of the final article of a series published by Mr. Pokrovsky in the weekly newspaper *Pravda*, No. 7, March 9, 1919.

begun, but Grey could already foresee their result! *A propos* of this, one should remember that it was from London that Sazonoff had received repeated warnings regarding the imprudent conduct of the Russian representative in Belgrade. Certainly Hartwig, to whom the warnings directly referred, had already passed away. But the practical English were by no means inclined to regard the question exclusively from the standpoint of the personality of the Russian Minister. Hartwig was dead, but the "traditions" of his policy, the traditions of Russian policy in the Balkans in general, were still the same. Were Hartwig's successor suddenly to "take up a resolute attitude," it would be "extraordinarily difficult to repair the mischief."<sup>1</sup> In the meantime Grey, as we shall see directly, was far from feeling firm ground under his feet. The Russians were always in a hurry, and the London Cabinet had every reason to fear that they would also evince this annoying characteristic in the present case.

In St. Petersburg matters were actually hurried forward with such rapidity that not only the suspicious English, but also Russia's well-trying French friends in Poincaré's Cabinet, became uneasy. We are indebted to the secret correspondence between Iswolsky and Sazonoff for a most interesting telegram, dated 17th/30th of July, 1914 (No. 210), which must be reproduced in full:

Continuation of No. 209. Copy to London. Please send instructions without delay.

Margerie, to whom I have just spoken, told me that the French Government, which has no desire to interfere with our military preparations, would consider it extremely desirable, in view of the continuation of negotiations for the preservation of peace, that the nature of those preparations should be as little public and provocative as possible. The Minister for War, who expressed the same idea, remarked for his part to Count Ignatieff: We might declare that in the supreme interests of peace we were prepared temporarily to delay mobilization, which would not prevent us from pursuing and even increasing our military preparations, whilst refraining wherever possible from the transport of large masses of troops. A ministerial council under the presidency of Poincaré will be held at 9.30, immediately after which I shall see Viviani.

ISWOLSKY.

The author of these lines seizes the opportunity to correct a mistake. In his article "Those Responsible for the War" (see collected works, "Foreign Policy," Moscow, 1911),<sup>2</sup> the author, on the strength of the French Yellow Book, was rash enough to suspect the Russian Government of taking measures for mobilization without thinking of consulting its French Allies. As events have proved, the ally was so thoroughly initiated in the matter as

<sup>1</sup> The words in inverted commas are taken from the same telegram of Benckendorff's of 9th/22d of July.

<sup>2</sup> This date should read 1917.

actually to be in a position to impart extremely useful advice on technical questions. From this fact it may be deduced that the most complete understanding existed between the two Powers. Official France was quite as ready to enter into war as official Russia, and was perfectly aware that the whole of this frippery, the ostensible object of which was "to prevent the disturbance of the balance of power in Europe," was only intended to divert the attention of a gullible public. The high authorities were fully cognizant of the trend of events and of the aim in view. The following secret telegram from Sazonoff to Iswolsky removes any doubt on this heading. We reproduce the telegram in full:

Secret telegram to the Ambassador in Paris.

For transmission to London:

No. 151. Urgent.

St. Petersburg, July 16/29, 1914.

The German Ambassador has today informed me of the decision of his Government to carry out the German mobilization, unless Russia abandons the military preparations which she is now pursuing. These preparations, however, have only been undertaken by us in consequence of the already completed mobilization of eight corps in Austria, and of the unconcealed disinclination of Austria to agree to any peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia.

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, there is no course open to us but to accelerate our military preparations and to prepare for the probably inevitable war. Please be so good as to inform the French Government of this, and at the same time to express our sincere thanks for the statement made to me by the French Ambassador in the name of the French Government to the effect that we might count on the full support of our French Allies. In existing circumstances, this assurance is of special value to us. It is most desirable that England should also, without loss of time, declare herself on the side of Russia and France, for only by such action will she succeed in averting the dangerous disturbance of the European balance of power. Sazonoff.

We draw the attention of the reader to the date of this telegram. On Wednesday, the 29th of July, the comedy of the "efforts for the preservation of peace in Europe" was in full swing, and Sazonoff fully understood that there "is no course open to us but to accelerate our military preparations." If, notwithstanding this, he trembled, it was not for the cause of peace, but for the outcome of the war. So long as the question of the part to be played by England had not been decided the affair still remained a most risky adventure. In St. Petersburg and Paris, the most interesting invalid at this time was English "public opinion," whose pulse was constantly felt several times a day. Benckendorff's telegrams gave the impression of veritable medical bulletins. At the commencement of the war, the diagnosis was apparently entirely favorable. "Grey's utterances are markedly clearer and more decided today than has hitherto been the case," telegraphed Benckendorff on the 14th/27th of July, 1914.



He is hoping much from the impression created by the announcement of the measures taken by the fleet, which were decided on on Saturday evening (*i.e.*, immediately after the publication of the Austrian ultimatum, announced in the papers of Friday, the 24th of July and published today). Buchanan's telegram, received yesterday, apparently produced a very salutary effect. In any case, the confidence felt by Berlin and Vienna in English neutrality is no longer justified. Benckendorff.

As is so often the case, however, this first bulletin proved far too optimistic. In three days Benckendorff telegraphed:

Cambon inquired of Grey whether, in his opinion, the moment had arrived. Grey replied that the moment would have arrived as soon as Germany had fully declared her attitude. Cambon did not insist on the point as England was engaged in active preparations not only by sea, but also on land. Cambon stated that, in his opinion, the situation was not sufficiently defined in the eyes of the British Parliament for Grey to venture today, without risk, upon an open declaration of his policy.

The following day, however, the aspect of affairs had become quite threatening. A telegram of Benckendorff, dated the 18th/31st of July reads as follows:

Grey is fully alive to the situation and is perfectly aware that as the result of a reaction in the feeling of Parliament his position is one of considerable difficulty, and he must therefore act with the utmost caution. Quite apart from the tremendous agitation in progress in Germany, yesterday's *Times* discussed the question in a violent and not particularly happy article describing it as a specifically Slavonic question concerning only Austria, Serbia and Russia, and maintaining a very tactless silence in regard to French, English and European interests in the matter. Instead of doing good, this article did harm. Today the public, and even Parliament, regard the question as exclusively Slav. I think, however, that the issue will soon become clear. I must ask you to take into consideration the fact that the Government cannot take action without having prepared public opinion. In estimating the importance of English intervention, this must be borne in mind. The press maintains the attitude of the last few days, but the principal organs considerably outstrip public opinion, which they no longer reflect quite accurately. The crisis may not be looked for until the day when the possibility of an invasion of France will render the European aspect of the question fully apparent. This at least is my opinion and that of Cambon. Please bear this in mind as far as possible.

Though the situation was not quite clear in London, nothing could be clearer in St. Petersburg. Again and again the same theme recurred; in order to guarantee that England would take part in the war on the side of Russia and France, Germany must be drawn into the war. But there was a sure means to secure this by the invasion of Austria by Russia, or at least



by such an attitude on the part of Russia that Germany would consider that invasion inevitable. The part to be played by the Russian mobilization now becomes clear. When justifying itself diplomatically, the Government of the Czar, as is well known, utterly denied that it was the first to begin mobilization, and was thus directly responsible for the war. The following telegram from Sazonoff to Benckendorff which was dispatched on the day after the declaration of war, is the clearest admission of guilt conceivable in such a case:

Germany is clearly trying to shift the responsibility for the breach on to us. Our general mobilization was due to the gigantic responsibility which would have been ours if we had not taken all precautions, while Austria, restricting herself to negotiations of a temporizing nature, was bombarding Belgrade. The Emperor gave a verbal promise to the German Kaiser that he would undertake no provocative measures whilst the negotiations with Austria were proceeding. After such a promise and after all the proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany had no right to doubt and, indeed, could not doubt our assurance that we would welcome any peaceable solution compatible with the dignity and the independence of Serbia. Any other solution would be quite incompatible with our own dignity and would of course destroy the European balance of power by strengthening the hegemony of Germany. This European and world-wide character inherent in the conflict is immeasurably more important than the cause which gave rise to it.

It must be acknowledged that the "cause" had arisen at the right time; on the very day of the Russian mobilization, the London bulletin was more somber than night. Benckendorff telegraphed:

Today it has been ascertained that Parliament cannot sanction a resolute attitude at the present time, that public opinion considers the Serbian question as of no importance and that all financial, commercial and industrial centers in the north of England are against the war.

Some hours later Benckendorff sounded a direct alarm:

Urgently request instructions. Personal. Events may develop so rapidly, that any over-hasty judgment of England's attitude at the present time might do harm and in particular would paralyze Grey, whose influence might be restored again in a few hours.

When this telegram was sent to London the German proclamation of the *Kriegszustand*—represented by the German Government as a reply to the order for mobilization of Russian naval and military forces—was already known (verbally by Benckendorff). This representation did not distort the original very much, for already on the morning of 18th/31st of July a telegram reached Paris from Paléologue, the French Ambassador in Petersburg, "which confirmed the full mobilization of the Russian army without exception." (Secret telegram from Iswolsky on the evening of the same date.)

If, after that the restoration of Grey's influence in the future was still to be reckoned with, this shows how slowly the Austro-Russo-Serbian conflict was reacting on public opinion in England. But once the avalanche of mobilization was set in motion, the rest happened automatically and of its own accord. On the 20th of July/2d of August, Iswolsky telegraphed to Sazonoff:

The Germans are crossing the French frontier in various small detachments and a few hostile encounters on French territory have already resulted. That will give the Government an opportunity of declaring before the Chambers, which have been summoned for Tuesday, that France has been attacked, and of thus avoiding a formal declaration of war. The news has come in today that German troops have entered the territory of Luxemburg, and have therefore violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, which was guaranteed by the Treaty signed amongst others by England and Italy in 1867. This circumstance is considered very advantageous for France, as it will inevitably call forth (gap in the telegram) on the part of England and force her to an energetic course of action. There is also news that German troops are alleged to be moving in the direction of Arlon, pointing to an intention to violate Belgian neutrality also. That will be felt even more by England. The President of the Council of Ministers at once telegraphed to London and instructed Cambon to draw Grey's attention to the matter.

The violation of neutrality "so advantageous for France" had its effect, and on the 4th of August England was already at war with Germany. Did the latter understand, when hurling herself against Liège, that she had fallen into the trap set by the Franco-Russian *agent-provocateurs*? But another question may also be asked: "Did the Franco-Russian *agent-provocateurs* realize that the German military party had led them by the nose? Which party was it that deceived the other?" We think that upon this issue nobody was deceived. All imperialistic beasts of prey wanted war and had need of deceit, not for use among themselves, but for the masses whom they drove to the slaughter. They threw sand into the eyes of the latter, not all of whom have yet recovered their sight. It is time that they did so.

M. POKROVSKY.

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