University of Leicester

MA TESOL and Applied Linguistics

Module 5 - Dissertation

A CDA approach to analysing BBC Television's *Newsnight* reports on the

Israel/Palestine conflict

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Abstract

This paper sets out to analyse recent BBC *Newsnight* reports on the Israel/Palestine conflict utilising Fairclough's approach to Critical Discourse Analysis. The aims of this study are to explore the explanatory power of Fairclough's three levels of analysis – context, interaction, text – in the light of the criticisms of this approach by Greg Philo of the Glasgow University Media Group (2007); and to attempt to discover whether the results of Philo and Berry's (2011) study of mainstream news coverage of Israel/Palestine also apply to *Newsnight*.

The findings suggest that CDA's three levels of analysis have a considerable amount of explicatory power. In this case, proposing that aspects of the way that the conflict are reported as revealed by linguistic *description* of texts, can be *interpreted* by reference to the institutional order of discourse (BBC TV news production), and *explained* in terms of the context of the BBC's relationship with the state and the UK government's foreign policy. This research further indicates that a number of Philo and Berry's findings on the way in which mainstream news programmes report the Israel/Palestine conflict also apply to *Newsnight*.

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1 Introduction

The media have been the subject of critical analysis for many years, during which time a wide range of techniques have been used to study them. Initially a sociological approach was mainly predominant (see for example McQuail 1972, Schramm 1975, or Tunstall 1970). Curran et al. (1977: 2) suggest the approach at first was empiricist, as embodied in Lasswell's formula of `who says what in which channel to whom with what effect' (Lasswell: 117).

According to Hall, under this approach `speculation about media effects had to be subject to the kinds of empirical test which characterized positivistic social science' (1982: 57). So research concentrated on finding direct results of exposure to media through evidence of individuals changing their behaviour. This was based on a view of society as a `pluralistic consensus' (Hall, 1982: 60), where there was widespread agreement on societal values and there were considered to be no structural barriers to individual advancement. The problem was that Lasswell's formula `makes sense only as an instrumentalist empirical model for the analysis of short-term effects' (Curran et al., 1977: 3), and those effects – in terms of individual changes in behaviour – were found to be very limited.

To make progress in researching media effects, different approaches were required, with different theoretical constructions of society – including those of Marxism and cultural studies. Instead of focusing narrowly on individual `messages' and trying to measure their effects on individuals, the aim now was to consider `whole societies, their class structure and forms of class dominance and an exploration of the role of the media as ideological and signifying agencies within that whole' (Curran et al., 1977: 4).

This entailed a different view of the role of the media:

> For if the media were not simply reflective…of an already achieved consensus, but instead tended to reproduce those very definitions of the situation which…legitimated the existing structure…[the media] had now to be reconceptualised in terms of…consensus formation (1982: 63-64).

In the original empirical approach the power of the media was regarded as residing in the ability to influence individuals in decision making. However, a very different form of power now arose for consideration, the ability to shape the way that people accept their place in the existing order. This raised the issue of ideology. The precise meaning of this term has always been contested, but the view of ideology that underpinned this approach has been set out by

Hall (1982). In order to discuss the nature of ideology, it is first necessary to consider how we come to understand `reality'.

Fundamentally, in this approach it is considered that human beings do not perceive `reality' transparently but construct an understanding of it socially and culturally. Saussure's analysis of the sign is important here (Saussure, 1978). The external referent in the world is represented in language - often by a particular word. This word is a sign, which consists of two parts, the signifier and the signified. The latter is the mental representation of the referent, the former is the word used to refer to it. The definition of the word comes not from the external referent but by the system of language in which it is socially and culturally agreed which particular signifiers refer to which particular signifieds. It is by the general agreement of the system of relationships between signifiers, and consequently which one refers to which signified in a system of language, that we understand and communicate about `reality'.

If this is true, it has profound implications for our understanding of the world. We do not have a transparent `one-to-one' relationship with the external world, it is mediated by language. Furthermore, it is argued that at least to

some degree language is a cultural construction. Not every culture encodes its experience of the world in the same way, and within cultures the meaning of words may be contested. `Ideology' itself is an example of this. The reason that such meanings may be contested in the Marxist view is that society is not a pluralistic consensus but an arena for struggle between members of different social classes with different material interests. Language, then, is part of that struggle. The more it is accepted that use of language defines our reality:

> The more important, socially and politically, becomes the process by means of which certain events get recurrently signified in particular ways…The power involved here is an ideological power: the power to signify events in a particular way (Hall, 1982:69).

However, Hall raises the question of whether ideology operates only through the content or also the structures of language. Veron argued that `Ideology is a system of coding reality and not a determined set of coded messages…in this way ideology becomes autonomous in relation to the consciousness or intention of its agents' (1971, cited in Hall, 1982: 71). The suggestion here is that the way a society classifies the world is based on premises that are ideological. Surface contents generated by individuals from their culture's way of viewing the world then bear the ingrained ideology of the underlying classificatory system without the individuals concerned necessarily being aware of it. In this way, `common sense' concepts may become ingrained into the language and appear as presuppositions in everyday communications. `Any

statement that is so embedded will thus appear to be merely a statement

about `how things really are''(Hall, 1982: 75).

If this view is correct – that language is the way in which we define reality and

that it is a site of struggle between contending interests within society – then

the role of the media in reporting on and representing social events, structures

and processes through language may be considered vital in contributing to

securing widespread agreement on social meanings. How is it that consent is

engineered for the continuing domination of society by those in positions of

power? Hall writes that `the critical point…is that , in any theory which seeks to

explain both the monopoly of power and the diffusion of consent, the question

of the place and role of ideology becomes absolutely pivotal' (1982: 86).

This view suggests that a socially aware discourse analysis could play a useful

role in helping us to understand the role of media discourse within our society.

Critical Discourse Analysis, in particular, regards the role of language in the

maintenance of power relationships as a central issue. The question then

arises of whether the CDA approach can enhance our understanding of media

discourse. Is the theoretical approach sophisticated enough to underpin both

textual and wider social analysis? Can a CDA analysis based on this theoretical

approach help us to understand how and why media texts are constructed,

and what messages they encode and are decoded or inferred by the audience?

In order to consider this question, I aim to investigate BBC *Newsnight's* recent

coverage of Israel/Palestine in this light using a CDA approach to test its merits.

I set out the main theoretical basis of CDA - particularly as developed by

Norman Fairclough - in section 2. Not all media researchers agree with this

approach, however. Therefore, I will also discuss the criticisms of CDA put

forward in particular by one critic, Greg Philo of the Glasgow University Media

Group (GUMG), and try to make some assessment of their validity in this

section.

In section 3 I will discuss the methodology suggested by Fairclough in his

writings and how I intend to use it in this study. As the Glasgow University

Media Group has done a considerable amount of work on media

representations of the Israel/Palestine issue, I will be comparing my findings on

BBC Television's *Newsnight's* coverage with GUMG's findings on the coverage

in BBC and ITV news bulletins. In so doing, I hope to throw light both on media

coverage of this issue and also on theoretical and methodological differences

between GUMG's approach and that of Fairclough's CDA. I will present my

findings in section 4. I aim to try to draw some conclusions, both on

Newsnight's coverage of the Israel/Palestine issue and the methodological

differences between CDA and GUMG, in the final section.

2 Theoretical Framework and Review of Literature

2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

According to Bloor and Bloor, discourse analysis began as a `non-critical'

discipline aiming to describe and analyse discourse, and develop theories of

communication (2007: 12). However, a critical approach seeks to go beyond

understanding and explanation to developing critiques which can contribute

positively to social change.

Accordingly, Critical Discourse Analysis concerns itself with all the above but

situates them within a critical social analysis. This approach does not attempt

the `objectivity' claimed by positivist views of science. CDA has this in common

with many other kinds of qualitative research, which `…is fundamentally

interpretive, which means that the research outcome is ultimately the product

of the researcher's subjective interpretation of the data' (Dornyei, 2007: 38).

CDA then has many of the same strengths and weaknesses as other forms of

qualitative research.

2.2 Fairclough's Approach

A number of social theorists and linguists work in the field of CDA, but I shall

concentrate here on the variety developed by Norman Fairclough. The

question of ideology is central. CDA's view of ideology is critical rather than descriptive – texts should be analysed for `naturalised implicit propositions of an ideological character' which people are not usually aware of and which contribute to `the social reproduction of relations of domination' (Fairclough, 2010: 26). Ideology is seen as existing both in structures and events (these terms will be discussed further below) and is exercised in discourse. He argues that ideology is usually opaque to participants in discourse, it is not a question of the application of conscious bias. He locates ideology in western societies within the social relationships between classes in capitalist society. Control of the state is vital for the capitalist class, but it does not rule alone, it forms a dominant bloc with others who consider their interests to be in alignment (Fairclough, 2001: 27). When necessary, force can be used to maintain this power. However, this is not sufficient in normal, non-crisis, periods when `a whole range of social institutions ... collectively and cumulatively ensure the continuing dominance of the capitalist class' (2001: 27). Institutions, for example the media, operate in ways which legitimise existing social relationships – partly through ideology. This is relevant to study of orders of discourse (discussed further below).

Although CDA is centrally concerned with discourse and power the approach is not monolithic. Studies may come from different theoretical backgrounds and use a variety of methodologies. Wodak and Meyer state that Fairclough `understands CDA as the analysis of the dialectical relationship between semiosis (including language) and other elements of social practices … (he) oscillates between a focus on structure and a focus on action' (2009: 27). They go on to say that Fairclough draws upon Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics theoretically.

However, SFL is not the only theory that Fairclough has drawn upon. He has discussed a number of different approaches to media discourse which he has used to develop his analytical framework (1995: 20-34). These include sociolinguistic analysis (such as that of Allan Bell), conversation analysis (using an ethnomethodological approach), semiotic analysis (for example John Hartley), Van Dijk's social-cognitive model, and cultural-generic analysis (or cultural materialism) which Fairclough relates to the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, as well as systemic functional linguistics. Although they can be considered separately `there is a great deal of cross-fertilisation between them, and many analysts combine them' (1995: 20).

From his discussion of these approaches, Fairclough sets out what he terms `a desiderata for a critical analysis of media discourse' (1995: 32-34). This should include the following (though not all analyses would necessarily include all of these elements):

- How media discourse practices are affected by social and cultural change

- Textual analysis should address all elements – language, vision, sound (as appropriate)

- Analysis should also consider the processes of production and consumption of the text(s)

- The influence of the wider social, cultural and institutional context should be a part of the analysis, including ideologies and relations of power

- Media texts are often hybrids of different genres and discourses. This intertextuality needs to be subjected to analysis.

- Analysis needs to consider the construction of representation, relations and identities within the text(s)

- Analysis requires a multi-level approach, possibly including phonics, lexis, grammar and `beyond the sentence'

- Analysis requires an approach that recognises that texts are both social

  products and play a part in constituting the social

  (Fairclough, 1995: 33-34)

2.3 Fairclough's Model

Figure   1   Discourse as text, interaction and context

(From Fairclough, 2001: 21)

Fairclough has attempted to evolve an appropriate analytical model and

methodology which can be generally applied (including to the media). At its

core is a view of discourse at three levels as shown in the above diagram – the

level of the *text*, the level of its production and interpretation referred to as

interaction, and the wider social *context* around its production and

interpretation.

2.3.1 Context

The term `discourse' takes on different meanings at these different levels.

According to Fairclough, discourse as social practice means that language is `a

part of society', that it exists as `a social process', and that `it is a socially

conditioned process, conditioned by other (non-linguistic) parts of society'

(2001: 18-19). The social context of our lives – which includes all the elements,

both linguistic and non-linguistic – shapes the ways in which we use language.

This provides the context for how we interpret and understand the world,

which Fairclough states is an active process:

> You do not simply `decode' an utterance, you arrive at an interpretation through an active
> process of matching features of the utterance at various levels with representations you
> have stored in your long-term memory…some of these are linguistic, and some of them are
> not (2001: 8-9).

Fairclough uses the (somewhat inelegant) term `Member's Resources' (MR) for

these resources that are stored in our long-term memory and used to

understand and interpret the world. The important point here is that `MR are

socially determined and ideologically shaped' (2001: 9). Thus the social context

plays a vital role in our understanding of texts - our cognitive resources are

socially derived. Discourse at the level of context involves the social conditions

of production of meaning, and of the social conditions of interpretation of

meaning.

With regard to the context of mass media production and consumption, a CDA analysis would be likely to consider the economics and politics involved – such as relations with the state and politicians, the nature of any regulation, how the markets operate, the relationship with audiences and how media output is consumed, technological issues and questions of access.

2.3.2 Interaction

This refers to the way that actual discourse is institutionally determined and is referred to by Fairclough as networks of *orders of discourse* (from a term used by Foucault). Fairclough distinguishes between orders of discourse and *social orders*. The term `social orders' refers to `a structuring of a particular social `space' into various domains associated with various types of practice', whereas an `order of discourse' is `a social order looked at from a specifically discoursal perspective' (2001: 24). Social orders consist of institutions which provide social conventions for *social practices*. These define particular ways of acting and combine discoursal and non-discoursal elements. Thus, for example, in the social order of broadcasting the BBC is an institution with varying conventions which structure its various social practices into orders of discourse which include particular linguistic activities – a radio news presenter will speak and act somewhat differently than a TV news reporter, but both will operate

within conventions that have become naturalised for the activity of broadcasting within those particular contexts. As Fairclough says, `people are enabled through being constrained: they are able to act on condition that they act within the constraints of types of practice – or of discourse' (2001:23). Text production and interpretation is embedded in institutional discourse practices, and therefore mediates between sociocultural practice (the area of context) and text. According to Fairclough, discourse can be analysed in social practice as *genre* (a way of acting), *discourse* (a way of representing), and *style* (a way of being). Examples would be a journalistic interview, public service broadcasting `impartiality', and a news programme presenter respectively.

With regard to the media, CDA usually wants to look at institutionalised practices in particular areas. For example, how do television news programmes routinely gather news and transform it into broadcast material? What structures and processes exist to facilitate this? How are such programmes viewed, by whom and in what circumstances? What institutional arrangements exist to deal with pressure from the state or powerful organisations, and to ensure adequate finance for newsgathering activities? Fairclough argues that media orders of discourse can `usefully be examined as a domain of cultural power and hegemony' (1995: 67).

2.3.3 Text

Fairclough states that his aim in CDA is to link theoretical approaches which do not analyse texts with close textual analysis. `Text analysis is an essential part of discourse analysis, but discourse analysis is not merely the linguistic analysis of texts' (2003: 3). Texts may be in spoken or written form, and may include visual and/or aural elements. They are multi-level, being composed of small units of meaning which build up into broader meanings. As such, textual analysis must be multi-level. It may pay attention to any or all of the grammar, lexis, intonation, and cohesive devices used, as well as global meanings. In addition, `language use – any text – is always simultaneously constitutive of (1) social identities, (2) social relations and (3) systems of knowledge and belief' (Fairclough, 1995: 55). By 2003 these categories had developed into *action* (the relationship of the text to the event – genres), *representation* (the relationship of the text to the wider world – discourses), and *identification* (the persons involved in the event – styles) (2003: 27-28).

Texts are parts of social interaction in *events* (an example could be a television news programme), which combine a variety of actions together, only some of which will be textual. They are produced by *social agents* (for example journalists) within the constraints of the operative order of discourse. *Social*

practices (for example newsgathering and reporting on the news) mediate

between events and *social structures* (for example language). Fairclough

employs the Althusserian notion of `overdetermination' to describe the effect

on language as it moves from the relatively abstract level of social structure

through the social practices of the order of discourse to its use in specific

events - `it becomes increasingly difficult to separate language from other

social elements' (2003: 24). The language used is selected and controlled to

achieve specific social purposes.

Media texts may involve a high degree of *intertextuality*. This appears to

particularly be the case with news and current affairs genres, which weave a

range of voices together in order to interpret events. Attention also needs to

be paid to what has not been included, `which texts and voices are included,

which are excluded, and what significant absences are there?' (2003: 47).

These intertextual chain relations *recontextualise* selectively from one context

to another. This raises the issue of *framing*, how the recontextualised material

is presented; and with how recontextualised contributors are presented – are

they treated as authoritative or otherwise, as terrorists or freedom fighters;

and how the voices are ordered in relation to each other. If a television news

report includes interviews from opposing sides of an issue, which one is left

with the final word?

One of the key aspects of texts is their implicitness, which `is a pervasive

property of texts, and a property of considerable social importance' (2003: 55).

Fairclough categorises implicit assumptions in three ways – existential (about

what exists), propositional (what can or will be the case), and value (what is

good or desirable); he suggests that most evaluation in texts is assumed rather

than declared. Furthermore, `assumed meanings are of particular ideological

significance – one can argue that relations of power are best served by

meanings which are widely taken as given' (2003: 58). This is generally held to

be the case in CDA. For example, Van Dijk argues that one major feature of

discourse is that it is usually incomplete:

> Semantically speaking, a discourse is like the tip of an iceberg: only some of the propositions
> needed to understand a discourse are actually expressed; most other propositions remain
> *implicit*, and must be inferred from the *explicit* propositions' (2009: 77).

The above constitutes an outline of Fairclough's model of CDA which he

regards as generally applicable in the analysis of social phenomena. It may be

particularly useful in analysing the media, Fairclough argues, because the mass

media are `predominant … in the creation of these cultural conditions' (2006:

454). However, while many may largely agree on the importance of the media

not everyone regards this model as useful.

2.4 Philo's Critique

Greg Philo, of the Glasgow University Media Group has produced a critique of

critical discourse analysis (Philo, 2007). Other critiques, such as that of

Widdowson (1995) have been more widely discussed but I will concentrate on

Philo's critique here, both because it has not received as much attention, and

because of the GUMG's research on media coverage of Israel/Palestine, which

is relevant to this study and which I will discuss further below.

2.4.1 GUMG's Methodology

The GUMG has been conducting media research since 1974 (see

http://www.glasgowmediagroup.org/images/stories/pdf/timeline.pdf) and has

built up a considerable body of work beginning with studies of coverage of

industrial issues (for example GUMG, 1982), and continuing into other areas

such as Northern Ireland and war. The academic roots of the group are in the

sociology of the media. John Eldridge has recounted how the group's

methodology began as a type of content analysis as developed by a positivist

sociological approach (Eldridge, 2005). Eldridge refers to the quantitative

content analysis methodology of Robert Merton and says `there is certainly a strong affinity between this approach to content analysis and the work of Glasgow Media Group, which has characteristically made use of this method across a range of topics' (2005: 110). He admits that this type of analysis has its limitations, being more revealing of form than content. However, the group developed their methods to enable them to go `deeper into a more thematic content analysis' (2005: 111).

Philo explains that in focusing on `major thematic areas' they found it necessary to examine:

> The explanatory frameworks or perspectives which underpinned the descriptions that were given … The issue then was not to look simply at the descriptions which were offered of the world in a specific text, but to look at the social relations which underpinned the generation of these descriptions (2007: 178).

It is necessary to grasp that there is an ongoing process in which competing interests continually adjust their descriptions to attempt to meet with changing circumstances. Therefore, he argues it is necessary to go beyond the text in order to analyse the nature of the debate and its basis in social and political disputes. However, it is notable that the detailed analysis required to understand a text involved the analysis of other texts, `public materials such as

books, reports, the press and TV, and any other relevant sources' (2007: 179).

Philo refers to looking for preferred accounts in the text, and the presence or

absence of particular explanations. He refers to the `routinisation' of

explanations (which Fairclough would probably call naturalisation). `We also

developed at this time the concept of the explanatory theme … an assumed

explanation which gives a pattern or structure to an area of coverage' (2007:

181) – which could be considered as a *discourse* in CDA terms.

However, it would be wrong to see this as a one-dimensional process,

broadcasters do sometimes feature a range of views, depending on the

sensitivity of the issue concerned. But there are real external pressures that

influence what goes into – and what is left out of – some texts:

> The key conclusion that we drew, in terms of methods, was that it was not possible to
> analyse individual texts in isolation from the study of the wider systems of ideologies which
> informed them and the production processes which structured their representation (2007:
> 184).

Accordingly, GUMG incorporated work both on media production processes

and audience reception into their studies. The former has involved `a great

deal of interviewing of journalists and their sources'. For the latter, the group

adapted the `focused interview' technique as used by Robert Merton (Eldridge,

2005: 117).

This methodological approach can be seen in the group's work on TV news coverage of Israel/Palestine (Philo and Berry, 2011). For this study the group recorded a range of BBC and ITV TV news bulletins and transcribed them. They began with a quantitative approach:

> In practice for this content analysis, we began by calculating the amount of coverage given to different subject areas, such as the depiction of violence or peace negotiations. We did this by counting lines of text from transcribed news programmes (2011: 177).

They then analysed the representation of the origins of the conflict, followed by how the different perspectives were represented - `To obtain some measure of the relevant dominance of different accounts and perspectives we count their frequency and the manner in which they appear' (2007: 176). They then analysed the content for the presence or absence of different explanations or representations of the conflict (a `thematic analysis'). They also looked at the role of visual images in imparting meaning. However, the study was not limited to textual study, also including an analysis of audience understanding and reception using focus groups and questionnaires, and interviewing journalists with knowledge of the issue.

2.4.2 Philo's Critique of Fairclough

Arising from the GUMG methodology set out above, Philo's main criticism is that Fairclough's studies are text-based, which limits their usefulness due to the lack of production and reception analysis. He states that Fairclough's theoretical basis lies in `left/Marxist variants' of structuralism, such as Althusser. Philo finds some correspondence between GUMG's and Fairclough's analyses of text, noting that his analysis of linguistic categories such as hyponymy and collocation lead to similar conclusions as to those drawn by GUMG (2007: 180). However, Philo argues that it is not possible to fully understand representation in news without paying attention to the production processes involved. Practical production factors can have a major influence on the final output. For example, because of the pressure from supporters of both sides in the Israel/Palestine conflict, journalists might avoid explanations because of the amount of time they would take, or to avoid criticism. `The key theoretical point is that all these pressures exert major influences on the content of texts' (2007: 183).

As a result, Philo argues that `discourse analysis which remains text-based' has difficulty in showing the relationship between discourses and social interests, the influence of factors such as professionalism, and how the audience actually

interprets texts. He also criticises Fairclough with regards to

recontextualisation in that he states the need not only to recognise it, but also

to follow up on the recontextualised source to see if it has been represented

accurately. In addition, although CDA may highlight absences from texts it fails

to present them fully, especially when there is strong evidence to support

them. `Critical discourse analysis would be more powerful if it routinely

included a developed account of alternatives' (2007: 186). But the main point

is that external criteria are required to be able to discriminate, textual analysis

alone is not sufficient.

2.5 An Evaluation of Philo's Critique

It does not seem entirely clear whether Philo is criticising Fairclough's theory

or practice, or both. For example, in a footnote Philo says:

> There are also theorists from within discourse analysis who have suggested, as I do, that a
> focus on linguistics leads to a lack of proper attention to processes of production and
> consumption. John E. Richardson, for example, has argued that critical discourse analysis
> should be focused at three levels: "on texts; on the discursive practices of production and
> consumption; and on the wider socio-cultural practices which discourse (re)produces"
> (Richardson, J. 2006, `On Delineating `Reasonable' and `Unreasonable' Criticisms of
> Muslims', *Fifth-Estate-Online*, August) (2007: 195, note 1).

It seems odd that Philo does not recognise this as Fairclough's theoretical

model of CDA. Richardson makes this clear in his book *Analysing Newspapers*

(2007). For example, he states `The approach to CDA that I feel most satisfied with is that of Norman Fairclough' (2007: 37). Richardson explains:

> He argues that to fully understand what discourse is and how it works, analysis needs to draw out the form and function of the text, the way that this text relates to the way it is produced and consumed, and the relation of this to the wider society in which it takes place (2007: 37).

Philo simultaneously criticises Fairclough for confining analysis to the text and praises Richardson without seeming to realise that Richardson bases his analysis on Fairclough's model.

In fact, it seems reasonably clear that there is some degree of theoretical congruence between Fairclough and GMUG, at least in regard to the need to situate text analysis in a wider analysis. Fairclough clearly refers to the need for analysis of the wider social conditions of production and consumption. In his concept of MR he attempts to address theoretically aspects of the ways in which texts are consumed, an approach which might enrich GUMG's analysis. In his concept of the orders of discourse which constrain and shape actors in their production of discourse he addresses theoretically areas such as media production. If Philo is suggesting that Fairclough does not address the questions of production and consumption theoretically that would appear to be mistaken.

However, it may be that when it comes to the question of practical research

Philo has a point. Fairclough has developed a sophisticated theory of discourse

analysis at three levels but in his work it may be that he concentrates on

textual analysis. Carvalho concedes that CDA `has not been able to account for

the full cycle of news discourse' and that Philo has `a valid, if nearly unsolvable,

point' (2008: 163). For, as Fursich says, it is only comparatively `large-scale

research projects that [can] integrate moments of production, content and

reception' (2009: 239). Many researchers do not have the resources to conduct

ethnomethodological production studies, for example, or audience surveys.

Such work is very labour intensive. However, if resources can be found, one

way forward is a transdisciplinary approach. Fairclough argues that CDA

analyses the relationships between social and semiotic and other elements and

that `this requires CDA to be integrated within frameworks for transdisciplinary

research' (2009: 231). Indeed, he says that:

> CDA developed as a response to the traditional disciplinary divide between linguistics, with
> its expertise in the micro analysis of texts and interactions, and other areas of social science
> such as sociology, with expertise in exploring macro issues of social practice and social
> change (Fairclough et al., 2006: 417).

It may be that a transdisciplinary approach is in CDA's DNA, so to speak.

Some development of CDA may be underway. Carvalho has suggested a possible solution to Philo's point about CDA lacking a developed account of alternatives with what she terms a `comparative-synchronic analysis' (2008: 171). This means comparing the text under analysis with others published at the same time on the same topic:

> By cross-referencing news outlets and checking original documents, such as reports or policy documents, researchers can form their own image of reality, which is hopefully more accurate and/or more complete than each individual media representation (2008: 171).

Another attempt at developing CDA can be seen in Barkho and Richardson's critique of the BBC's Middle East news production strategy (2010). They agree that our knowledge of news discourse is still too heavily based on textual analysis. They attempt to overcome this problem in their study by combining textual analysis of news output with a study of internal news production guidelines, and interviews with senior BBC managers responsible for the strategy (I will discuss this study further below).

This approach is important because it is possible to identify two broad and usually separate approaches to media research:

> On the one side are scholars influenced by literary studies, linguistics, or rhetoric ... [who] are specialists in analyzing textual material ... On the other side, media sociologists and

economists emphasize the construction of public discourse in circulation (Fursich, 2009: 247-248).

Fursich locates GUMG in the latter group, and by implication locates Fairclough in the former (although perhaps further along the scale towards GUMG, at least theoretically, than some scholars). Although both approaches have their strengths they also have their weaknesses. Textual analysts may underplay, ignore or over-generalise the role of context while sociologists or economists `may see content as a mere reflection of reality or of a dominant ideology' (2009: 248). Fursich argues for a combined approach that will play to the strengths of both traditions. Barkho and Richardson seem to be working towards that goal.

However, it is not always possible to conduct research in multidisciplinary teams. Sometimes researchers will only be able to apply themselves to the analysis of texts. Provided there is awareness of the potential pitfalls there can be real value in textual analysis by itself. As Fursich points out, texts may encode implicit meanings which neither producers nor consumers are consciously aware of (2009: 244). She further suggests that `media content is a site in which current societal debates and representations are played out' (2009: 244-245), so texts may need to be considered for possible meanings as

well as specific readings in specific contexts. For example, she cites research on

the role of media texts as narratives using theoretical approaches which

address the text in ways that are beyond the producers or consumers'

intentions or conscious awareness. Ultimately, it may be that `the central

concern of textual scholars should be which versions of reality are available in

a given media text such as a newspaper article, television program or internet

site' (2009: 246). Production and audience studies can be very valuable but

their absence does not necessarily devalue textual analysis.

3 Research Design and Analysis

3.1 Research Design

Fairclough maintains that it is not possible to `neatly separate and oppose theory and method in the conventional way' in CDA (2010: 225). The first stage is to construct an object of research. Methods will then be selected depending on how this is theoretically constructed. This is because CDA research should not be confined to the textual level, but needs to consider interaction and context as well.

Stage 1: Focus upon a social wrong, in its semiotic aspect – This is divided into two steps. The first is to select a topic which relates to a social wrong and which can be usefully analysed using a transdisciplinary approach focusing on the relationship between semiotic and other elements. The second is to construct objects of research by theorising them in ways conducive to a transdisciplinary approach. It is possible to work in a transdisciplinary fashion `either in research teams which bring together specialists in relevant disciplines, or by engaging with literature in such disciplines' (2009: 236).

Stage 2: Identify obstacles to addressing the social wrong – The aim here is to identify why the social wrong is not being addressed - `This requires bringing in analyses of the social order, and one `point of entry' into this analysis can be

semiotic' – through analysing the relationships between semiotic and other

elements of the social order, orders of discourse and events. From this, texts

are selected and analysis is carried out.

Stage 3: Consider whether the social order `needs' the social wrong – The

question here is, what role does the social wrong play in the continuance of

the social order and is it possible to change it within the existing social order?

Stage 4: Identify possible ways past the obstacles – What could be done to

overcome the social wrong within the existing social order, `a specifically

semiotic focus would include ways in which dominant discourse is reacted to,

contested, criticised and opposed' (2009: 239).

3.2 Analytical Methods

Once the object of research has been constructed, a variety of methods may

be used for a critical discourse analysis of the relevant text(s). For Fairclough,

textual analysis explores both the internal and external relations of the text.

The latter refers to the relationship of the text to the relevant social practice

and its accompanying order of discourse, and to the wider social context. A full

analysis involves `*description* of text, *interpretation* of the relationship

between text and interaction, and *explanation* of the relationship between

interaction and social context' (2001: 91). I will be attempting this in section 4.

With regard to textual analysis, Fairclough says that his `main point of reference within existing literature on text analysis is Systemic Functional Linguistics', an approach based on Halliday's Functional Grammar (2003: 5). In this approach, meaning resides in all grammatical units from the morpheme upwards, but the most significant unit is the clause. This is because it simultaneously combines three metafunctions, namely *ideational*, *interpersonal* and the *textual*. Ideational meaning is expressed by transitivity; interpersonal meaning by grammatical mood; and textual by theme positioning (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 309). Fairclough has taken this analysis and adapted it for his method as mentioned above as *action* (closest to Halliday's `interpersonal' category and also incorporates his `textual' category), *representation* (similar to `ideational'), and *identification* (most of which is in Halliday's `interpersonal' function) (Fairclough, 2003: 27). According to Fairclough, *action, representation* and *identification* correspond with *genres, discourses* and *styles* respectively at the level of the order of discourse; and `interdiscursive relations between genres, discourses and styles are realised, or instantiated, as semantic relations, which are realised as (`formal') grammatical and vocabulary relations' (2003: 38). However, there is no exact correspondence between particular grammatical forms and these categories.

For example, `choices in modality are significant not only in terms of Identification, but also in terms of Action (and the social relations of Action), and Representation' (2003: 166). Because all three metafunctions may be represented simultaneously in the clause, and because there is not an exact fit between grammatical form and metafunctions, I will not be treating them separately in my analysis. I will analyse and discuss them as appears to be relevant in each case. However, I will discuss them separately here for the sake of clarity.

3.2.1 Genre and Action

This is analysis of `the specifically discoursal aspect of ways of acting in the course of social events' (2003: 65) with text as action. In analysing television genres for example, a television news bulletin will usually begin with headlines, then proceed item by item, each with a studio introduction and probably additional content such as videotaped reports, interviews, and so on. Fairclough suggests that generic analysis should begin with the way in which texts weave different interconnected texts together in `genre chains' to produce formats. Genre may often be defined in terms of purpose, and structure or staging, an approach that I will be applying here.

Genre may be important in the way that it constructs social relationships, for example, television news and current affairs programmes will accord

differential status to different interviewees. This may become apparent in the

kinds of questions they are asked. Members of the public may well be asked

how they feel about an event, especially if they have been involved in it. It

seems to be less common for them to be asked about what they think – this

seems more likely to be reserved for politicians and officials. Fairclough refers

to this as `conversational rights' in dialogue (2003: 78). I intend to explore

some aspects of this in the *Newsnight* reports I will be looking at.

With regard to semantics, a multi-level approach to textual analysis would

commonly be applied which might consider any or all of the lexis, grammar,

phonology, cohesive devices and global meanings of the text; that is to say,

examining the generation of meaning at the levels of word and phrase, clause

and sentence, `beyond the sentence' (for example how the discussion is linked

together in paragraphs in a written text), through intonation in speech, and as

a whole. I will be attempting to examine all of these categories with the

exception of phonology, due to lack of space. A *syntagmatic analysis* will

consider the existing text and the way the parts are connected together to

make a whole. However, a *paradigmatic analysis* will also be required in this

case – what are the significant absences, the possible choices that were *not*

selected for inclusion.

With regard to lexis, Fairclough suggests that the lexis used should be examined for the *experiential*, *relational* and *expressive* values it has (2001: 92-93). In other words how does it represent the world, social relationships and values? Are `ideologically contested' words (such as `terrorist') used, and if so, how? But meaning is not only encoded in language in the form of the denotation of individual words (or their connotations), a wider lexicogrammatical system is in operation. Halliday and Matthiessen argue that grammar and lexis are `two poles of a single cline' (2004: 43). Aspects of grammar that may be considered are the local semantic relations between clauses and sentences which are realised through taxis – grammatical relations between clauses within sentences. Parataxis is additive through use of co-ordinating conjunctions to connect clauses, whereas hypotaxis subordinates a clause to a main clause. Fairclough associates hypotaxis with what he terms `explanatory logic' and parataxis with `the logic of appearances' (2003: 94). I will be looking for patterns of parataxis and hypotaxis in my analysis.

3.2.2 Discourse and Representations

This is an analysis of ways of representing systems of knowledge and belief about the world, indicating the relationship of the text to the wider world through representations of processes and participants, which may be

ideologically significant. Two ways of identifying discourse are through

discerning themes, and identifying the perspective taken. For example, in

reports of football matches a discourse of war is sometimes used with

reference to attacks, battles, victories and defeats. It seems to be fairly

common for sport and war to stand in for each other as metaphors.

Perspectives may be identified from elements such as an `us' and `them' point

of view. A text may adopt a perspective on workers' industrial action as an

economic threat, for example, rather than an attempt to achieve a fairer

income distribution. The lexis used may be the clearest indicator of the

perspective taken.

Presuppositions may be integrated into such discourses through metaphors or

`preconstructed classificatory schemes' (2003: 130). One person's `terrorist'

may be another's `freedom fighter' but whichever term is used it fits into a

scheme of classification that underlies the story. Grammar may also be used

for the purposes of discourse, for example, eliding agency for particular actions

through transitivity. An example of how this may have an ideological meaning

is that a transitive verb takes an object which can become the subject of the

verb in the passive voice; by this means the agent responsible for the action

can go unmentioned, naturalising the action by removing the agent from the

description. Alternatively, this can be achieved by nominalising a process, for

example turning `whalers threaten extinction of whales' to `whale extinction

threat'. So I will be examining both lexis and grammatical features as elements

of discourse. Representation is particularly important in recontextualisation,

since selections on what should be incorporated from the original text are

likely to change the meaning of the original in some way, and

recontextualisation is an important feature of media texts.

Fairclough's analysis of representation in the clause identifies three elements –

processes, *participants* and *circumstances* (drawn from Halliday's Functional

Grammar) (2003: 134). These are usually realised grammatically as verbs,

subjects or objects of verbs, and adverbials respectively. This clausal

metafunction can represent physical, mental and social aspects of the world,

and may be significant ideologically in terms of which of these elements are

included or excluded, and of those included, which are foregrounded and

which are backgrounded. Fairclough identifies the main process types as

material, mental, verbal, relational and existential (2003: 141). With regard to

analysis of the participants, he lists a number of factors for consideration

including presence or absence, whether the participant is in the participant or

circumstances element of the clause, is the actor active or passive, and

whether the reference is specific or generic (2003: 145-146). All of these factors may be of importance in considering reporting of Israel/Palestine. The Circumstances element relates the participants and processes to time and place. Fairclough argues that our understanding of space and time is socially constructed and `routinely constructed in texts', for example through the chaining of events which occur at different times and in different places into a text (2003: 151).

3.2.3 Styles and Identities

Styles are embodied identities, ways of being. Common styles on news programmes are politicians and reporters. A person in such a position is likely to expect to, and be expected to, act in ways considered commensurate with that position or role. Fairclough states that `discourses are inculcated in identities' (2003: 159). The grammatical and linguistic aspects that Fairclough associates with identification are those of modality and evaluation. Modality relates to the extent to which people see something as necessary or true; and evaluation tells us their view in terms of value – how good or bad, or desirable or undesirable is the thing they refer to? These are likely to be important analytical categories for examining news programmes. Perhaps the most obvious grammatical category here is that of modal verbs. `Will' is a stronger commitment to a proposition than `might'. However, modality can be

expressed via a range of grammatical features, which Fairclough identifies as modal adverbs (`probably') and adjectives (`probable'); participle adjectives (`required'); adverbs of frequency (`usually'); verbs such as `seem' and `appear'; what he calls mental process clauses such as `I think'; and other means (2003: 170-171).

In evaluations people commit themselves to an assessment of the value of a person, thing, idea, action, proposition, and so on. In so doing they are also likely to express their valuation as a matter of degree. Once again, there is a wide range of grammatical forms that can be used for this purpose, including adjectives and adverbs, some verbs, noun phrases, and also some exclamations (2003: 172). Degree can be expressed, for example, through the use of gradable or non-gradable adjectives (nice/wonderful), and some other word classes such as verbs which can suggest variations in intensity (killed/massacred). However, values are not always stated openly. One important aspect of analysis is whether the text contains assumed values. Such assumptions are likely to be ideologically significant.

4 Findings and Discussion

4.1 Constructing the Object of Research

As stated above, Fairclough maintains that the object of research should be constructed through a framework for transdisciplinary research, which may be carried out through engaging with the relevant literature. The social wrong that I have chosen to focus on here is the long-running conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The semiotic `point of entry' is the media coverage of the issue. The lack of a peaceful resolution is clearly hurtful to the people of the region, but it has also had a more global effect, for example in terms of what is usually called terrorism in the western media. Western countries, such as the UK and the USA, have had a considerable influence on events, and this needs to be understood as part of the context. To attempt to gain some understanding of the current situation it will be necessary to research texts in history and politics. In addition, at the level of interaction (the order of discourse in discoursal terms), some work in the sociology of mass communications will be relevant – for example ethnomethodological studies of news production in the BBC. Once the context and order of discourse have been explored to set out the background, I will attempt a textual analysis of recent Newsnight reports on the subject.

4.2 The Context

The Israel/Palestine conflict has a long, complex and highly disputed history. I

have set out an outline of this in Appendix 1, based on Philo and Berry (2011).

My analysis below is based on Chomsky (1999, 2010); Chomsky and Pappe

(2010); Curtis (2003, 2004); Pappe (2007, 2010a, 2010b); and Philo and Berry

(2011).This explanation will necessarily be contentious – it seems that there

are very few explanations of the situation that are accepted uncritically by

both sides, which is one of the problems faced by journalists who cover the

region.

My contention here is that from the early twentieth century onwards the

Zionist movement in Palestine intended to establish a Jewish state at the

expense of the indigenous population. This was achieved through a

combination of violence and international support. In 1948 the state of Israel

was established after a war which resulted in approximately 800,000

Palestinians losing their homes and becoming refugees. After the `six-day war'

in 1967 Israel took control of the West Bank (and later Gaza) with some

400,000 refugees. United Nations resolution 242 called upon Israel to revert to

the pre-June 1967 borders as part of a peace settlement. However, this Israel

has refused to do. From the 1970s onwards the project has been to create a

`Greater Israel' including the West Bank, thus excluding any possibility of a viable independent Palestinian state. All attempts at peace which would prevent this have been ignored or rejected. The Palestinians in the form of the PLO or Hamas have offered to accept a two state solution that recognises the existence of Israel, but Israel is determined to prevent the emergence of a viable independent Palestinian state.

This strategy would have been a good deal more difficult without support from elsewhere. In fact, the USA has been a very strong supporter of Israel with money, weapons and diplomatic support (see Appendix 1), and although the USA states that it is in favour of a two-state solution, in practice it has supported Israel's de facto opposition to this. Curtis argues that British foreign policy through succeeding governments has been to align closely with the USA, and that the UK also therefore de facto supports Israel's `Greater Israel' policy, while all the time paying lip service to the international demand for a two-state solution (see Appendix 1). This is relevant here, I contend, because the relationship between the state and the BBC has an effect on the way that BBC news programmes report Israel/Palestine.

4.3 Interaction – Production and Interpretation

In Fairclough's model the level of interaction mediates between the social

context and the text, and is constituted as social orders whose discoursal

aspects are networks of orders of discourse. One such is television news

journalism which takes texts produced elsewhere and recontextualises them

via institutional practices into news for audience consumption. This process

needs to be understood in relation to the social context – in this particular

case, the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the attitude of the major

participants, which for the BBC includes both the US and UK governments – as

well as with regard to the types of discourse practices which have become

prevalent.

4.3.1 The BBC and the State

In producing its report on the future of broadcasting in 1977 the Annan

Committee reviewed the history of broadcasting in the UK. Following the

establishment of the British Broadcasting Company by radio set manufacturers

in 1922 a parliamentary committee – the Sykes Committee – was established

to investigate the medium and declared it to be `a valuable piece of public

property' (cited in Annan, 1977: 9). In 1926 the second committee of enquiry

on the subject – the Crawford Committee – declared that `the broadcasting

service should be conducted by a public corporation' (cited in Annan, 1977: 9).

The BBC was duly converted from a private company into a corporation established under a Royal Charter which runs for a specific period of time, and is then subject to renewal. From the beginning, the question of who had control of what was broadcast was considered crucial, with the Sykes Committee stating that control should remain with the state. However, the BBC should not be `subject to the continuing Ministerial guidance and direction which apply to Government Offices' (cited in Annan, 1977: 9). Accordingly, day-to-day control was left in the hands of BBC management, but with restrictions. For example, in 1927 the BBC was instructed by the Postmaster General that it must not editorialise about public policy – a restriction that is still maintained today in the BBC's Licence.

Given that the BBC had day-to-day managerial freedom how were the limits of debate and coverage to be decided? Firstly, managerial control was to be in the hands of `the great and the good' – people who could be broadly trusted to conform to mainstream opinion. Stuart Hood refers to a list kept by the Director of the Public Appointments Unit of the Civil Service Department, containing the names of `4,000 citizens' considered to be trustworthy, from which senior BBC appointments were made (Hood, 1980: 39). Secondly, a system of top-down editorial control was maintained. The BBC Trust, the top

level, sets the strategic direction and holds the Executive Board to account

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/ aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/managementstructure/

bbcstructure/). The Executive Board is responsible for the BBC's operations

and is headed by the Director-General, and includes the Directors of News and

other areas. It is supported by a number of subcommittees and management

groups (http://www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/

managementstructure/seniormanagement/) which include lower levels of

management. Organisational strategy and directions for carrying it out are

filtered down through the organisation by this means. This structure enables

issues to be `referred up' the management structure if they become a

problem. However, day-to-day control is invested in lower areas of

management which are held accountable to BBC policy through the

management structure (I will discuss this further below).

So a management structure exists of people who can be regarded as `reliable'

(at least in the most senior positions) to ensure that BBC policy is maintained.

But that still leaves the question of how the policy is to be decided. If the BBC

is not to editorialise, it must take the parameters of what is to be debated and

reported on from somewhere outside of itself. In practice, the limits tend to be

set by the range of views represented in Parliament. If a topic is being

discussed by MPs it is quite legitimate for the BBC to report on it and allow for

views to be expressed without any question of editorialising (as long as

standard reporting guidelines are followed). However, if a point of view is not

represented in Parliament it is far more problematic. For example, all three

major political parties – Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat – state

they support a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Yet, in

practice, when in Government they have all tended to implicitly follow the US

lead, with only minor variations (for example, the UK joined the USA in refusing

to call for a ceasefire after Israel launched Operation Cast Lead against Gaza).

However, this is implicit, not openly stated. Apart from the possible exception

of the Respect MP George Galloway, there is no voice in Parliament which

discusses this. Therefore, this support in practice for the USA and Israel's

rejection of the two-state solution generally goes unremarked and undebated

on BBC programmes. Thus the assumptions underlying mainstream views tend

to be naturalised (e.g. the political parties seek a two-state solution) and

anyone who seeks to question such views is likely to be marginalised, if

acknowledged at all. Although the BBC is legally required to be impartial, in

practice this turns out to be between the existing mainstream parties. The

concept of balance is applied, which requires that if, for example, the

Conservative Party argues a particular view, then the Labour and Liberal

Democrat parties should be able to put theirs forward too – it guarantees no

access to anyone else.

However, this does not ensure the BBC a crisis-free existence. The indirect

nature of control, along with the different interests of those who govern the

state and those who report on them, ensure that conflicts arise from time to

time. Confrontations between the government of the day and the BBC have

occurred periodically – for example over the Suez crisis in the 1950s (Barnett,

2011: 40), reporting of `terrorist groups' in Northern Ireland in the 1980s

(2011: 91-102), and the BBC's reporting of the Blair government's

manipulation of evidence in 2002 in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq (2011:

171-181). They tend to be more likely to occur when major differences open

up between the political parties, or within government, which allows the BBC

space to represent different sides of a debate. If there appears to be very little

conflict over a policy, the BBC is unlikely to want to be seen to be editorialising

by introducing debate. In case of difficulties, governments do have some

means of minimising the risk of the BBC causing them problems. One way in

which the BBC may be particularly subject to manipulation is the regular need

to negotiate the renewal of the Charter and Licence. A refusal to renew might

be too unpopular an action for a government to risk, but limits to increases in

the licence fee can put great strain on the BBC, and is a potential threat that

the BBC tends to be mindful of. All of these factors mean that the state

remains broadly in control of the BBC's agenda, but relies on BBC management

and culture for day-to-day control of output.

4.3.2 Journalistic Practice and Editorial Control

As stated above, in Fairclough's view orders of discourse enable people to act

by placing restrictions and limitations on how they can act – their actions are

channelled in particular ways. Therefore, journalists at the BBC can be seen as

acting via the constraints of the socialised practices of journalism as adapted to

a BBC context.

Ethnomethodological studies, such as Cotter (2010), have provided useful

insights into how journalism operates on a day-to-day basis. The concept of

craft is central to the practice of journalism. In the trade, individuals are seen

as acquiring communicative competence as they internalise how to carry out

the practices, such as newsgathering, evaluating sources, and structuring and

writing a story. Repetition of the application of these techniques socialises

journalists into their professional identities. Such reporting practices are

channelled into patterned and habitual ways of operating on the basis of the

application of *news values*, perhaps the most important ideological construct

involved. Cotter suggests that possible stories are evaluated on the basis of

values such as timeliness, proximity, prominence of people involved, impact,

conflict, relevance, usefulness and human interest (2010: 68-69). Availability

and quality of pictures can be added to this list for television news. These

values are likely to be constructed differently depending on the

publication/programme and the intended audience. However, such news

values involve the application of assumptions about the world – what kinds of

stories are relevant, whose views are important and so forth. Such

socialisation:

> `… invokes learning what comprises the ideology behind the practice; the conceptual
> boundaries of interpretation of group and individual beliefs, values, and intentions, and how
> they are marked discursively (Cotter, 2010: 52).

These assumptions tend to be naturalised in daily practice and underlie

decisions on what is considered to be news, the angle to take, and whose

views should be solicited.

News values, through the application of inbuilt assumptions, form part of the

system of editorial control. In his ethnomethodological study of the production

of news at the BBC, Schlesinger found that the routine functioning of the

editorial system ensured `broad conformity with the desired approach to the

news' (1987: 135). He examined minutes of meetings held by senior

management, which showed `primarily ... pressures feeding in to the top of the

BBC's hierarchy' from politicians and lobbyists (1987: 143). Concerns about

how to deal with these pressures were spread by diffusion of the minutes

down to newsroom duty editors. Thus they were made aware of the issues

concerning top management without being instructed directly on what to do.

The editors were then able to take these concerns into consideration in the

daily routines of programme production:

> On examination, it becomes apparent that `reference upwards' does not adequately
> describe the editorial process. More accurately, there is a continual process of reference
> downwards, of judgements and decisions, which goes largely unacknowledged ... the
> invisible framework of guidance is omnipresent (Schlesinger, 1987: 137).

Various tools are used to ensure that the BBC's news values are agreed and

applied as consistently as possible, for example through routine editorial

meetings, sanctions applied to those who do not conform (such as lack of

career progress), and routine reference to the *Producer's Guidelines*. This is a

handbook of nearly 300 pages:

> `which is circulated to correspondents, producers, programme makers, editors and
> managerial staff ... this book is referred to on a daily basis and the BBC's position ... is very
> clear' (Harrison, 2000: 142).

According to Schlesinger, editors are not given much room for individual

interpretation, `Editorial soundness is identified by its consistency' (1987: 149).

One more recent development is the BBC College of Journalism

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/academy/collegeofjournalism), set up in 2005 on the

recommendation of the Neil Report into the implications of the outcome of the

Hutton Inquiry into the BBCs coverage of a government dossier on the (non-

existent) weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The College delivers a wide

range of training modules online on the basis that `training is not just about

journalism. It is about BBC journalism' (Neil Review Team, 2004: 20). Once

again, consistency is the aim. Thus a variety of means are used to ensure that

BBC news output is broadly consistent with the concerns of BBC policymakers,

which include the assumptions about the nature of the state and the

boundaries that need to be observed discussed above.

4.3.3 BBC Guidelines on Reporting the Middle East

This editorial practice can be seen in the attempt to control how the BBC

reports the Middle East. As reporting on this area tends to be very

controversial, the BBC has taken great care to try to ensure a consistent

approach, and to try to regularise the descriptive terminology used. It has

commissioned reports into its coverage and issued guidelines to reporters. For

example, the BBC College of Journalism has a compulsory module on this area

for BBC journalists, although this has not been made accessible to the public

(Barkho and Richardson, 2010).

In recent years, the most controversial report on the BBC's coverage was

probably that by BBC insider, Malcolm Balen, in 2004. This supposedly found

that the BBC was biased against Israel (for example see ynetnews.com, 2006).

However, it has not been published so its contents are still not known. In 2006,

a report on the impartiality of the BBC's coverage was compiled by a panel

chaired by Sir Quentin Thomas (Thomas, 2006). This was initially made

available online by the BBC but later withdrawn. The report conceded that

news and current affairs output is `a construct requiring intentional selection

and design' and if a report `relies on many assumptions' it will be `open to

challenge' (2006: 30). But it did not investigate the assumptions that underlie

BBC reporting. Instead, it stated that `there was little to suggest systematic or

deliberate bias' (2006: 3), although the report was not uncritical. It argued for

more consistency in language use, to give fuller explanations of the

complexities of the conflict, and for a senior editorial person to be given

oversight of the coverage (2006: 4). It reflected on how the asymmetry in

power between the two sides affected BBC reports and argued that a better

balance was required (2006: 13).

The outcome of these reviews was the appointment of Jeremy Bowen as

Middle East Editor to oversee coverage of the region, and a list of key terms

used to describe the conflict with normative definitions – a small number of

which have been made public (BBC, 2006). In their critique, Barkho and

Richardson point to the power asymmetry in the key terms between some of

those describing the Israelis compared with some of those describing the

Palestinians – for example, *Palestine* is defined in five lines whereas *Eretz Israel*

takes 18 (2010, no page number):

> But what is more important is the way the writer or writers of the glossary assume the role
> of omniscient `scholars'. They, and not BBC reporters in the field, say what words and
> phrases Middle East stories should include ... They occasionally `prescribe' readymade
> clauses' (Barkho and Richardson, 2010).

Barkho and Richardson contend that the result is lexical hegemony – in

different ways the Palestinians are categorised as `the bad guys' and the

Israelis `the good guys'; and clausal hegemony – deaths of Palestinians are

usually nominalised so that those responsible are elided, whereas deaths of

Israelis usually have a named agent (for example, `Palestinian gunmen'). In

their view, the BBC's editorial policy is not neutral between the two sides but takes its framing from an Israeli viewpoint.

4.3.4 Interpretation – the Audience

This is an undeveloped area in CDA. Fairclough has theorised it as part of the level of interaction, and has theorised the interaction of social and mental processes in interpretation (`member's requirements' discussed above). But little other work seems to have been done. It seems likely that it would require a transdisciplinary approach to include it systematically, with a probable need for techniques such as surveys, questionnaires and interviews and possibly a degree of quantitative research in producing statistics. However, it is possible that a CDA approach could make a distinctive contribution. For example, different versions of stories could be put to interviewees utilising CDA theory on the use of lexis and grammar to create meaning, and then these theories could be tested by real audience responses to the different versions.

One potential problem for journalists in relation to the audience is their lack of real contact. Cotter has described the relationship with the audience as a pseudorelationship `which derives from the necessities of news production' (2010: 129). In his study of BBC news, Schlesinger argued that BBC journalists

did not feel a need for a direct relationship. In practice, the journalists he

questioned tended to form a mental picture of a typical viewer, often based on

someone they knew, and used that as their construct of the audience.

However, they did not necessarily have the audience in mind when working on

stories:

> To over-simplify a little, the argument is that journalists write for other journalists, their
> bosses, their sources, or highly interested audiences. The `total' audience, however, remains
> an abstraction (1987: 107).

But that does not mean that television news does not have a wider social

impact. Harrison suggests that even in the 21st century with fragmenting

audiences, mainstream television news is regarded as a very important source

of information, both as a primary source and in terms of its trustworthiness

(2000: 45). This is supported by an Independent Television Commission study

in 2003 which found that TV news was the main source of news for 79% of the

population (cited in Philo and Berry, 2011: 276).

In its study of television news reports on Israel/Palestine, the Glasgow

University Media Group found audiences were influenced in their

understanding of the conflict by what they saw on TV news. For example, what

GUMG refer to as the dominant Israeli perspective in TV news reports appears

to result in audiences accepting this view, and having little knowledge of the

Palestinian perspective (Philo and Berry, 2011: 300). By asking participants to

use a set of images of the conflict to write news stories, GUMG found

renditions that were quite faithful to the kinds of reports and narratives

broadcast by BBC and ITN in their news programmes (2011: 300-306). Thus

audience research suggests there may be a case for the broadcasters to

answer in influencing audience beliefs about the conflict in ways which may

privilege the accounts of one side. It is an area that needs to be addressed by

CDA if the level of interaction is to be fully analysed.

My contention so far in this section is that constraints placed on the BBC by the

state are taken on board at the policy level, and the resulting concerns and

assumptions are filtered down to newsroom level where they are applied in

day-to-day journalistic practices. An example of this is the way that the

language used in reporting the Middle East is overseen centrally by editorial

management. Journalists are aware of what is required of them as

professionals, but may be unaware of the assumptions underlying their

professional practice as these are naturalised out of direct view. Alternatively,

they may be aware of these assumptions but take them purely at face value as

a professional requirement, which it would be unprofessional to challenge. The

effects on how reports are constructed, what is included and what is absent,

may have an effect on the understanding of audiences. I now turn to a textual

analysis of recent BBC *Newsnight* reports to examine whether this analysis –

which has referred to BBC News programmes – also applies to a news/current

affairs hybrid such as *Newsnight.*

4.4 Text – BBC *Newsnight*

In this section I will briefly examine the nature of *Newsnight* to see how it

differs from other news programmes. Then I will attempt to use Fairclough's

methodology, as set out in Section 3 above, to analyse four recent *Newsnight*

reports. As the GUMG findings on television news coverage of Israel/Palestine

are relevant to the discussion, I have included a summary of them in Appendix

2, which I refer to from time-to-time. Although I have discussed the three

metafunctions of the clause separately above (see section 3.2), in practice they

occur simultaneously. Therefore, I will not be dividing my analysis of them into

separate sections here as I did above to discuss the theory.

4.4.1 *Newsnight* Background

Historically, BBC News and Current Affairs were completely separate

programming areas with little contact between them. News concentrated on

reporting day-to-day events with limited background analysis; current affairs

explored the background to `topical but non-immediate news' (Barnett, 2011:

56). Some critics felt that because of this, news reporting suffered from a lack of context, notably as in John Birt's `bias against understanding' critique (Barnett, 2011: 78). *Newsnight*, which began in January 1980, was the first collaboration between the two departments (BBC, 2009), and aimed to contextualise the news by concentrating on a small number of longer reports. Veteran correspondent Charles Wheeler described it as `a revolution I had longed for' (2005). However, programme production is still routinised in a similar fashion to the main news bulletins (Paxman, 2005), and the question arises whether reporters are subject to similar pressures to conform to BBC policy. Given that the programme is able to look at news which is `topical but not immediate' does *Newsnight* manage to contextualise the news satisfactorily? The Israel/Palestine conflict is a challenging test case.

4.4.2 *Newsnight* Report 19.11.12.

 Most TV viewers in Britain are probably familiar with the television news genre. The leading news programmes on the main channels tend to have a similar format – with a dramatic opening utilising music or sound effects and an authoritative sounding voiceover announcing the headlines, then studio introductions to individual items, often followed by filmed packages or studio interviews. The items are usually relatively short and the programme may move at a fairly swift pace. *Newsnight* bears some similarities to this picture,

but there are important differences too. The programme usually begins with

the presenter introducing the lead story directly to camera in the studio. There

may be short inserts into this introduction, followed by trails for the other

items in the programme. Only after this will the opening titles be played.

Presumably this format has been adopted to maximise the impact of the lead

story on the viewer (as the items are fewer and longer). There are usually no

more than four stories in a programme of about 50 minutes, so there is much

more time for background and analysis than in the main news programmes. As

with other news programmes, *Newsnight* sends reporters out to cover stories,

uses its own journalists to present additional information in the studio or take

part in two-way interviews with the presenter, and includes interviews with a

wide range of people. However, the reports are longer and considerably more

detailed.

This particular edition contains four stories but leads with the latest news of

the violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. A transcription of the relevant

parts of the programme can be found in Appendix 4. One approach to generic

analysis is by stage and purpose. This report on Gaza can be broadly divided

into four stages each with a somewhat different but connected purpose,

beginning with the introduction to the item in stage one at the head of the

programme.

4.4.2.1 Stage One

When the presenter introduces the programme or an individual item there

may be stills or video playing in the background. In this instance, as Kirsty Wark

introduces the lead story, there is background footage of explosions and

rockets being launched (with Arabic subtitles visible), thus emphasising violent

conflict and giving some indication of the identity of one side (who presumably

speak Arabic) although there is no clear visual indication of the identity of the

other side. It is interesting that her introduction lists the two participants as

subjects of the process - `Gaza and Israel descending into war'. This could also

be represented with one participant as the subject, and one the object, for

example `Israel attacking Gaza'. Including both as the subject tends to elide the

disproportion between them and who is responsible for the fighting. The

possible reasons for the violence include a desire by the Israelis to punish

Gazans for supporting Hamas (see Appendix 1), but this does not appear here –

perhaps a significant absence from the report. Instead, Wark's introduction

focuses on the interrogative – who will stop the fighting? This is followed by a

brief elaboration by the Diplomatic Editor, Mark Urban, giving a possible

answer to the question, before returning to Wark to trail the final part of the

story – an interview with Tony Blair (with Blair in vision in the background).

Given their privileged ability to directly address the camera both Wark and

Urban are constructed as authoritative figures; while the introduction

constructs the audience as serious minded and concerned about international

affairs.

4.4.2.2 Stage Two

The second stage concentrates on updating the viewer on the most recent

events in the conflict and consists of Wark addressing the camera in the studio,

and then conducting a two-way `interview' with Urban, although as this only

consists of one question it is really an opportunity for Urban to make an

extended presentation on current events. It is quite possible to see aggressive

interviews conducted on *Newsnight*, particularly with politicians. However, this

never seems to happen with the programme's own journalists – they are

constructed as `experts' who are there to brief the viewer. One possible

consequence of this is that any presuppositions which their contributions

contain tend to go unquestioned, and may enter into a chain of explanation

without the audience being aware that parts of it could be tendentious. This

might be one important way that `common sense' explanations of the world

are propagated by news programmes. A possible example is Urban's

description of the 2006 attacks on the Lebanon and the 2009 Israeli invasion of

Gaza as `limited conflicts' (l.33). There is also an assumption that both sides

bear a responsibility for starting such conflicts (`the parties' l.35). Whilst it is

true that there are two sides to the conflict as a whole, is it necessarily true

that both sides are responsible for individual outbreaks of violence? This also

fails to put the situation as a whole into the context of the occupation – a term

which is notably absent from this report.

Given the fact that *Newsnight's* role is to give background, conduct analysis

and explain stories, and that Urban plays a major part in this presentation, it

may be revealing that his contributions are almost all linked paratactically –

which Fairclough associates with the logic of appearances. Explanation may

often be through hypotaxis – which Fairclough associates with explanatory

logic – where dependent clauses are used to give further information or

explanation. Where Urban does use a non-dependent relative clause, in line

42, his explanation may be open to question. Is ending the blockade only about

access to the Israeli economy? Arguably it is fundamentally about obtaining

the means of life first and foremost, and only secondly about the economy

(where access to the world economy might also be an important factor). In

terms of grammatical mood, it may be unsurprising that the clauses are mainly

declarative and making assertions about what has happened. There are,

however, some elements of modality in Urban's contribution allowing him

some `wiggle room' in his claims. For example, he uses hedging `if you like'

(l.24), and a modal adverb `generally' (l.25). We find use of the qualifier `quite'

(l.36). He also uses the expressions `from the Hamas perspective' and `what

they term' to distance himself from the expression `Israeli blockade' (l.40-41),

although this expression seems in quite widespread use in news programmes

without such distancing.

Is there any privileging of the perspective of one side or the other in this stage?

Wark asserts the cause of the Israeli attacks as being `in retaliation for rocket

attacks'. This was one of the themes in TV news coverage of Israel/Palestine

discovered by GUMG (see Appendix 2). It seems comparatively common for

Israeli military assaults to be reported as retaliation for some prior action by

the Palestinians. GUMG found that these accounts tended to be taken at face

value by journalists or were not put into the context of the Israeli occupation.

In this particular instance, the Palestinians claim the conflict was begun by the

Israelis killing a child in an incursion into Gaza on 8 November (Abumarzuq,

2013). Where there are two sides to a story the BBC might reasonably be

expected to give both sides. The fact that Wark asserts the Israeli version in a

declarative clause as a fact suggests a framing of events based on the Israeli

account (which fits with GUMG's findings – see Appendix 2). Wark also highlights Netanyahu's conditions for a ceasefire which include `an international effort to stop Hamas from rearming'. This presupposes that it is illegitimate for Hamas to have weapons and that it is legitimate for Israel to call for this, and by extension to have weapons itself. One question that could be asked is, `Is it legitimate for those resisting an occupation to have weapons to defend themselves, or to attack the occupier'? This seems a reasonable question which would undoubtedly prompt a range of responses. However, Wark's wording presupposes an answer and fails to put Hamas' possession of weapons into the context of the occupation. An additional point is the way in which Urban backgrounds the Israeli attack on a building housing journalists while foregrounding an attack on a militia commander by placing this in the theme position (l.50-52). Were the journalists just collateral damage or were they specifically targeted? Urban fails to raise the question, although Israeli attacks on journalists – seemingly as a deliberate tactic - have been reported on by Human Rights Watch (for example, see http://multimedia.hrw.org /distribute /iopmljzweq).

4.4.2.3 Stage Three

The third stage discusses what would be involved in negotiating a ceasefire and begins to incorporate more voices – specifically an Israeli ex-Defence Minister,

Herzog, and a representative of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Ghanem. A

short clip of a Hamas press conference is also included. Are these voices given

equal prominence? There are two clips of Herzog against one of Ghanem, with

only a short soundbite from the press conference. The main difference is in the

treatment of Hamas. The other two are constructed as speaking in the

interests of existing nation states, Israel and Egypt, and are allowed to put their

points of view. However, Hamas is not addressed directly nor asked to express

a view. Instead we have a brief clip of the press conference with a general

statement being made. It may be that Hamas is not allowed to speak for itself

because it does not represent a state; or it may be because Hamas is not

recognised by the US and UK governments as a representative of the

Palestinian people (despite being elected). However, Hamas is the de facto

representative of the Palestinians in Gaza – is it in the interests of licence-fee

payers that the BBC does not address Hamas directly? Is it the BBC's role to

follow British foreign policy in its news coverage?

Stage three gives us a good example of media intertextuality as it constructs a

chain of texts into a package constructed to carry an argument. The

interviewees are asked questions, but we do not see or hear them – the

interviewer is edited out of the picture. The interviewee's contribution is then

edited so that it can be used to construct the argument. Of course, this does

not necessarily mean that the reporter supports or endorses what is said, but it

does show the framework of meaning that informs the package. Choices are

made about what to include and exclude which have an ideological impact. So

for example, the focus starts out on a possible ceasefire - Herzog speaks about

what he believes is involved in negotiating an Egyptian mediated ceasefire, and

Ghanem gives the attitude of the Egyptian government. But then Urban goes

on to discuss the consequences of not reaching a deal, which he says would be

an Israeli ground invasion. His characterisation of this (supported by the

onscreen graphics of tanks on a map) as a discourse of military exercises is

quite revealing. Would an invasion of Israel be discussed in these terms, with a

`ground push' into Jerusalem perhaps, or `severing' Tel Aviv's `main

communications route'? It seems highly unlikely that such a matter-of-fact

attitude towards `hundreds of civilian deaths' would be expressed in that case.

In invading Gaza and causing `hundreds of civilian deaths' not to mention

destruction of property would Israel be committing war crimes? The question

seems not to have crossed Urban's mind but it seems a legitimate one. Where

are the interviews with international statesmen (Tony Blair excepted) or

experts in international law to comment on this? They are conspicuous by their

absence. By his approach, Urban seems to accept Israel's `right' to invade

Gaza, but he does comment finally that this could cause international outrage.

However, this is backgrounded compared to the foregrounding of the technical

details of a possible military invasion.

In his brief account of the most recent violence (l.64-72), Urban appears to

foreground Hamas's actions. The rockets are in the theme position of the first

clause, despite the fact that over a hundred Gazans have died compared to

three Israelis. This information is present, but it is backgrounded by

comparison and we are not told how they died (whereas we might presume

the Israelis were killed by rockets). How has Israel been attacking Gaza? Urban

does not tell us. Once again this might be considered as having an ideological

effect. Another point is Urban's assertion of the reason for the 2009 invasion,

which he says was `essentially to raise the pain level for Hamas' (l.101-102). He

has used only minor hedging with `essentially' so this is a fairly strong

statement, but it is not at all clear that he is correct. A possible alternative

explanation is Israel's desire to punish Hamas and Gaza for continuing to

pursue the goal of a viable independent Palestinian state. Urban's declarative

clause does not seem to allow for such a possibility; once again this appears to

be a significant absence.

4.4.2.4 Stage Four

The remainder of the report consists of a pre-recorded interview between

Kirsty Wark in the *Newsnight* studio and Tony Blair `down the line' in a studio

elsewhere. With a `live' interview journalists have less ability to shape the

contents to construct a narrative (although it may well be edited if pre-

recorded). However, that may be less important here as the purpose now is to

elicit reactions and explore possibilities rather than to construct a storyline.

The attitude of interviewees may often be known in advance, which can make

preparation of questions easier, but the interviewer needs to be alive to the

direction of argument and possible presuppositions that need to be

questioned. Whether presuppositions are questioned, together with the

nature of the questions asked, may be considered part of the ideological

stance of the programme.

As a former Prime Minister and current Middle East representative of the

Quartet, Blair is a high status interviewee, constructed as a key player with

informed knowledge of the situation. It might also be said that he comes with

`a certain amount of baggage' given his strong support for the USA and Israel

during his time in office. The viewer might expect that Blair's views will be informed not just by his knowledge but also by his attitudes, and that these ought to be properly examined by the interviewer.

I shall examine this stage by question and response.

Q1 `*Who do you think has got the best chance of brokering this ceasefire'?*

This question links to one of the main issues discussed earlier in the report.

Response

Blair gives the answer which was probably expected – Egypt. He goes on to discuss the suffering on both sides, although it is interesting that in Gaza this is summed up briefly in the noun phrase `civilian casualties' (l.132), whereas a much more extensive account is given for the Israelis although their suffering appears to be much less. This includes the number of people affected and where (l.134-135), how they are affected (`taking shelter' l.135) and the results (`the schools are shut and normal life's impeded' l.136-137). Why no account of the deaths and destruction in Gaza? A point Wark does not take up.

Q2 `But there are concerns that some of the longer range weapons from Gaza are actually

being filtered through from Egypt'

This is a declarative sentence with the effect of a question. Wark has a range of

possible questions to choose from here – she could have asked about the

civilian casualties in Gaza that Blair chose not to elaborate on; she could have

asked about the attitude of the Egyptian government; she could have asked

about the chances of an Israeli ground invasion; or other possibilities. Why

does she focus on the weaponry of Hamas? This appears to be the application

of an Israeli frame of reference again, the presupposition that Hamas are not

entitled to have weapons but the Israelis are.

Response

Blair highlights as a `crucial issue' `weapons coming into Gaza' because `if Israel

feels under attack then it will defend itself'. This presupposes that when Israel

attacks Gaza it is because it feels under attack. However, there is an argument

against this view put forward by academics and historians such as Chomsky

and Pappe (see Appendix 1). This says that Israel is the aggressor, and that

Gaza has been attacked because Hamas was elected and stands for a viable

independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. Blair also refers to `the point

where people in Gaza are allowed to live more normal lives'. The use of the

passive voice here begs the question `allowed by whom'? Israel's agency is

elided.

Q3 `… Egypt is getting so much aid from the US and so much er from Europe … is there no

pressure we can put on that this weaponry does not come through from Egypt'?

Far from challenging Blair on the presuppositions contained in his previous

response, Wark chooses to develop them in her question. The use of the

deictic inclusive `we' to orient the viewer behind the presupposition that

Hamas should not have weapons seems particularly telling. There are two sides

to the conflict. Neither the UK government nor the BBC is a party to the

dispute. Yet a BBC presenter is referring to `we' and implicitly endorsing the

Israeli/US policy of trying to deny weapons to one side while not raising the

question of weapon supply to the other side at all. The fact that the USA

supplies weapons to Israel (see Appendix 1) is completely absent from the

discussion. This seems to be the clearest evidence yet of the application of an

Israeli frame of reference to the conflict (although the reason behind it may

well be more to do with the BBC's relationship with the British state – and the

British state's support for US policy - than any direct support for Israel's

position).

Response

Blair repeats his stress on weapons coming into Gaza and Israel `feeling under threat' while ignoring the question of who is arming the Israelis. It is interesting that he seeks to bring the Iranians (not previously mentioned) into the discussion by referring to `an Iranian origin' for the missiles. Perhaps this is an indication of an underlying wider agenda on the Israel/US side that Wark could explore.

Q4 `Do you agree though … the harassment of Israel by er weaponry from Gaza is as nothing as to the disproportionate response from Israel'?

Wark does now address the question of the disproportionate use of force between the two sides, but the framing is still very interesting. `Harassment of Israel' is occurring (although the agent is somewhat obscured by the use of the nominalisation `weaponry from Gaza'), while Israel's actions may be disproportionate but they are a `response'. Israel is still framed as retaliating to provocation – the presupposition is still maintained.

Response

Blair's response seems somewhat incoherent, perhaps because he tries to avoid placing any responsibility on Israel in his answer. He uses the nominalisation `civilian casualties in Gaza' to avoid any reference to the agent

responsible. He avoids reference to who started the hostilities by use of `you'

for generic reference (`once you start er the hostilities'), but then goes on to

refer to Palestinian rockets without mention of Israeli firepower (thus avoiding

the question). He then refers to Israeli defence capacity, and the fact that Gaza

is densely populated. In terms of modality he makes the strong statement that

`the only way of protecting the civilian population in Gaza is to get the

ceasefire'. However, there is another possible way which is for Israel

unilaterally to call off its assault. Neither this possibility nor the amount of

weaponry used by the Israelis feature in Blair's somewhat rambling answer.

Q5 `… you take potentially a different line [from the Quartet] that actually it would be good

to talk to Hamas'

Wark ignores Blair's evasion of her last question.

Response

Blair's response is once again based on the questionable allegation that Israel

is willing to accept a two state solution but that Hamas will not recognise

Israel. With regard to modality, his statement here `unless they give up

violence and accept the right of Israel to exist' is very strong. Chomsky, Pappe

and others have quoted evidence to show that Hamas is willing to negotiate a

two state solution which accepts the existence of Israel. However, they say

Israel will not accept a viable independent Palestinian state and this is what lies

behind the allegation that Hamas `will not accept the right of Israel to exist'

(see Appendix 1). This may be a contentious view but it is supported by

evidence. However, Wark allows Blair's assertion to go unchallenged and the

question of whether Israel will give up violence and accept the existence of an

independent Palestine is completely absent.

Q6 `… what chance would you give a ceasefire in the next 24 hours'?

Response

Blair gives a non-specific answer.

4.4.2.5 Discussion

This report seems to be a good example of the way in which journalists take

texts and chain them together to create a narrative, which is usually likely to

be based on a number of presuppositions, as seems to be the case here. There

appears to be evidence here which supports a number of GUMG's findings on

news coverage of Israel/Palestine (see Appendix 2). The framing of the report

and the questions to Blair suggest a privileging of the Israeli viewpoint. The

motif of Israeli `retaliation' is employed uncritically, and more attention

appears to be paid to effects on Israelis than on Palestinians, although the

effects on the latter are disproportionate. There are also significant absences

from the report – no mention of the occupation, of Israel's weaponry or who

supplies it, or whether Israel is willing to accept a viable, independent Palestinian state. However, this is not one-sided propaganda. Some Palestinian concerns are considered in the report, and put to Blair by Wark. But the tendency towards the Israeli/US viewpoint does seem clear.

4.4.3 *Newsnight* Report 20.11.12.

This is a much briefer follow-up report to that of the previous evening. Seemingly, the only development is negative – a ceasefire has not been declared. There is a brief trail of the item at the head of the programme, and then a report which consists only of a clip of Hillary Clinton at a press conference, and a two-way interview in the studio between Maitlis and Urban. In the trail it is interesting that Maitlis chooses the lexical verb `warn' in `the Israelis warn the people of Gaza to evacuate'. This is far more neutral than a possible alternative `threaten'. It might be interesting to speculate which of those verbs might be chosen if the report was on a possible ground invasion of Israel by Iran. It seems very unlikely that the more neutral choice would be made. This suggests an underlying presupposition that the Israelis have a right to tell Gazans to leave their home as they may come under attack.

Maitlis's introduction to the item follows the previous night's report in treating Israel and Hamas as two more or less equal sides - `shelling and rocket attacks between the two sides continue unabated'. There is no sense of Israel wielding disproportionate power here. The clip of Clinton focuses almost solely on Gazan `terrorist organisations', with no mention of Israel's bombardment of Gaza. There is an argument that Israel's military operations against the Palestinians constitute state terrorism, but this is completely absent from these BBC reports. Clinton frames the dispute in terms of `Israel's security', a discourse that is echoed by Urban (l.39). This is a very one-sided view that *Newsnight* presents (through Clinton) and allows to pass unchallenged. In fact, there is no comment at all on what Clinton has to say – it is present in a comparatively unmediated form (although it has been edited).

The remainder of the report consists of Maitlis asking Urban two questions to give him an opportunity to update us on events. Some of the lexis he uses is worthy of examination, for example the noun phrase `military action' (l.54) for Israel's bombardment and threat of invasion of Gaza once again arguably underplays the effects of what is happening; the repetition of `warn' (l.72) for the Israeli threat of action; and the phrasal verb `punch in' to refer to a ground invasion (l.74). The Israeli viewpoint seems still to be prevalent here. We can

also see how Urban reformulates a text from elsewhere. He refers to the

Hamas press conference glimpsed in the previous day's report, and suggests

the Hamas leader was taunting Israel with comments that meant `come and

have a go if you think you're hard enough' (l.67-68), although he does add the

hedge `more or less'. It seems very unlikely that the original comments would

be translated directly into English in such a colloquial way. This could be

considered an example of conversationalisation – when public figures attempt

to relate to their audience and reduce distance between them by the use of

everyday speech.

4.4.4 *Newsnight* Report 21.11.12.

This is very similar to the report in the previous night's programme. It is an

update on events – a ceasefire has now been agreed – with a clip of Hillary

Clinton at a press conference, and Mark Urban once again commenting on

events via an interview with the presenter. (I am unable to comment on the

trail for this item at the head of the programme as this was not recorded).

In contrast to the placing of the participants as joint subjects of the process in

previous reports, Jeremy Paxman places Israel as the subject and Palestinians

as object of the verb `killed' (l.4). Analysis of a larger number of reports would

be required to know which is the more common practice (but Barkho, 2008, suggests the former). Urban's response to Paxman's question suggests a construction of the audience as knowledgable, in that he refers to Egypt's attempts to broker a peace as `this business with the Egyptians' (l.11-12). A question that possibly arises is with regard to the backgrounding or absence of references to the Israeli occupation. Is this also based on an assumption that the audience are aware of it (which is incorrect for mainstream news audiences according to Philo and Berry, 2011), or are its effects ignored in practice by journalists, which allows them to treat the conflict more as a discourse of law and order or retaliation for militancy? With regard to the involvement of the Americans, Urban's declarative clauses do allow for some modality. Thus, `it does *seem* it was necessary for the Americans to become engaged … to deliver Benyamin Netanyahu' (l13-16). This is used to explain and lead into a clip of Clinton's appearance at the press conference to announce the deal. However, this is not the only possible reason. It could be that Clinton appeared because the deal was seen by some as a climbdown for the Israelis, which Netanyahu would not want to be quizzed about - the Americans might be covering the Israelis' tracks. It is notable that both `Palestinians and Israelis alike' (l.27) now appear in her discourse, whereas when she was discussing the violence the previous day the Israelis were noticeable by their absence.

In answer to Paxman's next question Urban gives some account of the violence

that has been used by both sides. There is no modality at all in his statement

that Israeli targets in Palestine were `exclusively at first the rocket sites' (l.33).

Does this fit with the Palestinian account that the violence began when the

Israelis killed a Palestinian child? Apparently not, but this is not part of Urban's

narrative, which constructs a scenario of escalating violence based on Israeli

retaliation for rocket attacks. He emphasises that the targets hit in Gaza were

particularly associated with Hamas but does this fit with the widespread death

and damage to buildings that were reported? This discourse appears to fit the

Israeli viewpoint of targeted attacks rather than the Palestinians' assertion of a

more indiscriminate assault. In his final contribution, Urban gives a seemingly

clear justification for the Israelis concern about rockets, pointing out that

Israeli cities are now within range. Presumably that could be a reason for

genuine negotiations towards a two-state solution rather than a military

assault but this option, and the possible reasons why it is not pursued, are not

discussed.

4.4.5 *Newsnight* Report 27.11.12.

The subject and approach of this report is different from those looked at

above. This discusses the Palestinian bid for non-member observer state status

at the United Nations and weaves four different voices into a chain of texts

presented by Urban. It is not reporting on dramatic unfolding events in the

same way and thus has a more reflective feel. An example is the repeated

motif of the walls and the watchtower in Bethlehem. It might seem to

represent the occupation but Urban does not mention this, observing they `are

intended to obstruct violence' (l.19-20), using the passive voice to avoid

discussing agency. As the BBC claims to aim for balance in its reports we have

two voices represented as more official, and two represented as more ordinary

members of the community – in each case, one from each side. It is the

representation of these voices that I want to focus on here because the

treatment seems quite revealing.

The more official voices are Gilead Sher on the Israeli side and Diana Buttu for

the Palestinians. For some reason Buttu's status is not captioned, but she has a

history of working for the Palestinian cause (see http://imeu.net/news/

article005754.shtml). Sher calls for negotiations leading to a two-state

solution, while Buttu argues that Palestinians should be able to go to the

International Criminal Court to hold Israel to account. It seems unlikely that

both participants were asked the same questions given the difference in their

comments. Perhaps Sher's contribution is included to show that Israel wants a

two-state solution (this links up with and reinforces Riskin's later claim), and

Buttu's is there as Palestinian access to the ICC is a contentious issue for the

UK government.

Urban then moves the narrative on to possible effects on daily life in the

community, and the voices of Afra Sa'd and Shlomo Riskin are included,

apparently to represent their communities. They are constructed in a similar

way as teachers in their own communities, one in Bethlehem and one in the

West Bank settlement of Efrat (considered illegal under international law,

although this is not mentioned). It would be interesting to know the questions

they were asked as their comments are completely different. Sa'd talks about

children receiving two different messages about life, and then goes on to talk

more abstractly about freedom and liberation. By contrast, Riskin is very

specific in placing the blame on the Palestinian leadership for the differences

between Palestinian and Israeli communities. He is also given the last word in

the report where he is allowed to voice the claim that the Israelis `clearly and

without question' `have been in favour of a two-state solution'.

It is notable that a voice constructed as a representative of the Israeli

community is allowed to make such a contentious claim, yet it is broadcast

unmediated by any questioning or alternative viewpoints. It is presented as the

voice of everyday experience – the voice of the community – rather than the

claim of a politician which is subject to interrogation. In fact, the distribution of

voices in this report appears to be radically unbalanced. Afra Sa'd does indeed

seem to be a teacher at a local school (see http://www.kerkinactie.nl/site

/uploadedDocs /06_AprMay_1_1.pdf), but Shlomo Riskin who `runs a religious

college in the Jewish settlement of Efrat' according to Urban, appears to be

rather more than that. According to Urim Publications his `contributions to

Israel and world Jewry over the course of the past 35 years have been

instrumental in shaping today's Modern Orthodox society'

(http://www.urimpublications.com/Merchant2/merchant.

mv?Screen=CTGY&Store_Code=UP&Category_Code=RISKIN). Further, his

attitude to the Palestinian community appears to be far from neutral. Fein

(1995) describes him as `one of the noisier chauvinist protesters' who believes

that Israelis have a biblical right to the land of Palestine. `It is not a virtue to

prefer land to peace' observes Fein, but `that is what the Riskin position …

comes down to'. Is Urban unaware that Efrat, where Riskin lives, is regarded

under international law as illegal occupation of Palestinian land? Is he further

unaware of the way that the settlements have been used to divide the

Palestinians and instate military rule in the West Bank (see Appendix 1)? Yet

Urban has structured a report which seems to construct Riskin as a voice of the

ordinary community – like Sa'd presumably – to voice unopposed the

contentious view that the Israelis are in favour of a two-state solution and that

the problems are all the fault of the Palestinian leadership. This appears to be a

blatantly one-sided presentation of the `facts'. If Urban had voiced these views

himself he might well have faced accusations of bias. However, by utilising the

voice of an interviewee and structuring the report so that no counter-

argument is put, he has allowed the argument to be put forward without

taking personal responsibility.

To summarise the results of analysing these four *Newsnight* reports, there

seems to be clear evidence to support some of Philo and Berry's (2011) claims

about coverage of Israel/Palestine in mainstream news programmes. Although

issues important to both sides are discussed, there is a tendency to frame the

issues in a way which privileges the Israeli point of view. There is also evidence

to support Barkho and Richardson's (2010) claim of both clausal and lexical

hegemony – both grammatical constructions and choice of lexis contribute to

the framing. Although the nature of *Newsnight* allows in theory for much

deeper examination of stories, the result seems to be very much in keeping

with the ideological approach of the mainstream news programmes. The same

news values seem to be applied which leads to the same kinds of framing -

longer reports do not necessarily lead to deeper analysis.

5 Conclusion

In this study I aimed to test the merits of Fairclough's approach to CDA by attempting an analysis of recent BBC *Newsnight* reports on the Israel/Palestine conflict. In doing so, I also aimed to evaluate the reports and compare my analysis with that of mainstream news programmes by GUMG. I attempted to assess the validity of Philo's critique of Fairclough, and to investigate the differences of approach between the two.

I believe this study has shown that there are potentially considerable merits in the CDA approach. Arguably, the three levels of analysis enable a relatively sophisticated exploration of the factors involved in discourse – in this case, that the nature of the *Newsnight* reports could be at least partly explained through a linguistic *description* of the reports; linked to an *interpretation* of the workings of the order of discourse - BBC news production; situated in an *explanation* of the social context – the BBC's relationship with the state and the UK government's foreign policy in the Middle East. However, there are limitations too. Philo puts a strong argument that textual analysis alone is not sufficient to explain news discourse. Although Fursich makes a case for textual analysis alone, for CDA this cannot be enough. Fairclough has his answer to this

problem – transdisciplinary research. Potentially, this could make CDA a powerful tool, however, any such research would need to be carefully planned to ensure that the different approaches are able to meld together consistently.

In this study, as I have been working alone, I have interrogated the literature of other disciplines rather than co-operating with historians or sociologists. Although this is certainly one way of incorporating other approaches, in my view it cannot be as satisfactory as co-operation with researchers from other fields. This would be more likely to yield fresh insights and new ways of looking at problems, although far harder to organise. A particular weakness of previous CDA research has, by contrast, been one of GUMG's strengths – work on audience reception studies. I believe Philo is wrong to discount the explanatory power of Fairclough's theory, but partly right in his criticism of its limitations so far in terms of practical research. However, GUMG might be considered weak where CDA is strong – linguistic analysis. Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses.

With regard to the *Newsnight* reports analysed here, on the basis of my findings I suggest there is evidence to show that the difference in format

between *Newsnight* and mainstream news programmes makes little difference to the framing, lexis or grammar of the reports. As I have suggested above, it seems that a number of GUMG's findings also apply here (see Appendix 2). However, this is a small sample and further research would be required to see if the same findings apply more generally. A major gap in this research is the audience. It may be that *Newsnight* tends to adopt an Israeli frame of reference in its reports but if so, does that have an effect on viewers' opinions of the conflict? I have no information on this and cannot say, although GUMG suggest this is the case for mainstream news bulletins.

Finally, I would like to return to Fairclough's account of constructing the object of research (see section 3.1). In stage 3 it is necessary to consider whether the social wrong can be changed within the existing social order, while stage 4 is an attempt to find ways past the obstacles with particular regard to how the dominant discourse is criticised or opposed. In this case, it would probably be very difficult to change the social wrong. If the analysis of the context above is correct there are very powerful forces behind the status quo in the Middle East, and their discourse appears very dominant in the media . Those who wish to try to change the situation for the better will almost certainly need to challenge the representation of the conflict to help develop a wider

understanding. This could, for example, take the form of active campaigning

when apparently misleading reports are published or broadcast, which might

not achieve a great deal of change in the reporting, but could raise public

consciousness about the nature of the assumptions in the reports. Ultimately,

unless a parliamentary opposition to the current policies develops – which

could allow the media space for a more open debate – it seems likely that the

presuppositions which can be seen to underlie some of the *Newsnight* reports

will continue to go unchallenged in the mainstream media.

(Word count: 18,723)

Appendix 1

The Israel/Palestine Conflict – A Brief History

Philo and Berry have summarised the history of the conflict together with reactions from both sides to the key events (2011: 9-169). The following account is mainly based on this summary. Fundamentally, the dispute is about territory – who should be able to live in and control the land historically known as Palestine.

1 Pre-1948

Zionism – the political doctrine that the Jews should have their own homeland – developed in the nineteenth-century as a reaction to persecution. However, it was a minority view for many years, only beginning to gain currency in the last decades of the century. Although Palestine was not the only possible `homeland' considered, it became the focus for the movement in the late nineteenth-century. Sizeable numbers of Jews began to immigrate to Palestine from the 1880s to escape pogroms in Russia (although the majority settled in the USA). At this time Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. Philo and Berry contrast the `practical zionism' of the early settlers with the `political zionism' that became predominant in the early twentieth-century (2011: 12), when Jewish political parties began to be established with a new wave of

immigration, and campaigns to keep non-Jews out of the workforce in Jewish-owned concerns took root in an attempt to create `a homogenous Jewish society' (2011: 13).

The defeat of the Turks in Word War 1 led to Palestine passing to a British sphere of influence. Although the British had given the Arabs assurances of independence in return for their support in the war, these hopes were dashed by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which stated:

> His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine (cited in Philo and Berry, 2011: 15).

Philo and Berry go on to point out that the `non-Jewish communities' comprised 89% of the population at this time. Further Jewish immigration in the 1920s was followed by outbreaks of anti-Zionist violence, leading to `a full scale Arab rebellion' from 1936-39 (2011: 20), which Chomsky states was crushed `with brutality' by the British (1999: 92).

2 1948 and the Establishment of Israel

In November 1947 the United Nations passed a resolution calling for the partition of Palestine into two states - one for the Jews and one for the Palestinian Arabs. The Arab States argued that the Resolution should be ignored as it `violated the terms of the UN Charter' (Philo and Berry, 2011: 30). Fighting between the two communities began at the end of 1947 which became a civil war. Zionist forces emerged victorious, `by May its armies had taken over parts of the territories assigned to the Palestinian state' (Chomsky, 1999: 95). The founding of the state of Israel was declared in May 1948. War then followed with three Arab armies, ending with Israel taking over about half of the allotted Palestinian territory. The rest was annexed by Jordan, leaving no land for the Palestinians. As a result, Palestinian society fell apart with people fleeing the violence or forcibly expelled from their homes and villages. For many years Israel officially denied that Palestinians were killed or expelled, instead claiming that they chose to leave. However, a number of Israeli `new historians' have found evidence to support the claims of the violent expulsion of the Palestinian population. According to Ilan Pappe,

> Jews expelled, massacred, destroyed, and raped in that year, and generally behaved like all the other colonialist movements operating in the Middle East and Africa since the beginning of the nineteenth century (2010a: 58).

Approximately 800,000 Palestinians had lost their homes and become refugees (Pappe, 2010a: 62). Philo and Berry state that Israel occupied 78% of Palestine (as opposed to 57% in the UN recommendation) (2011: 39). In an attempt to ensure there could be no return of the refugees Israel embarked upon a campaign of destroying Palestinian homes or resettling Jews in them. In the following years a flow of Jewish immigrants ensured an increase in the population of the country.

3 1967 and the `Six Day War'

In 1967 Israel inflicted a comprehensive military defeat on Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi forces. The causes of the war are still in dispute but the effects on the Palestinians are much clearer:

> The conflict triggered a second mass exodus of Palestinians, many of whom became refugees for a second time, as they had sought refuge in the West Bank and Gaza after having to abandon their homes in 1948-49 (Philo and Berry, 2011: 48).

There was evidence once again of forced evictions and the destruction of Palestinian villages, although this is disputed by some Israelis. Philo and Berry suggest there were about 400,000 refugees, who were prevented from returning to their homes (2011: 49).

After the war the United Nations adopted Resolution 242, which called for Israel to withdraw from the recently occupied territories and for a `just settlement of the refugee problem' (2011: 51). Israel argued that the text was not specific about which territories were in question although Philo and Berry argue that the debates at the UN Security Council at that time do not support this interpretation.

4 The Occupation of the West Bank

According to Chomsky, since the 1970s the Arab states and the Palestinians (through the Palestinian Liberation Organisation or Hamas) have tried to engage the Israelis in peace negotiations numerous times, on the basis of a two-state solution with recognition of Israel within its pre-June 1967 borders. However, on each occasion they have either been ignored or negotiations have been refused (see Chomsky, 1999). He further argues that this is because of the various Israeli governments' `Greater Israel' policy. According to Chomsky, the aim is eventually to incorporate all of the West Bank (but presumably no longer the Gaza Strip) into Israel by establishing `facts on the ground', fundamentally control of the territory through establishing settlements linked by Jewish-only roads, thus rendering remaining Palestinian areas as disconnected `bantustans' that can never form a Palestinian state that could threaten Israel. This has led to the restriction of the social and political rights of

the Palestinians due to Israel's military administration of the territories. For

example, it is difficult to travel from one area to another because of the need

to pass through military checkpoints.

The Israeli human rights organisation, B'Tselem, states that there are over 120

settlements in the West Bank, plus about 100 outposts, and twelve

neighbourhoods in Jerusalem that are considered settlements under

international law. This leads to a differential application of the law.

> One system, for the settlers, de facto annexes the settlements to Israel and grants settlers
> the rights of citizens of a democratic state. The other is a system of military law that
> deprives Palestinians of their rights and denies them the ability to have any real effect on
> shaping the policy regarding the land space in which they live and with respect to their rights
> … rights depend on the national identity of the individual (www.btselem.org/settlements).

The UN Human Rights Council has recently published a report on the

settlements which states that their purpose is to drive the Palestinians off the

land, and that they are `committing serious breaches of humanitarian law'

(BBC, 2013). In addition, the so-called `separation wall' built across Palestinian

land (supposedly to keep suicide bombers out of Israel), which was declared

illegal in 2004 by the International Court of Justice (Philo and Berry, 2011: 114),

also has the seemingly fortuitous effect of cutting Palestinians off from

essential resources such as water and agricultural land.

5 Gaza

The Gaza Strip is a small area on the coast bordered by Israel and Egypt that makes up only 2% of the land area of Palestine (totalling about 140 square miles). It was an integral part of the country until 1948 when it was split geographically from the Palestinians of the West Bank, after which `Gaza became a huge refugee camp restricted severely by the respective Israeli and Egyptian policies', and became `one of the world's densest areas of habitation' (Pappe, 2010b: 171-172). Israel won control of Gaza in 1967 and began to settle Israeli Jewish citizens there with a view to incorporating Gaza into a Greater Israel. However, in 2005 Israel removed all the settlers from Gaza. The reason was given as a unilateral movement towards peace, but a possible alternative explanation is the consequent reduction in the number of non-Jews in the state of Israel (Philo and Berry, 2011: 119).

There are important differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinians in the West Bank are administered by the Palestinian Authority, run by the Palestinian political party, Fatah. According to Chomsky, the PA is `a loyal client, rife with corruption and willing to carry out harsh repression' on behalf of the occupiers (2010: 96). By contrast, in 2006 the citizens of Gaza elected Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist political organisation, to govern there.

Hamas has offered to negotiate with Israel on the basis of a two-state solution

but is not as pliable as the PA when it comes to controlling Palestinians on

behalf of the occupying power. Chomsky recounts the reaction to this result.

> Palestinians committed a grave crime by Western standards. They voted `the wrong way'.
> The United States instantly joined Israel in punishing Palestinians for their misconduct, with
> Europe toddling along behind as usual … The punishment of Palestinians for the crime of
> voting the wrong way was severe. With constant US backing, Israel increased its violence in
> Gaza, withheld funds that it was legally obligated to transmit to the Palestinian Authority,
> tightened its siege, and in a gratuitous act of cruelty, even cut off the flow of water to the
> arid Gaza Strip (Chomsky, 2007: 5-6).

Hamas had maintained a truce with Israel from February 2005 but there was

still violence. Israel used missiles and artillery against members of armed

groups (although it was impossible to exclude bystanders from the results of

such strikes) and other Palestinian groups had fired rockets into Israel, killing

an average of four people a year from 2004 to 2009 (2011: 123). There is not

sufficient space here to explore the events which followed (see Philo and

Berry, 2011: 129-135) but fighting between Fatah militia and Hamas in 2007

left Hamas in control of Gaza. This led to an ongoing blockade by Israel which

caused `severe food, fuel and water shortages' (2011: 133). Meanwhile, the

violence continued – 47 Israelis and 1,288 Palestinians were killed from 2006

to 2008 (2011: 135).

Pappe recounts Israeli strategy from 2006 to 2008 (2010b: 174-191):

essentially preparation for invasion and ground war in Gaza, which occurred as

`Operation Cast Lead' at the end of 2008 continuing into 2009.

> From November 25 until January 21, 2009, the Israeli army bombarded the million and a half
> people of Gaza from the air, land and sea. Hamas responded with missiles that ended with
> three casualties and another ten Israeli soldiers were killed, some by friendly fire (Pappe,
> 2010b: 191).

The European Union's response was condemnation of Israel for a

disproportionate use of force and a call for a ceasefire; a call not supported by

the USA or UK. The President of the UN General Assembly, Miguel D'Escoto

Brockmann, called the Israeli assault `genocide' (Pappe, 2010b: 191). In

January Israel began a ground invasion causing massive destruction to

buildings. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights said that 1,415 Palestinians

were killed (Philo and Berry, 2011: 142-143). The ensuing UN report by Judge

Goldstone accused both Hamas (for launching rockets) and Israel of war crimes

– but Pappe argues that the two were scarcely proportionate (2010b: 193).

There were further allegations of crimes by Israeli forces in 2010 when Israeli

commandos boarded a ship in international waters and shot and killed nine

people. The ship was carrying supplies for the besieged Gazan people. An

International Criminal Court report described the Israeli actions as `clearly

unlawful' (Philo and Berry, 2011: 163).

In 2012 the threat of an Israeli invasion of Gaza arose again. Israel launched

Operation Pillar of Defence on 14 November and again attacked Gaza from the

air, killing 167 people. However, this time an invasion did not follow (see

Finkelstein, 2012 for discussion of reasons why not). This incident is the subject

of the BBC *Newsnight* reports that I have analysed here. At the time of writing

Gaza remains under siege by Israel with severe restrictions on the amount of

supplies that can be imported.

6 The Role of the United States

The USA has proved itself to be a very strong supporter of the zionist project.

Chomsky has set out the relationship in great detail (1999). Briefly, it takes the

form of financial aid, weapons and political support. Chomsky states that the

exact scale of this is unknown as much of the detail is hidden (1999: 9), but

Pappe records $100 billion in grants and $10 billion in special loans to Israel

since 1949 (2007: 26); Philo and Berry refer to joint weapons projects (2011:

76) and give the example of the supply of arms to support Israel's war on

Lebanon in 2006 (2011: 128); and Mearsheimer and Walt record numerous

instances of Congressional support for Israel (2006). In addition to this, the

USA has a record of vetoing United Nations resolutions which are critical of

Israel (for example see Philo and Berry, 2011: 68, 70 and 168).

Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) credit much of the strength of US support for

Israel to what they refer to as the Israel Lobby, mainly Jewish organisations in

the USA. They document the activities of organisations such as AIPAC

(American-Israel Public Affairs Committee) which conducts powerful media

and lobbying campaigns of behalf of Israel – although Chomsky points out that

they represent only the Israeli hawks (the Greater Israel policy) not the doves

(peace with the Palestinians). Pappe argues that Mearsheimer and Walt

underplay the role of Christian Zionists in boosting support for Israel (Pappe,

2007), but Chomsky suggests that however strong the Israel lobby is, it would

have limited effect if US policymakers did not see support for Israel as being in

US strategic interests. He suggests that the overwhelming interest of the US in

the region is in control of the oil resources there. If they cannot be directly

controlled by the USA (a task that has become increasingly difficult as possibly

evidenced by the outcome of the US invasion of Iraq) then reliable client states

need to be in place (Saudi Arabia might be considered an example). Chomsky

suggests the prime threat to this design is radical nationalism. In his view,

Israel acts as a US policeman in the region to ensure continuing US dominance,

and this is why there is such strong US support for Israel (1999: 17-23). A truly

independent Palestinian state could be seen as a threat to this strategy as it

might encourage radical nationalist movements in the region. Lip service must

be paid to the two-state solution as it has a great deal of international support,

but Chomsky and Pappe argue that the USA gives strong support to Israeli

efforts to undermine it.

7 The Attitude of the UK

Since the 1950s the USA has taken over the dominant Western role in the

Middle East that was previously held by the UK. What does that mean for the

attitude of the British government to the situation now? The Foreign Secretary,

William Hague, in a speech on `Sixty years of British-Israeli diplomatic relations'

in March 2011 stated both that `Israel has a right to defend itself', and that

`Israel's long-term future and security can only be guaranteed by a two state

solution' (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011). How seriously should the

last remark be taken?

Mark Curtis says that academics and the media assume that Britain's foreign

policy is based on the principles of peace, democracy and promoting human

rights – but that the reality is very different:

> The twin goals of British foreign policy are … to maintain British elites' political standing in
> the world, i.e. some form of `great power' status; and to ensure that key countries and
> regions, and the global economy, function to benefit Western businesses. Both are to be
> secured primarily in alliance with US foreign policy (2004: 276).

Can we take Britain's support for a two-state solution at face value? Writing in

2003 Curtis argues:

> Britain is doing nothing to bring any of this about; indeed, its actual policies are undermining its public positions to the extent that the latter appear largely for public relations. The Blair government has consistently failed to identify Israel as the primary aggressor and has refused to seriously press Israel to change policies that are systematically violating international law … Instead, London acts as a de facto condoner of Israeli aggression (2003: 122-123).

He goes on to recount details to support his argument (2003: 120-133). It is not

easy to see any change in stance with the change in government. For example,

William Hague blamed Hamas for Israel's assault on Gaza in November 2012

(Saleem, 2013). None of this should be surprising if Curtis is correct in saying

that actual British foreign policy follows the USA, which supports Israel in

undermining the possibility of an independent Palestinian state, according to

Chomsky and Pappe amongst others.

Appendix 2

Summary of GUMG's Findings on TV News Reporting of Israel/Palestine

I have set out the methodology used in GUMG's research on TV news
presentation of the Israel/Palestine conflict in section 2.4.1. Their study
concentrated on the main BBC and ITV news programmes on BBC1 and ITV.
One of their main findings was that the Israeli perspective was predominant,
with little explanation of the Palestinian view.

> The numerical frequency, the prominence and the legitimacy accorded to Israeli accounts
> are important in understanding how the news works to explain and contextualise events
> from a particular perspective. But there is another important factor, which is that this
> perspective is used to structure and develop news accounts ... It becomes an organising
> principle ... an explanatory theme (Philo and Berry, 2011: 348).

Concentration on reporting day-to-day events was found to obscure the causes
of the conflict (2011: 192), with very little coverage of the origins or history
(2011: 189) - a view given some support in the Thomas Report (2006: 4) which
criticised BBC coverage for being `incomplete'. GUMG found that use of
vocabulary was loaded, with terms such as `brutally murdered' or `atrocity'
used to describe the deaths of Israelis, but not Palestinians (2011: 231-232);
and terms such as `militants' or `gunmen' applied only to Palestinians (2011:
250). Another point was the way in which the role of the USA was presented.
This was generally as being even-handed between the sides and trying to

broker a fair peace (2011: 184), which is far from the case if Chomsky and

Pappe are correct (see Appendix 1). There was little reporting of the economic

consequences of the occupation, including how Israel controlled the water

resources in the West Bank and Gaza (2011: 192-194); or of the daily problems

caused by military rule and the `key military and strategic function' of the

settlements (2011: 198). GUMG also suggested that TV news tended to follow

Israeli accounts that military action was `retaliating' against prior Palestinian

action without sufficiently exploring the truth of these contentions, or putting

Palestinian actions in the context of the occupation of their land (2011:237-

242). With regard to the invasion of Gaza in 2009, `the news perpetuated a

one-sided view of the causes of the conflict' accepting that this was to stop

rocket attacks, and ignoring competing explanations such as that it was to

undermine support for Hamas (2011: 344). There were also very few mentions

of the Hamas offer to stop the rockets if Israel lifted their siege (2011: 353). In

all this, Philo and Berry emphasise their view that the privileging of the Israeli

viewpoint is systematic and not the result of individual bias (2011: 362).

Appendix 3

Key to *Newsnight* Transcriptions

<u>Spoken Text</u>

. = a pause

<u>Visuals</u>

/ = cut

bgd = background

GRX = graphics

GVs = general views

MCU = medium close-up

presser = press conference

VT = video

Appendix 4

Newsnight 19.11.12 - Transcription

Line	Spoken Text	Visuals
5	**Kirsty Wark:** who can stop Gaza and Israel descending into a ground war . the world can call for a ceasefire again and again but who holds the cards . as we go on air peace negotiations are happening but not much goodwill on either side	*Newsnight* studio – KW to camera with background video of explosions / Rockets launching (Arabic subtitles visible) /
	Mark Urban: Israel and Hamas both want it to stop and it's Egypt that holds the key role in mediating	Studio – MU to camera with stills of violent scenes in background /
	Kirsty Wark: I'll be asking the Quartet's spokesman Tony Blair is there going to be a ceasefire [Other items in the programme are trailed]	KW to camera with background stills of violence and Tony Blair in studio awaiting interview / Clips from other items / Programme titles /
10	**Kirsty Wark:** good evening more than a hundred are dead in Gaza and three in Israel as Israeli jets pound the Strip in retaliation for rocket attacks . President Obama called the Israeli Prime Minister and the Egyptian President to discuss de-escalating the violence .	KW to camera with stills of violence in bgd Camera slowly pans around studio to
15	witnessed so far in the six-day offensive . but Benjamin Netanyahu has put four conditions on the table for a ceasefire including the promise of an international effort . to stop Hamas from rearming . so how does that square with Egypt's proposal for a	
20	ceasefire I'm joined by our Diplomatic Editor Mark Urban . is there any more sign of a deal tonight	
	Mark Urban: well we know that there's been this discussion	Two-shot Wark and Urban with bgd stills of violence /

25	throughout the day in Egypt with the key parties involved . it's been talked up if you like by Egyptian and Palestinian sources . with the Israelis generally tending to talk it down . tonight the inner cabinet in Israel that includes all the key decision-makers . went into session a couple of hours ago and is still in session as we speak now . they are considering	MCU Urban
30	terms that have come out of Cairo . they're also considering whether to continue postponing this ground operation they've got planned . we know from the similar limited er conflicts against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006 and against	/ two-shot Wark and Urban / MCU Urban
35	Gaza in 2009 . that once the parties start these things they find it quite hard to stop them . without some sort of minimum terms and of course in both those previous cases . without ground fighting . now . in this case . the minimum terms are to do with	
40	stopping the arms supplies for Israel . and from the Hamas perspective . ending what they term the Israeli blockade which really means trying to get more access into the Israeli economy . we simply don't know whether the two sides are prepared to	/ two-shot Wark and Urban
45	make the necessary conditions in order to achieve that at this moment . and while that uncertainty carries on . the bombing goes on too	/ MCU Urban
	Mark Urban voiceover pictures: today's strikes in Gaza . saw more targeting of individuals as well as rocket sites . leading to scores	/ stills of destruction, people affected /
50	of casualties . in this attack Israel killed an Islamic Jihad militia commander . in the same building . that was being used by several news organisations . this is escalation no doubt . but both sides now seem to be searching for a way out	VT explosion in a building, person carried to ambulance, smoke pouring from building
	Brigadier General Michael Herzog *Israeli Defence Ministry 2001-2009*: 	/
55	in order for a ceasefire to be stable I believe it requires . a er mediated deal er Egyptian-brokered deal . kind of a trilateral understanding between	Herzog to camera from a studio

60	Israel Egypt and Hamas . in which er all parties' concerns are addressed er for example Israel is highly concerned about the smuggling of weapons from Sinai into Gaza . in order to deal with that you need an Egyptian commitment to do a serious job along the border	
65 70	**Mark Urban voiceover graphics**: up to this morning 860 rockets had been fired at Israel . they say their missile defences knocked down 320 . and that there's been a fall in the number fired from around 300 during the first two days . to about 180 . in the past two . and the cost for Gazans has increased the death toll there . is now over a hundred . with three people killed in Israel . Hamas insists though . that it is not fighting a war of diminishing returns	/ GRX 1 Rockets fired 860 [GRX 1-4 source: IDF] mix to GRX 2 Rockets destroyed 320 mix to GRX 3 Rockets per day 300 mix to GRX 4 Rockets per day 180 mix to GRX 5 Death Toll Gazans 100+ mix to GRX 6 Death Toll Israelis 3
75	**Khaled Meshaal *Hamas political leader***: [speaking in Arabic] **English translation voiceover**: we are the people of a just cause . we are not the aggressors against anyone . this is Palestine . whoever attacks Palestine will be buried	/MCU Meshaal at presser
80	**Mark Urban voice over video**: today Cairo became the crucible . for peace mediation efforts . with the UN Secretary General flying in . as well as Israeli and Hamas delegations being in town . Egypt has mediated past disputes . but now it has a democratic Islamist government . that's much more supportive of Hamas	/ VT end of presser, ext building (in Cairo?) / Ban Ki Moon sitting with man in suit
85	**Mohammed Ghanem *Muslim Brotherhood***: the position of Egypt is not going to be repeated as . Mubarak used to act er we can see that clearly by er withdrawing the Ambassador from . Israel er asking the Ambassador the Israeli Ambassador to leave . and that itself is significant er Mr Morsi has clearly said . we're not going to leave Gaza . by itself . facing this aggression	/ MCU Ghanem interviewed in a (hotel?) room

90	**Mark Urban**: both sides now want a ceasefire . but equally they both know that a simple cessation of violence could look too much like a sticking plaster solution . that will come apart . when the next flare-up happens . so while terms that might be acceptable to the Israelis and Hamas are searched for by mediators . there's the prospect of an Israeli ground operation . and that hangs over everybody . like a sword of Damocles	/ Studio Urban to camera with bgd still of rocket launches
95		
100	**Mark Urban** [voiceover graphics]: it may follow the lines of 2009's ground push . severing Gaza's main communications route . and halting normal life in much of the Strip . as well as producing hundreds of civilian deaths . its purpose then was essentially to raise the pain level for Hamas . Israeli generals may now be contemplating something bigger . they've called up 80,000 reservists . enough for three armoured divisions . they could be used to cut the border with Egypt along the so-called Philadelphia Road line . as well as sever all communications in the Strip . but that could produce higher civilian casualties as . well as international outrage	/ GRX map of Israel mix to aerial photo of Gaza with line and arrows Arrows removed Caption 80,000 reservists added then 3 tank symbols, arrows and lines added
105		
110	**Brigadier General Michael Herzog**: Egypt is better positioned to influence Hamas because of the close relationship . and that affords Egypt a unique er position to broker a ceasefire which they're trying to do and I hope they'll be successful	/Herzog to camera from a studio
115	**Mark Urban** [voiceover pictures] tonight there are reports that agreement may be close . but also that the two sides are still trading rockets for airstrikes . one thing is clear . when a halt does come . each side will try to convince its people . that the past week's suffering has been worth it	/Pics men with weapons, rock thrower, uniformed Israeli firing weapon, flames, Palestinian with flag

		Mix to Studio Wark to camera with bgd still of destruction
120	**Kirsty Wark**: Mark Urban well a little earlier I spoke to the former Prime Minister Tony Blair . who is now the representative of the European Union . the United Kingdom . the United States and Russia the so-called Quartet . on middle east peace . Tony Blair first of all er who do you think has got the best chance of brokering this ceasefire	/MCU Blair to camera in a studio
125		
	Tony Blair *Middle East Peace Envoy*: Egypt I mean er there's no real doubt I think that the Egyptians are in the best position to try and broker the ceasefire er I know they've been making very strong efforts to do it it's in their interests to do it . it's actually obviously in the interests of people in Gaza . because they are suffering and you know there's been a lot of civilian casualties there erm in the past twenty-four hours and of course it's in the interests of people in Israel because . there's a million people . in the south of Israel who are taking shelter every night and in shelters the schools are shut and normal life's impeded . so it's in frankly everyone's interests to get this done	
130		
135		
140	**Kirsty Wark**: but er there are concerns . that some of the longer range weapons . from Gaza are actually being filtered through from Egypt	/ MCU Wark addressing Blair / Studio Blair to camera
	Tony Blair: well there are concerns and one of the . crucial issues is going to be that even if you get a ceasefire . what will then definitely come on the agenda in order to deal with it . is the question of more weapons and the longer range weapons coming into Gaza because . you know if Israel feels under attack then it will defend itself . likewise erm I hope that it's possible if we could calm this situation to get . to	
145		
150		

155	the point where people in Gaza are allowed to live more normal lives so there are two . very very clear objectives for people in Gaza and people in Israel that . should be secured and the one thing that is for certain . is that the longer these hostilities go on the more innocent people suffer so it's important to try to bring it to an end if we possibly can	
		/ Wide shot studio Wark addressing Blair on screen
	Kirsty Wark:	
160	but if there are weapons coming through from Egypt is there no pressure look you know . Egypt is getting so much aid from the US and so much er from Europe . otherwise the country would really be in the doldrums is there no pressure we can put on to make sure that this weaponry does not come through from Egypt	MCU Wark addressing Blair / Studio Blair to camera
165	**Tony Blair**:	
170	Well . there is a lot of pressure going on but it .. there are many different routes I'm afraid of weapons into Gaza erm and . to be fair to the Egyptian authorities it's not always possible for them to act in the way that erm . in theory you would think is possible . however having said that . look I think one thing is for sure that . if what happens is that you have a ceasefire but . then there's a restocking of armaments coming into Gaza er	
175	particularly if they're the longer range missiles and these er [indistinct]-5 missiles which have got a range of about seventy-five kilometres erm that are essentially . from an Iranian origin . if those start coming in you know Israel's going to feel under threat and it'll act	/ MCU Wark addressing Blair / two-shot Wark addressing Blair
180	**Kirsty Wark**:	/ MCU Wark / two-shot
	do you agree though . that I mean the you know the harassment of Israel by er weaponry from Gaza is as nothing as to the disproportionate response from Israel . I mean would you suggest that it's disproportionate . look there's over a hundred dead	

		/ Studio Blair to camera
185	**Tony Blair**: look . er it's terrible that you have these civilian casualties in Gaza but the problem is this . once you start er the hostilities and there are rockets being fired erm at Israeli towns and villages and Israel's	
190	got the capability through this Iron Dome to knock out about eight . out of ten of them erm and of course the weaponry's far less sophisticated . but then you've got Gaza Gaza Strip is . twenty to twenty-five miles long it's a few miles wide you've	
195	got one and three-quarter million people living in there, the rockets are . flown out of fired out of er densely civilian areas so . the only way . the only way of protecting the civilian population in Gaza is to get the ceasefire .{**KW** And and you're there} the only way you're going to do this {**KW** and your role}is to stop it and then deal with these longer term issues	/ Wark addressing Blair / Blair to camera / Two shot / MCU Wark addressing Blair / two shot
200	**Kirsty Wark**: And your role as spokesman for the Quartet {**TB** Sorry} the Quartet itself is not in favour of talking to Hamas but you I understand . take potentially a different line . that actually it would be good to talk to Hamas	/ MCU Wark / MCU Blair to camera
205	**Tony Blair**: look my view I'm bound by the Quartet principles and the Quartet principles are very clear erm that	
210	we don't engage with Hamas that Hamas can't come into the peace process unless they give up violence and accept . the right of Israel to exist . my point is very simple really that that . it would be sensible if you were able to have erm all the parties at the table . but you can't really have that situation .	
215	unless there is . an acceptance that it's only through political means . and negotiation peaceful negotiation that you pursue your political objectives	

220 225	. and by the way when in the Northern Ireland situation . we began the peace process . we did it only after the acceptance of erm Sinn Fein that . purely peaceful means would be used so that's that's actually the real sticking point here so . er look that's for a later time but . right now what is important is . as I say to de-escalate the situation bring some calm and then work on stabilising it . not just for the short term but for the medium and long term	/ wide shot studio with Blair on screen / MCU Wark
	Kirsty Wark: finally er both er Russia and the EU have called for a ceasefire I mean what chance would you give a ceasefire in the next 24 hours	/ MCU Blair to camera
230 235 240	**Tony Blair**: well I think it's possible because as I say the interests . of Egypt . Israel . and people in Gaza are aligned in this sense that that everyone wants to see a cessation of hostilities . on the other hand the only basis upon which that will come . is that the cessation is genuine . and that these longer term questions . go on the table and can be dealt with so . I don't know quite honestly Kirsty I mean I know that there are very intensive efforts that are continuing erm as we speak . and I hope something . fruitful will come out of it	/ Wark to camera in studio with bgd stills for next item
	Kirsty Wark: Tony Blair thank you very much for joining us . and of course a small correction of course the fourth member of the Quartet is not the United Kingdom it is indeed the UN Item ends 0.14.29 [Goes on to other items]	

Appendix 5

Newsnight 20.11.12. - Transcription

Line	Spoken Text	Visuals
	[Introduction to other items on the programme] @ 0.00.34 **Emily Maitlis**: the Israelis warn the people of Gaza to evacuate their suburbs as a ceasefire was meant to be imminent	Newsnight studio EM to camera with bgd VT of Palestinians walking along street
5	**Mark Urban**: after hours in which Egypt and Hamas said a truce would come in tonight it manifestly didn't . so why did they talk it up in the first place	/ MU to camera with bgd stills of Palestinians /
	[Introduction to other items on the programme – followed by other items] @ 0.23.15 **Emily Maitlis**:	Programme titles EM to camera with bgd stills Palestinians
10	there was much anticipation today that a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas could be realised this evening as it is . shelling and rocket attacks between the two sides continue unabated . well the appeals for a diplomatic solution are being urged in their usual way by the international community but just before coming on air the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton . arrived for talks in Jerusalem	
15	**Hillary Clinton** *US Secretary of State*: President Obama asked me to come to Israel with a very clear message . America's commitment to Israel's security is rock-solid and unwavering . that is why we believe it is essential to de-escalate the situation in Gaza . the rocket attacks from terrorist	/ MCU HC addressing press conference
20	organisations inside Gaza . on Israelis' cities and towns must end . and a broader calm restored	

	Emily Maitlis: Hillary Clinton in Jerusalem well Mark Urban's here now after all the toing and froing and one comment from one side and contradictions from the other . why do we think it didn't happen Mark	/ EM to camera pull back to two-shot with Urban bgd stills Palestinians and a tank
25		
	Mark Urban *Diplomatic Editor*: well indeed er President Morsi of Egypt said it will happen tonight er Hamas was giving out similar signals there were suggestions er that a press conference would happen at a certain time who would be on the platform . it hasn't happened er for a number of reasons I think in essence . because all that was agreed was `ceasefire light' if you like . stop shooting at one another . whereas we know full well that both sides are actually after something more substantial than that . in the case of Hamas of an easing of the blockade of the Gaza Strip . more access for their economy er from the Israeli side of course . something that deals with more fundamental security issues . people moving in and out of the Gaza Strip to the Sinai Peninsula . causing them problems there now . the supply of missiles . all of these other kind of factors . there clearly isn't agreement on those things . and the Middle East is always a place that's full of theories . but I think it's reasonable to suspect that this flagging up of the possible truce . by Egypt and by Hamas was designed to put pressure on the Israelis to agree today . something they didn't do	/MCU Urban speaking to EM
30		
35		
40		
45		
	Emily Maitlis: right because at the weekend er there was the threat it seemed of a ground war an incursion at least . has that now been averted	/ Two-shot
50		
	Mark Urban: no I don't think it has been averted . I mean the Israelis have been threatening it . since early on in this military action as you say er in some sense it's	/ MCU Urban

55 60 65 70 75	patently incredible . it would so clearly be damaging to what they're trying to achieve diplomatically . everybody is warning them off . from Hillary Clinton who's arrived tonight the US the EU . all sorts of people are saying don't do it . they know from the experience of 2009 that casualties among civilians in Gaza damage to infrastructure could be very heavy if they went in . they may also run the risk of having their soldiers kidnapped all these other risks are there if they do it . so much so that Khaled Meshaal the Head of Hamas . said in Cairo yesterday he more or less taunted the Israelis er saying he didn't really believe they were serious and come and have a go if you think you're hard enough . more or less er and so they do have to make it credible . and this is where I think the crisis has its own dangers and possible momentum today we heard about leaflets being dropped . to warn citizens to move away from certain areas . where the Israeli army would . we imagine punch in . to the Gaza Strip . and there is an attempt to make it more credible . and it is only fair to say that if there isn't agreement on a broader peace package . in the next 48 hours . then it may well become an inevitability **Emily Maitlis**: Mark thanks very much Ends 0.26.43 [other items]	 / Two-shot

Appendix 6

Newsnight 21.11.12. - Transcription

Line	Spoken Text	Visuals
	[Start of programme not recorded]	
	@ 0.12.24	*Newsnight* studio wide shot / MCU JP to camera
	Jeremy Paxman:	
	now . for the last er three and half hours there's been a truce in Gaza and Israel . earlier there'd been more of this .	
	now in the last eight days . Israel has killed an	Mix to VT GVs explosions and wreckage
5	estimated 140 Palestinians and lost five of its own citizens . the truce was announced by the Egyptians . but the American Secretary of State clearly had a significant role in the agreement so can this ceasefire last . Mark Urban is here . how did news of the	
10	ceasefire come out Mark	Mix 2-shot JP and MU with bgd stills tank and damage, camera pans round studio
	Mark Urban:	
	well of course for days we've had this business with the Egyptians . and the er Palestinian factions saying oh it's imminent any minute now but it does seem that it was . necessary for the Americans to become	
15	engaged . with Hillary Clinton personally travelling . to Israel yesterday to deliver . Benyamin Netanyahu the Israeli Prime Minister on this deal . and therefore when the announcement was made in Cairo . the honours were done jointly by the Egyptian Foreign	
20	Minister and Hillary Clinton	
	Hillary Clinton:	Mix to MCU Clinton to camera at presser
	the people of this region deserve the chance to live free from fear and violence . and today's agreement is a step in the right direction . that we should build on . now we have to focus . on reaching a durable	
25	outcome that promotes regional stability and advances the security . dignity . and legitimate aspirations . of Palestinians and Israelis alike	/

	Jeremy Paxman: er Mark how did the ceasefire come about what was each side trying to gain	2-shot in studio /
30	**Mark Urban** *Diplomatic Editor*: well in a security sense we saw them going hammer and tongs in the last 36 hours we saw the initial er er target list if you like of the Israelis . which was exclusively at first the rocket sites . turn into something quite different . on the Palestinian side	MCU MU answering JP
35	too there was escalation perhaps to try and empower the negotiating process . a bus bomb in Tel Aviv this morning now that's something that hasn't happened for quite a while and of course . yesterday too firing another rocket at Jerusalem . very	/ 2-shot in studio bgd VT of damaged bus
40	important symbolic target and showing that new capability . from the Israeli side . the level of violence that's been dished out from air and sea and land in the past 36 hours very intense . and symbolically attacking certain targets . for example the National	Mix to bgd map Mix to aerial photo Gaza Strip, captions Gaza City & National Islamic Bank
45	Islamic Bank . in the centre of Gaza City and organisations set up by Hamas . to try and get around various international sanctions . that were put upon them . another key target very near the bank . in Gaza City the Civil Administration Building	/ wide shot studio also with bgd stills of damage to Bank / 2-shot with aerial photo caption Civil Admin Building, track in to MU and aerial photo
50	all sorts of administration goes on there er particularly to do with going to Israel other things like that . symbolic again from the Israeli point of view . infrastructure a key bridge that had been put in . on the highway that connects Gaza . to the south	Photo changes, caption Nuseirat & Wadi Gaza bridge, wide shot studio with bgd stills
55	of the Gaza Strip in the Egyptian border area and that border area Rafah . er heavy bombing on the smuggling tunnels . Israelis would say trying to prevent resupply with missiles . but also damaging the economy . and the wider community in Gaza	/ MU and aerial photo photo changes, captions Rafah and Egypt
60	**Jeremy Paxman**: well just so we don't get too carried away erm is it likely to be permanent	/MCU MU

	Mark Urban:	
	I think what both sides were seeking was something	
	that would last not weeks or months but perhaps	
	years they both know it can't be permanent and in a	
65	situation like this . each spins away trying to convince	
	its own public and the wider world opinion . that it	
	was unbowed and got the better deal . Hamas has	/2-shot JP and MU
	stressed this evening . that if this ceasefire period of	
	24 hours . persists and is solid . that border crossings	/ MCU MU
70	will be open . to Israel and Egypt . the siege in their	
	terms will be broken the Israelis from their side have	
	said we didn't want a sticking plaster agreement . we	
	wanted something that gave accountability . and	
	monitoring the accountability . all sorts of other	
75	factions have fired hundreds of rockets into Israel	
	before this started . Hamas was saying not us . they	
	now see that as being a situation where Hamas will	
	be accountable . monitoring by outside forces the	
	Egyptians and possibly others now . if you look in the	
80	broader sweep not just the past few weeks . er the	/ 2-shot JP and MU
	fascinating thing is how far Israel's security position	
	vis-a-vis Gaza . has deteriorated . when they left	/ MCU MU
	there they withdrew unilaterally in 2005 . they were	
	dealing with suicide bombers yes . stone-throwers	
85	and contraband firearms . now they have their main	
	cities within rocket range . thousands of rockets have	
	come into Gaza in the past year or two some of them	
	. long enough range to hit Tel Aviv . Hamas has	
	maintained the rocket fire throughout this eight days	
90	despite the intensity of that Israeli bombardment .	
	accountability . perhaps the key point in all of this .	
	Israel and Hamas do not recognise one another in	
	one sense . but now . Hamas is being asked . to be	
	accountable and in that sense . Israel has given it	
95	that form of recognition	
	Jeremy Paxman:	
	Mark thank you very much	
	Ends @ 0.17.19	/ wide shot studio

Appendix 7

Newsnight 27.11.12. - Transcription

Line	Spoken Text	Visuals
	[Trails for other programme items]	*Newsnight* studio
	@ 0.00.53 **Jeremy Paxman**: it looks as if the United Nations is at last about to offer Palestine some sort of recognition but . can it now ever be extricated from Israel	VT of Palestinian graffiti on Bethlehem walls mix to view of watchtower through broken window
5	**Unidentified Palestinian [Afra Sa'd]**: we will ask for our rights and our er freedom . our state . our liberation . of course it's going to make a difference	Mix to MCU Sa'd speaking (to reporter) mix to trail for another item
	[Trail for another programme item] [Other programme items]	
10	@ 0. 39.33 **Jeremy Paxman**: now it looks as if the Palestinians if not quite Palestine . are about to get the international recognition they have sought for decades . the day after tomorrow the United Nations will vote on making them a non-member observer state . the Israelis are seriously unhappy about it but already France is on board . and our Diplomatic Editor Mark Urban . thinks the British may go the same way . but	Newsnight wide shot studio tracking in to JP speaking to camera with bgd stills Israeli and Palestinian flags
15	given how long it's been . would it ever be possible to disentangle things to make a proper Palestinian state feasible	
20	**Mark Urban**: in Bethlehem . the wider conflict plays out at a neighbourhood scale . the walls and watchtowers are intended to obstruct violence . but also separate people . doing the same job a mile or two apart . like Afra Sa'd . a Palestinian teacher . and Shlomo Riskin .	/ 2 young Palestinian boys standing in from of wall in Bethlehem / path surrounded by walls and watchtower / graffiti on wall / view of watchtower through broken window / Palestinians in street /

	who runs a religious college in the Jewish settlement . of Efrat	cut to Sa'd teaching / Riskin talking with students / CU students
25	**Shlomo Riskin**: they would like to be more together with us but they have a good deal of . pressure . for example when I first came we used to have soccer games together . and they were very well attended and very good Arafat stopped that . the the stoppage of a lot of the things that we would do together . is due to the Palestinian Authority . and their control	/ MCU Riskin speaking (to reporter)
30		
	Mark Urban: three generations of Palestinian children . have gone to this school since Israel took the West Bank . for their teachers . education presents many dilemmas . not least the degree to which . the national dreams of Jew and Arab . can be reconciled	/ Palestinian children in playground
35		
40	**Afra Sa'd**: well they do get er two different messages . they get the message of er loving and er because they are people . but on the other side they get the message that this is our land and we're occupied by Israel . and we should free our land . and this comes by er struggling . by er making demonstrations erm raising our hands for our rights you know calling for our rights . they get two messages they get both messages	/ MCU Sa'd speaking (to reporter)
45	**Mark Urban**: the Palestinian yearning for self-determination finds its forms on the walls here . and now involves their leadership . in a push for United Nations membership . while Israel has threatened dire reprisals against the Palestinian Authority . there are signs that Israel's position is shifting . and indeed one veteran of earlier talks with the Palestinians argues . this week's UN move .should spur revived negotiations	/ GVs graffiti on walls
50		/ shot through office window of Sher in bgd talking (to somebody off-screen)

55	**Gilead Sher** *Israeli Prime Minister's Office 1999-2001*: I believe that what needs to be done by the international community . is to provide a process . of negotiations . not just the slogan of the two-state solution . two states for two people . but rather . a binding continuous . and hands-on process for the parties to negotiate . towards ending the conflict and put a finality to all claims	/ MCU Sher speaking (to reporter)
60 65 70	**Mark Urban,** *Diplomatic Editor*: with Hamas celebrating its self-proclaimed victory in the recent fighting . some are concluding that the forces of compromise . in the form of the Palestinian Authority need a boost . if not those on both sides who reject the two-state solution could triumph . that fear lies behind a change in Britain's position . the statehood vote has proven highly divisive within the EU . and up until now Britain was preparing to abstain . but we've learned . the UK is now ready to back the Palestinians in the General Assembly . if they put on hold their application for the International Criminal Court . that's causing frantic last minute negotiations . because many Palestinians . are deeply reluctant to concede that point	/Caption 21 November VT Palestinians celebrating the ceasefire / children with gun / people in street / waving flag / driving through streets / MU to camera in street
75 80 85	**Diana Buttu**: the fact that European countries including the UK and other countries are coming forward . and saying to the Palestinians that . they shouldn't be going to the ICC . begs the question then who is going to hold Israel accountable . we've seen that the United Nations hasn't done so we've seen that the Quartet hasn't done so we've seen that the Europeans haven't done so . the Americans haven't done so . and so the question becomes . if they don't go to the ICC who is going to take up that charge of holding Israel accountable . this is why I think it is very important . that the Palestinians do sign on to the ICC	/Buttu speaking to camera in street

90	. and begin to hold Israel accountable for its violations of international law . and in particular its violations of er international human rights law . from everything from the expansion of settlements to its actions in Gaza **Mark Urban**: the issue of international justice . may dominate the last hours of talks . but on the ground in Bethlehem people hope the UN vote . can make a difference to daily life	/ Bethlehem street / graffiti on walls
95 100	**Afra Sa'd**: of course it's going to make a difference because then we will have . the right to er ask for our rights and our freedom . our state . our liberation . of course it's going to make a difference . and we are asking .more people to er bring this awareness . to their people so that we we have the vote enough voting to be a member in the United Nations	/ MCU Sa'd speaking (to reporter)
105	**Mark Urban**: but the politics . like the tangle of concrete communities and crossroads . cannot easily be sorted out . and for the settlers in Efrat . the issue of recognition they're concerned about . is that by radical Palestinian factions . of Israel's right to exist . rather than Thursday's UN vote	/ panning shot ext of Efrat / Israeli woman walks with young boy / man playing with dog / MCU Riskin speaking (to reporter)
110 115	**Shlomo Riskin**: it is a symbolic gesture . it's not a real gesture . it's going to make things a little bit more difficult . because . unfortunately to say it as clearly as I can say it . I believe that we and from the beginning we have been in favour of a two-state solution . and I say this clearly and without question . and they still do not recognise Israel as a Jewish state . now `they' is not the Palestinian people . `they' is the Palestinian leadership and that's Fatah as well as Hamas	/ ext shots Efrat

| 120 | **Mark Urban**:
Thursday will not bridge the fault lines around Jerusalem . but it will mark an attempt by the Palestinian Authority . to remain relevant . and by its foreign supporters . to insist that this conflict cannot remain frozen indefinitely

Jeremy Paxman:
that was Mark Urban…

Ends @ 0.46.25
[Programme closing sequence] | /
Mix to JP to camera in studio |

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